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Foreword
I am pleased to introduce the OTA assessment of Civilian Space Stations and the
U.S. Future in Space. This study was requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on Science and Technology,
and the request was endorsed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the
House Committee on the Budget.
The study was designed to cover not only the essential technical issues surround-
ing the selection and acquisition of infrastructure in space, but to enable Congress to
look beyond these matters to the larger context; the direction of our efforts. Given
the vast capability and promise available to the country and the world because of the
sophisticated space technology we now possess, equally sophisticated and thoughtful
decisions must be made about where the U.S. space program is going, and for what
purposes.
The Advisory Panel for this study played a role of unusual importance in helping
to generate a set of possible space goals and objectives that demonstrate the diverse
opportunities open to us at this time, and OTA thanks them for their productive com-
mitment of time and energy. Their participation does not necessarily constitute con-
sensus or endorsement of the content of the report, for which OTA bears sole respon-
sibility.
It often happens that information generated during the course of an OTA study
can be used as legislation moves through Congress. A number of statements presented
in Senate and House hearings by OTA and a technical memorandum drawn from the
analysis have already contributed to the course of the debate. This report, the culmina-
tion of the OTA process, is now a resource for both Congress and the National Com-
mission on Space, which Congress has created in order to give full and fundamental
review to the basic questions of charting our course. It is OTA’S hope that the publica-
tion of the study will also expand the circle of those who can effectively engage in
the debate and contribute to the decision process.
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 Chapter 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION: RELATION OF A “SPACE STATION”
(I. E., SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE)
Atter the expenditure of some $200 billion
(1984$) since the launch of its first spacecraft in
early 1958, the United States has obtained the
scientific knowledge and developed the techno-
Iogical capability and professional expertise to
succeed i n virtualIy any theoreticalIy possible ci-
vilian space venture that it may choose to under-
take, But America’s second quarter-century of
space activities promises to differ markedIy from
the first, almost wholly exploratory, era. If space
is to be successfully developed in roughly the
same fashion as have other, more familiar natu-
ralI resources and environments, the next stage
will  be characterized by establishing and secu r-
ing the capabilities to support routine, operational
activities there. I n this report, OTA refers to the
TO THE U.S. FUTURE IN SPACE
range of in-space facilities and services that would
support such activities as “infrastructure. ”
Important steps in the considered development
of space have already been taken. By any stand-
ard, the satellite communications industry is a
great success; its revenues have reached the mul-
tibillion-dollar per year level and are growing at
an annual rate of 15 percent. Massive Iaunch fa-
cilities, expendable launch vehicles, and the
space Shuttle now provide routine access to
much of near-Earth space; used in conjunction
with a global communications network and sur-
face data processing facilities, they provide a so-
phisticated, though limited, range of services to
their users.
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
A large, inhabited “space station” in low-Earth-orbit is one approach to the establishment of a long-term infrastructure
in space. The concept shown here (being visited by the space Shuttle)    designed and built model used for
illustration throughout early 1984.
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Another sign of strength is the maturity of the
U.S. aerospace industry. This sector is now be-
ginning to position itself to provide space assets
and services independently, and now anticipates
conducting some in-space investigations and
commercial-industrial activities, privately fi-
nanced, either on its own or in combination with
other business concerns. And other countries
now have capabilities to do many things in space—
capabilities that continue to grow rapidly.
For years, leaders of the U.S. civilian space
community have advanced the view that the next
major logical step in space should be the acqui-
sition of specific, permanent in-space infrastruc-
ture: a civilian “space station. ”
In this context, Congress, in July of 1982, asked
OTA to undertake an assessment of “Civilian
Space Stations”; this report is the product of that
request. The OTA assessment was requested orig-
inally by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, later (in October
1982) by the House Committee on Science and
Technology. The assessment was endorsed in
August 1982 by the House Committee on the
Budget and the Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions. The various committee interests were stated
as follows:
l Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation: assess the need for a per-
manent orbiting facility; examine the major
technological alternatives and their related
costs and benefits; focus on the different
space station designs and orbits, the range
of feasible applications for the project, the
benefits and drawbacks of utilizing existing
concepts, the estimated costs for potential
missions and design options, and prospec-
tive private sector and international in-
volvement.
Ž House Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy: undertake an independent, rigorous,
balanced study of the need for a space sta-
l
l
tion; address “the hard questions”; not only
look at what a station can do that cannot be
done better some other way, but also eval-
uate alternatives to a space station. “In short,
the assessment should address and docu-
ment the real forces driving us to build a
space station. ”
House Committee on the Budget: estimate
the effect of a space station’s cost on the
NASA budget and the overall Federal bud-
get; and consider the roles of the Department
of Defense, the international community,
and the private sector in the development,
production, and operation of an inhabitable
space station.
Senate Committee on Appropriations: esti-
mate the relative merits-of in-habitable and
u nonhabitable space platforms; estimate the
role automation/robotics can be expected to
play in the construction and eventual use of
space platforms; and estimate the costs asso-
ciated with the range of design options.
This assessment has attempted to be responsive
to the entire range of congressional interest, with
the exception of the interest of the House Com-
mittee on the Budget in the role of the Depart-
ment of Defense.
The report has examined the range of technol-
ogy required of permanent space infrastructure
as well as the broader policy questions arising
from NASA’s proposal of a particular constella-
tion of infrastructure elements. Overall, the con-
sidered development of space through the paced
acquisition of appropriate elements of space in-
frastructure is a key to maintaining America’s
leadership in space. However, because the Nation
does not have clearly formulated long-range goals
and objectives for its civilian space activities, pro-
ceeding to realize the present NASA “space sta-
tion” concept is not likely to result in the facility
most appropriate for advancing U.S. interests into
the second quarter-century of the Space Age.
RATIONALE FOR SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
Several countries are competent in the conduct providing growing economic competition for the
of space investigations and the development and United States through development, acquisition,
use of space technology. These countries are now and operation of their own elements of infrastruc-
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ture. The Soviet Union has made a commitment
to the permanent occupancy of space, has oper-
ated orbital stations with human work crews for
over a decade, and is showing interest in provid-
ing competitive space services. Thus, if the United
States is to continue as the leader in civilian space
activities, Congress must give serious thought to
the kind of space infrastructure to be developed,
the long-term goals that that infrastructure is to
serve, and the public-private and international ar-
rangements that will take best advantage of it.
Future development of more sophisticated
space science and applications capabilities—e.g.,
staging of planetary exploration missions or as-
sembly of large communications platforms—
wouId be markedly facilitated by the existence
of appropriate elements of space infrastructure.
It is assumed in this report that, whatever deci-
sions are made regarding space infrastructure,
publicly supported space science and space ap-
plications will continue at roughly their present
level of appropriations (over $1 billion per year,
as measured in constant dollars).
Although the United States already has ac-
quired some initial elements of space infrastruc-
ture, these are insufficient to undertake a num-
ber of desirable activities in an efficient and
effective manner. The acquisition of some addi-
tional permanent in-space infrastructure elements
WOU Id :
l allow sophisticated experiments in life and
materials sciences to be conducted;
l permit fuel to be stored and supplies to be
warehoused in low-Earth-orbit;
l initiate more efficient staging of voyages to
high orbits, the Moon, planets, and asteroids;
l allow the initial trial of new instruments, ac-
tivities, and procedures; and
l allow the repair and maintenance of increas-
ingly complex and specialized satellites and
common carrier platforms.
The ability to undertake these activities, all of
which would support space science and applica-
tions, constitutes a persuasive rationale for acquir-
ing appropriate elements of permanent space in-
frastructure. At present, the more appropriate
would be those which allowed the satisfactory
conduct of: 1) life and materials sciences experi-
ments, and 2) satellite servicing. However, by the
same token, sufficient resources to ensure that
these science and applications activities actually
are undertaken must be assured; otherwise, the
rationale for the infrastructure vanishes.
A persuasive case can also be made for seeing
that some of these permanent infrastructure ele-
ments allow an on-board human work force. This
case rests on the fact that automated facilities,
whether relatively autonomous or teleoperated,
capable of supporting all of the activities listed
above will not be available before 2000, even if
a large automation R&D program is begun im-
mediately. (This does not argue against such an
R&D program. Indeed, there is good reason to
expect that sophisticated automation will be nec-
essary for the future development of space as well
as for non-space-related Earth applications. It
might well be appropriate, therefore, to initiate
such a program now. Later, with the results of
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this program in hand, informed judgments could
be made about the most sophisticated mix of
human and machine workers.)
As the Shuttle development program comes to
a close, thousands of in-house engineers and
technical support staff and, in principle, as much
as $2 billion (1984$) per year in contract funds
under its present $7 billion (1984$) “budget en-
velope” will be freed up to be applied to one or
more new programs. If NASA is to maintain its
current size—a size that NASA leaders judge to
be acceptable to the general public–the com-
bination of people and funds that could soon be-
come available suggests, strongly, that any new
programs must include development and acqui-
sition of a great deal of new technology, prefer-
ably related to having people in space; large num-
bers of technologists would be gainfully
employed both in NASA and in the space indus-
try under contract to NASA.
In addition, many believe that NASA might not
long survive in its present form without a single,
large, “people-in-space” program upon which
a majority of its energies are focused. If a num-
ber of smaller programs were initiated instead,
each of them, it is thought, could be terminated
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without widespread objections arising i n the po-
litical process.
Finally, NASA may have thought it prudent to
propose a ‘‘space station’ program rather than
some other large endeavor(s) (e. g., a return of
Americans to the Moon, or sending people on
an expedition to Mars, etc.), both because the
former had been carefully studied over the years,
representing, i n NASA’s view, a natural comple-
ment to the Shuttle, and because alternative large
programs seemed too grandiose, have not recent-
ly been discussed with the general public, and,
therefore, were less likely to enlist the required
support, both with in and without the adminis-
t ration.
All of these considerations, taken together, are
clear incentives for the space technology lead-
ers, both Government and industry, to opt for a
combination of a Shuttle-like “methods and
means’ activity, rather than to accept the posi -
t ion of a much smaller Federal agency or to fight
for approval of one or more large, new space
“end” programs.
But while the case to be made for acquiring
some long-term, inhabitable infrastructure in low-
Earth-orbit is persuasive, OTA concludes that there
is no compelling, objective, external case either
for obtaining all of the particular array of elements
that NASA now describes under the rubric of “The
Space Station, ” or for obtaining this or any other
array in the general manner that NASA is now ex-
pected to pursue, or for paying the particular pub-
lic cost that NASA now estimates is required. As
the infrastructure would be of a broadly general-
purpose nature, to be used to support over 100
conceptual uses (few of which have been sharply
defined or have gained wide acceptance as impor-
tant objectives of the space program), there is no
necessity for obtaining all of this particular array
soon.
INFRASTRUCTURE OPTIONS
The fact that the United
veloped a wide variety
means that it has genuine
States has already de-
of space capabi Iities
choices–both of what
infrastructure elements it places in orbit and of
how these elements are to be acquired and used.
It is around these choices that the difficuIt issues
lie; by andi large, the technology is either in hand
or can be readily developed.
Technology Options
It must be emphasized that the particular con-
stellation of space infrastructure elements that
NASA currently aspires to develop, construct,
deploy, and operate is only one alternative in
a wide range of options. Simply put, there is no
such thing as “the space station. ” What is under
discussion is a variety of sets of infrastructure
elements, ranging from modest extensions of
current capabilities to more sophisticated, ca-
pable, and costly ensembles than NASA is now
suggesting.
As one way of presenting the variety of tech-
no logy options available, OTA has prepared
 tables 1 and 2.}
There is one fundamental infrastructure option
that requires particular mention: should the ele-
ments be wholly automated or shou Id they house
‘] human crew? Conceptually, useful space infra-
structure couId be designed either to include a
human work crew or to depend on sophisticated
machines unattended in space or operated via
communication links with the surface. Despite
the fact that the relative efficiency and/or effec-
tiveness of these two quite different approaches
have been extensively debated for years, no gen-
eral consensus has emerged. However, if sophis-
ticated new space activities are to be supported
by in-space  infra
1990s, there will
structure as soon as the early
have to be a human presence.
8 l Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in space
Table I.—Comparison of Some Options’ for Low-Earth-Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure
,  - .     Free-flying NASA Infrastructure
Extended spacelab aspirations
Duration (developed Initial Mature,
Orbiter: as permanent operational fully
Phase II infrastructure) capability developed
Extended
Duration
Shuttle Orbiter:
Orbiter Phase I
Date available
(assuming start in 1985) Now
None
7
60
6
Can accept
Spacelab
10 days
Moderate
Modest
Some
Modest
No
No
Modest
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Modest
Modest
No
No
Modest
1988 1990 1990
0.5 2-3
20 6
100 100
(with Spacelab
habitat)
5 3
New technology Modest crew
1992 1996-2000
20
COSTb
(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) 0.2 8
Characteristics
Power to users (kW)
Pressurized volume (m3)
7
60
80
200
200
300
Nominal crew size
Miscellaneous
5
No new
technology
8
Orbital
maneuvering
vehicle plus
two free-flying
unpressurized
platforms
20
Reusable
orbital
transfer
vehicle plus
several more
platforms
-.
required; accommodations
modest
laboratory
space
Capabilities c
Time on Orbit 20 days 50 days Unlimited
(90 day
resupply)
Unlimited
(60-90 day
resupply)
Extensive
Modest
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
No
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
 Unlimited
(90 day
resupply)
Laboratories for:
Life sciences
Space science/applications
Materials science
Technology development
Observatories
Data/communication node
Servicing of satellites
Manufacturing facility (materials
processing)
Large structure assembly
Transportation node
Fuel and supply depot
Moderate
Modest
Some
Modest
Modest
No
Modest
No
Considerable
Modest
Moderate
Some
Modest
No
Modest
Modest
No
No
No
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Considerable
Considerable
Considerable
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
No
No
No
Moderate
Moderate
No
Extensive
Extensived
Considerable
Response to reasons advanced for
space infrastructure
Maintain U.S. space leadership and
technology capability
Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities
Enable long-term human presence
in space
Attention-getting heroic public
spectacle
Extended international cooperation
Promote U.S. commercialization of
space
Maintain vigorous NASA
engineering capability
Enhance national security, broadly
defined
Space travel for non-technicians
aLi~.ed  ~ption~  are illustrative examples; the list is not exhaustive.
bcosts  include design, development, and ~r~uction;  launch  and ~perational  costs are not included,  some  costs are estimated  by the  office  Of Technology Assess.
ment; others were provided  to OTA.
cClearly  judgmental.
dlnclud~ng  launch to the Moon, Mars, and some asta:otis.
Modest Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Moderate
Modest
No
No
Modest
Modest
Modest
Considerable
Modest
Moderate
Considerable
Modest
Modest
Modest
Considerable Extensive
Modest
Modest
Considerable
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Modest Modest Modest
Modest
Modest
Moderate
Considerable
Moderate
Considerable
No Extensive Extensive
No Unclear Unclear
Modest Considerable Considerable
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Table 2.—Space Infrastructure Platformsa That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
Unpressurized coorbiting platforms Pressurized platforms
(serviced by means of extravehicular activity) (serviced internally while docked)
Space European
Industries’ Modified
SPAS MESA LEAS ECRAFT EURECA Platform Spacelab
Date available
(now, or approximate, assuming
start in 1985)
1986 Late 1980’s 1989Now
0.005
0.6
None
None
3,000 lb
Payload
10 days
No
Modest
Modest
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Unclear
No
No
No
Now 1987
0.2
2
None
None
2,000 lb
Payload
6 months
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
Modest
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Costb
(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) 0.3 0.60.01 0.2
Characteristics
Power to users (kW)
Pressurized volume (f?)
Nominal crew size
0.1
None
None
6
None
None
20
2,500
1-3 only
when
docked
25,000 lb
Payload
6
3,000
3
20,000 lb
Payload
200 lb
Payload
20,000 lb
Payload
Miscellaneous
Capabilitiesc
Time on orbit
Laboratories for:
Life sciences
Space science/applications
Materials science
Technology development
Observatories
Data/communication node
Servicing of satellites
Manufacturing facility (materials
processing)
Large structure assembly
Transportation node (assembly,
checkout, and launch)
Fuel and supply depot
Unlimited 3-6 months Unlimited8 months
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
Considerable
Modest
No
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
No
No
Extensive
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
Moderate
No
No
Considerable
No
Modest
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No NoNo No
Response to reasons advanced for
space infrastructure
Maintain U.S. space leadership
and technology capability
Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities
Enable long-term human presence
in space
Attention-getting heroic public
spectacle
Extended international cooperation
Promote U.S. commercialization of
space
Maintain vigorous NASA
engineering capability
Enhance national security, broadly
defined
Space travel for non-technicians
No Modest Modest No
No
No
Modest
No
Modest
No
Modest
No
No NoNo No
No
Considerable
No
Considerable
Unclear
No
No
Modest
No NoNo No
NoNo No No
No No No No
aListed ~latforms  are illustrative examples; the list k not exhaustive.
bcogtg include degi~n, development,  and pr~uctlon;  launch  and  operational costs are not included. SOme  costs are estimated by the Office  of Techno@y  Assess-
ment; others were provided to OTA.
cClearly  judgmental.
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Procurement Options
Inasmuch as there is an affirmative answer
to the question of whether to acquire some long-
term, in-space infrastructure, the decision of
how it is to be acquired must be faced. In many
respects, this second decision is just as impor-
tant as the first. The mode of acquiring new,
long-term, in-space assets and services should
be influenced by a clear understanding of the
context in which space activities are expected
to be carried on. And the decision as to how to
acquire these assets and services will have a sig-
nificant impact on future space activities.
There are four main factors that could heavily
influence procurement choices:
Several foreign countries are now capable
of producing and operating substantial ele-
ments of space infrastructure.
Using its own resources, the U.S. private sec-
tor is now capable of producing much of the
infrastructure currently envisioned and of-
fering it for sale or lease to the Government
or the private sector.
NASA would prefer to acquire the infrastruc-
ture under its own aegis and in the same gen-
eral way that it has acquired other large
space systems (except for Spacelab).
Other large and sophisticated civilian space
programs-can be easily imagined that would
require professional skills and funds of the
kind and magnitude now envisioned for a
“space station. ”
Congress and the President have approved
NASA’s request to initiate a “space station” pro-
gram, and NASA appears to be moving to acquire
such infrastructure in much the same fashion that
it acquired the Shuttle:
l
l
l
A great deal of new technology would be de-
veloped, acquired, and used, essentially all
of which would be publicly funded.
NASA would arrive at and issue detailed en-
gineering specifications for, and exercise
close management control over, the technol-
ogy to be acquired.
This infrastructure would be procured by
NASA with Federal funds. The U.S. private
sector would not be prompted to use its own
l
resources to provide a substantial portion of
the infrastructure.
The international role would be limited.
NASA would not seek the kind of close col-
laboration that would result in shared author-
ity, even if doing so might result in substan-
tial capital cost reduction for the United
States.
A significantly different acquisition approach–
another option—would have the following
elements:
l
l
l
l
As much as is reasonably possible, already
developed, tested, and paid-for technology
would be used to achieve an adequate ini-
tial operating capability, with development
of new technology undertaken only where
demonstrably required to lower overall cost
of ownership.
NASA would prompt our private commer-
cial-industrial-financial sectors to develop
and produce, with their own resources and
on a genuinely competitive basis, as many
of the Government-required civilian “space
stat ion’ assets and services as they can;
NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so;
and they could be offered to NASA on a sale,
lease or payment-for-service basis.
NASA, in obtaining the elements not pro-
vided by the private sector, would empha-
size management methods specifically de-
signed to take the best advantage of the now
quite sophisticated U.S. space industry.
NASA would negotiate collaborative agree-
ments with other cooperating countries that
wouId see all partners share in the benefits
of such an initial operating capability at a re-
duced acquisition cost to the U.S. Govern-
ment for its share.
This second approach would imply that NASA
would hand off much (perhaps most) of the more
mundane “space station” work by paying the pri-
vate sector to do it, thereby conserving its skills
and resources so that they could be focused on
more challenging space goals and objectives, in-
cluding development of the very advanced tech-
nology (e. g., bipropellant engines, a reusable or-
bital transfer vehicle, etc.) required to address
them—an activity which, for the most part, the
private sector cannot justify.
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These two options are at opposite ends of a
spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of
long-term space infrastructure. In determining
which approaches from this spectrum are most
likely to influence the evolution of space activi-
ties in a desirable direction, Congress may wish
to consider the following questions:
l Should the Government be allocating its pro-
fessional skills and experience to the devel-
opment of (a) incremental or (b) fundamen-
tal advances in technology?
Which approach is most likely to stimulate
the “commercialization of space?”
What level of international collaboration is
really desirable?
What other large and important space ends
should be addressed in the next decade in
addition to the acquisition of in-space infra-
structure methods and means?
Congress may also wish to keep in mind that
the choice of approach to infrastructure acquisi-
tion will also affect its eventual cost to the tax-
payer. Beyond the observation that, in some gen-
eral fashion, the cost will increase with the
capabiIity and sophistication of the infrastructure,
accurate cost estimates are very difficult to make.2
However, the following are important cost
factors:
1. the total capability acquired–which, as sug-
gested by the examples listed in the tables
of infrastructure options, can encompass a
considerable range;
2. the extent to which already developed,
tested, and paid-for technology is used, v.
a focus on new technology with its higher
development cost and greater risk of cost
overruns;
3. the substitution, where feasible, of auto-
mated systems for the accomplishment of
tasks previously undertaken only by human
beings;
4. the manner by which the infrastructure is ac-
quired–i.e., the extent to which NASA puts
the engineering challenge on the space in-
dustry by issuing performance specifications,
rather than continuing to issue detailed engi-
5.
6.
7.
8
9.
neeri ng specifications and managing the ac-
quisition process in detail;
the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to per-
suade our private sector to develop infra-
structure assets and services “on their own, ”
and to provide them to the Government at
purchase, lease, or payment-for-service
prices lower than those achievable by the
Government;
the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effect
eventual private sector operation of the in-
frastructure and its related activities;
the extent to which large and rapid expan-
sion of military space research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activi-
ties increases costs in the civilian space
sector also;3
the extent to which any “Christmas-tree ef-
fect” takes place within NASA, whereby the
infrastructure acquisition management is
persuaded by the NASA Centers to allow the
cost of desirable but nonessential RDT&E
activities to be included in the acquisition
program; and
the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arrive
at large-scale collaboration and related cost-
sharing arrangements with other countries.
These points address only the initial capital cost
of this infrastructure—to this cost must be added
its ongoing operation and maintenance costs; the
cost of instruments and equipment needed for
scientific experimentation in association with its
use; and the interest cost of any money borrowed
to fund the acquisition program. And it must be
remembered, too, that the infrastructure will
eventually become obsolete or wear out.
It is clear that there are many opportunities to
reduce infrastructure net cost that could be
grasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and deter-
mined NASA management.4
These considerations suggest that, over the next
year or two, at least as much attention should be
given to identifying the best ways by which the
country should set about the permanent develop-
ment of space as there is given to any technologi-
‘ClasSit’Ied m.lterldl  M ,~~ not used I n prep.1 rl ng th IS report.
4Cost red u ct 10 n me,~su rw are d ISC u ssed  I n .1 pp. D of t h I \ report
12 l Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space
cal advances and operational capabilities that are
to be obtained.
Funding Rate Options
Another way of thinking about space infra-
structure is to estimate how much of it could
be obtained if different annual funding rates
were established. Thus, to provide an independ-
ent basis of comparison with the civilian “space
station” program now apparently favored by
NASA, OTA has estimated what new space ca-
pabilities could be provided, by when, for various
annual average Government funding rates. No
changes to present NASA acquisition procedures
or NASA anticipated acquisition costs are as-
sumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levels
of $0.1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$)
were chosen to illustrate the number and kind
of space infrastructure elements that could be ac-
quired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years.
The results of these 12 funding scenarios are
given in table 3, which shows the funding rate,
number of years, total expenditure, and kinds of
infrastructure elements acquired. s The elements
are divided into those that can operate indepen-
dently (e.g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space sta-
tion” central base) and those that depend on be-
ing serviced or maintained from one of the
independent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneu-
vering vehicle, a local in-space transportation sys-
tem operated from a “space station” central ele-
ment, or directly by the Shuttle).
Table 3 lists the following (among other) ele-
ments of space infrastructure that could be ac-
quired over various acquisition intervals:
1. At $0.1 billion per year: probably no “per-
manently manned” facility could be ob-
sAdditional  discussion of funding rate options can be found in
ch. 4 of this report.
Table 3.—Some Illustrative Space infrastructure Acquisitions Possibie at Various Annuai Average Federai
Funding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)
Space acquisition~
Dependent elements
Funding Number Total Unpres- Pressur- Space-based Beyond geostationary
rate of expenditures Independent infrastructure surized ized plat- transport
($&r)
orbit spacecraft
years ($) element+ platforms form# vehicles elements
0.1e 5 0.5 EDO If (20 days, 5 crew) 2 — — —
10 1 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 — — —
15 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — —
0.3 5 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — —
10 3 Free-flying Spaceiab modules’ 1 1 OMV —
(permanent, 3 crew)
15 4.5 2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2 1 OMV —
28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each)
5 5 Space transportation center (4 crew) – — OMV; ROTV —
10 10 NASA initial operating capability 2 1 OMV; ROTV —
“space station”g (8 crew)
15 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV;ROTV —
5 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV; ROTV
10 NASA mature “space statlon”g (16 crew) 3
—
30 2 OMV;ROTV Lunar capable ROTV;
Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV) staffed Lunar facility
15 45 NASA mature “space station”g 5 3 OMV; ROTV Lunar capable ROTV;
(18 crew, SDV) staffed Lunar facility;
Mars voyage
aTaEle8  1 and  2 pre~nt charactorlatlcs  and  capabllltles  of Infrastructure element8  In detail.
b~tend~  Duratl~ Omltem  (EOO)  am limited In their etays  on orbit; other Independent elements am IOnO-term.
cplatfms  of the LEABECRA~/EURECA  type.
dplatfoma of t~ m~lfl~ f~.flylm SWcela~pa~ lndugtrl~ ty~ With their own electrical power  and pressurization SY8WIIS.
eA~  * 1 b~~llonfyr,  no  Iong.tefm,  staffed  Infrastructure elements are -Ible.
f ~~ i ~=teti  ~mtlon  o~lter, phaae  I) and t~ Spacelab  modules have Ilmkd electrical Wwer  (abut 7 k~.
bhe NASA “space etatlon”  elements are expected to operate as transportation and aewiclng  centera  ae well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power for
exten81ve  materlale processing.hA Slgniflcant pan of the cost of a human vieit  to Mara couid b provided in thle  ca~.
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tained even by the year 2000. Further exten-
sion of capabilities of the Shuttle system and
unpressurized platform developments could
be obtained. The acquisitions could be: a de-
velopment of the Extended Duration Orbiter
(EDO) Phase 1, for 20-day orbit stays, over
a 5-year period; or EDO Phase II, for 50-day
orbit stays, over 10 years or longer, plus two
or three free-flying unpressurized platforms
such as EURECA, LEASECRAFT, and/or the
Space Industries’ platform (assuming that the
Government would make an outright pur-
chase of such platforms).
At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, the
acquisitions could be an EDO II plus several
(perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10
years, there could be acquired: 1) the first
permanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived hab-
itable modules in 28.5° LEO that could sup-
port three people; 2) an orbital maneuver-
ing vehicle (OMV) (enabling servicing of
nearby satellites); and 3) a few free-flying
platforms. in 15 years, there could be ob-
tained either: 1) two free-flying Spacelabs,
one in polar orbit, one at 28.5° LEO; or 2)
much more capable permanent infrastruc-
ture at 28.5° than that which could be ac-
quired in 10 years.
For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, there
could be acquired: 1 ) a permanent LEO fa-
cility operating as a transportation node; 2)
an OMV; and 3) a reusable orbit transfer ve-
hicle capable of transporting spacecraft to
and from higher, including geostationary, or-
bit. In 10 years the initial operating capabil-
ity (IOC) infrastructure now favored by
NASA could be acquired. In 15 years, nearly
4.
all of the infrastructure now seriously con-
sidered by NASA could be acquired.
At $3 billion per year (assuming that only
funds, not technology or other factors,
would be the pacing program factor):
NASA’s fully developed “space station”
could become available in somewhat more
than 5 years. In 10 years, this infrastructure
plus a geostationary platform, plus a Shuttle-
derived cargo vehicle for lower cost fuel and
cargo transfer to LEO, plus a lunar facility
ready for occupancy and continuing oper-
ation would become possible. In 15 years,
NASA’s complete infrastructure aspirations
and a lunar settlement could be in hand and,
perhaps also, plans for seeing a human crew
travel to the vicinity of Mars and back could
be well advanced.
These projections are for infrastructure acqui-
sition only; operational costs are not included.
Also, there is a basic difference between the costs
associated with Shuttle-type vehicles and perma-
nently orbiting facilities. The use of an EDO to
conduct extended science or development activ-
ities with a crew would involve launch costs each
time it went into orbit; use of a permanent facil-
ity would require resupply several times per year,
but the cost for each flight could be shared with
other payloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30-
day EDO flights were conducted per year, about
$1 billion (1984$) in annual transportation costs
would be involved; in comparison, the cost of
4 partial-load Shuttle launches per year to resup-
ply a permanent facility would total $100 million
to $400 million (1 984$).
NEED FOR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
In view of the variety of possible ensembles of which identifiable, serious users have “hard” re-
infrastructure, the different methods of acquiring quirements might well be acquired within the next
them, and the range of funding rates at which decade. In the meantime, the most effective way
they could be acquired, how are the choices to to determine our direction in space would be a
be made? In general, these choices should not be national discussion of, and eventual agreement
made without prior agreement on the future direc- on, a set of long-range goals which the United
tion of the civilian space activities of the United States expects its civilian space activities to
States; however, the infrastructure elements for address.
 14 l Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in space
B Photo credit”  Aeronautics and Space Administration
One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the space Shuttle for many advanced operations in
low-Earth-orbit. Shown here: (A) servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit—
here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna.
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Today, unfortunately, there is general agree-
ment neither on such a set of long-range goals
nor on a set of specific objectives which, as they
are addressed, would serve as milestones of prog-
ress toward those goals. If future civilian space-
related goals and objectives are to be effective
i n providing direction to U.S. space efforts, they
should be such as to command widespread at-
tention; have inherent humanitarian and scien-
tific interest; foster development of new technol-
ogy; have relevance to global issues; prompt
international cooperation; and involve major par-
ticipation of our private sector.
Such a set of goals and objectives would allow
a clear determination of the basic characteristics
of the infrastructure elements actually needed,
and of the means and rate whereby these ele-
ments should be acquired. In the absence of such
goals and objectives, and with the great uncertain-
ties in the estimate of any infrastructure cost to
the public, OTA concludes that it is impossible to
judge, objectively, whether or not most of the in-
frastructure elements proposed to date—and, in
particular, many of the set currently proposed by
NASA—are truly appropriate and worth their sub-
stantial cost.
SOME POSSIBLE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
I n order to prompt the formulation and subse-
quent discussion of future space goals and ob-
jectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible long-
range goals and a set of nearer-term objectives
designed to address those goals. Although OTA
does not recommend either this particular set of
goals or its supporting family of objectives, they
are intended to exemplify the kind of goals and
objectives around which consensus might well
be formed so as to provide sensible guidance for
the Nation’s future space activities. The Advisory
Panel of this assessment has taken an unusually
active role in helping to formulate these goals and
objectives. It is the panel’s judgment that the
goals and objectives proposed for discussion are
reasonable and important.
The national goals proposed for discussion are
as follows:
l
l
l
l
l
l
to increase the efficiency of space activities
and reduce their net cost to the general
public;
to involve the public directly in space activ-
ities, both on Earth and in space;
to derive scientific, economic, social, and
political benefits;
to increase international cooperation and
collaboration in and regarding space;
to study and explore the Earth, the solar sys-
tem, and the greater physical universe; and
to spread life, in a responsible fashion,
throughout the solar system.
OTA has also formulated, as milestones to mark
progress toward these goals, the following family
of 10 objectives. Table 4 relates these objectives
to the six goals. Some of the objectives are readily
achievable; others may not be, but still represent
legitimate targets.6 They are not rank-ordered.
1. A space-related, global system/service
2
3.
4.
could be established to provide timely and
useful information regarding potentially
hazardous natural circumstances found in
the Earth’s space and atmosphere, and at
and below its surface.
A transportation service could be estab-
lished to and from the Earth’s Moon, and
a modest human presence established
there, for scientific and other cultural and
economic purposes.
Space probes could be used to obtain the
information and experience specifically re-
quired to plan for further exploration of the
planet Mars and some asteroids.
Medical studies of direct interest to the gen-
eral public, including study of the human
aging process, could be conducted through
scientific experiments that compare phys-
iological, emotional, and social experience
in the absence of gravity with experience
gained in the conduct of related surface
stud ies.
‘A full  dl~cussion  of the objectik es appear~ [n ch,  6 of this report.
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Table 4.—Possible Goals and Objectives
Goals
Increase Derive
space activities’ Involve the scientific, Increase Study and Bring life
efficiency; general Derive political, inter- explore the to the
reduce their public economic and social national physical physical
net cost directly benefits benefits cooperation universe universe
Objectives:
N
P
P
P
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Establish a global information system/
service re natural hazards
Establish lower cost reusable
transportation service to the Moon and
establish human presence there
Use space probes to obtain information
re Mars and some asteroids prior to
early human exploration
Conduct medical research of direct
interest to the general public
Bring at least hundreds of the general
public per year into space for short
visits
Establish a global, direct, audio broad-
casting, common-user system/sewice
Make essentially all data generated by
civilian satellites and spacecraft
directly available to the general public
Exploit radio/optical free space
electromagnetic propagation for long-
distance energy distribution
Reduce the unit cost of space transpor-
tation and space activities
Increase space-related private sector
sale&
Y Y NN N N Y
N
Y
P
Y
Y
Y
P
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
P
Y
P
P
Y
Y
Y P Y N NN N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
aThlg w~ld  advance  the proapects  of successfully addressing aii other “9~is.”
Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carried out.
At least hundreds of members of the gen-
eral public per year, from the United States
and abroad, could be selected on an equi-
table basis and brought into space for short
visits there.
A direct audio broadcasting, common-user
system/service could be established that
would be available to all of the countries
of the world on an economical and equi-
table basis.
In general, all of the nonclassified and non-
private communications from, and non-
proprietary data generated by, all Govern-
ment-supported spacecraft and satellites
could be made widely available to the gen-
eral public and our educational institutions
in near-real-time and at modest cost.
Radio and optical free-space electromag-
netic propagation techniques could be ex-
ploited in an attempt to allow reliable and
economic long-distance transmission of
large amounts of electrical energy, both
into space for use there, and from space,
lunar, and remote Earth locations for dis-
tribution throughout the world.
The unit cost of space transportation, for
people and equipment, between the
Earth’s surface and low-, geosynchronous-,
and lunar-Earth orbit could be sharply
reduced.
Space-related commercial-industrial sales
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
in our private sector could be stimulated
to increase at a rate comparable to that of
other high-technology sectors, and our
public expenditures on civilian space assets
and activities could reflect this revenue
growth.
Congress and the President have now agreed on
legislation that will establish a National Commis-
sion on Space. This commission will be well-posi-
tioned to initiate and sponsor a national debate
on the future direction of U.S. space activities. The
goals and objectives suggested here may provide
a substantial starting point for further discussion.
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INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED BY THE PROPOSED GOALS
AND OBJECTIVES
Technology
Some of these objectives, if they are to be
achieved, will require certain elements of in-
space infrastructure; others, depending on how
they would be carried out, may or may not re-
quire such elements; still others will require none.
The manner in which the United States obtains
any of this infrastructure should reflect, as much
as possible, our already great investment in space
technology and operations; whenever reasonably
possible, it should be obtained at the lowest cap-
ital, and operations and maintenance, cost to the
public purse.
If the Government’s large capital costs for de-
velopment and production are to be minimized
and the private sector strengthened, then serious
consideration might well be given to encourag-
ing the private sector to provide infrastructure ele-
ments that meet Government performance spe-
cifications, rather than detailed engineering spe-
cifications. These elements could be provided to
others as well as to the Government through sale,
long-term leases, or on the basis of charges for
actual service use.
The main elements of longer term space infra-
structure called for in pursuing the family of 10
objectives are:’
a.
b.
c.
an LEO capability to assemble and check
out the large and sophisticated satellites and
space structures needed to provide both the
hazard-prevention and the direct audio
broadcast global system/service [objectives
(1) and (6)];
an LEO human residential and working
space to be used for medical research [ob-
jective (4)], and possibly for space visits [ob-
jective (5)];
a transport staging facility to support effi-
cient travel to geostationary orbit, the
Moon, and beyond, using reusable orbital
transfer vehicles or other vehicles. [this
7N0 additional space infrastructure elements are needed to
achieve objective (7).
would address objectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9),
and possibly (8)]; and
d. a storage facility in LEO would allow use of
full Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), and
staffed LEO laboratory facilities could pro-
mote (1 O).
Of course, if such infrastructure elements were
available for the specific purposes that justify their
acquisition, they could be used for additional pur-
poses also.
Note that, in essence, provision of the infra-
structure needed to pursue two of the larger-scale
objectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate most
of the needs of all of the other eight. In what fol-
lows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure is
included under these two objectives.
And note that no Government development of
free-flying platform infrastructure elements is
called for; these elements (e.g., MESA, SPAS,
EURECA, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries plat-
form, etc.) could and probably would be de-
signed, developed, and installed by our private
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in this
artist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost
space infrastructure elements.
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sector, and/or other countries, and offered to the
civilian space community—both Government
and private interests—under appropriate sale or
lease arrangements, where they could be used
for remote sensing, the conduct of scientific re-
search, or the production of various materials
under microgravity conditions.
Finally, note that very large amounts of very
costly electrical power in LEO (with an initial cap-
ital cost of as much as $10,000 per watt) are not
called for; some 20 kilowatts would appear to be
sufficient. Larger amounts appear to be needed
only for any eventual commercial-industriaI ma-
terials processing, and could then be provided
and financed by the private sector in anticipation
that such processing will prove to be profitable.
cost
Attaining all of the proposed objectives would,
overall, cost a great deal of money. In the accom-
panying table S, rough estimates are made for the
cost of each of them, and the length of time over
which each would be pursued to completion. It
is a fundamental assumption that maximum use
will be made of: 1 ) already developed and paid-
for technology, 2) the most truly competitive pro-
curement methods, and 3) the most modern and
least burdensome acquisition strategies and pro-
cedures.
A first rough estimate of the total cost8 of at-
taining all 10 of the proposed objectives is no less
BApp.  F of this  report discusses costs in detail.
Table 5.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion
Total costa Duration
Objectives (billions, 1984 dollars) (years)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Establish a global information system/service
re natural hazards
Establish lower cost reusable transportation
service to the Moon and establish human
presence ther#
Use space probes to obtain information re
Mars and some asteroids prior to early human
exploration
Conduct medical research of direct interest to
the general public
Bring at least hundreds of the general
public per year into space for short visitsg
Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,
common-user system/service
Make essentially all data generated by
civilian satellites and spacecraft directly
available to the general public
Exploit radio/optical free-space electro-
magnetic propagation for long-distance
energy distribution
Reduce the unit cost of space transportation
and space activitiesg’h
Increase space-related private sector salesh
2
20
2
6
0.5
2
0
0.5
5
0.5
10
15, 25
15
5, 25
5, 25
10
25
10
15
25
-$401
acO~t~ are for @VelOprnent  and  acqulsltlorr.  o~ratlona  and maintenance costs are nOt included, excePt for some iaunch and
Oparationa costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.
b15 ~eam t. eatabliah  t~ settlement, and 3 visits/year at $0.1 billion each (pius  tMSiC Shuttle launch costs) over the followin9
c~~~~~maverage,  one pro~ eveV  3 yeara and S0.4  billion  each.
d~ billion  over 5 Yearn t. establish a iife sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2 billionhear  thereafter  to oPerate  it. This
laboratory could also be used for materials science and other research.
e5 years t. establish a LEO  “ldgts-habitat,)’  and its continuin9  use thereafter.
f $OU billion/year in addition to DOD expenditures.
g~.3 billion~ear  for a l~year  t~hnolqy  development  efforf  to reduce  space  transportation Unit COStS.
%his would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives.i The actual cost  couid  ~ as high as $80 billion (1984 dollars), if costs exceed initial pr~ictions  by WO/O
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than $4o billion and perhaps considerably more
(as much as $60 billion [1 984$]) over the next 25
years. Table 5 itemizes the estimated costs for all
the objectives. Given that these estimates are
made at an early stage, there cannot be great con-
fidence in their detailed accuracy, but such ac-
curacy is unnecessary for the illustrative purposes
being served here.
If work were to commence on all of them now,
the bulk of the cost would occur over the next
15 years.
Space transportation costs are not included in
these estimates, except for an additional $0.1 bil-
lion (1984$) or so for each flight from low-
Earth-orbit to lunar orbit. Rather, it is assumed
that some 10 Shuttle surface-LEO flights per year
at an average cost of about $0.1 billion (1 984$)
each by early in the next decade would be bud-
geted for all Government-sponsored civilian R&D
purposes, including those considered here.
Financing
There are many matters that must be given
carefuI consideration before a national commit-
ment to undertake such large, lengthy, and costly
public activities could be made. Certainly among
the most important are the sources and magni-
tude of funds that can be reasonably expected
to be available.
If the funding previously spent on Shuttle de-
velopment (approximately $2 billion per year) is
continued but reallocated towards the initial ob-
jectives, and if the NASA appropriation (approx-
imately $7 billion per year) is augmented by a
real growth of 1 percent per year, and if truly col-
laborative cost-sharing international agreements
could be reached whereby other friendly coun-
tries would contribute, say, an additional amount
equal to one-third of this subtotal, we could look
forward to approximately the following amounts
being available for the initial 10 objectives:
Reprogramming of the Shuttle
development effort fund level
of $2 billion per year for 25
years – $ 50 billion
1 percent per year “real
growth” over 25 years applied
to these objectives – $ 25 billion
Cost-sharing by other countries – $ 25 billion
Total – $100 billion
Amounts spent for related space research, devel-
opment, test, and evaluation by the U.S. private
sector would be added to this total.
As these figures are considered, it should be
kept in mind that space is a high-technology do-
main. Increasing private sector interest in exploit-
ing the economic potential of space invites com-
parison of growth rates in other high-technology
sectors. If private sector space-related sales con-
tinue at a rate of 10 percent per year (a conserv-
ative estimate for high-technology sectors), the
tax revenues derived therefrom would, over the
next quarter-century, be quite substantial. And
to the extent that public funding of Government
space activities is understood as “offset” by these
tax revenues (as they sometimes are in the aero-
nautics area) the net cost to the public for such
space activities would be substantially reduced. g
Clearly, under such circumstances, funding lim-
itations would not prevent the United States from
undertaking an ambitious publicly supported ci-
vilian space program throughout the next quar-
ter of a century.
9App. F of this report discusses these prospects at length.
SHAPE OF THE SPACE FUTURE
There are important changes under way in how rity considerations are already the subject of
space activities are carried on. The number of im- widespread debate. If the United States is to
portant players is increasing as space expertise maintain its leadership role in civilian space activ-
and experience spreads, economic considera- ities, it must be prepared to make fundamental
tions are becoming more important, and secu- shifts i n policy and practice.
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Photo credit:  Aeronautics and Space Administration
Communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit (such as Webster Vl, shown here)
can provide continuous coverage of large  of the Earth’s surface for relay of radio,
television, and telephone signals.
International ‘
International space activities will continue to
expand, both in numbers of countries involved
and in absolute magnitude of their capabilities.
There is every reason to expect that the spacefar-
ing nations of the world will find it in their inter-
est to participate in the considered development
of near-Earth space, and perhaps all countries
would like to engage in civilian space activities
to some extent. The OTA report on International
Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space
Activities10 addresses a wide range of issues aris-
ing in this area, and appendix C of this report dis-
cusses the variety of ways in which the United
  and Competition in Civilian Space
Activities, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 
 in press.
States and other friendly countries might, in con-
cert, develop, operate, and use long-term in-orbit
infrastructure.
Private Sector
To date, private sector interest in space has
been confined primarily to the successful satel-
lite communications business and the support of
Government activities. However, there is tangi-
ble evidence that a number of private concerns
will soon begin to offer assets and services on a
fee-for-service or lease basis, both to the Govern-
ment and to other private interests. The projected
needs of space science and space applications,
for example, constitute a ready market for pro-
viders of various future infrastructure system/
services.
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New Role for NASA
In view of the significant changes in the way
that space activities will be carried on in the fu-
ture, NASA may well have to make certain funda-
mental shifts of attitude and operation. I n the
past, it has been NASA’s responsibility to meet
any given national space objective by itself; in
the future, it should be NASA’s responsibility to
see that the objective is met. That is, NASA should
now aspire to the much broader role of seeing
that others in our private sector and throughout
the world do much more of what it does today.
In the simplest of terms: if NASA is to rise suc-
cessfully to the challenges now emerging in the
national and international space arena, it should
place relatively less emphasis on accomplishing
by itself those things that our private sector or
other friendly nations can satisfactorily do, either
alone or with NASA assistance. It can succeed
in this only by continuing to cooperate with both,
and by broadening this cooperation so as to
prompt and assist both to extend their space-re-
lated capacities, confidence, and commitment.
And it could emphasize such cooperation in the
acquisition of in-space infrastructure—i. e., a
“space station .“
Released from its present relatively near-term
focus, NASA could concentrate more of its own
professional activities on the most important and
exciting of everything else in and concerning
space, the things that no one else can or will do:
the very best of space-related science; the cutting
edge of space-related technology development;
the boldest of space-related explorations and de-
velopments.
Finally, NASA and other space-related offices
i n the executive branch shouId see that their ac-
tivities continue to be conducted, and the results
thereof continue to be used, not only to increase
knowledge and to address important social and
political goals, but now also to enable our pri-
vate space sector to increase its non-Government
sales—the sales that generate the taxes that help
to pay for Government space activities.
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Chapter 2
ISSUES AND FINDINGS
GENERAL
N A S A ’ s  C i r c u m s t a n c e s
A general and most important conclusion of
this assessment, one that touches on all its other
findings, is that any serious discussion of the
Nation’s future civilian space aspirations and
activities, both publicly funded and privately
sponsored, must be carried on with a full appre-
ciation of the present and near-term circum-
stances of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).
Since soon after NASA’s inception, its space
programs have had two major components: 1)
a core of continuing space science and space ex-
ploration activities, later joined by space appli-
cations activities, and the development of that
technology specifically required to conduct
them; and 2) singular major technological for-
ays, centering on people in space. It is worth
noting that while the core science and explora-
tion activities were mandated in NASA’s founding
charter, the National Aeronautics and Space Act
of 1958, as amended, the succession of big pro-
grams seems to continue as a matter of tradition–
with the explicit approval of the President and
Congress.
Such major undertakings as Mercury, Gemini,
Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle take years, even a
decade, to complete, involve a large fraction of
NASA’s engineering staff, and cost billions or tens
of billions of dollars. Because the magnitude of
NASA’s commitment to these undertakings is so
complete, other, smaller programs—including the
core science and exploration activities—are al-
ways at some risk of seeing part of their funding
delayed or transferred to cover overruns in the
big programs. A small percentage overrun in a
major program component can represent the
whole of a smaller, but perhaps equally impor-
tant science or application program.
For the most part, it is this spectacular kind
of activity that takes most of NASA’s attention
and resources, is of most interest to the general
public, here and abroad, and serves the impor-
tant national objective of projecting the civil-
ian technological prowess of the United States
on the world stage.
From the viewpoint of the technologists who
make up most of the continuing leadership of the
U.S. publicly funded space effort, these major
NASA programs serve several important objectives:
l
l
l
l
l
l
they keep NASA in the public eye in a par-
ticularly gratifying fashion;
they attract the services and loyalty of out-
standing space engineers both within NASA
and the closely related sections of the U.S.
private space industry;
they allow the development of a great deal
of new technology otherwise difficult to
justify on a piecemeal basis–technology that
allows further space advances subsequently;
they are more difficult to interrupt or cancel
than smaller and/or less generally appreci-
ated space activities;
once approved, they require relatively little
further engagement by engineers in “politi-
cal justification” activities for some time; and
they provide perhaps the most visible and
apparently effective civilian response to the
widely publicized in-space activities of So-
viet cosmonauts.
And to date, it is this kind of activity that has
obtained the most attention, and approval, of the
president and Congress. But these large programs
also have another, rather troubling set of char-
acteristics. Because they are primarily technologi-
cal in nature, they are inherently difficult to ex-
plain satisfactorily to those who are not
professionals or not particularly interested. They
are initiated by Government technologists and
their supporters who are convinced of their value,
rather than being initiated in response to large
segments of the general public’s specifically call-
ing on NASA to provide them. ’ Perhaps most im-
‘The implication here is not that there is no public support for
the civilian space program in general or the big technological spec-
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Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dramatic manned space missions such as the Apollo 11 lunar landing have generated public support for NASA,
portant, the completion of any one of the large,
high-technology, “manned” programs faces
NASA’s management either with making a fun-
damental move toward a more equal distribu-
tion of agency funds among all its R&D pro-
grams, or with creating and securing support for
another program of the same general charac-
ter and size.
Thus, the first successful flight of a Shuttle or-
biter in early 1981 found the NASA management
 in particular, but that this support might be broadened if
wide public discussion were encouraged. One need only compare
the extent to which the public, to date, interests itself in space issues
with the extent to which it interests itself in education, health serv-
ices delivery, housing, defense, transportation, etc.
confronting this problem again. Within a rela-
tively few years thereafter, either another large
new program would have to begin, or a number
of relatively small existing programs would have
to be considerably enlarged (or new ones initi-
ated)—or else as many as one-quarter of NASA’s
professional staff and approximately $2 billion per
year would be lost.
Without an internal or external mandate to
achieve a more nearly equal distribution of funds
among all its R&D programs, NASA leaders opted
to pursue another large, high-technology,
“manned” program. The particular program
chosen has been the subject of study and dis-
cussion within the civilian space community for
decades: “the space station” program. After
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detailed engineering study, the public acquisition
of in-space infrastructure under this program
would proceed for several years at an average
rate of some $2 billion per year. It would involve
the development of high technology, much of
which would address the problems attendant on
seeing people reside and work in space in a per-
manent fashion under safe and sanitary condi-
tions. Its buildup could be phased to match the
reduction in the Shuttle development program
so that, overall, NASA’s present and anticipated
“budget envelope” could be maintained, and the
Shuttle program’s professional skill mix could be
satisfactorily reassigned.
Given, first, its institutional end of maintain-
ing its current size and, second, its choice of a
space infrastructure program as means to attain
that end, NASA has been somewhat reluctant
to consider new modes of acquiring the infra-
structure envisioned. For example, NASA could
choose to employ a great deal of already devel-
oped, space-qualified, and already paid-for tech-
nology. It could prompt the U.S. private space
industry to come forward with proposals to pro-
vide major infrastructure elements to NASA in an
economical fashion, elements that the private
sector, using its own resources (including private
funds), would design to the Government’s per-
formance specifications (rather than to detailed
design specifications under contract). lt could
seek international collaborative arrangements
under which foreign partners would bear a sub-
stantial fraction of the present $8 billion estimate,2
thereby significantly reducing the cost to U.S. tax-
payers. However, with the two givens, these new
approaches could result in an insufficient pro-
gram base to maintain the agency’s present size
and, perhaps, even its present character as an in-
dependent, civilian, national resource.
In view of NASA’s internal circumstances and
the many other external desiderata which its re-
sources could alternatively address, the question
arises: is a “space station” program the best way
for NASA to spend the foreseeably available $2
billion per year3 to serve the needs of the Na-
tion—and the world? The President and Congress
have just approved a “space station” program
in principle, and allocated $150 million to com-
mence engineering studies—studies now ex-
pected to take 2 years. Decisions as to the char-
acter, magnitude, and pace of this program
would be made after the completion of these
studies, and any others that Congress might
request.
If: 1) NASA’S basic decision not to move
toward a more nearly equal distribution of funds
among all its R&D programs remains unchanged,
2) its overall aspirations for its “space station”
program are not realized, and 3) no adequate
substitutes appear and are approved within the
next 2 years, then the basic character of the
present U.S. publicly funded civilian space pro-
zlt is imw~ant to appreciate that this $8 billion figure covers only
the initial capital outlay, not the continuing operations and main-
tenance costs or subsequent capital outlays to acquire additional
capabilities.
JThe  $2 billion per Year figure is predicated upon two Projec-
tions: that NASA’s overall budget will remain level in constant
(1984$) dollars at somewhat over $7 billion per year, and that the
roughly $2 billion per year currently spent for Shuttle development
will be made available for space infrastructure acquisition.
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gram itself could be placed in question. If
NASA’s professionals were convinced that they
could not see a reasonable future for the exer-
cise of the skills they so successfully displayed in
the Shuttle program, they would soon begin to
explore employment alternatives—and the more
accomplished, more imaginative, and more inde-
pendent employees, which any outstanding R&D
organization simply must retain, would be the
ones most likely to do so. One of the clear alter-
natives would be to work on what now appears
to be another rapidly growing high-technology
space program area—that of the space elements
of the new military Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), a program now headed by a former asso-
ciate administrator of NASA who was responsi-
ble for the Shuttle development program.
If large numbers of professionals left NASA, and
if their leaving the civilian space R&D area were
accompanied by similar departures from that part
of the private space industry long associated with
NASA, an already significant and increasing im-
balance between our military and civilian pub-
licly funded space programs would be magnified.
A vigorous, independent NASA has served the
Nation well; any trend toward reducing it to mere
adjunct status cannot be viewed, in the overall
national security context, without concern.
Thus, the NASA management may have “bet
the company” on the successful outcome of a
campaign to obtain approval for one more large,
new, high-technology, publicly funded civilian
space program. Unfortunately, even if approval
is received, such a program could foreclose, per-
haps for 5 to 10 years, the possibility of NASA’s
undertaking other, more desirable options or its
effecting any fundamental changes either in its
major program mix or in the way it acquires
space technology. Yet, in OTA’S judgment, seri-
ous consideration must be given, now, to pre-
serving these options and making these changes,
if NASA is to maintain U.S. space leadership.
For fundamental shifts in other national and in-
ternational circumstances that will importantly
affect the conduct of future space activities are
already under way.
Just as unfortunately, because the Shuttle de-
velopment program is expected to be essentially
complete within 2 years, any moves to effect large
and desirable changes in the NASA program mix
and/or acquisition processes and/or international
collaboration policies must also be made within
that time. Making such moves effectively would
call for a high degree of institutional imagination
and political statesmanship by both branches,
and NASA particularly.
Whatever else the executive branch and Con-
gress decide to do at this decision point, they
should resolve that they will not be required to
face such circumstances again. The publicly
funded civilian space program of the United
States is too important, and the scientists and
technologists heading the program too compe-
tent and responsible, to continue to be treated
with the form of “benign neglect” that has been
the rule since
grand Apollo
Transitions
fundamental,
the successful completion of the
program.
Transitions
are under way. And they are so
and moving so rapidly, that we
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should not be surprised to see them have sig-
nificant, although presently unpredictable in
detail, impacts on any “space station” program,
even in the next few years. The key institutional
question is this: will U.S. leaders see to it that
NASA meets these transitions head-on and
moves out smartly to “lead the parade” by or-
chestrating the growing and increasingly varied
foreign and domestic space interests?
For nearly a quarter of a century, the United
States and the Soviet Union were the only ma-
jor players in the civilian space arena.4 Except for
satellite communications, all of the U.S. civilian
space activities were formally conceived, funded,
and managed by the Federal Government, pri-
marily NASA.
Similarly, during this interval, NASA, the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and the National Weather Service de-
cided, with regard to the weather and climate
area, what space-related scientific, technology-
development, and infrastructure-acquisition pro-
grams should be conducted; developed their
characteristics in some detail; mounted almost
always successful campaigns with the President
and Congress to receive direction, legal permis-
sion, and Federal funds for their conduct; and
then conducted them using large numbers of in-
house scientists and engineers and contracting
with their counterparts in universities and the
space industry.
NASA has frequently been willing to consider
international cooperation in science with other
countries, and has reached cooperative agree-
ments with many countries—agreements that saw
other countries spend significant amounts of
money to support their space professionals and
to provide them with equipment in order to ef-
fect such cooperation. But there has yet to be any
major cooperative agreement reached that would
see truly significant equipment jointly designed
and produced by the United States and one or
more other countries that would result either in
4Since the adoption of the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space
Act, the United States has maintained identifiably separate civilian
and military space programs, though there has always been coop-
eration between the two. The extent to which one can make a simi-
lar distinction with respect to Soviet space activities remains a vexing
question.
important technology sharing, in U.S. program
risk sharing, or in large savings to the public
purses The Department of Defense (DOD) often
does so within NATO and elsewhere, as do ma-
jor aerospace companies in order to reduce their
own financial, technological, and market risk ex-
posure in large complex programs. NASA officials
are making overtures to other countries regard-
ing their participation in any “space station” pro-
gram, but it remains to be seen whether these
overtures will result in the kind of collaboration
that would realize major cost savings to the
United States.
With a single recent exception,b there has been
no important instance in which our private sec-
tor has set out to develop major items of space-
related technology of acknowledged central im-
portance to NASA programs on its own, using its
own resources—including financing—to do so.
All such critical elements are still procured by the
Government, with Government funds and some
considerable Government oversight in the process.
However, over the past few years, international
civilian space circumstances, the circumstances
of our own space-related private sector, and the
attitude of our Government toward the civilian
space area have begun to undergo fundamental
shifts-shifts that, in the next few years, cannot
but have great impact on what our publicly
funded civilian space program does and how it
does it.
As a result of the sustained and generous assist-
ance of the United States, and by working in close
concert with NASA and the U.S. space industry
over the past few years, several other countries
have conceived of, developed, produced, in-
stalled, and used substantial space and space-
related equipment. Such equipment, some of it
designed primarily for scientific research, some
!$Spacelab  is the exception that proves the rule. NOAA,  on the
other hand, is moving to obtain further contributions of space-
related technology through the Economic Summit process, and is
pursuing the development of international polar-orbiting meteoro-
logical satellites; both of these initiatives could result in important
cost savings to the U.S. public program.
6The  exception is the agreement, on an ‘upper stage, between
NASA and the Orbital Science Corp. of Vienna, VA. McDonnell
Douglas upgraded the Delta and developed the Payload Assist
Module (PAM) using its own funds, and other private groups are
now developing expendable boosters of various kinds.
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primarily for commercial applications, is of a so-
phistication that often matches that of U.S. equip-
ment, and of a sales magnitude that, in some in-
stances, now clearly offers serious competition
to the generally acknowledged preeminence of
the United States (cf. Spacelab; Ariane; the Cana-
dian Remote Manipulator System; DBS space-
craft; etc.).7 These countries now have sufficient
confidence in their own skills and experience to
encourage them to ask for a much closer kind
of cooperation with the United States. It will not
be long before they can and probably will insist
on it, for they will have the ability and the motiva-
tion to “go it alone” if they cannot see that their
basic interests would be adequately served by the
kind of cooperation extended to them by the
United States.
Similarly, one of NASA’s outstanding successes
(shared with DOD) has been that of shepherding
the aircraft, electronics, chemical, and other high-
technology areas of our private sector into the
civilian space business. This is now a very sophis-
ticated and confident part of our overall national
commercial-industrial capability. But significant
segments of the private space sector are increas-
ingly restless with the prospect of having to pro-
duce high-technology space items under what
they perceive to be the no-longer-necessary, and
wasteful, “close control” of NASA managers.8
Also, the past few years have seen a growing
number of entrepreneurs beginning to enter the
civilian space area. These “newcomers” are not
limited to those who would use the assets and
services that NASA expects to acquire; some
would provide such assets and services to both
the Government and others in the private sec-
tor on what they believe to be inviting financial
terms. Both the President and Congress are clear-
ly determined to see that the private sector plays
a much more prominent role in the civilian space
area generally, that it is encouraged to make ma-
jor investments therein, and that the country
7For a thorough discussion of this issue, see the OTA report /i-
nternational Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activi-
ties, in press,
6At least some in the private sector believe that they can do as
good work on space hardware generally as they do on commer-
cial air transportation and communications satellites, and they are
willing to assume the financial responsibility of doing so and to risk
grave financial penalties if they fail.
finally begin to reap the large and direct eco-
nomic benefits so long hoped for by civilian space
leaders.
Finally, the great, persistent, and projected def-
icits in our Federal budget now require Congress
to take an even more careful look at deferrable
expenditures, especially “new starts. ” Indeed,
the central issue of the President’s request for
congressional approval of the first phase of a
“space station” program is that of its capital cost,
even though NASA now estimates the size of the
initial portion of the program (in constant 1984
dollars) to be less than one-half that of the Shut-
tle program, and not much more than 10 percent
of the Apollo program, and its acquisition sched-
ule would seemingly not require NASA’s budget
to be increased over today’s amount.g
These new national and international circum-
stances have begun to command the attention
of the executive branch, and important first
steps toward addressing them have been taken.
However, although many of the leaders of the
U.S. publicly funded space program are con-
vinced of the importance of these circum-
stances, few of them have the professional and
business experience required to ensure an ef-
fective response. Furthermore, it appears that
most of those beneath the top management lev-
els as yet have little enthusiasm for making in-
dicated changes. And, indeed, it is not clear that
leaders of the executive branch have thought
out, clearly, just how far they are willing to see
innovative arrangements arrived at that would
carry NASA and NOAA into much closer col-
laboration with other countries and with our
own private sector.
National Commission on Space
In July 1984, Congress enacted, and the Presi-
dent signed into Iaw, lo the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1985. Title II of this Act estab-
gHowever,  consider the following: “In recent decades the aver-
age overrun on major programs, in constant dollars and constant
quantities, has been slightly over 50 percent. The average schedule
milestone has been missed by a third of the time initially projected.
The average time to develop new systems has, until recently, been
increasing at the rate of 3 months per year . . . each year. ” Nor-
man R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech
Management,” Aerospace America, March 1984, p. 5.
lopublic Law 98-36I.
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Iished a National Commission on Space. The de-
liberations of the National Commission can be
expected to have a fundamental impact on the
entire civilian space future, including the future
course of any civilian “space station” program.
This conclusion is based on the assumption that
the Commission will provide an appropriate mix
of prestige, broad concern for the national inter-
est, technical expertise, and diverse outlook.
There are great opportunities now perceptible
in the civilian space area, but the rapidly chang-
ing circumstances that make their achievement
possible have raised difficult issues and created
institutional inconsistencies. If the new oppor-
tunities are to be realized, these issues must be
faced and the inconsistencies resolved. OTA has
earlier expressed the view that many of these
issues and inconsistencies cannot now be dealt
with adequately by the annual authorization
process and that, therefore, some more funda-
mental mechanism, such as a Presidential Com-
mission, should be created. The newly authorized
Commission is the first opportunity in a genera-
tion for Congress—and the Nation—to set a truly
fresh course in space. It is critically important to
the Nation generally, and to a successful U.S.
future in civilian space activities specifically, that
the Commission be successful.
NASA now plans to spend the next 2 years
making studies of a fairly specific low-Earth-orbit
(LEO) infrastructure complex that it would ac-
quire, operate, and use in a manner similar to
the Shuttle. This plan was set in motion some
years ago. Over the next year and a half, the
deliberations and eventual findings of the Na-
tional Commission could offer NASA, and
others seriously interested in the space future,
the opportunity to develop new program op-
tions, and to compare these new options, new
methods, and new attitudes with the civilian
“space station” program as currently defined.
Afresh, basic and uninhibited review of policy
issues might well result in a fundamental change
of NASA views on the following matters:
l
l
l
l
the appropriate character of the “space sta-
tion” program;
the character and mix of its various large,
long-range programs;
the ways in which it might orchestrate the ci-
vilian space interests of all friendly countries;
and
the ways in which it could act to prompt
greatly increased private sector investment in
space.
CIVILIAN “SPACE STATIONS”
The Case for Infrastructure in
Low-Earth-Orbit
on balance, a persuasive case can be made
for acquiring some long-term infrastructure in
near-Earth space, some of which would allow
a human work force to be retained there for ex-
tended periods.11 This case rests primarily on
tangible rather than intangible considerations.
The persuasive tangible reasons are that the
United States would then be able to explore the
possibility of more efficient transport staging be-
I I [t is of course assumed that the character and location of the
infrastructure elements would be chosen to meet the specific, im-
portant expressed needs of those expected to use the services that
these elements would be expected to provide—i.e.,  not chosen by
the technologists who would design, produce, and install them.
tween LEO and geostationary orbit (GEO), the
Moon, and beyond; to commence certain impor-
tant life science12 and materials science experi-
ments early in the next decade, the conduct of
which would otherwise border on the impossi-
ble; to warehouse space assets and consumables,
so as to improve the efficiency of very costly
surface-LEO transportation; to aspire to much
more ambitious and dependable servicing of ever
larger and more sophisticated, and therefore
more costly and complex, space assets, there-
by containing their total life-cycle costs and in-
creasing their effectiveness; and to undertake new
12Life ~ience  r-arch could include studies of long-term response
to in-space conditions (in preparation for possible staffed expedi-
tions to the Moon, Mars, or the asteroids) as well as studies rele-
vant to the general human population on Earth.
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and innovative space activities with confident
freedom.
These reasons reflect not only the many years
of conceptual studies of infrastructure arrays that
could support space activities but, as well, a gen-
eral consensus as to the value of space infrastruc-
ture elements gained with actual experience in
Skylab, the Shuttle Orbiter, the Soviet Salyut,
Soyuz, and Progress, the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System (TDRSS), Spacelab, the Manned
Maneuvering Unit (MMU), the West German
SPAS platform, the Canadian Remote Manipu-
lator System (RMS), etc.
Indeed, it seems likely that, in retrospect-some
two decades hence—at Ieast a large portion, per-
haps all, of the space infrastructure capabilities
now advanced by NASA as necessary will be seen
to have been so. But this eventuality gives no
guidance as to how and when the various ele-
ments should be acquired.
Another reason advanced is that, eventually,
there may be important economic payoffs from
materials processing in space that would require
the use of space infrastructure. What is now re-
quired is a great deal of imaginative and sound
in-space basic and applied research in the ma-
terials science area.
The intangible reasons for acquiring such infra-
structure—reasons of maintaining space leader-
ship generally, of creating further heroic role
models, of exhibiting our capacity for high-
technology development, of enhancing national
security, of maintaining a strong NASA, etc.—
are much less compelling. “Space buffs” and per-
haps some in the private sector (those who have
called for a long-term Government commitment
to provide R&D facilities in space before they
would consider investing there themselves) argue
that general-purpose space infrastructure (i.e., a
“space station”) would address such great and
intangible purposes. But there is no evidence that
large segments of the general public agree with
this assessment, and they have not been offered
the opportunity to express their views on other
major space ventures that might more forcefully
address such intangibles. A number of alterna-
tive intangible goals have already been put forth;
undoubtedly, more will be articulated in the
future.
The Concerns About Low-Earth-Orbit
Infrastructure
But while the case to be made for acquiring
some long-term, habitable, LEO infrastructure is
persuasive, there is no compelling, objective, ex-
ternal case either for obtaining all of the par-
ticular array of elements that NASA now de-
scribes under the rubric of “the space station,”
or for obtaining this or any other array in the
general manner that NASA is now expected to
pursue, nor for paying the particular public cost
that it now estimates is required to do so.13 (The
important internal case for proceeding with a
large, early “space station” program is discussed
above.) As the infrastructure would be of a very
general-purpose nature, to be used to support
myriads of conceptual uses, few of which have
been sharply defined or have gained wide accept-
ance as important objectives of our publicly
funded space program, there is no necessity for
obtaining all of it soon. And, under these circum-
stances its value to the space program is quite
difficult to estimate objectively.
Three groups are particularly concerned about
a nearly $10 billion (1984$) commitment to a
“space station” program:
l
l
those, particularly space scientists, who fear
that such a relatively large commitment
would represent a hazard to their own space
interests;
those space professionals who would prefer
NASA to take a more measured, evolving,
learn-as-we-go approach; and
13Some contend  that  the substantial and growing U.S.S.R. space
infrastructure (including Salyut,  Soyuz,  Progress, and Cosmos 1443-
class modules) constitutes a valid, and important, justification for
the United States to mount a comparable, if not more capable, pro-
gram. This report does not address this contention. However, even
if keeping up with the Soviets or beating them at their own game
were to become the motivation for a major civilian space infrastruc-
ture acquisition program, it does not follow that such a program
would resemble that which NASA has described. Indeed, it might
be quite different. See the OTA  Technical Memorandum, Sa/yut:
Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space, OTA-
TM-STI-14,  December 1983.
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l those particularly concerned with the com-
mencement of any new and costly Federal
initiative who are sensitive to its impact on
the Federal budget even if it falls within
NASA’s present, and hoped-for, “budget
envelope” of some $7 billion per year.
Of course, if the projected capital cost were
well less than the near $10 billion (1 984$) now
estimated for the initial operating capability (IOC)
(i.e., the initial phase of the infrastructure acqui-
sition program that NASA has in mind; the full
cost of the program would approximate $20 bil-
lion [1984$] by the year 2000), the concerns of
these groups would be significantly lessened.
The Cost of Low-Earth-Orbit
Infrastructure
The eventual cost of any in-space infrastructure
depends on the chosen size, capability, degree
of new technology involved, and method of ac-
quisition. It is not now possible to make another
estimate of the IOC cost that is significantly dif-
ferent from that made by NASA for what it de-
scribes as “the space station” in which one would
have greater confidence. There simply are too
many large potential “cost drivers, ” the signifi-
cance of which cannot be judged under today’s
rapidly changing circumstances.
All of the experience with the acquisition,
over a relatively long time, of large amounts of
space technology, much of it to be newly devel-
oped, suggests that the $8 billion (1984$) fig-
ure will eventually be seen to have been a floor,
not a ceiling, on cost. In spite of, or rather be-
cause of, this experience, NASA is determined
that it will not be repeated.14
There are several options available relating to
acquisition practices, international collaboration,
and the more imaginative use of the U.S. private
sector that, if effectively grasped, could reduce
the cost impact on the Federal budget. Acquisi-
tion of in-space infrastructure is inherently dif-
ferent from the acquisition of a Shuttle or a com-
mitment to develop and deploy those resources
required to send a person on a safe round-trip
to the Moon. To use NASA’s own earlier, cor-
lasee Augustine,  op. Cit.
rect, and quite illuminating expression, space in-
frastructure can be bought “by the yard.”15
One thing is clear: NASA, if it wished, or were
persuaded, could opt for obtaining now a
“core” fraction of the total infrastructure ca-
pability that it believes that the country will need
over the long term—a core fraction that would
allow many useful scientific studies to be made
and infrastructure support operations to be ex-
plored and evaluated, at a net U.S. capital cost
of one-quarter to one-third of the $8 billion that
it now seeks. To this core fraction other ele-
ments could be added incrementally as experi-
ence is gained in its use and as requirements be-
come sufficiently persuasive.
The technological and programmatic options
exist for doing so. There is clearly a great variety
of U. S., other Government, and private in-space
infrastructure (some already in hand, some in de-
velopment, some that is receiving detailed study)
from which selections could be made to provide
various kinds and amounts of in-space assets and
support services—assets and services that would
be expected to allow some new activities to be
undertaken, and to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of others.
Properly encouraged by NASA, private sector
firms are almost certain to come forward in the
next few years with proposals that would provide
some of the desired infrastructure elements and/
or support services now thought to require Gov-
ernment development and acquisition. Some
such developments are already under way.16
Alternatives
Some large sophisticated civilian space ven-
tures such as the Space Telescope are pushing
at the frontiers of technology. This is not (or, at
least, need not be) the case for in-space infrastruc-
ture. Indeed, there is little doubt that, with appro-
ls’’Space stations are the kind of development that you can buy
by the yard.” James Beggs,  NASA Administrator; Committee Re-
port of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technol-
ogy, and Space (Senator Gorton, Chairman) of the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Mar. 8, 9, and
15, 1983, p. 51.
IGTheSe developments  are discussed in some detail in ch. 3 of
this report.
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priate congressional approval and funding, the
Nation could see the capabilities described by
NASA in place and operating satisfactorily well
before the middle of the next decade. Because,
in OTA’S view, technology development for
space infrastructure envisioned in the near-term
should present no significant problem, it has not
been given central attention in this assessment.
However, some general observations on technol-
ogy matters may be useful here.
• Three basic kinds of in-space infrastructure
elements are worthy of separate, but related,
attention:
1. one or more relatively large central com-
plexes, with work crews as required–
complexes where the bulk of the relatively
innovative work could be carried on;
2. normally unattended “free-flying” plat-
forms, nearby or remote from such com-
plexes, where various equipment could
carry on activities precluded by the orbi-
tal locations, micro-gravitational circum-
stances, or effluents associated with a cen-
tral complex; and
3 .transportation between the surface and
such a complex, and between the com-
plex and the platforms, and between the
complex and much higher orbits or even
out to solar system distances.
l OTA is not persuaded that all of the particu-
lar capabilities now being emphasized by
NASA, when measured against alternatives,
are the ones that have the greatest value to
the Nation’s publicly funded civilian space
program. NASA’s present selection of the ini-
tial set of infrastructure elements and their
location in space would provide many of the
desired support capabilities. But they would
not serve the interests of those attempting
to service remote-sensing platforms of impor-
tance to weather and climate from low, near-
polar orbits, or from geostationary orbits, nor
the interests of those in the private sector
whose communications, and perhaps navi-
gation/position-fixing, satellites are located
in much higher, including geostationary, or-
bits, nor the interests of those who would
like to see less costly transportation provided
between the Earth and GEO, and the Moon,
Mars, and asteroids.
l Providing safe, sanitary, and suitable in-
l
l
frastructure elements ‘for long stays by
human crews will be costly. But however
much some may be interested in exploiting
unattended sophisticated machinery in LEO,
the state of the art is not yet capable of pro-
viding the wide range of functions and con-
fidence that human workers can provide un-
til well after the early 1990s. However, given
the substantial emphasis that, to date, NASA
has placed on human work crews in space,
it would be the prudent course, now, to raise
the level of support for the development of
in-space automation and remote operation
from Earth. Emphasis on R&D for space-
related automation and remote operation
could also be expected to have a salutary in-
fluence on automation R&D for applications
here on Earth, U.S. industrial competitive-
ness, and its introduction into commercial-
industrial activities.
There are two quite different reasons that can
be advanced for the development of new
technology to be employed in space infra-
structure. One reason is to provide capabil-
ities there that present technology cannot;
the other is to reduce the life-cycle costs of
its ownership—i.e., to reduce O&M costs
and extend its useful lifetime. Both are
laudable objectives. But they must be
balanced against the simple fact that “there
is no such thing as enough money,” and any
decision to provide anything more (or less)
than the vitally needed capabilities, and to
do so at an earlier than necessary date, and
any decision to try to predict the far future
so as to provide for all possible uses of such
capabilities, will simply result in at least the
unwarranted, and perhaps wasteful, use of
funds. OTA is not convinced that a good
enough balance has been struck between
the competing demands for funds for infra-
structure and funds for other space activities.
Diligent and imaginative exploitation of the
Shuttle fleet, along with use of free-flying
platforms and local in-space transportation
systems for individuals (all already under
way), could provide much useful informa-
tion and experience that would be of great
value in making later decisions about the
characteristics and operational employment
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of long-term in-space infrastructure. Over
time, this broadening experience will in-
crease the confidence with which eventual
infrastructure selection decisions are made.
l Significant extensions of the time that an Or-
biter could remain usefully on-orbit (to, say,
double or triple today’s 7 to 10 days) would
provide many of the capabilities desired for
work crews in permanent infrastructure, and
provide them sooner and at relatively mod-
est cost, thereby relaxing the cost and sched-
ule requirements associated with the latter.
l Space lab’s operational characteristics also
could be amplified at relatively modest cost,
with the same helpful consequences.
l Private sector development of large in-space
electrical power supplies, occasionally at-
tended platforms, and other infrastructure
elements could be successfully completed
before the end of the decade. If done with
imagination and economy they could offer
attractive alternatives to Government devel-
opment and acquisition of these capabilities.
OUR FUTURE IN SPACE
Long-Term Space Goals and
Objectives
The United States can now make major strides
in the civilian space area, but it is not adequately
prepared to do so.
We need to “re-visit” the substance of the
1958 Space Act, reaffirm those of its policy prin-
ciples that are judged to be still valid, add others
as appropriate, and lay out a set of new goals
that are responsive to contemporary and fore-
seeable circumstances, interests and values. An
initial family of end objectives also should be
identified that would address those goals over
the next years and decades.
U.S. civilian space activities should be designed
to protect, ease, challenge, and improve the hu-
man condition, In addressing its long-term goals,
the Nation should strive to move its space inter-
ests and activities closer to the mainstream of
public interests and concerns, maintain space
leadership, enhance national security, and posi-
tion its civilian space activities to respond to find-
ing the unexpected in the cosmos.
For the purpose of prompting public discussion,
OTA has developed an initial set of such goals,
and a family of initial objectives to address these
goals. Chapter 6 of the assessment treats these
in some detail. The objectives are suggested for
consideration as additions to, not substitutes for,
the continuing “core” programs of space science
and exploration, space applications, and the de-
velopment of the technology needed to conduct
all three. The family was generated to encourage
much greater and more direct involvement of in-
terested segments of the general public in civil-
ian space activities, and to strive for economic,
political, and cultural ends in addition to the sci-
entific, exploration, and technology-development
ends of today. And the family contains some ele-
ments that are simply “bold. ”
The national goals OTA proposes for discussion
are:
l
l
l
l
l
l
to increase the efficiency of space activities
and reduce their net cost to the general
public;
to involve the general public directly in space
activities, both on Earth and in space;
to derive scientific, economic, social, and
political benefits;
to increase international cooperation and
collaboration in and for space;
to study and explore the Earth, the solar sys-
tem, and the greater physical universe; and
to spread life, in a responsible fashion,
throughout the solar system.
Brief descriptions of the national objectives sug-
gested to prompt public discussion follow; they
are
l
not rank-ordered.
A space-related, global system/service could
be established to provide timely and useful
information regarding all potentially haz-
ardous natural circumstances found in the
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l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Earth’s space and atmosphere, as well as at
and below its surface.
A transportation service could be established
to and from the Earth’s Moon, and a mod-
est human presence established there, for
scientific and other cultural and economic
purposes.
Space probes could be used to obtain the
information and experience specifically re-
quired to plan for further exploration of the
planet Mars and some asteroids.
Medical studies of direct interest to the gen-
eral public, including study of the human
aging process, could be conducted through
scientific experiments that compare physio-
logical, emotional, and social experience in
the absence of gravity with experience
gained in the conduct of related surface
studies.
At least hundreds of members of the general
public per year, from the United States and
abroad, could be selected on an equitable
basis and brought into space for short visits
there.
A direct audio broadcasting, common-user
system/service could be established that
would be available to all of the countries of
the world on an economical and equitable
basis.
In general, all of the nonclassified and non-
private communications from, and nonpro-
prietary data generated by, all Government-
supported spacecraft and satellites could be
made widely available to the general pub-
lic and our educational institutions in near-
real-time and at modest cost.
Radio and optical free-space electromagnetic
propagation techniques could be exploited
in an attempt to allow reliable and economic
long-distance transmission of large amounts
of electrical energy, both into space for use
there, and from space, lunar and remote
Earth locations for distribution throughout
the world.
The unit cost of space transportation, for
people and equipment, between the Earth’s
surface and low-, geosynchronous-, and
lunar-Earth orbit could be sharply reduced.
Space-related commercial-industrial sales in
our private sector could be stimulated to in-
crease at a rate comparable to that of other
high-technology sectors, and our public ex-
penditures on civilian space assets and activ-
ities could reflect this revenue growth.
Under present circumstances, the infrastructure
that NASA would acquire in its “space station”
program is best described as general-purpose,
i.e., designed to support well over 100 in-space
activities. As a consequence, it must contain a
large number of sophisticated and costly ele-
ments, and there is considerable difficulty in set-
ting objective acquisition priorities among them
and acquisition schedules for all of them.
Were a specific family of space end objectives
established, it would then be much less diffi-
cult to establish which are the more important
in-space support assets and services that are re-
quired, and the time by which they would need
to become available.
A rough estimate of the cost of meeting this
family of objectives over the next quarter of a cen-
tury amounts to some $40 billion to $60 billion.
To put this cost into perspective, it should be
noted that:
l
l
l
l
completion of the Shuttle development pro-
gram would reduce NASA expenditures by
$2 billion per year, or $50 billion over this
interval;
if the 1 percent per year “real-growth” prin-
ciple is accepted and is extended indefinite-
ly, another $25 billion would thereby be
provided;
collaboration with other countries could pro-
vide the equivalent of perhaps another $25
billion; and
the private sector should be able to reduce
costs and make direct space R&D invest-
ments that, together, could amount to the
equivalent of billions of dollars.
Clearly, under such circumstances, funding
limitations would not prevent the United States
from undertaking an ambitious publicly sup-
ported civilian space program throughout the
next quarter of a century.
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Long-Term Space Strategies
If Congress and the President together re-
establish a formal set of basic civilian space
goals, they—and the general public—could turn
their attention to identifying a family of specific
objectives to address them. Then, on a year-to-
year basis, as these plans were completed to the
satisfaction of both branches, Congress could
decide which one(s), if any, to pursue as tech-
nological, financial, political, and other circum-
stances suggest and allow.
In the case of each objective, detailed program
plans could be laid out for attaining it. Such plans
could:
identify required technological develop-
ments and space infrastructure support ca-
pabilities;
identify operational and/or political con-
cerns;
reflect circumstances in the civilian space
area generally, both here and abroad;
estimate the schedules and costs to accom-
plish each;
judge who would be expected to be the ma-
jor participants in their conduct;
judge what the most likely end results of their
successful completion would be;
identify who would benefit from their suc-
cessful completion, and what sources of
funds should be looked to to meet both ini-
tial capital costs and any ongoing O&M costs;
and
suggest who would have the responsibility
for any long-term ownership, operation,
maintenance, and use of assets produced in
the program.
Every 5 years or so, a review of the progress
of programs addressing the initial list of objec-
tives could be conducted as at the outset, and
a new family established. In this fashion, Congress
would always have before it well-thought-out ci-
vilian space activity and investment options—op-
tions to which a great deal of professional study
and general discussion had already been given
before any decisions to proceed were required.
In this general fashion the two vital questions
of “can we do it?” and “should we do it?” would
be separated, and the latter could be taken up
by our political process in a more paced, thought-
ful, and confident manner.
It is helpful to remember that broad, public,
national debates on other important and com-
plex issues–on housing policy, for instance, and
defense policy–take place regularly. While it is
true that, historically, there has been little or no
national debate on civilian space issues, that is
because the Nation’s space capabilities are only
now coming of age—in the sense that after 25
years real options, worthy of discussion, finally
exist.
Cost Reduction
However else the publicly funded space activ-
ities of the United States might be described,
they certainly would have to be characterized
as being very, very costly. Today, the kind and
number of space activities is no longer hindered
by ignorance of the physical characteristics of
the Earth’s space domain, by concern about the
reliable in-space lifetime of well engineered and
tested equipment, or by fear that men and wom-
en going into and remaining in space for as long
as weeks at a time would be harmed. The unit
cost of these activities is the greatest inhibition
to our development and use of space. If these
costs were lowered by 10 to 100 times, many
individuals and organizations would be at-
tracted to doing things in and concerning space
that today are not seriously considered or even
thought of.
Consequently, if space is ever to be widely
used, a fundamental thrust must be to reduce
these unit costs sharply and across the board—
and particularly the cost of space transportation.
The Shuttle is an outstanding technological and
operational success, but achieving the objective
of a much lower dollar per pound cost for pas-
senger and cargo transportation between the
Earth’s surface and LEO, GEO, and beyond still
remains to be accomplished.
Some elements of space infrastructure now
under consideration by NASA for the first (IOC)
and second (full-capability) phases of its “space
station” program could improve the efficiency
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of Shuttle use and offer the promise of lowering
the unit cost of LEO/G EO/Lunar trips, and these
elements should be singled out for early and spe-
cific attention. But cost reduction is such a fun-
damental matter that it should receive major sup-
port by NASA, and by the Department of
Transportation, and by our private sector gener-
ally, and this support should call out for techno-
logical, operational, and institutional innovation,
and the objective, tough-minded, pursuit of any
such innovations that show significant promise.
There are many opportunities open to NASA
for reducing unit costs in its own acquisition proc-
esses, and these are spoken to in some detail in
appendix D.
The Private Sector
Both the President and Congress have ex-
pressed their determination to see the private
sector play a much more prominent role in our
civilian space area, and NASA and NOAA must
pay this determination particular heed. But it
is OTA’S view that, as yet, this serious matter
is not receiving all the attention within the ex-
ecutive branch that it warrants, except perhaps
at the highest levels. ” This lack of attention
seems to result from the fact that most of the
space engineers and scientists in the Government
simply do not have the professional and business
experience required to work closely and imagi-
natively with the private sector. Perhaps even
more important, their long-term experience with-
in the Government “space club” has not pro-
vided them with the perspective to appreciate
how important it is to the future of the publicly
funded space program that the private sector
assume this more prominent role.
In general, most NASA and NOAA scientists
and engineers can appreciate that successful pri-
vate sector investment in the civilian space area
(as well as any other area, for that matter) will
result in increased employment opportunities, the
production of needed and desired capital goods
and commercial services, the strengthening of our
economy generally and our international trade
‘The July 20, 1984, issuance by the White House of a “National
Policy on the Commercial Use of Space” fact sheet is an encourag-
ing development.
position particularly, etc., and do express the gen-
eral sense that these are laudable national objec-
tives. Yet almost all are still more interested in
addressing their own internal science and engi-
neering agendas.
There is another aspect of the successful inter-
jection of large-scale private sector activity into
the civilian space area that is perhaps most im-
portant to the long-term prospects of the publicly
funded portion of these activities: they could in-
crease the tax base and increase tax revenues.
Today, U.S. private sector space sales amount
to some $2 billion per year, are increasing at an
average annual rate of some 15 percent per year,
compounded, and are probably generating a total
of some $½ billion in taxes of all kinds. It appears
to be a reasonable conclusion that such an aver-
age annual rate of increase could well be main-
tained for at least the next decade or two.
Such a rate of commercial and industrial space-
related sales- and tax-revenue increase could fig-
ure most importantly in the future of the publicly
funded civilian space program. Already, today,
while the Federal outlays for this program cost
some $7 billion per year, private sector space
sales return some $1/2 billion annually in the form
of taxes. Were the 15 percent per year, com-
pounded, rate to continue throughout the end
of this century (and setting aside consideration
of any negative impact that this growth could
have on other segments of our economy), the re-
sulting tax revenues could approach half of our
public cost for supporting a civilian space pro-
gram of today’s magnitude. indeed, in 20 years
these growing tax revenues could equal the cost
of such a public program. And, by then, private
sector space-related R&D activities also could be
funded at a level of billions of dollars per year.
The funds now being spent on NASA and NOAA
programs are “discretionary” not “entitlement”
funds. At some time in the future, our national
financial circumstances could prompt serious
questions to be raised about the continuance of
such large, deferrable, expenditures. Of course,
there are arguments that can be, have been, and
would be advanced for not reducing the present
level of such public expenditures, but these levels
have been sharply curtailed in the past. To the
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extent that objective evidence of the direct im-
portance of the R&D and other activities of NASA
and NOAA to this kind of economic growth is
in hand, it is an argument for the continuation
of these activities.
OTA concludes that two important, perhaps
the most important, activities that NASA could
undertake today, and for the indefinite future,
would be to reduce the unit cost to the private
sector of their conducting activities in space, and
to be of assistance to them in their making pro-
ductive investments in space.
Developing methods of truly useful and accept-
able assistance could well be a thorny matter,
inasmuch as in many commercial-industrial-
financial areas there is a somewhat adversarial
relationship between the Government and the
private sector. And for some time the Govern-
ment will continue to be the largest purchaser
of any private sector space goods and services.
Consequently, just as in, say, the supercomputer
and nuclear energy areas, the space area will
have to see the appropriate roles of the Govern-
ment and the private sector sorted out to ensure
that the interests and responsibilities of each are
clear, so as to best serve both—and the Nation.
Finally, it can be anticipated that the private
sector’s particular concern for cost reduction will
eventually result in lowered costs in public space
activities also.
International Space Cooperation
For most of the space age, there has been con-
siderable cooperation in space activities be-
tween the United States (by NASA, NOAA and
DOD) and several other friendly countries—ef-
fective and useful cooperation. The changing
circumstances of the civilian space area call for
a reappraisal of the kind and magnitude of
cooperation that now should be sought.
The OTA report International/ Cooperation
and Competition in Civilian Space Activities,
studies this area in some considerable detail;
here we will confine our conclusions to two:
1. The European Space Agency (ESA), several
of its major member countries, Japan, and
Canada have evidenced interest in working
closely with the United States on a “space
station” program. Now may be the time to
inquire as to whether our best interests, and
the interests of at least some of these coun-
tries, would be best served by moving
beyond yesterday’s and today’s kind of
cooperation, and to attempt more direct col-
laboration or even joint venturing with them
on any such program.
As yet, NASA appears to be giving insuffi-
cient thought to establishing the kind of mul-
ti-national, interleaved, development and
production program of the type often en-
tered into by the Department of Defense in
NATO and elsewhere, and by some of our
large private sector organizations and their
analogs in other countries.
In the DOD case, considerations of mili-
tary security, the additional complexity of
working on programs involving other coun-
tries, the hazards of undue technology trans-
fer, and eventual commercial “spinoffs,”
have oftentimes been resolved, to mutual
advantage, in favor of sharing costs and im-
portant professional skills. There may be, in-
deed, similar, legitimate concerns about
technology transfer arising in any future in-
ternational civilian infrastructure develop-
ment program. However, the technology de-
veloped in such a civilian program would,
in the main, be general-purpose, and the
cost-sharing incentives would remain.
The general economic circumstances of
many of these countries are basically sound;
they desire to work with us on civilian space
matters in general, and any “space station”
program in particular; they have exhibited
technological prowess in Spacelab, the Ca-
nadian Remote Manipulator System, Ariane,
and various communications satellites pro-
vided to INTELSAT. They were willing to
trust the good offices of the United States
and NASA in going ahead with the $1 bil-
lion European Spacelab program–a pro-
gram that could be rendered valueless at any
time that the United States were to withdraw
the opportunity of their employing it with
the Shuttle.
Given all of these circumstances, it is not
beyond imagination that a major internation-
al collaborative civilian “space station” pro-
- . — .  
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gram could be negotiated that, among its
other virtues, could lighten the total burden
on our public purse perhaps by as much as
$2 billion to $3 billion. This is not the ap-
proach to dealing with other countries on
any “space station” program that is now be-
ing taken by NASA. The present approach
is one of asking other countries to add funds
to the United States’ estimated and antici-
pated $8 billion commitment. The alterna-
tive approach has not been debated in the
United States outside of NASA.
The alternative approach is being explored
by NOAA: NOAA is soliciting important
cost-sharing, perhaps as much as one-half,
on the part of other countries who share the
U.S. interest in maintaining, and improving,
weather-related space sensing systems. This
alternative approach to working on a “space
station” program with other countries is
worthy of careful consideration by Congress.
For no reasonable way of reducing the Fed-
eral debt burden by billions of dollars should
be passed by unless Congress convinces
itself that it is not in the Nation’s interest to
do SO.
2. Except, perhaps, for the smallest and poorest
countries, all of the countries in the world
must have at least some interest in space:
the devices and people that orbit above
them, the activities that go on there, and
how they all could affect their own interests.
But only about one-tenth of the world’s
countries play an active role in space today.
Here is an extraordinary opportunity for
the United States!
Our determination to exhibit “space lead-
ership” need not and probably should not
be confined to dealing with the richest and/
or most technologically advanced countries.
We could broaden our approach to “inter-
national cooperation” by taking as an expli-
cit goal the incorporation of the space inter-
ests and activities of any other country in the
world into our program, if that country
would be at all inclined to participate in
space ventures along with us, Of course,
such an initiative would require hard work,
patience, imagination, and generosity on the
part of the United States. But these charac-
teristics are not usually in short supply in the
United States generally, and certainly not
among the professionals in NASA and the
Department of State. Indeed, it was the com-
bination of just these national characteris-
tics in the U.S. approach to working with a
few countries in the past that enabled them
to begin to work in space.
Recall that INTELSAT now has over 100
member countries, joined in a common in-
terest to see space used to improve commu-
nications. The United States could now
begin to use any in-space infrastructure pro-
gram to start orchestrating the interests of all
of the countries in the world that would be
willing to work with us in reasonable ways
to see space developed and used for any and
all peacefu I purposes “for the benefit of all
man kind.”
Space as an Arena of
Peaceful Cooperation
Even now, when discourse between the United
States and the Soviet Union is modest in the ex-
treme, and the practical possibilities of effecting
cooperative space-related activities between the
superpowers are severely limited,18 many cannot
but hope that the two countries will find ways
to initiate important cooperative civilian space
endeavors in the future.
To date, most visions of such cooperation form
around scientific activities. They are important,
and they should continue to be given serious and
thoughtful attention.
Together, the United States and the Soviet
Union have some 600 million people and a gross
national product of some $5 trillion between
them, and both have global interests and power.
Therefore, possible joint cooperative space
activities need not be confined to science; in-
deed, a broad range of space-related activity
IBU,S..U.S,S.R.  Coowration  in space-related activities has not en-
tirely vanished. The SARSAT search-and-rescue program, a joint
U.S.-Canadian-French undertaking, continues to interoperate suc-
cessfully with the parallel Soviet COSPAS  system. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union are members of INMARSAT, the
maritime equivalent of INTELSAT,  and both are cooperating, along
with Europe and Japan, in the International Halley Watch program.
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Photo   Aeronaut/es and Space Administration
NASA has had agreements with more than 100 countries for cooperation in space activities. The pinnacle of international
cooperation in space to date was the  Test Project  in 1975 (shown here), in which a U.S. Apollo
spacecraft docked with a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft for several days of joint manned operations. However, no international
cooperative agreement (including  has yet involved significant sharing of technology or saving of costs.
areas might well be explored, imaginatively and
determinedly.
OTA plans to report on some of the issues in
this area in the fall of 1984.
NASA’S Changing Role
Until a few years ago, and except for the satel-
lite communications area, NASA has, since its in-
ception, organized, staffed, and managed itself
to see that it, and its contractors, did essentially
all that was done in the civilian space area.
Throughout most of this time, and probably
without conscious reflection on NASA’s part, or
the part of anyone else, it has simply been as-
sumed that once our country decided that some-
thing was to be done in or for civilian space,
NASA was to do it. That is, the responsibility for
seeing that something got done in the civilian
space area was equated with NASA’s doing it
itself.
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But the changing circumstances of the past few
years now clearly suggest a fundamental reap-
praisal of NASA’s responsibilities and role in the
development and further study, exploration, and
use of space.
Although this study of civilian “space stations”
and the U.S. “future in space” has brought these
changing circumstances into clear, at times pain-
fully clear, focus, it has not attempted to search
out what NASA’s new role should be in detail.
It is to be noted, however, that the Nation’s in-
terests now are becoming much broader than
those of NASA and, indeed, in some instances,
may lead to conflicts with what NASA may per-
ceive to be its own interests.
NASA could and, in OTA’S view, might well
now give increased attention to making some
fundamental shifts of attitude and operation.
In the past, it has been NASA’S responsibility
to meet any given national space objective; in
the future, it could be NASA’s responsibility to
see that the objective is met. That is, NASA could
now aspire to the much broader role of encour-
aging others in the private sector and through-
out the world to do much more of what it does
today.
If NASA is to rise successfully to the challenges
now emerging in the national and international
space arena, it must place relatively less empha-
sis on accomplishing by itself those things that
our private sector or other friendly nations can
satisfactorily do, either alone or with NASA assist-
ance. it can succeed in this only by continuing
to cooperate with both, and by broadening this
cooperation so as to prompt and assist both to
extend their space-related capacities, confidence,
and commitment. And it could emphasize such
cooperation in the acquisition of in-space infra-
structure, i.e., a “space station. ”
Released from its relatively near-term focus,
NASA could concentrate more of its own profes-
sional activities on the most important and ex-
citing of questions regarding space, the things that
no one else can or will do: the very best of space-
related science; the cutting edge of space-related
technology development; the boldest of space-
related explorations and developments.
Finally, NASA could see that its activities con-
tinue to be conducted, and the results continue
to be used, not only to increase knowledge and
to address important social and political goals,
but also to enable our private space sector to in-
crease its non-Government sales—the sales that
generate the taxes that help to pay for NASA’s
activities.
Non-Government Policy Studies
It is inherently difficult for the Government
to make some kinds of policy studies and, in-
deed, it is potentially hazardous to have all such
studies made by the Government in areas of im-
portant national concern.
Particularly in areas where Federal programs
take a long time to develop and carry out (say,
a decade: cf. Apollo, Shuttle, Landsat, “space
station”) vested interests are naturally created
within the Government and closely related sec-
tions of the private aerospace industry. Later
these interests can present serious problems
of resource re-allocation on the program’s ap-
proaching completion unless new avenues for
their employment have been carefully explored
and publicly agreed on beforehand.
Our free, and increasingly educated, mobile,
diverse, rich society is bound to generate ideas,
desires, value judgments, and activities about
which the Government simply has difficulty in
keeping well informed, particularly if the ideas
are quite different from those with which the
Government has been dealing for some time and
are generated and pursued by persons and orga-
nizations that are “new to the scene. ”
Civilian space activities continue to be of im-
portance to the United States in many intangi-
ble ways, and they are now beginning to be
appreciated as offering tangible and growing pri-
vate sector economic prospects as well. “Space
commercialization” has become a popular topic.
But in the absence of a “bottom line” and com-
petitive economic forces, the Government has
a more difficult time than does our private sec-
tor in sharply reducing unit costs. And Govern-
ment offices only rarely, by themselves, originate
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large innovative and challenging programs and
carry them out to satisfactory completion.
In the area of the physical sciences, for in-
stance, U.S. leaders can look to several policy
study centers for independent guidance on issues
of broad national concern, In the space area,
however, there are only a few dedicated individ-
uals who can provide similar guidance.
In view of the increasing importance of civil-
ian space activities to the American public gen-
erally, it might well be desirable to establish one
or more independent space policy centers whose
professional staff would not be required to re-
spond to the contemporary institutional con-
cerns of the space community. Such centers
would control their research agendas and
allocate resources as they believed best, rather
than simply responding to directives. An exam-
ple of this type would be a university-based in-
stitute with several funding sources. The con-
tinuing study efforts of such centers could
provide the American public a better opportu-
nity to consider, and to help initiate, space activ-
ities that would address important cultural, eco-
nomic, social, and political ends.
POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
In the context of the circumstances and issues
discussed in this assessment and the conclusions
reached therein, Congress could now give con-
sideration to taking a number of initiatives.
Some of these suggested initiatives are directly
related to “the civilian space stations” area;
others are related to broader areas that are of gen-
eral importance to “our future in space. ”
Strategies for Acquiring Any New
In-Space Civilian Infrastructure
The response of Congress to the President’s for-
mal request for the commencement of a “space
station” program should take account of the gen-
eral circumstances discussed in this study and the
existence of options beyond those proposed by
NASA. Given these general circumstances and
the variety of options, Congress could adopt one
of four positions:
1. decide that it is premature and/or inadvisable
to set out, soon, to obtain any large amount
of new long-term in-space infrastructure, and
refuse to accede to an executive branch re-
quest to do so a year or two hence; or
2. at least by implication simply agree, in prin-
ciple, to provide the kind and number of in-
space assets and services that NASA judges
to be necessary and, accepting its $8 billion
cost and 7 to 8-year schedule estimate as
working numbers, be prepared to approve
3.
a year or two hence the acquisition of the
general kind of infrastructure elements that
NASA is now focusing on; or
specifically identify any major space services
to be provided, ask NASA to present various
estimates of costs, schedules, and procure-
ment strategies that would be involved in
providing them and, subsequently, select
from these estimates the elements and strat-
egies to be approved; or
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in this
artist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost
space infrastructure elements.
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4. for the acquisition of any in-space infrastruc-
ture, simply approve an average annual ex-
penditure rate for its acquisition and allow
NASA to select the elements, acquisition
schedules, and procurement strategies in the
light of NASA’s judgment regarding their rel-
ative cost and value.
Congress need not imagine that it is required
to commit itself to accepting any of these posi-
tions at this time, inasmuch as the President’s
fiscal year 1985 request was restricted to the first
year of a 2-year study activity that would cost a
relatively modest amount (some 5 percent of the
projected total acquisition cost) for such a ma-
jor implied space activity. But there is a suffi-
ciently persuasive case for our obtaining some
additional space infrastructure so that thoughtful
and comprehensive study of what it should be
and how it should be obtained is now warranted.
Therefore (setting aside the very important mat-
ter of our Federal budget’s present and projected
circumstances and the implications thereof for
any deferrable “new starts”) Congress could use
the next year and a half to become better in-
formed about the options available to it and the
implications of selecting particular ones from
among them. And it could task the executive
branch to make additional, broader, studies than
it now has in mind—studies that could assist Con-
gress in arriving at its crucial judgments a year
or so hence.
The House Committee on Science and Tech-
nology has taken an important step in the direc-
tion of raising such broader issues in requesting
a study by NASA that will look into “space sta-
tion” program management and procurement
matters. 19 A report of this study, to be provided
by NASA to the committee by December 15,
1984, is expected to speak to both “ . . . [the]
Space Station development management plan
and procurement strategies with a description of
the alternatives available and the basis for the
[NASA] choices taken.”
Similarly, Congress could request the executive
branch to inform it regarding:20
l
l
l
Igsee Committee report of Mar. 21, 1984.
qt shou  Id be noted that this assessment makes the assumption
that NASA’s overall funding level will remain relatively constant
as it has in recent years.
The priorities it places on the various serv-
ices and assets that it sees as generally de-
sirable. That is, if Congress were to allocate
more or less than the $2 billion per year now
being discussed for the acquisition of IOC
elements of space infrastructure, what are
the most important services to be made avail-
able and elements to be selected?
The ways that are available to keep the U.S.
public cost to a minimum, and the bases for
the executive branch’s pursuit or rejection
of them. That is, there are two important op-
portunities for reducing the public cost of
any space infrastructure, but it is not clear
that NASA—with its institutional interest in
retaining present personnel force and appro-
priation levels—has incentives to pursue
either with sufficient imagination and vigor.
These opportunities are:
1, Other countries could collaborate closely
with the United States so as to produce
any agreed infrastructure in a fashion that
would see their financial contributions re-
duce the demands on our public purse to
well below the $8 billion figure, rather
than simply producing additional, perhaps
essentially duplicative, infrastructure ele-
ments at no savings to the United States.
2. Our private sector could be encouraged
to use its own resources to develop, pro-
duce, and install as much of any agreed
infrastructure as would meet the Govern-
ment’s performance specifications at a
cost lower than the Government’s present
procurement practices allow, rather than
have Government funds used to purchase
all of it and Government personnel used
to manage the process in detail.
Other important space initiatives that NASA
could undertake. That is, if Congress were
to decide that the acquisition of any in-
frastructure should proceed at an average
annual public expenditure rate appreciably
less than $2 billion per year, what other im-
portant programs could be mounted with the
remaining professional staff and the differ-
ence in dollars?21
*1 Ibid.
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l Conceptual programs of cooperation with
the Soviet Union in civilian space activities.
That is, while a case can be made for mount-
ing large and continuing, technologically
challenging, U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative civil-
ian space programs, essentially nothing of
this nature is now being seriously considered
because of the low state of political accom-
modation. In anticipation that today’s ten-
sions may abate someday, it is important that
conceptual programs now be identified and
described that would: 1 ) be of little inherent
political sensitivity, 2) offer little prospect of
significant technology transfer, 3) allow for
important involvement of other space-expe-
rienced countries as well, and 4) offer the
promise of important cost savings to any
country that, otherwise, would pursue any
of them alone. The conduct of some such
programs could well require some related
elements of in-space infrastructure.
These broader studies would be carried on
at the same time, and for a small fraction of
the cost of, the “space-station” engineering
studies that NASA is now beginning to con-
duct, and the conclusions of their satisfac-
tory completion would clearly be of impor-
tance to Congress 1 ½ years hence.
Civilian Space Policies, Goals,
Objectives, and Strategies
Except for a few changes in the basic space law,
Congress has been satisfied to deal with evolv-
ing circumstances through specific year-to-year
changes in NASA’s authorization bills. But these
circumstances are now so greatly changed, and
our space assets and experience are now so great,
that it has become clear that Congress could re-
assess our civilian space laws’ goals, objectives,
institutions, policies, and plans with great profit.
For instance, Congress and the general public
should not find themselves in the position of hav-
ing to decide on large, complex, and very costly
items of space infrastructure such as a “space sta-
tion” without having a much clearer understand-
ing of what these items will all be used for over
the long term, and without being confident that
their character, the uses to which they will be put,
how they are to be acquired, owned, operated,
and paid for, have all been carefully considered
and conclusions reached that most would accept
as reflecting our broadest national interests—not
primarily the interests of the space community.
Congress is now moving to effect some impor-
tant changes in space law and policy. Legislation
has already been enacted in 1984 by Congress
and accepted by the President that makes an im-
portant change in the Space Act.22 The act now
declares “ . . . that [NASA should] seek and en-
courage, to the maximum extent possible, the
fullest commercial use of space.”
Although a sufficient, and sufficiently broad,
base of thought, analysis, and discussion of fun-
damental considerations is not yet in hand to
allow Congress to proceed to make other funda-
mental changes in our national civilian space pos-
ture with great confidence, the National Com-
mission on Space authorized for in Title I I of this
year’s legislation,23 and its subsequent activities,
couId go far toward calling widespread attention
to our civilian space problems and opportunities.
The Commission is expected to give the first
broad consideration to our national space inter-
ests in a generation—consideration that would
encompass interests in addition to those of sci-
ence and technology that receive by far most of
the attention today. It is the kind of considera-
tion that would guard against our continuing to
be caught up in either fascination with or the de-
tails of exotic space technology, and would focus
instead on sensible and generally acceptable
methods whereby we can proceed with the de-
velopment of space, meet human needs in so do-
ing, and fashion new ways of paying for it as we
go. And it could identify new policies, goals, ob-
jectives, and strategies, and structural changes
that, put in place, would increase the likelihood
that the great promises of the next quarter-cen-
tury of the space age would, in fact, be realized.
All of those within and without the Govern-
ment who are truly and seriously interested in
furthering our prospects in space should be pre-
pared to assist this Commission.
zzpublic Law 98-361.
ZJlbid.
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The Creation of Space Policy
Study Centers
The number of professionals engaged in space
policy analysis is extremely small. The President’s
science advisor spoke to this lack of independ-
ent expertise in testifying before a House subcom-
mittee in February 1984.
And in March the House Committee on Sci-
ence and Technology24 spoke to “ . . . the chang-
ing character of national and international space
activity [that] translates into issues and policy con-
siderations of increasing breadth and complex-
ity, ” and went on to say that “[d]uring the next
Wjee  committee  KpOrt Of Mar.  21 f 1984.
year the Committee intends to look in greater
depth at the elements and character of the cur-
rent institutional apparatus for setting space pol-
icy [and] examining the process by which deci-
sions and policies are reached on civil space
issues. ”
In these circumstances, Congress could con-
sider prompting the establishment of one or more
modestly sized, policy-related, study centers out-
side of the Government. Provided with sufficient-
ly broad charters, and funded in such a fashion
as to assure both independence in, and long-term
support of, truly challenging studies, professionals
would be attracted to conduct the kinds of broad
inquiry and analysis that the civilian space area
now so badly needs.
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Chapter 3
SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
SUMMARY
Since 1957 various spacefaring nations have
launched hundreds of spacecraft, many of which
remain today in Earth orbit or on itineraries within
the solar system or beyond. Many of these space-
craft, and some of those to be launched in the
future including any “space station” elements
and associated launch and transportation sys-
tems, are elements of space infrastructure, enabl-
ing humans at the surface and in space to carry
out activities outside of Earth’s atmosphere. This
chapter begins with a discussion of the space
environment, orbits, and the technical aspects of
space infrastructure. NASA’s specific aspirations
for a “space station” and the functions that NASA
expects it to provide are listed in detail. The pro-
jected uses of such a facility are summarized,
taken from the response of a number of major
aerospace contractors to NASA’s Mission Anal-
ysis Studies. The reaction of the National Re-
search Council’s Space Science Board and the
Space Applications Board to NASA’s “space sta-
tion” aspirations are then discussed. The re-
mainder of chapter 3 lists and describes alterna-
tives to NASA’s aspirations for space infrastructure,
including a number of currently existing platforms
and other infrastructure elements, and some that
are under development or in the planning stage. 1
A “USA Salyut” concept is presented as an op-
tion that could provide in-space infrastructure
that is roughly comparable to the Soviet Union’s
current Salyut 7.
‘Among  the sources for the material presented in this chapter
are background repcrts  prepared for OTA  by Dr. Jerry Grey,
aerospace consultant (on space systems and transportation) and
by Teledyne-Brown Engineering on alternatives to wholly new tech-
nology in-space infrastructure. Additional material on existing or
proposed space platforms and spacecraft was furnished by indi-
vidual aerospace companies. Also available were results of an OTA
workshop on lower cost alternatives to a space station; workshop
participants included aerospace industry and international repre-
sentatives.
INTRODUCTION
The United States is currently pursuing a wide
variety of civilian space activities. The argument
is being forcefully advanced that additional in-
space infrastructure would permit scientific, tech-
nology-development and commercial activities
to be performed more easily or economically
than at present, and might allow new types of
activities in space. Plans for a civilian “space sta-
tion, ” i.e., space infrastructure, were included
in the ambitious U.S. publicly supported space
effort which commenced immediately after the
launch of the first Sputnik over a quarter century
ago. NASA undertook preliminary designs for
such “space stations” in the early sixties.2 In the
early seventies, astronauts were successfully sup-
ported for long durations aboard Skylab, the first
U.S. space laboratory. Now, at the beginning of
the second-quarter century of the space age, U.S.
space infrastructure that would support long-du-
ration human activities in space is again under
consideration.
‘The first realistic design initiative for a space station appears to
have been taken prior to the NASA efforts by the Lockheed Corp.
Missiles and Space Division in the late 1950s (S. B. Kramer and R.
A. Byers,  “Assembly of a Multi-Manned Satellite, ” LMSD Report
No. 48347, December 1958).
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANY SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
The space environment is quite different from
that on and near the Earth’s surface. There are
a number of orbital, environmental, and techni-
cal factors that must be considered to ensure safe
and successful operations in space.
Orbits
Infrastructure elements could be located in
one, or several, of a wide range of orbits. Most
communications satellites and some meteorologi-
cal and Earth observation satellites utilize loca-
tions in geostationary orbits, 35,800 km above
the Equator, as fixed vantage points from which
to transmit and receive signals or to observe the
Earth’s surface and its atmosphere. It has been
frequently suggested that on-orbit servicing of
geostationary satellites, their orbital transfer pro-
pulsion systems, and inter-orbit transportation
vehicles, could be done more efficiently from in-
frastructure located in low-Earth-orbit (LEO) with
a low inclination relative to the Equator. An or-
bital inclination of 28.5° (see fig. 1) would be rea-
sonable for this infrastructure, because launches
over the Atlantic Ocean from Cape Canaveral
into orbits of this inclination consume the least
energy.
These two functions–servicing geostationary
satellites and launching into the lowest energy
orbit from Cape Canaveral—are reasonably com-
patible, because the additional energy needed
per unit mass at great altitudes to transfer a
payload into geostationary orbit from 28.5° is
relatively small.
However, full repetitive coverage of the Earth
for low-altitude meteorological and other Earth-
viewing satellites requires near-polar orbits (such
as the near-900 inclination illustrated in fig. 1).
Such satellites are therefore launched from the
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, which
offers a safe launch trajectory to the south, over
the Pacific Ocean. A Sun-synchronous near-polar
orbit that follows the dawn-dusk line is possible;
it avoids Earth shadowing of solar-powered or
solar-viewing instruments, but does not accom-
modate Earth-viewing instruments that require il-
lumination of the Earth’s surface by the Sun.
b
Figure 1
Representative Uses
l Earth observation
Near-polar (land, ocean, atmosphere)
orbit
I
Materials
processing
Life sciences
Astrophysics/solar
When repetitive but not full coverage of the
Earth is essential, a lower inclination can be used;
an orbit inclination of 57o is favored because it
is the maximum practical inclination obtainable
with a Cape Canaveral launch. It may be desir-
able to use infrastructure elements in several or-
bital planes, or perhaps to develop and employ
a reusable orbital transfer vehicle (ROTV) for
transportation between orbits having various in-
clinations, although this would be expensive.
Orbital altitudes are also related to several phys-
ical characteristics of space. One of these is the
“solar wind,” a radiation flux of high-energy par-
ticles from the Sun, that can present a threat to
human beings and equipment. However, the re-
gion from 200 to 600 km in altitude (LEO) is
shielded by the Earth’s magnetosphere and the
radiation there is almost negligible compared with
the radiation in and beyond the Van Allen belts,
which extend to 50,000 km in altitude. The mag-
netic field is less effective in shielding against ra-
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Diagram showing Earth’s magnetosphere and other near-Earth phenomena.
diation approaching the Earth near its magnetic
poles, including that associated with solar flares.
Thus, high-altitude orbits and near-polar orbits
are much less hospitable than low-Earth-orbits of
low inclination.
Orbit altitude also affects the amount of global
Earth coverage available to viewing instruments.
If a sensor is required to provide daily global cov-
erage, for example, the physical limitations on
the angular swath width impose a minimum sat-
ellite altitude much higher than 500 km.
Aerodynamic drag becomes an important con-
sideration for lower altitude orbits. Aerodynamic
drag decreases for higher orbits; at 400 km, the
drag is two orders of magnitude less than at 200
km. The minimum economical, long-term alti-
tude for large semipermanent infrastructure ele-
ments that would be serviced using the Shuttle
ordinarily would be above 300 km, and it will
likely be below 600 km because of the rapid de-
crease in Shuttle payload capacity with greater
altitude.
Since locations in LEO are above most of the
atmosphere, astronomical observations of all sorts
are favored there. As well, one revolution around
the Earth in a typical circular LEO takes 90 min-
utes, allowing vast areas of Earth’s surface to be
observed in continuous succession and on a fre-
quently repeated basis. However, higher orbits
provide a broader field of view for remote sens-
ing of Earth.
Another consideration is the energy that must
be expended to take material to a sufficient alti-
tude to obtain a relatively low drag, long-life or-
bit. To reach LEO requires more than half of the
energy required either to reach geostationary or-
bit or to escape the Earth’s gravitational field
altogether. This is the physical basis for some of
the projected cost savings of a permanently orbit-
ing infrastructure base: large launch costs would
be paid only once when infrastructure compo-
nents are carried into orbit and left there, avoid-
ing additional, repetitive, launch costs for heavy
equipment that would be frequently used in
space. Of course, resupply launches would still
be needed and would offset some of this cost sav-
ing.3
Low-Earth-Orbit Environment
Four characteristics of the LEO physical envi-
ronment are of particular interest: microgravity,
high vacuum, periodic high-intensity sunlight,
and the combination of solar exposure and shad-
owing that makes thermal control possible. For
any infrastructure elements located beyond the
Van Allen belts, a fifth environmental parameter
is high-energy radiation,
3The number of resupply launches required would depend on
the types and levels of activities carried out, the presence or absense
of people, etc.
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Above the minimum practical orbital altitude
of a permanent space facility, the presence of
microgravity and vacuum are essentially inde-
pendent of orbital inclination and altitude. In par-
ticular, the exploitation of microgravity or near
“weightIessness, ” which occurs when gravita-
tional and orbital acceleration counteract one
another, shows promise for the processing of ma-
terials under such unique conditions. Energy gen-
eration depends on radiation from the Sun, and
thermal control depends on radiating waste heat
out into deep space. For most orbits, the Sun is
eclipsed nearly half of the time by the Earth, but
this effect can be tolerated if energy storage sys-
tems are used; batteries charged from solar pho-
tovoltaic arrays can be used to supply electric
power during times that sunlight is blocked by
the Earth.
Of course, for many human beings, simply be-
ing in orbit, and being able to view the Earth and
heavens from this perspective, are the outstand-
ing characteristics of space.
Technical Considerations
The design of infrastructure components and
systems will depend heavily on a number of
technical considerations. While a considerable
amount of workable “space station” technology
exists, as demonstrated by the success of Skylab,
SPAS, MESA, and the Shuttle itself, the develop-
ment of new technology may be desirable to ob-
tain a long, and particularly useful and efficient
lifetime for space infrastructure.
Data Management.– Space infrastructure ele-
ments would use an extensive data handling net-
work both on-board and on the ground. The net-
work would serve orbiting elements including the
Shuttle, communication, navigation and remote
sensing satellites, orbital transfer vehicles, crew
members on spacewalks, tended free flyers, and
support staff and scientific researchers on Earth.
Cost, program control, and reliability prompt con-
sideration of a wide variety of hardware and soft-
ware technologies just now coming into being.
For example, faster processors, laser disk storage,
and flat display terminals will provide large in-
creases in capacity at lower unit cost and weight.
Communications.—A number of communica-
tion links would be desirable using frequencies
throughout the electromagnetic spectrum and en-
compassing a wide variety of distances, informa-
tion content, and line-of-sight propagation direc-
tions. Space communications must be designed
to avoid interference with established ground-
based systems and to take privacy, cost, capac-
ity, and reliability into account. Another consid-
eration is the location of communications and
data processing nodes. The various space infra-
structure elements could require a large number
of antennas and lenses (the Shuttle has 23) that,
altogether, would cover a wide field of view.
Phased-array antennas, whose radiation patterns
can be “pointed” electronically rather than me-
chanically, could be widely used.
Systems for locating and tracking natural and
manmade debris, loose tools, and approaching
spacecraft is also necessary. System concepts for
this purpose include radar with beacons or pas-
sive reflectors, radio transponders, interferometry,
the Global Positioning System, ground-based ra-
dar, or Iidar (laser radar),
Although space communications can rely ini-
tially on current technology, millimeter and op-
tical wavelengths may be desirable for use in
space. The development of systems in these parts
of the spectrum would offer significant techno-
logical challenge.
Electromagnetic Interference (EMl).–This is
a significant problem that can occur in space, par-
ticularly when high-power microwave sources
and sensitive detectors are involved. It is difficult
to protect some electronic circuits from this “pick-
up” problem. In some cases EM I could force the
use of a constellation of individual platforms sep-
arated rather widely from each other rather than
a single large structure.
Attitude Control and Stabilization .–Although
space infrastructure elements do not have to con-
tend with gravity, wind, earthquakes, precipita-
tion, and other problems encountered on Earth,
they must deal with quite different problems such
as the absence of both a “firm footing” and the
‘‘stiffening” influence of gravity. Of particular
concern is the control and stabilization of large,
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flexible, evolving, structural assemblies and mod-
ules. Elaborate control systems for each module
(sensors, actuators, computers, , . .) that are co-
ordinated by a single “supervisory” controller
may have to be employed.
Power.–Solar photovoltaic power generators
with nickel-cadmium battery storage are com-
monly used in space. Systems employing them
today cost at least several thousands of dollars
per watt and have useful lifetimes of 10 years or
less in orbit. One alternative is a nuclear power
reactor, perhaps of the type now being explored
in the Space Power Advanced Reactor program,
but development time and hazards to human be-
ings (and perhaps cost) may well preclude the
use of nuclear reactors for inhabited infrastruc-
ture in the near future.
Significant cost reduction in photovoltaic arrays
has been achieved using optical focusing devices
that concentrate sunlight on the photocells, but
considerable effort would be needed to develop
and demonstrate practical arrays of this type for
use in space. Coupled with this technique could
be the use of more efficient solar cells, such as
gallium-arsenide, in place of silicon cells. Efforts
to increase the lifetime and reduce the mass of
batteries could also lead to cost reduction. One
promising replacement for present nickel-cad-
mium devices is the nickel-hydrogen battery.
Another, at an earlier stage of development, is
the regenerative fuel cell/electrolysis method, in
which a fuel cell produces electricity and water
when in the Earth’s shadow and splits water into
hydrogen and oxygen when in sunlight.
Thermal Energy Management.–For infrastruc-
ture composed of connected modules, it may not
be practical to use individual thermal control sys-
tems for each module. Although individual sys-
tems would offer maximum flexibility, such an
approach would prevent heat thrown off from
one module from being used by another, and
each module’s radiator, which is by far the big-
gest and most exposed component of the ther-
mal system, would impose its own orientation
and location constraints on the overall structure.
Hence, a centralized, automated system may be
needed both to minimize total mass and to op-
timize radiator orientation (i.e., edge to Sun).
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However, such a system would require both a
large, massive single radiator and considerable
transfer of energy among the various modules via
a heat-transport medium. Therefore, the trade-
offs between centralized and modular thermal re-
jection systems need to be examined in detail.
The centralized system might utilize a gimbaled
radiator maintained in an edge-to-Sun orienta-
tion, not only maximizing heat dissipation and
thereby requiring perhaps a 60-percent smaller
area than a fixed radiator, but also minimizing
solar-wind degradation of its thermal coating.
A conventional separate-tube radiator, similar
to that used in the Shuttle, would be extremely
complex and massive because of the need for
redundant piping, valving, and other plumbing
components. For a typical 100-kW heat rejection
system, a Shuttle-type radiator would require
almost 6,000 meters (almost 4 miles) of tubing
in over 1,500 individual pumped fluid tubes,
more than 50 fluid manifolds, and more than 75
isolation valves, fluid swivels or flexible line
segments. Hence, a heat pipe radiator may be
a better choice. Heat pipes transfer heat by boil-
ing a fluid such as ammonia at one end of a
sealed tube and condensing it at the other. The
liquid is then returned to the hot end by capillary
(surface-tension) forces in a specially designed
wick which forms part of the tube. The heat pipe
has no moving parts, and each pipe is self-con-
tained. Single pipes have demonstrated heat re-
jection rates up to 2 kW; hence, as few as 50
could handle 100 kW of power in space, While
the technology is relatively well known, consid-
erable development is called for to evolve a prac-
tical, reliable, long-life, heat pipe radiator at this
power level.
Another technological challenge would be an
inter-module system that transfers thermal energy
to a radiator. Shuttle-type pumped-loop systems
using Freon 21 would consume large amounts
of power (up to 5 kW for a 100-kW system), and
would also require the development of large,
costly, space-rated pumps and their attendant re-
pair and maintenance. A two-phase heat trans-
port system using the same principle as the heat
pipe would consume only about one-tenth as
much power. Hence, it may be worth the cost
of its development.
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The use of passive cryogenic coolers for electro-
optical detectors will present a difficult techni-
cal challenge. Active cryogenic systems are prob-
ably not satisfactory for long-term operation. Pas-
sive coolers require exposure to dark space and
an environment that is free from effluents that
would condense on the cooler’s cold patch.
Propulsion.— Infrastructure elements require
propulsion systems for attitude control, orbit
change, station-keeping, and acceleration con-
trol. Propulsion systems currently use storable liq-
uid mono- and bi-propellant pressure-fed thrust-
ers. Near-future plans include cryogenic oxygen/
hydrogen propulsion systems. Longer term pros-
pects are electromagnetic thrusters including ion
rocket (ions can be accelerated to much higher
exhaust velocities than those provided by chem-
ical rockets) and mass drivers (“buckets” of heavy
materials can be accelerated, very rapidly by elec-
trical motors rather than by conventional chem-
ical combustion).
A principal challenge will be the creation of a
storage and transfer system for handling liquid
fuels in space. Specific needs are leak-proof fluid
couplings and leak-detection techniques, fluid-
quantity gauges that operate with acceptable ac-
curacy in microgravity where conventional liquid-
Ievel sensors are not suitable, reusable, low-mass,
nontoxic, long-life insulation for cryogenic stor-
age and transport, and the liquefaction and refrig-
eration systems needed for long-term cryogenic
storage. Improvements in cryogenic refueling
procedures now used on the surface for Shuttle
operations would be necessary—preferably pro-
cedures that would use automation—to obviate
the need for a large technical staff that would be
very expensive to accommodate in space.
Life Support Systems.–Some of the materials
necessary for the support of humans in space
would be supplied from Earth, others would be
recovered in orbit from metabolic byproducts.
With the exception of food, recovery technology
demonstrated since 1967 can provide for oxygen,
carbon dioxide scrubbing, and water for both
drinking and washing. Such a “partially closed”
system accommodating an eight-person crew,
each drinking about 3.5 kg of water and using
about a liter of wash water per day, would have
to be resupplied every 90 days and would have
a 30-day contingency supply. Compared with the
Shuttle system, which does not use recovery,
almost 7,OOO kg per resupply launch could be
saved. If reclaimed water were also used for
showers, and for washing utensils and clothes,
thereby replacing “wet wipes,” disposable clothes,
and disposable food service utensils, another
5,000 kg could be saved for each launch. There-
fore, the development cost of such a system
could be offset by associated transportation sav-
ings of over $100 million per year.
Food supply technology will also require some
development, including improvements in packag-
ing, preservation, bulk storage, reconstitution,
and on-board preparation. Proper sanitation to
reduce the incidence of debilitating illness in the
completely closed environment of a “space sta-
tion” will require waste disposal, contamination
containment, disease-prevention measures, and
heakh-maintenance facilities unique to micro-
gravity environments to be developed and used.
Some of this technology has already been devel-
oped for the long-duration Skylab project, but im-
provements are needed. Particular attention
should be given to the proper design of residen-
tial, exercise, and recreational facilities if people
are to remain in orbit for periods of much longer
than several weeks.
Space Transportation
Vehicles will be needed for transportation be-
tween Earth and LEO, between various LEO or-
bits, between LEO and higher, including geosta-
tionary, orbits, and beyond to the Moon and
perhaps to other planets and some asteroids. In
the near future, supply for a “space station” from
Earth would rely primarily on the present Shut-
tle and possibly its derivatives. Local checkout
and maintenance services requiring people work-
ing directly in space could be conducted by
tethered or free-flying spacesuited astronauts,
sometimes augmented by the existing manned
maneuvering units (MMUs). Servicing of more
distant spacecraft could be accomplished with a
planned orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), pos-
sibly in combination with either the Shuttle or a
planned space-based ROTV, or by an ROTV (or
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the Shuttle) carrying an astronaut equipped with
an MMU.
Launching spacecraft into higher orbits or on
Earth-escape trajectories requires the use of an
upper stage rocket, which could be automatic,
teleoperated, or used with a crew, plus kick
stages or planetary landing stages, depending on
the project. ROTVS, either teleoperated or em-
ploying crews, could be used to service satellites
in orbits of significantly different altitude and
somewhat different inclination.
Shuttle.-The Shuttle (fig. 2) meets most of the
current needs for transportation between the
Figure 2.—Diagram of
Earth’s surface and LEO at any Inclination. The
Shuttle can deliver 30,000 kg to a 200-km (120-
mile) orbit inclined at 28.5° to the Equator. Any
increase in orbit altitude or change from this or-
bit inclination reduces the payload capacity.
However, most payloads are volume-limited by
the cargo bay’s 18-meter length and 4.6-meter
diameter rather than weight-limited. By the early
1990s, the earliest date considered practical for
obtaining a “space station,” NASA projects a total
of some 24 to 30 Shuttle flights per year, and
some 50 per year by the year 2000. The Shut-
tle’s cargo bay could be used to carry infra-
structure- elements
Shuttle Mission Profile
.
SOLID ROCKET
BOOSTER RECOVERED
A
APPROACH AND
LANDING
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its crew of up to seven persons could be used
to assist with any assembly and checkout. The
Shuttle could also resupply expendable, ferry
personnel, and serve for emergency rescue.
Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU).–The
MMU is a backpack equipped with a computer-
operated propulsion system that permits an astro-
naut to “free fly, ” thereby projecting his senses,
his strength and dexterity, and his judgment be-
yond the confines of the Shuttle or other habit-
able infrastructure out to a few hundred meters.
It is a general-purpose device that can be used
for inspection, servicing and deployment or re-
trieval of equipment, for construction and assem-
bly operations, for crew rescue, for emergency
repairs, etc. A Shuttle-based MMU was success-
fully demonstrated on two flights in early 1984.
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV).-Local
transportation in LEO would be provided by the
OMV. It would be operated remotely from the
Shuttle, other space infrastructure, or possibly
from Earth. It would be designed to have a six-
degree of freedom propulsion system that would
allow satellite or platform servicing operations at
distances well beyond the MMU’S few-hundred-
meter limit. One version of the OMV would be
able to make altitude changes of 1,000 km or
more above its initial LEO and orbit plane changes
of up to 8°, depending on payload weight.
Basic OMV equipment includes propulsion
units and propellent tanks; television cameras and
lights for inspection and operator guidance; com-
munications; control systems for remote opera-
tions; electric power; thermal control; and various
manipulators and docking attachments. Current
NASA plans are to have such a new-technology
vehicle developed and operating in time to be
useful in the deployment and assembly of a
“space station.”
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV)-Up to No-
vember 1982, all payloads launched into space
were carried there by ELVS. There are now three
basic U.S. families of ELVS: the Delta, Atlas-Cen-
taur, and Titan III. The European Space Agency
has its Ariane family of boosters, Japan has its
N-2 (derived from the U.S. Delta) and is devel-
oping others, the People’s Republic of China has
launched a geostationary satellite using its FB-3
“Long March” rocket, and the Soviet Union is
offering to make its Proton launcher commercial-
ly available. In addition, several private corpora-
tions in the United States and Germany have an-
nounced plans to develop ELVS. Many of these
vehicles and possibly others may be available
commercially throughout the next decade. How-
ever, it is not likely that they will be suitable for
launching spacecraft that carry people, although
they could launch supply spacecraft as the Sovi-
et Proton boosts the Progress into orbit.
Expendable launch vehicles that can launch to
high orbits, or to Earth-escape trajectories, use
either their own upper stages or uniquely com-
patible orbital transfer vehicles (OTVS). The pay-
load itself carries the “kick stage” or other pro-
pulsion needed to move from high, inclined,
elliptical orbits to geostationary orbits.
Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV).-A
reusable, high-performance, liquid propellant
“space tug” could provide transportation be-
tween LEO and geostationary and lunar orbits,
or between Earth orbits of various inclination and
altitude. Reusability and space-basing give prom-
ise of economic benefit for the use of an ROTV
in launching and servicing communications and
other satellites that utilize the geostationary or-
bit. An ROTV could be piloted by a crew or re-
motely operated.
Development of an “Advanced Space Engine”
suitable to power an ROTV has yet to be started.
Space-basing implies reusability, of course, as
well as flexibility of thrust and duration of rocket
burn, and the ability to refuel and perform main-
tenance in space. Thus, space-basing requires
some form of orbital logistics system, including
tanks, pumps, controls, and other equipment for
refueling, people or teleoperator devices to check
out the ROTV, refurbish it as needed, and reset
its operating systems for each new trip, and per-
haps crew quarters.
Space-basing also requires docking, servicing,
and storage facilities in space to make ROTV op-
eration possible. Moreover, as fuel for the ROTV
must always be brought from the surface to LEO,
alternative ways of transporting it are under con-
sideration. More efficient delivery systems than
the Shuttle, such as a Shuttle-derived tanker vehi-
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cle, are being looked at. Scavenging left-over fuel
from the Shuttle external tank is being given con-
sideration. Considerable development time and
expense would be involved in any of these efforts.
A prospect which offers an opportunity for con-
siderable propellant savings is to dissipate the
ROTV’S excess kinetic energy, on return from
high altitudes to LEO, by allowing it to dip into
the upper reaches of the Earth’s atmosphere, a
maneuver called “aerobraking.” The return flight
would consist of a brief de-orbit burn that would
place the ROTV into an elliptical transfer orbit
that intersects the top of the atmosphere. If the
ROTV could dissipate enough energy to decrease
its velocity by 2,400 meters per second, it would
have just enough energy left to raise it to a “space
station’s” (typical) 300-km orbit. There, it could
deliver its return payload (if any) and refuel for
its next trip. This aerobraking concept promises
a saving of over half of the propellant needed
(compared to an all-propulsive ROTV) for a re-
turn trip with payload from geostationary Earth
orbit.
NASA’S APPROACH TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
“Mission Analysis Studies” Summary
In 1982, as part of NASA’s planning to acquire
long-term inhabited infrastructure, i.e., a civilian
“space station, ” the agency authorized “mission
analysis studies” in the United States, and reached
an agreement with foreign countries for parallel
studies, of the desires or needs for, and charac-
teristics of, such infrastructure. The results of
these studies appear in appendix A.
The “mission analysis studies” started with the
supposition that the United States would build
a civilian “space station, ” and did not require the
potential user to address either justification of the
basic “space station” concept or its funding. The
studies were simply to identify uses that either
would require or would materially benefit from
the availability of a “space station” and to sug-
gest some of its fundamental characteristics.
Of the several hundred potential activities in
science, commercialization, and technology de-
velopment identified by the U.S. companies (pri-
marily aerospace) conducting the studies, the
selection was narrowed by NASA to a set of about
100 time-phased missions for the first 10 years
of “station” operation, 70 percent of which could
be accomplished from a central base facility lo-
cated in a 28,5° inclination in LEO. Free-flying
platforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit,
could accommodate most of the others.
The contractors viewed activities such as equip-
ment servicing, research (especially in the life
sciences and materials processing), and assembly
and modification of large space systems as areas
in which presence of a human crew would be
particularly beneficial. They recommended archi-
tectural concepts involving several types of mod-
ules for the initial central complex: a command/
habitability module with accommodations for a
crew of four; an electrical power system provid-
ing about 25 kW to the users; logistics modules
for periodic resupply; airlocks, docking ports, and
pallets to enable mounting of equipment and lab-
oratory modules. Subsequent development and
growth of the facility over a 10-year period and
incorporation of an ROTV and several free-flying
platforms were anticipated.
Estimation of acquisition costs ranged from ap-
proximately $4 billion to $5 billion (1984$) for
the initial facility, to about $12 billion for an
evolved complex envisioned as being completed
6 to 8 years after the system first became opera-
tional. Other than the performance and social
benefits of such a “space station,” they estimated
that economic benefits from servicing satellites
in orbit, transfer of satellites to higher orbits by
an ROTV, and human-tended long-term research
activities would be considerable. The increased
ability to launch planetary probes, establish a
lunar settlement, and undertake human explora-
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tion of Mars was considered of great significance
in terms of long-range goals.
The foreign mission analysis studies paralleled
those of the U.S. contractors and defined a simi-
lar set of space activities appropriate for infrastruc-
ture use. All participating agencies from Europe,
Canada, and Japan expressed great interest in tak-
ing part both in providing elements of space in-
frastructure and in actively participating as part-
ners in its use. Many of them look upon it as
fundamental to their future role in space and
therefore want long-term understandings and
agreements with the United States on partici-
pation.
NASA assembled the United States and foreign
mission analysis reports and held a workshop in
May 1983 to synthesize the results. The workshop
established a minimum time-phased “mission
set” (for the initial decade of use) of 107 specific
space activities, plus four generic commercial-
industrial service activities (e. g., satellite servic-
ing). Of the total set, 48 were categorized under
science and applications, 28 under commercial,
and 31 under technology-development.
In parallel with the contractor studies, NASA
hired two consulting firms to communicate with
a variety of non-aerospace companies to iden-
tify and encourage interest in the use of in-space
facilities for commercial purposes. The consult-
ants discussed prospects with approximately sO
companies, and more than 30 expressed active
interest in using a “space station” if it were avail-
able. Most of the companies moving toward
agreements with NASA to become active in space
are well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with an
announced agreement is the 3M Co.), but sev-
eral are from the small business sector or Europe.
Interest is concentrated on the possible produc-
tion of particular chemicals, metals, glass, com-
munications, and crystals. Among the half dozen
companies now actively investigating the possi-
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bility of sponsoring space experiments, most are
more interested in crew-tended operations rather
than automated procedures. Further details of the
consulting firms’ studies are discussed in the final
section of appendix A.
Infrastructure Functions
The NASA planning process has depended
heavily on the “Mission Analysis Studies” of U.S.
and foreign aerospace contractors and foreign
space agencies. From the views assembled there-
in, functions were identified for any space in-
frastructure (“space station”) that could provide
efficient and effective assets and services to sup-
port the projected space activities.
NASA’s aspirations for a “space station” were
most recently presented to the Senate Commit-
tee on Appropriations in March 1984. The in-
frastructure envisioned in their plans would pro-
vide the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
an on-orbit laboratory supporting research
on a wide range of life, materials, and other
science topics, and the development of new
technology (e.g., studies of biology, cosmic
rays, processing methods for pharmaceuti-
cals and semiconductors, testing of space
materials, and advanced communications
technology);
permanent observatories for astronomy and
Earth remote sensing (e.g., a solar optical tel-
escope to examine the surface of the Sun,
a starlab to study the structure of galaxies,
and Iidar equipment to probe the at-
mosphere);
a facility for microgravity materials process-
ing and manufacture of products (e.g., phar-
maceuticals, semiconductors, glasses, and
metals);
servicing of satellites and platforms (e.g., the
maintenance or replacement of compo-
nents, replenishment of consumables, and
exchange of equipment);
a transportation hub to assemble, check out,
6.
7.
8.
and launch vehicles (e.g., those carrying
communications satellites) to geostationary
or other high orbits, and as automated in-
terplanetary probes (e.g., a Mars orbiter or
an asteroid rendezvous vehicle;
an assembly facility for large space structures
(e.g., antennas for advanced satellite com-
munications systems);
a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and sup-
plies for use as needed by satellites, plat-
forms, vehicles, and people; and
a staging base for more ambitious future
projects-and travel (e.g., a lunar settlement
or a human voyage to Mars).
Questions such as the following must be asked
relative to the corresponding functions listed
above:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
How much of an investment do these (and
other) capabilities warrant?
Is use of a “space station” the optimum way
to accomplish these missions?
When will the need for a microgravity pro-
duction facility be demonstrated, and how
much of its cost should its users pay for?
What kinds of satellites will be repaired,
why, and who will bear the cost?
When will the transportation hub be ready
and why is it needed then?
What is the purpose of the assembly facility
for the large space structures–and of the
large space structures themselves?
What is the justification for a storage depot
in space?
When will a staging base be required for a
lunar settlement or a manned Mars expe-
dition?
And, underlying all of these specific questions
is the hazard that too great a commitment to the
acquisition of in-space infrastructure, and the re-
sulting long-term operations and management ex-
penditures, might preempt the adequate support
of other important civilian space activities.
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REACTIONS OF NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL BOARDS
Other science and engineering organizations
have participated in the study of space infrastruc-
ture acquisition. NASA invited the National Re-
search Council (NRC) to review its possible utili-
zation for space science and applications. (The
NRC is a private organization of distinguished
scientists and engineers operating within the char-
ter of the National Academy of Sciences to act
as an advisor to the U.S. Government (and others)
on science and technology issues. It works
through its committees, boards, and institutes,
two of which, the Space Science Board (SSB) and
the Space Applications Board (SAB), studied these
issues in workshops during the summer of 1982.)
The Space Science Board concluded that al-
most all of the space science research projects
forecast for the next 20 years (a forecast made
without giving great attention to the possible use
of sophisticated in-space infrastructure) could be
carried out without the use of a “space station”
as then characterized by NASA. These projects
could be carried out by using Shuttle/Spacelab,
satellites, interplanetary probes launched with ex-
pendable launch vehicles, or contemplated up-
per stages compatible with the Shuttle. The SSB
stated it was not opposed to a “space station, ”
that a decision on it should be made for reasons
beyond science uses, and that some science in-
terests would make use of it if it were available.
But the SSB expressed concern that any delays
in launching science payloads that might be im-
posed as a consequence of waiting for comple-
tion of any “space station” could harm science
programs unnecessarily, as the SSB believes hap-
pened during the development of the Shuttle
(when several programs used up funds for em-
ployee salaries and other program costs during
such delays),
The Space Applications Board expressed guarded
support for use of a “space station .“ It indicated
interest in applications made possible, or made
more efficient, through use of appropriate infra-
structure, such as servicing of free-flying plat-
forms, launching of geostationary satellites, repair-
ing LEO satellites, and serving as a materials
processing laboratory. Communications experi-
mentation, especially for large antennas, was
another likely use in their estimation. The pres-
ence of a human crew was deemed desirable,
particularly for materials science experiments and
for modification and repair of instruments. The
SAB also concluded that a platform in near-polar
orbit would be an important infrastructure com-
ponent, to be used for Earth remote sensing of
resources, Earth environmental studies, and
ocean observations. The capability of the plat-
form to merge and process a variety of data prior
to transmission to the ground would be an advan-
tage compared to independent, unprocessed
transmissions from individual satellites. The SAB
cautioned that sufficient resources must be made
available to develop instruments and payloads for
use on any “space station. ”
Another body examining the role of expanded
space infrastructure was the NASA Solar System
Exploration Committee (SSEC). The SSEC is a
group of the Nation’s outstanding planetary scien-
tists directly advising NASA on planetary research.
The SSEC, which spent 2 years defining a new
U.S. planetary space strategy, looked at the
usefulness of any new infrastructure for planetary
exploration. It concluded that, in the near term,
the facility could be used beneficially as an
assembly and launch base for deep space probes
with potentially important advantages for plane-
tary spacecraft requiring large internal propulsion
systems. In the longer term, this could greatly fa-
cilitate the return of samples from Mars by pro-
viding a fully loaded booster such as a Centaur
rocket. A “space station” could also serve as a
holding facility for returned samples to alleviate
concerns of their possible contamination of the
Earth.
In January 1984, NASA created a 15-member
advisory panel of academic space scientists that,
over a 2-year interval, is expected to give NASA
advice on suitable research projects for long-term,
habitable, space infrastructure.
Of related interest to NASA programs, the NRC’s
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB)
conducted a workshop during 1983 on NASA’s
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Space Research and Technology Program. While
not directly addressing “space station” issues,
their report noted the high payoff uses of space
in the communications and meteorology fields,
the present speculative nature of manufacturing
in space, the high cost of space transportation
and systems as an inhibiting factor in the com-
mercial use of space, and that, in the face of
foreign competition, the United States should
continue to explore and stimulate potential uses
of space.
The ASEB urged NASA to provide access to
space for experimental purposes as a natural ex-
tension of national aerospace facilities on the
Earth’s surface. Overall, the report recommended
that NASA devote a significant portion of its ef-
forts to develop technology that would reduce
the cost of spacecraft subsystems, payloads, trans-
portation, and operations.
ALTERNATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE
Because of the large public costs associated
with the NASA plans for acquiring in-space in-
frastructure, and considering the view of the
Space Science Board (and others) regarding the
NASA plans, it is important to explore alterna-
tive approaches for providing the desired capa-
bilities of such infrastructure. OTA has identified
several alternatives that could provide various ca-
pabilities, at various times, and at various initial
costs to the Government. These alternatives in-
clude system components that currently exist or
are currently under development. OTA has also
considered a gradual approach to infrastructure
acquisition with various average annual funding
rates; lower cost alternatives could be used as
early steps in an evolutionary development lead-
ing to increasingly sophisticated and capable ar-
rays of infrastructure. Each of these approaches
has different implications for initial Government
cost, life-cycle costs, pace of commercial devel-
opment, and the pace for carrying out human
activities in space.
Uninhabitable Platforms
Regardless of the outcome of the debate over
the need for infrastructure that includes and/or
supports a long-term human presence in space,
there is a significant community of users who
would benefit from having uninhabited space fa-
cilities and services available to them. A number
of so-called free-flying automated platform alter-
natives now exist, are in development, or have
been conceived, that could take advantage of the
Shuttle or expendable vehicles for launch and
service.
The Shuttle can be used to launch to, and re-
turn equipment or other materials from, LEO. This
ability allows for the use of space platforms of-
fering electric power, heat rejection, communi-
cations, attitude control, and other services to a
number of users. Some time after insertion into
orbit (typically several months to a year), the Shut-
tle or an ROTV would rendezvous with such a
platform, and servicing intervals for platform-
mounted instruments would be coordinated with
the rendezvous schedule, keeping costs in mind.
Payloads could be exchanged, attitude control,
fuel and other expendable replenished, batteries
charged, or the platforms could be returned to
an LEO base or to Earth. Platforms could avoid
contamination and stability problems associated
with inhabited infrastructure. The cost of the
common platform facilities could be amortized
over a long lifetime and a large number of ac-
tivities.
Fairchild LEASECRAFT.-The Fairchild LEASE-
CRAFT (fig. 4) is designed to support equipment
that can be exchanged on orbit. This design ap-
proach anticipates that the costs (special equip-
ment, crew training, etc.) and risks associated
with performing maintenance and payload modi-
fications and substitutions on orbit are outweighed
by the saving in transportation cost and improve-
ment in spacecraft utilization, which avoids fre-
quent launch and return of the platform.
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Figure 4.—An Artist’s Conception of a LEASECRAFT Enroute to Orbital Altitude With Payload Attached
LEASECRAFT was inspired by the Multimission
Modular Spacecraft (MMS) system on which the
Landsat D and Solar Maximum Mission spacecraft
are based. It can provide up to 6 kW of power
and other services to user payloads, and is in-
tended to serve LEO space projects that include
data acquisition/transmission and materials proc-
essing.
Data acquisition activities generally require fine
pointing and high data rates but relatively mod-
est power levels. Materials processing projects,
on the other hand, require high power but low
data rates and relatively coarse pointing. The
LEASECRAFT could be converted from one con-
figuration to the other on orbit from the Shuttle
or from other inhabited infrastructure.
The LEASECRAFT design includes a centrally
mounted propulsion module that contains 2,700
kg of hydrazine for transfer from the standard
Shuttle orbit of about 300 km to an operating
altitude of 480 km. Later it can be returned to
the Shuttle orbit for rendezvous. The total weight
of the LEASECRAFT bus is expected to be 6,400
kg (including the initial charge of propellant).
The power and other services provided by the
LEASECRAFT are dependent on the number and
type of its modules. Details of how module and
payload changes will be handled will depend on
lessons learned from the Solar Max repair. Pos-
sibilities include the manipulation of tools by the
Remote Manipulator System (RMS), spacewalk-
ing outside the Shuttle cargo bay by payload
specialists, and retrieval of the LEASECRAFT by
the RMS to a position in the cargo bay where
payload specialists would perform the work
needed.
An automated electrophoresis payload being
developed by McDonnell Douglas is frequently
mentioned in conjunction with the LEASECRAFT.
It will consist of an electrophoretic processing fa-
.
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cility and a separate supply module having a com-
bined weight of some 10,000 kg. The process-
ing unit will use 3.5 kW of power and will require
an acceleration environment of less than 0.1 per-
cent of gravity on Earth.
Another prospective payload for the LEASE-
CRAFT system is NASA’s Advanced X-Ray Astron-
omy Facility (AXAF). AXAF is a 9,000-kg telescope
that will operate in a 500-km orbit, require 1.2
kW of power, and periodic change of imaging
and spectrographic instruments.
The LEASECRAFT’s ability to accommodate
specific payloads is very similar to that of the high
power version of EURECA (see below), with one
important exception: the higher data handling
ability of LEASECRAFT would allow it to accom-
modate most science and applications instru-
ments. It would not accommodate some instru-
ment projects that are very large, or those that
require human involvement.
The initial LEASECRAFT reportedly will cost at
least $150 million (1984$) apiece to purchase.
Users may also purchase partial services of
LEASECRAFT or lease an entire platform from
Fairchild for $20 million to $40 million (1984$)
per year. Transportation costs will include initial
launch of the LEASECRAFT and its payload and
other payloads that, subsequently, are taken to
it for exchange.
Boeing MESA.–The Modular Experimental
Platform for Science and Applications (MESA) is
a low-cost satellite system designed by Boeing for
launch on the Ariane. The MESA design follows
from Boeing small spacecraft designs and produc-
tion of the last decade. This includes three space-
craft known as S-3 for the Department of De-
fense, two Applications Explorer Modules (AEMs)
for NASA, and the Viking Spacecraft being pro-
duced today for the Swedish Space Corp.
The MESA program utilizes existing hardware
and previous experience to achieve a low-cost
platform for modest payloads that do not require
recovery, and for special cases that do require
recovery.
An interesting feature of the MESA system in
its Viking configuration is that it duplicates the
Ariane structural interface on its top side, which
enables it to share a launch by fitting between
the Ariane and the primary payload. This use of
residual launch capacity can reduce the cost of
transportation to orbit.
The total mass of the MESA/Viking platform is
some 500 kg. The design of the platform provides
for attitude control and propulsion. Once the Vik-
ing separates from the main satellite after launch,
the propulsion unit can boost the Viking into its
operational orbit. The spacecraft is spin stabilized
at 3 rpm, and Earth/Sun sensors and magnetic
torquers are elements of the attitude control sys-
tem. A combination of solar arrays and a battery
provide 60 W of average power with a peak pow-
er of 120 W.
Limited changes can be made in solar array size
and power output. The overall diameter of the
MESA with payload cannot exceed the 2.95-me-
ter internal diameter of the Ariane’s payload com-
partment. The central core of the platform is de-
signed to accommodate both platform (420 kg)
and payload weights (0o kg for the design refer-
ence) and up to nearly 2,OOO kg of host satellite
weight during Ariane launch. The available vol-
ume for the payload is 1.6 cubic meters (m J).
Should the solid-propellant rocket motor not be
required, an additional internal volume of ap-
proximately 0.6 m3 would be available for pay-
load use.
MESA is limited in its applicability because of
its small size, limited resources, the use of spin
stabilization, and the intention to have the pay-
load integrated within the structure. This makes
it best suited to small, scanning or nonviewing,
dedicated activities. While suited for some space
plasma physics or cosmic ray investigations, the
spin stabilization is not appropriate for micrograv-
ity activities. MESA will accommodate only a
small fraction of the science and applications
projects identified in NASA’s Mission Analysis
Studies.
MESA is reported to cost $10 million (1984$).
Transportation charges on the Ariane are uncer-
tain since it can share a launch with another pay-
load. If it is carried in the Shuttle, it should qualify
for the minimum charge of $12.5 million (1984$).
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The Boeing MESA spacecraft undergoing ground processing.
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Shuttle Payload Support Structure (SPSS).–
An example of a structure supporting payloads
that remain attached within the Shuttle cargo bay
is the SPSS that has been developed for NASA.
Teledyne Brown expects to commercialize SPSS
during 1985. It will provide a mount, electrical
power, data handling, and environmental con-
trol for payloads weighing up to 1,400 kg.
Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF).–A
platform housing 57 experiments, many of them
seeking to record how manmade materials hold
up in the LEO environment, was released from
the Shuttle in April 1984. The 10,000 kg-satellite,
called the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF),
will be retrieved by the Shuttle in 1985. The LDEF,
basically a free-flying support structure for scien-
tific experiments, cost $14 million (1 984$), not
including launch and retrieval.
Pleiades Concept.–A concept to expand the
use of platforms for space science research has
been proposed by students in a 1983 systems en-
gineering course at Stanford University. In this
concept (called “pleiades”), a platform located
in the Shuttle cargo bay would provide data proc-
essing and other support for several co-orbiting
free flyers equipped for long-term astrophysics
research. Periodic servicing would be feasible
from the Shuttle. If developed, it might become
a permanent space infrastructure element.
Space Industries’ Platform.-A free-flying per-
manent industrial space facility (lSF), designed pri-
marily for materials processing, has been pro-
posed by a new commercial space company,
Space Industries, Inc. (fig. 5). An automated plat-
form suited for production purposes, it could be
placed in LEO by the Shuttle and serviced sev-
eral times a year by it and/or any eventual long-
term space infrastructure. The ISF would include
a pressurized volume where equipment could be
serviced by a crew during resupply periods; the
facility, however, would provide no life support
functions when occupied other than a suitable
atmosphere compatible with the Shuttle or ROTV,
to which it is expected to be attached during
these periods.
Assuming successful financing, the facility could
be placed in operation in the late 1980s. No cost
figures have been made public, but some indus-
try sources estimate that it would cost some hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to develop and con-
struct.
MBB SPAS.–The concept of a Shuttle-tended
platform was tested, to a limited degree, with the
Space Pallet Satellite (SPAS) payloads during two
Shuttle flights. SPAS was developed at the initia-
tive of the German company Messerschmitt-Bol-
kow-Blohm (MBB). Its structure is constructed out
of graphite epoxy tubes to form a modular truss
bridge that spans the Shuttle cargo bay in width
and fits that length dimension for which a mini-
mum launch charge is made by NASA. The struc-
ture provides mounting points for subsystem and
experiment hardware and includes a grapple fix-
ture for handling by the Remote Manipulator Sys-
tem, i.e., the Shuttle arm. The SPAS is designed
to operate in either a Shuttle-attached mode or
as a free-flying platform, and it was released dur-
ing the seventh Shuttle flight to operate in the lat-
ter mode for about 10 hours before retrieval. In
that operation it provided the first opportunity
to demonstrate the Shuttle’s ability both to de-
ploy and retrieve a satellite. The SPAS payload
remained in the cargo bay during the 10th Shut-
tle flight, where it successfully handled equip-
ment for several commercial users.
Having only battery power and compressed gas
thrusters, the initial SPAS is designed for short-
Iifetime projects (7 to 15 days), but subsequent
versions could undoubtedly extend the lifetime
by incorporating solar photovoltaic arrays and
propellant-type thrusters, and maybe even a kick
motor to achieve a wider range of orbits and/or
to be able to return to a Shuttle-compatible or-
bit for rendezvous. In its present form, SPAS will
only accommodate relatively small, low-power
instruments used for short periods of time.
The basic SPAS platforms costs less than $1 mil-
lion (1984$); subsystem equipment required by
specific payloads is not included. SPAS is de-
signed to qualify for the minimum Shuttle launch
charge of $12.5 million (1984$) but, with a large
payload, it may exceed this qualification.
EURECA.–The European Space Agency (ESA)
is developing a small unmanned platform carrier
that would be released from the Shuttle and re-
trieved after free flights in space of 6 to 9 months.
.— — —
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Figure 5.—A Free-Flying Permanent Industrial Space Facility
Initial Operating Configuration
‘ - - -
Four ISF Module Configuration
. .
---
Two ISF Module Configuration
ISF Docked to NASA’’ Space Station’
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Shuttle. The ability to fly from the Shuttle to a
useful orbit and back for rendezvous with the
Shuttle is typical of most space platform concepts.
The EURECA will have a payload capacity of
about 1,100 kg with the combined carrier and
payload weighing approximately 3,500 kg. The
total length of the carrier/platform, plus its
payloads, in the Shuttle’s cargo bay will be 2.3
meters, with an option for a shorter length of 1.6
meters if desired.
Energy for EURECA will be provided by deploy-
able and retractable solar arrays that will initially
deliver 5.4 kW of power at 28 volts. Of this out-
put, 1 kW will be available to the payload on a
continuous basis, while much of the balance will
be required to charge the batteries that supply
power when sunlight is not available.4 The power
supply for EURECA and its payload will be cooled
using a fluid loop connected to a radiator.
EURECA payload and housekeeping data will
be relayed to Europe via circuits employing the
L-Sat communications satellite as a test. The
telemetry system will normally use ground sta-
tions in Europe, but it will also be compatible with
the Shuttle. The maximum data rate that can be
processed on the ground by the proposed sys-
tem is 2.5 kbps, although the on board system will
be capable of transmitting up to 1 Mbps.
Size, mass, capacity, and data handling ability
are the most stringent EURECA design constraints.
If the data rate is restricted to 2.5 kbps, only film
cameras can be accommodated. But if the full
1 Mbps data rate can be utilized, many science
and applications instruments can be accommo-
dated. However, large, high power, or high data
rate payloads, such as telescopes, radars, Iidars,
multispectral scanners, or a combination of these
or other instrument payloads cannot be accom-
modated. Increasing the available power level
alone does not significantly improve the ability
to accommodate such payloads, since science
and applications instruments that require high
power (e.g., remote sensing radars) also tend to
have high data rate requirements (tens to hun-
dreds of Mbps).
4More power would be available for payload use if it proves pos-
sible to operate the platform in a Sun-synchronous dawn-dusk or-
bit where it does not enter the Earth’s shadow.
The cost of EURECA has not been clearly stated,
although ESA has referred to a program cost of
$170 million (1984$) that appears to include some
payload costs.
Plans are also being developed for EURECA 11,
an advanced version having increased power and
payload capacity. The new design will allow
space-basing and equipment exchange on-orbit,
using the Shuttle or a yet-to-be-developed Ariane
automatic docking system.
SOLARIS.-This French concept includes pre-
liminary designs for an automated platform. It
would be unmanned, located in LEO, and would
use furnaces, a robot manipulator arm, solar
power, and other subsystems. Ariane 4 would
launch a transfer and supply stage, and a ballistic
reentry capsule will bring processed materials
back to Earth.
The first generation facility would have the fol-
lowing major elements:
l The Orbital Service Module (OSM), which
is a user-shared platform with docking ports
for payloads and transport vehicles.
l An in-orbit Transport Modular Vehicle (TMV)
for resupply, transport, and servicing of
space payloads.
l A Data Relay Satellite Communications
System for control and high data rate trans-
missions.
. The Ariane 4 launcher.
The intent is to fly the OSM in a circular “Sun-
synchronous” orbit following a path over the twi-
light line, thus avoiding the Earth’s shadow and
thereby achieving a relatively high 10 kW of con-
tinuous power output for its users. Activities such
as materials processing, microwave Earth obser-
vation, and assembly and check-out of large ve-
hicles in orbit are envisioned. The orbit altitude
could be adjusted from 600 to 1,000 km. Two
docking ports would be available for TMV berth-
ing, with five ports for payloads. Data transmis-
sion rates would not exceed 400 Mbps. The en-
tire OSM weight would be 4,500 kg (excluding
propellant).
The function of the TMV is to provide transpor-
tation service between the Ariane delivery orbit
and the OSM, and to permit the return of a lim-
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ited amount of equipment and products to Earth.
The TMV will consist of an expendable module
with propulsion, attitude and trajectory control,
and the ability to rendezvous and dock.
The TMV can be used in either one-way or
round-trip service. For one-way service the pay-
load would be attached directly to the TMV mod-
ule, and both would be placed inside the fairing
of the Ariane 4 for launch. A 5,000-kg payload
could be accommodated in this manner.
Round-trip service requires the use of a reen-
try vehicle similar to the Apollo reentry module.
The TMV module is attached to the reentry body
for launch in a manner similar to the arrangement
for a one-way payload, and the two are separated
during reentry. About 2,500 kg and 15 m3 of pay-
load could be accommodated within the reen-
try vehicle; it could touch down on either land
or water and is designed for reuse.
The first generation SOLARIS concept is func-
tionally similar to the science and applications
space platform studied by NASA, except that
SOLARIS specifies a dawn-dusk Sun-synchronous
orbit. This orbit restricts its usefulness for many
Earth-viewing projects that require lighting from
the Sun. However, radars, Iidars, and some mi-
crowave instruments can “see” in the dark and
would not be affected, while solar-viewing in-
struments wouId gain the advantage of continu-
ous visibility of the Sun. The ability of SOLARIS
to support large, multiple instrument facilities
should allow for accommodation of most of the
solar physics payloads. However, a continuous
full Sun orbit would be a problem for many celes-
tial-viewing instruments that depend on Earth
shadow to eliminate scattered light from the Sun.
All automated life science activities and all
materials processing, except for those requiring
human presence, could be accommodated.
The orbit of SOLARIS is not suited to launch,
retrieval, or servicing of low inclination satellites
(including geostationary satellites), since a large
orbit plane change is required. And, since most
Sun-synchronous satellites are not in dawn-dusk
orbits, a “latitude drift” would be required to
service them. Some studies consider satellite
assembly and service to be a major role for a
“space station”; SOLARIS would be able to ac-
commodate only a small fraction of this market.
Costs of the evolutionary SOLARIS program
have not been defined, but they likely would be
several billions of dollars (1984$) if the entire con-
cept is developed.
Habitable Infrastructure
Although uninhabited platforms can be used
to support many experiments and commercial
processes that do not require human presence,
and some activities require a stability that would
be difficult to achieve if humans were present,
other activities require or can be greatly aided
by human presence. These include life science
studies of humans in space, which are necessary
to prepare for long duration human travel in
space, and interactive experimentation in mate-
rials processing (e.g., pharmaceuticals, semicon-
ductors, crystals), which is required in order to
explore the commercial potential of materials
processing.
A number of infrastructure elements other than
the proposed NASA “space station” are available
that can support humans in space.
Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO).–A major
constraint on the duration of the on-orbit time
for the Shuttle is the availability of electrical
power. The current Shuttle power system uses
three fuel cell powerplants fed by cryogenically
stored hydrogen and oxygen, and delivers 21 kW
on a continuous basis, of which 14 kW is allo-
cated to the Shuttle itself and 7 kW is available
for payloads. The fuel cells are fed from tank sets
(one hydrogen and one oxygen tank in each set)
located under the floor lining in the Shuttle cargo
bay. Three tank sets are considered standard
equipment. Two additional sets (for a total of five)
can be installed with no volume penalty to pay-
loads, but with a combined weight penalty (fully
fueled) of 1,500 kg. The full complement of five
tanks will provide a stay time of 8 days if the full
7-kW payload allocation is drawn upon continu-
ously. Where little payload power is drawn, as
might be the case for satellite repair or remote
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sensing activities, the stay time could be as much
as 12 days.
One obvious approach to extending the stay
time is to add more tank sets. One such concept
results in a stay time of 15 to 22 days, again
depending on power consumption, by loading
a four-tank-set carrier into the cargo bay. Such
a carrier would shorten the usable length of the
cargo bay by some 2 meters out of 18, and re-
sult in a 3,700-kg decrease in payload capacity.
Extension of this approach to even longer dura-
tions has a practical limit because of the volume
and weight capacity lost, and the limited storage
lifetime of cryogens.
A 20-day stay time with 7 kW of power con-
sumed by the payload, or up to 26 days if less
power is consumed, can be achieved by using
a solar array in conjunction with the five stand-
ard cryogenic tank sets. In one concept, the solar
array would deliver 18 kW in sunlight, and the
fuel cells would deliver 3 kW makeup power for
a total 21 kW. During orbital eclipse of the solar
array, the fuel cells would supply the full 21 kw.
The RMS could deploy the array underneath the
Shuttle, to avoid interference with the power sys-
tem heat radiator and the field of view from the
cargo bay. A previously proposed Power Exten-
sion Package (PEP) was identical in concept but
was sized to provide 15 kw, instead of the nor-
mal 7 kw to payloads. The payload weight pen-
alty for these concepts, including tank sets, is esti-
mated at 2,300 to 2,700 kg. The cost to modify
one Shuttle was estimated to be $100 million to
$200 million (1984$). Spacelab would have been
the principal beneficiary of the PEP, but the
planned flights of Spacelab were judged to be not
frequent enough to justify the expenditure.
To achieve stay times well beyond 20 days re-
quires some radical changes in the power system,
but the Shuttle could be designed for essentially
limitless duration as far as power is concerned.
Batteries would be used for power during Shut-
tle eclipse, and operation of the existing fuel cells
would be limited to launch, reentry, or emergen-
cies. The fuel cell reactants would be stored at
ambient temperature and high pressure, thereby
eliminating the storage lifetime constraint asso-
ciated with cryogens. A 48-kW solar array would
be required to provide power to recharge the bat-
teries in sunlight; this power would be in addition
to the basic 21 kW needed for Shuttle and pay-
load power. The weight penalty for such a power
subsystem is estimated to be about 3,200 kg.
Modifications are required in other areas as
well. Flash evaporators that are currently used
to supplement radiator heat rejection require
large amounts of water in some attitudes, and to
minimize reliance on them it would be neces-
sary to increase the capacity of the radiators. With
regard to habitability, water tanks must be added
to compensate for water that is no longer gener-
ated by fuel cells and a regenerative CO2 system
would be required. Furthermore, for 15- to 30-
day durations, the Shuttle habitable volume is
only adequate to marginal for a crew of four. A
reconfiguration of the mid-deck, recommended
for 30- to 60-day durations on orbit, includes
moving the airlock to the cargo bay. A Spacelab
module would also be added to provide such
crew amenities as a shower and an exercise and
off-duty area as well as increased work area.
Among the activities which an EDO would be
expected to support is satellite servicing. The
Shuttle can reach a wide range of orbit inclina-
tions and LEO altitudes, and the cargo bay, with
its RMS and space for supplies and other support
equipment, seems well suited for this type of ac-
tivity. The technical feasibility of repairing satel-
lites from the Shuttle was demonstrated on the
Solar Maximum Mission Satellite in April 1984.
With the Shuttle launch charges alone projected
to be as much as $100 million for a dedicated
flight before the end of the decade, the prospect
of sharing a launch for this purpose along with
other payloads and/or activities is a significant fac-
tor in the economic viability of such an operation.
In theory, with on-orbit infrastructure serving
as an operations and distribution center, a Shut-
tle destined for it could carry not only supplies
and equipment for the operation at hand but
could be loaded with payloads and supplies to
be left in space. Subsequent transfers to free-
flyers, for instance, could then be accomplished
with a lighter, more energy-efficient proximity-
operations vehicle in contrast to the relatively
massive Shuttle. The premise is that the saving
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to be realized by utilizing the launch capacity of
the Shuttle more effectively would, over time,
more than offset the cost of the on-orbit infra-
structure specifically designed to handle equip-
ment and supplies. It is not clear to what extent
the on-orbit infrastructure operations costs (both
on-orbit and ground-support) are included in
analyses of such operations. It is also not clear
how total costs (facilities and operations) would
be allocated among all users of a shared “space
station” to establish the economic viability of any
particular activity such as satellite repair and
servicing.
Finally, an EDO could function as an observa-
tory and a laboratory. There are adequate accom-
modations in the aft flight deck to control and
monitor an observing payload such as one con-
taining a large telescope. The Shuttle has no pro-
vision for laboratory operations beyond the ac-
commodations available in the mid-deck lockers
and, on some early flights, the main galley area.
However, a Spacelab module, discussed in the
following section, could be added to provide a
shirt-sleeve working environment in the cargo
bay. One drawback is that Spacelab consumes
nearly half of the available 7 kW of payload pow-
er. Thus, electrical power for experiments would
require careful management, and a more capa-
ble power system would be desirable for an EDO.
An EDO is estimated to cost about $2 billion
(1984$) for the basic Shuttle, $300 million (1984$)
for an upgraded habitation module similar to
Spacelab, and $200 million (1984$) for the PEP.
The full Shuttle launch cost would be incurred
for each flight.
Spacelab.–The Shuttle carried Spacelab into
orbit for its maiden flight in November 1983.
Spacelab is a set of hardware that converts the
cargo bay into a general-purpose laboratory for
conducting science, applications, and technol-
ogy investigations. It was financed and built
jointly by ESA in close cooperation with NASA,
providing a convenient means for working with
a collection of experiments in a shirt-sleeve LEO
laboratory environment. It augments the Shuttle
services for powering, pointing, cooling, and con-
trolling experiment hardware and for data handl-
ing and transmission to Earth.
Spaceiab is composed of two primary building
blocks: modules and pallets. The module is a can-
Iike pressure vessel approximately 4 meters in
diameter that provides a shirt-sleeve working
environment for the crew and rack accommoda-
tions for experiment hardware. The module con-
sists of two end cones and one or two center sec-
tions (each 2.7 meters long). It may be used in
either its long form (7.0 meters) or short form (4.3
meters) and may be flown alone or in combina-
tion with one or more pallets. The pallets are U-
shaped structures 3 meters long that span the car-
go bay and provide mounting for instruments that
are to be exposed to the space environment. pal-
lets may be flown individually or tied together
in trains. For pallet-only projects, the computers
and other subsystem elements normally carried
in the module are housed in an “igloo” that can
be attached to the forward pallet, The Spacelab
hardware set also includes an Instrument Point-
ing Subsystem (IPS) capable of high-accuracy
pointing for clusters of small instruments or a
large telescope.
While both pallets and modules can be consid-
ered for use as independent space infrastructure,
in its present form Spacelab is totally dependent
on the Shuttle for its resources. Specifically, the
Shuttle provides 7 to 12 kW of electrical power,
8 to 12 kW of cooling, data handling and data
communication at rates of up to 50 megabits per
second. Further, the Shuttle provides oxygen re-
plenishment, and serves as both a crew residence
and a safe haven under emergency conditions.
Spacelab depends on these resources to provide
a safe, stable laboratory environment.
Several stages in the evolution of the Space-
Iab module beyond the current generation have
been studied, moving from complete depend-
ence on, and attachment to, outside support ele-
ments, to relatively independent operation as a
free-flyer that is resupplied every 6 months or so
by the Shuttle or an OMV.
Spacelab With an EDO.–One version of the
Spacelab that would be carried by an EDO uti-
lizing a PEP, was studied by ESA in collaboration
with NASA, The electrical and heat rejection sys-
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Figure 6.— Major Spacelab Elements
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terns would be modified to handle increased
power, and the command and data management
system wouId be modernized. Since two Space-
Iab modules are now owned by NASA, additional
costs would involve only the modifications and
launch costs.
Spacelab as an Attached Module.–Another
version would see the Spacelab used as a labora-
tory component of a “space station.” The module
would be lengthened to provide a greater shirt-
sleeve volume for more experiments and people,
but in this case other connected infrastructure
elements would replace the Shuttle as a support
system. Either an existing NASA Spacelab module
could be used for this purpose, or an additional
module could be provided at a cost of $300 mil-
lion (1984$).
Spacelab as a Free-Flyer.–A third version is
that of Spacelab as an inhabited free-flyer. This
would require the development of a dedicated
service module that would provide the types of
resources currently provided by the Shuttle.
For attitude control, there are a number of pos-
sible candidate systems which could be adopted.
In Europe, for example, there is the ESA Modular
Attitude Control (MAC) system, which is designed
for general satellite application. This subsystem
is in prototype form, and hardware tests are u rider
way at present. Electrical power and cooling pro-
visions would be required, as part of the dedi-
cated services module, in the form of solar ar-
rays, batteries, and a heat radiator with a cooling
fluid loop. It is possible that the increased-capac-
ity (12 kW) solar arrays under development by
ESA, together with the ESA radiator, would be
suitable. Command and data handling could be
satisfied by commercial computer technology.
Oxygen supply for the free-flying Spacelab could
be handled by using the nitrogen tanks that are
already available in Spacelab. However, for long
durations on orbit, additional provision for ox-
ygen supply would be necessary, which might
possibly take the form of a water electrolysis sys-
tem (as yet undeveloped). For crew habitation,
the developed Spacelab free-flying module would
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Figure 7.–Shuttle-Spacelab Flight Profile
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need to be based on a two-segment-long module
as a minimum (7.0 meters), or preferably a three-
segment-long module (1 O meters), in order to
provide the necessary volume for sleeping, food
preparation and consumption, waste disposal, ex-
ercise and recreational equipment, and commod-
ity stowage. Crew-supported experiment and lab-
oratory activities could be accommodated in a
Spacelab-derived two-segment module, con-
nected to the habitation moduIe by an airlock;
it would contain the necessary laboratory equip-
ment and Spacelab-derived racks. The use of two
modules connected via an airlock would provide
the basis for a necessary safe haven in the event
of a major failure in, or of, either module.
The use of two Spacelab-derived modules,
combined with the associated dedicated service
module, could provide long-duration infrastruc-
ture for human and automatic operations in
space. An intermediate step in this direction
would be the development of a two-segment
Spacelab-derived module, coupled with a dedi-
cated service module. The cost of such a devel-
opment (designed for Shuttle resupply every 90
days) could be some $400 million (1984$). The
two-module development costs would be consid-
erably greater than for a one-moduIe configura-
tion, perhaps approaching $800 million (1984$).
To put the size of a Spacelab-derived free-flyer
into perspective, it is interesting to compare the
facilities described above to the Skylab facility
which was orbited 10 years ago. A three-segment
Spacelab module has roughly the same external
dimensions as the Apollo Command and Serv-
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ice Module’s propulsion/resource system plus
reentry vehicle, that part of the Apollo transpor-
tation system that rendezvoused with Skylab. The
Skylab Orbital Workshop (OWS) provided pri-
mary habitation and work space 6.7 meters in di-
ameter by 8.2 meters long or about 280 m3 of
volume. Thus, the volumes enclosed by the two-
and three-segment-long modules contain 25 and
40 percent, respectively, of the habitable volume
of the OWS, and together would total just 70 per-
cent of the OWS volume. In addition to the OWS,
some Skylab control and utility functions were
housed in the airlock module and the Multiple
Docking Adapter. Because of the dimensions of
the Shuttle cargo bay, a number of Shuttle
Launches would be required to build up a Space-
Iab-based infrastructure on a scale equal to
Skylab.
The free-flying Spacelab could accommodate
any payload currently envisaged for the Space lab
module on the Shuttle. Some life science facility
concepts now being studied use a dedicated
Spacelab module as their basic structure. All life
sciences studies could probably be performed;
high-temperature furnaces for material process-
ing may require higher power and cooling that
could, if necessary, be provided by additional
power modules. Commercial production facilities
are not yet clearly defined, but if such produc-
tion proves to be desirable, additional power and
Spacelab modules could be added, if necessary,
to accommodate it. A small fraction of the Earth
or celestial-viewing instruments could utilize the
scientific airlock or window of Spacelab, but this
is a cumbersome way to handle such instruments.
The only advantage of the Spacelab window or
scientific airlock over a permanent external mount-
ing position is easier access to the instrument,
while the disadvantages include limited space,
restricted field of view, and the necessity to han-
dle the instrument whenever it is installed. How-
ever, viewing instruments could be installed and
operated on one or more co-orbiting platforms.
Spacelab could serve as an operations control
center for other space activities. Properly equipped,
it could accommodate 100 percent of this func-
tion, although, depending on the number of
activities conducted, more than one Spacelab
module might be needed. The characteristics of,
and the problems associated with, exchanging
equipment in the Spacelab module indicate that
its best use might be as a dedicated life and/or
materials science laboratory, or as an in-space
control center.
The idea of developing and using. existing
Spacelab hardware for long duration human
activities in space remains attractive in view of
the maturity of the system building blocks. Limita-
tions of the free-flying Spacelab concept, how-
ever, may be significant. As an example, it would
be difficult to develop an efficient closed-loop life
support system.
Spacelab as free-flyer, including a utilities
module based on EURECA, has been estimated
to cost $1 billion (1984$). Transportation costs
would include an initial full Shuttle launch and
subsequent supply and transport services via the
Shuttle. An automatic docking service could be
developed for resupply by expendable launch
vehicles, but the cost of such a development is
uncertain.
Columbus.–The Germans and Italians have
proposed to ESA that the Columbus project, using
Spacelab modules as components of a more ex-
tensive infrastructure, should become the ESA
contribution to the U.S. “space station” program.
The plan, including three steps or phases, be-
gins with a Spacelab module attached to a U.S.
“space station, ” providing laboratory workspace
and deriving life support, power, attitude con-
trol, and other services from the parent “station. ”
A second step (fig. 8) is an independent free-flying
Spacelab with power, attitude control, and mod-
est life support supplied by a service module fash-
ioned after the EURECA platform. It would re-
quire direct resupply by the Shuttle or an OMV,
provide laboratory workspace, and allow tending
by a crew for up to 8 hours at a time. A third step
would add another Spacelab one-segment mod-
uIe, with propulsion,  to be used as a crew trans-
port and servicing vehicle which might also be
able to accommodate a small crew for short peri-
ods at the laboratory. By servicing the free-flyer,
it would enable the Columbus module to oper-
ate autonomously for a few months at a time. This
last phase is projected in Columbus program liter-
ature for possible implementation near the end
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Figure 8.—An Artist’s Conception of a Free-Flying Pressurized Module With
an Attached Resource Module (second phase of Columbus concept)
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of this century. Cost estimates for a Columbus
project are not yet available.
NASA Minimum Cost “Space Station. ”-A
study regarding a “space station” that would min-
imize costs by using Spacelab modules was per-
formed at the NASA Marshall Space Center and
was reported in 1982. It would provide sound
and useful infrastructure, but would be of rela-
tively modest dimensions in comparison with
NASA’s present aspirations. It would include a
habitat module, a separate safe haven for emer-
gencies, and a support systems module. It would
be launched by the Shuttle and would have 1 kw
of power and a scientific workspace. Later,
another support system module and a docking
adaptor would be attached, providing for the
long-term support of three persons, an experi-
ment module, pressurized and unpressurized ex-
periment ports, gyroscopic attitude control, com-
munications and data handling, and 6 kw of
nominal user power. According to the NASA
study, the cost of this facility would be $2 billion
to $2.5 billion (1984$), assuming the use of an
existing Spacelab module already in the in-
ventory.
Shuttle as permanent Infrastructure. -In the
discussion of the EDO, it was shown how rela-
tively modest changes to the existing Shuttle vehi-
cle could result in 20- to 25-day on-orbit stay
times while more extensive modifications could
make 30- to 60-day stay times attainable. A con-
cept has been proposed by one Mission Analy-
sis Study contractor group that would have ma-
jor Shuttle and its external tank assemblies carried
into orbit together to form permanent infrastruc-
ture. The basic Shuttle would be stretched to add
30 feet to the cargo bay and would be utilized
without the wings, tail, and thermal protection
subsystem. The main engines and the OMS engines
would remain in place. The crew compartment
would be stripped to make room for a control
module. A command module would be located
in the cargo bay. Major external tank modifica-
tions would include a power module with solar
arrays which would mount on the nose, and a
wraparound radiator for thermal control.
The Shuttle and its external tank also would use
the Shuttle solid rocket boosters for launching as
is the case for the conventional Shuttle. Upon its
reaching orbit, the solar arrays would be de-
ployed, the cargo bay doors would be opened,
and the command module would be rotated into
an upright position, thereby freeing the cargo bay
for use in servicing and staging operations. A
subsequent Shuttle launch could deliver a habit-
ability module, logistics module, and crew.
The use of a basic Shuttle in this fashion would
allow the very rapid acquisition of infrastructure
able to serve as a habitable “space station” for
a relatively low development cost.
Shuttle External Tank (ET) .-Application of the
ET as an infrastructure element is intriguing be-
cause of its large size, because it achieves a near-
orbital velocity during normal Shuttle launch
operations, and because it “comes free of extra
cost” to orbit. As a result, several aerospace com-
panies have studied the ET for possible use on
orbit.
The ET has an interior pressurized volume of
some 2,OOO m 3 in the form of two separate
tanks—one for hydrogen, the other for oxygen.
In present Shuttle launch operations, the ET
separates from the Shuttle and reenters the atmos-
phere after main engine cutoff. On average, at
separation from the Shuttle, the ET still contains
about 4,500 kg of liquid O2 and H2. The chal-
lenge is to identify practical methods of salvag-
ing the tank and scavenging these residual pro-
pellants.
The ET in orbit, initially viewed as a construc-
tion shed and distribution center, might serve as
a mounting structure for telescopes, large anten-
nas, large solar power collectors, and experiment
pallets, or it could be used as a component of
inhabited infrastructure, in which case it would
need windows and entry hatches. The most ob-
vious use for the ET is for on-orbit fuel storage.
This requires the least on-orbit modification,
but assumes that the techniques and equipment
needed to scavenge leftover fuel from the Shut-
tle and to store it for long periods in space are
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developed. Use as an uninhabited warehouse or
unpressurized, sheltered workshop in space only
requires that the tank be purged of residual fuel,
since several access openings (larger than 1 me-
ter diameter) already exist.
A concept to use ETs as components of habita-
ble infrastructure has been developed by the
Hughes Aircraft Co. In this concept, four ETs
would be taken separately into orbit and then
joined to form the spokes of a large wheel-like
structure. Solar panels would be mounted on a
rim connected to the outer ends of the ET spokes,
providing 150 kW of power. The wheel would
rotate, and a “despun“ module at the hub of the
wheel would provide zero gravity workspace.
The basic feasibility of this “dual-spin” system has
been demonstrated on a much smaller scale in
over 100 successful communications satellites
built by Hughes. Modules attached to the outer
ends of the ETs, carried into space as aft cargo
carriers, would be available for habitation and
pressurized workspace. Rotation of the wheel
would provide artificial gravity in the spinning
part of the facility and gyroscopic action for at-
titude control.
This innovative concept has several obvious ad-
vantages. There is no doubt that many human
activities, such as eating, drinking, food prepara-
tion, showering, and dealing with human waste,
would be much easier to carry on in the artifi-
cial gravity environment provided by this system.
And possible health problems associated with
long-term living in microgravity, such as decalci-
fication of bones and atrophy of muscle and con-
nective tissue, could be avoided. In general, the
presence of spin and a choice of gravity regimes,
ranging from microgravity to artificial gravity
simulating what we are used to on Earth, shouId
prove to be useful in solving a number of human,
scientific, and engineering problems.
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Figure 9.— External Tank Structure
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Figure IO.— Possible Uses of External Tank
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Figure 11 .—Concept of Infrastructure Utilizing Four External Tanks
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Chapter 4
A BUYER’S GUIDE TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
SUMMARY
If the United States decides to acquire a sub-
stantial amount of long-term space infrastructure,
there are various ways to proceed that should be
carefully considered, including the degree to
which new technology would be used, whether
NASA should set design or performance speci-
fications, and the roles of the private sector and
international partners. The costs and capabilities
of a number of possible infrastructure options are
compared in a table format. The cost drivers asso-
ciated with the listed options and OTA’s ap-
proach to cost estimation are discussed. The next
section examines a number of tradeoffs that
should be considered regarding the use of auto-
mation and people in a “space station. ” Buyers
may reasonably decide to acquire space infra-
structure using an average annual funding rate
rather than a “lump sum” approach. Possible in-
frastructure that could be obtained using aver-
age annual funding rates of $0.1, $0.3, $1, and
$3 billion (1 984$) are presented. The functions
that NASA intends to provide in a “space station”
are listed, and alternative infrastructures that
could provide those functions are indicated. ’
1 In addition to the two OTA workshops mentioned specifically
in the following text, sources of information for ch. 4 include the
same references noted in ch. 3 for possible infrastructure elements
and their estimated acquisition costs.
PROCUREMENT OPTIONS
If there is an affirmative answer to the ques-
tions of whether to acquire long-term in-space
infrastructure (and, if so, how much, of what
kind, and when), there yet remains the decision
of how it is to be acquired. In many respects, this
second decision is just as important as the first.
The mode of acquiring new, long-term, in-space
assets and services should be influenced by a
clear understanding of the contemporary context
in which space activities are carried on. And the
decision as to how to acquire these assets and
services will have a significant impact on the
future of space activities.
The pioneering, generous, and effective efforts
of the U.S. Government, and of NASA in particu-
lar, have resulted in the spread of civilian space
capabilities and expertise throughout much of the
world, to the point where they are now essen-
tially beyond the power of the United States to
control even if it is of a mind to do so. Many of
the nations of Europe, and Japan, Canada, India,
BraziI, and the People’s Republic of China as well,
are increasingly positioning themselves to pur-
sue their own interests in space, independent of
what the United States might desire. Other coun-
tries’ evident success with Spacelab, with Ariane
and its launch complex, and in the field of satel-
lite communications has given them great con-
fidence in their abilities to work in full collabora-
tion with the United States on major space programs
and, before long, to undertake such programs
without the United States, should they then deem
that to be appropriate.
The U.S. private space industry is also fully ca-
pable of developing all or most of the ensemble
of low-Earth-orbit (LEO) infrastructure elements
needed to provide a more-than-adequate initial
operating capability (IOC) of the type now be-
ing studied by NASA. With the important excep-
tion of satellite communications, our industry in
the past has undertaken work exclusively under
contract to the Government. However, the past
several years has seen the beginning of impor-
tant space activities undertaken wholly on pri-
vate initiative.
Some of these private sector activities and some
of those undertaken by other countries will be
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in direct competition with what many in NASA
now perceive to be their own important institu-
tional interests.
With the completion of the Shuttle develop-
ment program now in sight, the United States
faces a major decision as to whether–and, if so,
how–to redeploy a large fraction of NASA’s
resources. Under present circumstances, NASA,
as in the past, would prefer to undertake another
large technological program, similar to the Shut-
tle, to serve as the major agency focus, rather
than to spread its efforts over a number of activ-
ities that could be more demanding and more
useful. Of the various candidate activities, NASA
has chosen to concentrate on the acquisition of
a great deal of long-term, habitable LEO infra-
structure.
Congress and the President have approved
NASA’s request to initiate a “space station” pro-
gram, and NASA appears to be moving to acquire
such infrastructure in much the same fashion that
it acquired the Shuttle:
l
l
l
l
A
A great deal of new technology would be de-
veloped, acquired, and used, essentially all
of which would be publicly funded.
NASA would arrive at and issue detailed
engineering specifications for, and exercise
close management control over, the technol-
ogy to be acquired.
This infrastructure would be procured by
NASA with Federal funds. The U.S. private
sector would not be prompted to use its own
resources to provide a substantial portion of
the infrastructure.
The international role would be limited.
NASA would not seek the kind of close col-
laboration that would result in shared author-
ity, even if it might provide substantial capi-
tal cost reduction for the United States.
significantly different acquisition approach
would - have the following elements:
l As far as is reasonably possible, already de-
veloped, tested, and paid-for technology
would be used to achieve an adequate IOC,
with development of new technology under-
l
l
l
taken only where demonstrably required to
lower overall cost of ownership.
NASA would prompt our private commer-
cial-industrial-financial sectors to develop
and produce, with their own resources and
on a genuinely competitive basis, as many
of the Government-required civilian “space
station’ assets and services as they can;
NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so;
and they could be offered to NASA on a sale,
lease, or payment-for-service-provided basis.
NASA, in obtaining the elements not pro-
vided by the private sector, would empha-
size management methods specifically de-
signed to take the best advantage of the now
quite sophisticated U.S. space industry (see
app. D, “Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on
Cost Containment of Civilian Space infra-
structure [Civilian “Space Station”] Elements).
NASA would negotiate collaborative agree-
ments with other cooperating countries that
would see all partners share in the benefits
of such an IOC at a reduced acquisition cost
to the U.S. Government for its share.
This second approach would imply that NASA
would hand off much (perhaps most) of the more
mundane “space station” work by paying the pri-
vate sector to do it, thereby conserving its skills
and resources so that they could be focused on
more challenging space goals and objectives, in-
cluding the development of the very advanced
technology (e.g., bipropellant engines, a reusable
orbital transfer vehicle, . . .) required, an activ-
ity which, for the most part, the private sector
cannot justify.
These two options are at opposite ends of a
spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of
long-term space infrastructure. in determining
which approaches from this spectrum are most
likely to influence the evolution of space activi-
ties in a desirable direction, Congress may wish
to consider the following questions:
l Should the Government be allocating its pro-
fessional skills and experience to the devel-
opment of: 1 ) incremental or 2) fundamen-
tal advances in technology?
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l Which approach is most likely to stimulate • What other large and important space ends
the “commercialization of space”? should be addressed in the next decade or
l What level of international collaboration is two in addition to the acquisition of in-space
really desirable? infrastructure methods and means?
A CATALOG OF SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
The fact that the United States has already de-
veloped a wide variety of space capabilities
means that it has genuine choices—both of what
infrastructure elements it places in orbit and of
how these elements are to be acquired and used.
It is around these choices that the difficult issues
lie; by and large, the technology is either in hand
or can be readily developed.
It must be emphasized that the particular
constellation of space infrastructure elements
which NASA currently aspires to develop, con-
struct, deploy, and operate is only one alterna-
tive in a wide range of options. Simply put, there
is no such thing as “the space station. ” What is
under discussion is a variety of sets of infrastruc-
ture elements, ranging from modest extensions
of current capabilities to vastly more sophisti-
cated, capable, and costly ensembles than NASA
is now suggesting.
As one way of presenting the variety of tech-
nology options available, OTA has prepared
tables 6 and 7.2
 tables were prepared in response to the congressional
committees which requested this assessment,  3 discusses in-
frastructure options in detail.
Photo credit: Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration
One option for modestly increased length of stay in
space is a Shuttle Orbiter modified for extended
flight—the Extended Duration Orbiter, or EDO. Such
a configuration might involve large solar panels for
extended electrical power, as shown here.
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Table 6.—Comparison of Some Optionsa for "Low Earth” Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure
Free-flying NASA infrastructure
Extended Extended spacelab aspirations
Duration Duration (developed Initial Mature,
Shuttle Orbiter: Orbiter: as permanent operational fully
Orbiter Phase I Phase II infrastructure) capability developed
Date available
(assuming start in 1985) Now 1988 1990 1990 1992 1996-2000
Costb
(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) None 0.2 0.5 2-3 8 20
Characteristics
Power to users (kW)
Pressurized volume (m3)
7
60
20 6
100
(with spacelab
habitat)
5 3
New technology Modest crew
required; accommodations
modest
laboratory
space
60
200
200
300
Nominal crew size
Miscellaneous
6
Can accept
Spacelab
5
No new
technology
8
Orbital
maneuvering
vehicle plus
two free-flying
unpressurized
platforms
20
Reusable
orbital
transfer
vehicle plus
several more
platforms
Capabilities c
Time on Orbit 10 days 20 days 50 days Unlimited
(60-90 day
resupply)
Extensive
Modest
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
No
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
Unlimited
(90 day
resupply)
Unlimited
(90 day
resupply)
Laboratories for:
Life sciences
Space science/applications
Materials science
Technology development
Observatories
Data/communication node
Servicing of satellites
Manufacturing facility (materials
processing)
Large structure assembly
Transportation node
Fuel and supply depot
Moderate
Modest
Some
Modest
No
No
Modest
No
Moderate
Modest
Some
Modest
Modest
No
Modest
No
Considerable
Modest
Moderate
Some
Modest
No
Modest
Modest
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Considerable
Considerable
Considerable
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
No
No
No
Extensive
Extensive
Considerable
No
No
No
No
No
No
Moderate
Moderate
No
Response to reasons advanced for
space infrastructure
Maintain U.S. space leadership and
technology capability
Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities
Enable long-term human presence
in space
Attention-getting heroic public
spectacle
Extended international cooperation
Promote U.S. commercialization of
space
Maintain vigorous NASA
engineering capability
Enhance national security, broadly
defined
Space travel for non-technicians
No Modest Modest Modest
Modest
Considerable
Modest
Moderate
Considerable
Modest
Modest
Modest
Considerable Extensive
Modest
Modest
Considerable
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
No
No
Modest
Modest
No Modest Modest Modest Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Moderate
Modest
Moderate
Considerable
Moderate
Considerable
No No No Extensive Extensive
No No No Unclear Unclear
Modest Modest Modest Considerable Considerable
aLiated  options  are illustrative examples; the list la not  exhaustive.
bco~ts  include de@~n, development, and pr~uct’on;  launch  and operational costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the Office  of Technology Assess-
ment; others were provided to OTA.
cClearly  judgmental.
dlncluding launch to the Moon, Mars, and aome esteroids.
Examples of habitable infrastructure are shown listed, followed by one version of Space lab de-
in table 1. First, the present Shuttle Orbiter and veloped into a free-flying inhabited facility.
its possible modifications for somewhat extended Finally, the present NASA-envisioned space sta-
(but not permanent) stays on orbit (i.e., a so- tion” concept is given, including both the IOC
called Extended Duration Orbiter—EDO) are version with an estimated completion in 1992,
Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure l 8 9
Table 7.—Space Infrastructure Platformsa That Could Be Semiced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
Unpressurized coorbiting platforms Pressurized platforms
(serviced by means of extravehicular activity) (serviced internally while docked)
Space European
Industries’ Modified
SPAS MESA LEASECRAFT EURECA Platform Spacelab
Date available
(now, or approximate, assuming
start in 1985)
c o d ’
(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars)
Characteristics
Power to users (kW)
Pressurized volume (ft3)
Nominal crew size
Miscellaneous
Capabilities c
Time on orbit
Laboratories for:
Life sciences
Space science/applications
Materials science
Technology development
Observatories
Data/communication node
Servicing of satellites
Manufacturing facility (materials
processing)
Large structure assembly
Transportation node (assembly,
checkout, and launch)
Fuel and supply depot
Response to reasons advanced for
space infrastructure
Maintain U.S. space leadership
and technology capability
Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities
Enable long-term human presence
in space
Attention-getting heroic public
spectacle
Extended international cooperation
Promote U.S. commercialization of
space
Maintain vigorous NASA
engineering capability
Enhance national security, broadly
defined
Space travel for non-technicians
Now
0.005
0.6
None
None
3,000 lb
Payload
10 days
No
Modest
Modest
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Unclear
No
No
No
Now
0.01
0.1
None
None
200 lb
Payload
8 months
No
Modest
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Modest
No
No
No
1986
0.2
6
None
None
20,000 lb
Payload
Unlimited
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
Considerable
No
No
No
Modest
Modest
No
No
No
Considerable
No
No
No
1987
0.2
2
None
None
2,000 lb
Payload
6 months
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
Modest
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Late 1980’s
0.3
20
2,500
1-3 only
when
docked
25,000 lb
Payload
3-6 months
Modest
No
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
No
No
Extensive
No
No
No
Modest
Modest
No
No
No
Considerable
No
No
No
1989
0.6
6
3,000
3
20,000 lb
Payload
Unlimited
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
Moderate
No
No
Considerable
No
No
No
No
Modest
No
No
Unclear
No
No
No
No
aLi~t~  ~latformg  are illustrative examples; the list  Is not ‘Xhaustlve.
btists  include ~esian,  ~evelopment,  and ~r~uction;  launch a~ o~ratl~nal  costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the office  of Technology As~ss-
ment;  others were ~rovlded to OTA.
cClearly  judgmental.
and a mature, fully developed facility (1996- l
2000).
The parameters for each option that may be
used for rough comparative purposes are:
. Approximate date of availability—assuming
that an acquisition (in contrast to a study)
“go-ahead” were included in the fiscal year
1987 budget.
Cost (in fiscal year 1984 dollars)–to produce
the capabilities shown. The estimates are
based on sources such as industry reviews,
company publications and meeting presen-
tations, aerospace periodicals, and NASA in-
formation releases. Inasmuch as some op-
tions utilize existing hardware, the costs do
not reflect similar proportions of develop-
ment and production efforts for the various
options.
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l
l
Characteristics–several design parameters
and sizing factors that provide the bases for
infrastructure capabilities.
Capabilities—the types of functional activi-
ties that the listed infrastructure could sup-
port, and the degree to which these activi-
ties might be accomplished.
Responsiveness of a given infrastructure-to
the various reasons put forward for having
a  civi I ian n “space station, ” including any
long-term presence of human beings in
space .
If great and long-range space activities (for in-
stance, the establishment of a lunar human settle-
ment or the return of materials from the asteroids
or Mars) come under consideration, they wouId
appear to be achievable using a sophisticated
reusable orbit transfer vehicle (ROTV) coupled
with on-orbit assembly, check-out, launch, and
recovery. The one option listed in table I that
could provide these capabilities is the NASA fully
developed infrastructure.
Examples of uninhabitable “free-flying’ space
platforms are shown in table 2. These platforms,
or others, could be used in conjunction with, and
serviced by, any of the options listed in table 1.
In this way, additional capabilities could be added
to the infrastructures given in table 1, SPAS and
MESA are currently existing commercial platforms
that were financecj and developed by the private
sector. LEAS ECRAFT is also a private venture now
under development.
Some cautions should be noted in the interpre-
tation of this information. General descriptions
of the various options are given, an estimates
of their capabilities. These capabilities can be ex-
pected to change in some cases. Most of the ca-
pabilities have been described by qualitative ad-
jectives. Quantitative estimates are rounded off
to one figure. In the fifth section of the tables,
“Response to the Reasons Advanced for Space
Infrastructure, ” the comparisons clearly must be
qualitative and judgmental in nature and are pre-
sented simply to bring these factors to the atten-
tion of the reader. For instance, as a particular
item the Spacelab option of table 2 is only one
of several that have been put forward; one by
European Space Agency (ESA) countries could
definitely augment international cooperation if
it were implemented.
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COST DRIVERS
Beyond the observation that, in some general
fashion, the cost will increase with the capabil-
ity and sophistication of the infrastructure ac-
quired, it is difficult to estimate the eventual cost
of this capability to the Government. At least all
of the following factors could have an important
influence on this cost:
1. the total capability acquired–which, as sug-
gested by the examples listed in the tables
of infrastructure options, can encompass a
considerable range;
2. the extent to which already developed,
tested, and paid-for technology is used, v.
a focus on new technology with its higher
development cost and greater risk of cost
overruns;
3. the substitution, where feasible, of auto-
mated systems for the accomplishment of
tasks previously undertaken only by human
beings;
4. the manner by which the infrastructure is ac-
quired, i.e., the extent to which NASA puts
the engineering challenge on the space in-
dustry by issuing performance specifications,
rather than continuing to issue detailed engi-
neering specifications and managing the ac-
quisition process in detail;
5. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to per-
suade our private sector to develop infra-
structure assets and services “on their own, ”
and to provide them to the Government at
purchase, lease, or service-payment prices
lower than those achievable by the Gov-
ernment;
6. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effect
eventual private sector operation of the in-
frastructure and its related activities;
7. the extent to which large and rapid expan-
sion of military space research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activi-
ties increases costs in the civilian space
sector also;3
8. the extent to which any “Christmas-tree ef-
fect” takes place within NASA, whereby the
infrastructure acquisition management is
persuaded by the NASA Centers to allow the
cost of desirable but nonessential RDT&E
activities to be included in the acquisition;
and
9. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arrive
at large-scale collaboration and related cost-
sharing arrangements with other countries.
These points address only the initial capital cost
of this infrastructure—to this cost must be added
its ongoing operation and maintenance costs; the
cost of instruments, furnaces, etc., needed for
scientific experimentation in association with its
use; and the interest cost of any money borrowed
to fund the acquisition program. And it must be
remembered, too, that the infrastructure will
eventually become obsolete or wear out.
It is clear that there are many opportunities to
reduce infrastructure net cost that could be
grasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and deter-
mined NASA management.4
These considerations suggest that, over the next
year or two, at least as much attention should be
given to identifying the best ways by which the
country should set about the permanent devel-
opment of space as there is given to any techno-
logical advances and operational capabilities that
are to be obtained.
3Classified  material was not used in preparing this report.
4Cost reduction measures are discussed i n app, D of this  report.
structure issues is that of the proper mix of so- 1.
phisticated people and sophisticated machines
(automation) to be employed in work activities
in spaces
Sln arriving  at judgments  on various “man/machine” issues OTA,
in close concert with senior congressional staff members, designed
and convened a workshop which brought together many of the
Nation’s experts in “smart machine” development from the Gov-
ernment, industry, and academic communities with OTA and con-
gressional staff professionals. 2.
If specifically designed to do so, any civil-
ian “space station” program could effec-
tively serve as a high-visibility focus for pro-
moting research and development in all
disciplines in the field of automation. im-
portant advances in terrestrial applications
of automation could be expected to follow
from a vigorous space automation program.
However, there is a firm consensus among
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3.
4.
scientists and engineers in the various auto-
mation disciplines that current automated
equipment could not accomplish many of
the functions envisioned by NASA for an
early 1990s “space station. ” This situation
results, in part, because NASA has invested
relatively few resources to develop auto-
mated capabilities specifically for general-
purpose infrastructure-support (in contrast
with special-purpose scientific) space activ-
ities. In addition, the academic and indus-
trial advanced automation research commu-
nity numbers only a few hundred.
Therefore, if the kind of overall operational
“space station” now envisioned by NASA
is to be functioning by the early 1990s, it
will have to include people. Conversely, if
it is to be wholly or mostly automated, it
could not become operational until 5 to 10
years thereafter, even with a major automa-
tion R&D effort. However, if any of the
aspirations of those now conducting re-
search and development in the space materi-
als processing area are realized, and one or
more processes are found suitable for long-
term production, then elements of the infra-
structure that would be devoted to such pro-
duction, such as platforms co-orbiting near
any central complex, could be singled out
for early, specific, sophisticated-machine
R&D focus.
Conceptually, space infrastructure could be
designed either to include a human work
crew or to depend on unattended sophis-
ticated machines. Despite the fact that the
relative efficiency and/or effectiveness of
these two quite different approaches have
been extensively debated for years, no con-
sensus has emerged. This absence of con-
sensus results from a number of factors: the
state-of-the-art for sophisticated machines;
the amount of experience we have had to
date in the actual conduct of space support
operations is quite small; and, in such oper-
ations, NASA has placed more emphasis on
human beings than on machines;
5.
6.
For the foreseeable future, therefore,
only a general continuum of conclusions
can be outlined:
machines generally will be unable to an-
ticipate and deal with genuinely unknown
circumstances and surprises;
people will need the assistance of ma-
chines to gain speed, strength, and mem-
ory; to improve their sensory capabilities
and their mobility; and to provide them
with artificial senses via radar, Iidar, radi-
ation detection, etc.;
machines employed for ongoing R&D and
commercial-industrial operations will re-
quire human oversight and assistance; and
machines, maintained by people or not,
as circumstances suggest,” should do all
hazardous and very-long-term repetitive
work.
In the matter of relative cost of automated
and space facilities including people, the
expense of developing and providing safe,
sanitary, and suitable living and working fa-
cilities for human beings has to be weighed
against the costs of providing analogous
automated capabilities. The former will cer-
tainly be relatively expensive; the latter may
well cost more than some advocates im-
agine, especially if as much capability is ex-
pected of the machines as of a professional
human work crew. With respect to doing
useful work in space, human beings rep-
resent in-hand technology. Cost alone does
not provide sufficient ground for choosing
between automated and manned facilities.
However, there are three reasons advanced
for having men and women in space, only
one of which is to do useful work. The
other reasons are: to serve as subjects for
scientific study and to engage in any other
kind of human activity. With respect to the
second and third reasons, the question of
humans or machines does not even arise.
Only the purpose of doing useful work has
been extensively studied and, as indicated
in the preceding points, no clear and gen-, “ ,
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eral present advantage for having people or physiology, psychology, and social behav-
sophisticated machines there has emerged. ior, must be acquired. If, similarly, the Na-
If the Nation decides, as a matter of policy, tion decides, as a matter of policy, to enable
to have some of its people remain away from people to pursue in space a variety of cul-
Earth for long periods, then staffed space fa- tural activities other than work then, again,
cilities, allowing for the study of human only their presence there will suffice.
ALTERNATIVE FUNDING RATES
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss a space infrastructure
acquisition program that would involve an ini-
tial decision on the purposes of, and the objec-
tives to be achieved in, the civilian space area,
followed by the design of that infrastructure with
appropriate functional capabilities to support the
attainment of these objectives. An estimate of the
cost and schedule associated with the attainment
of these objectives, along with the acquisition of
such infrastructure, is also presented.
An alternative approach could simply establish
annual expenditure levels for in-space infrastruc-
ture acquisition. Thus, to provide an independ-
ent basis of comparison with the civilian “space
station” program now favored by NASA, OTA has
estimated what new space capabilities could be
acquired, by when, if various annual average
Government funding rates were established to do
so. No changes to present NASA acquisition pro-
cedures or NASA anticipated acquisition costs are
assumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levels
of $0,1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$)
were chosen to illustrate the number and kind
of space infrastructure elements that could be ac-
quired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years.
The results of these 12 funding scenarios are
given in table 8, which shows the funding rate,
number of years, total expenditure, and kinds of
infrastructure elements acquired. The elements
are divided into those that can operate independ-
ently (e. g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space sta-
tion” central base) and those that depend on be-
ing serviced or maintained from one of the
independent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneu-
vering vehicle (OMV), a local in-space transpor-
tation system operated from a “space station”
control element, or directly by the Shuttle).
Table 8 lists the following (among other) ele-
ments of space infrastructure that could be ac-
quired over various acquisition intervals:
l
l
l
For $0.1 billion per year: probably no “per-
manently manned” facility could be ob-
tained even by the year 2000. Further exten-
sion of capabilities of the Shuttle system and
unpressurized platform developments could
be obtained. The acquisitions could be: a de-
velopment of the EDO Phase 1, for 20-day
orbit stays, over a 5-year period; or EDO
Phase 11, for 50-day orbit stays, over 10 years
or longer, plus two or three free-flying un-
pressurized platforms such as EURECA,
LEASECRAFT, and/or the Space Industries’
platform (assuming that the Government
would make an outright purchase of such
platforms).
At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, the
acquisitions could be an EDO I I plus several
(perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10
years, there could be acquired: 1) the first
permanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived hab-
itable modules in 28.5° orbit that could sup-
port three people, 2) an OMV (enabling serv-
icing of nearby satellites), and 3) a few free-
flying platforms. In 15 years, there could be
obtained either: 1 ) two free-flying Spacelabs,
one in polar orbit, one at 28.5°, or 2) much
more capable permanent infrastructure at
28.5° than that which could be acquired in
10 years.
For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, there
could be acquired: 1) a permanent LEO
facility operating as a transportation node
(obtained as a new design by NASA), 2) an
OMV, 3) an ROTV capable of transporting
spacecraft to and from geostationary and
—Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure l 9 5
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Table 8.—Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible at Various Annual Average Federal
Funding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)
Space acquisitions a
Dependent elements
Number Unpres- Pressur- Space-based Beyond geostationary
Funding of Total Independent infrastructure surized ized plat- transport orbit spacecraft
rate years expenditures elements b platforms form# vehicles elements
O.1e 5
10
15
0.5
1
1.5
EDO If (20 days, 5 crew) 2
EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3
EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3
— —
—
—
—
—
1
1
1
—
—
0.3 5
10
1.5
3
EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3
Free-flying Spacelab modules’ 1
(permanent, 3 crew)
2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2
28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each
—
OMV
—
—
15 4.5 1 OMV
5
10
5
10
Space transportation center (4 crew) —
NASA initial operating capability 2
“space station”g (8 crew)
NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3
OMV; ROTV
OMV; ROTV
—
1
—
—
15 15 OMV;ROTV
OMV; ROTV
OMV:ROTV
1
1
2
—
15
30
NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3
NASA mature “space station”g (16 crew) 3
Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV)
NASA mature “space station”g 5
(18 crew, SDV)
5
10
—
Lunar capable ROTV;
staffed Lunar facility
Lunar capable ROTV;
staffed Lunar facility;
Mars voyageh
15 45 3 OMV: ROTV
aTables  1 and  2 p~e~erlt  characteristics  and  capabilities of infrastructure elements In detail.
b=tended D“ratlon  Orbitem  (EDO) are IImited In their stays on orbit; other independent elements are lonO-term.
cplatforms  of the L E A S E C R A F T /E U R E C A  tYPe
dplatfoma  of t~ m~ifi~  free.flylng spa~elab~pa~e  lndu~trles  type with their Own electrical power  and pressurization SyStemS.
eAt $fJ  1 billion&r, no long.te~,  staffed infrastructure ebments  are Wssible.
f Em  i (~tend~  Duration o~lter,  phaae 1) and the spacelab  modules have limited  eleCtriCa~  pOWer (about 7 kw).
gThe NASA “’space station” elements are expected to operate as transpodatlon  and servicing centers as well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power for
hextensive  materials procesalng.
A slgnlflcant  part of the cost of a human visit to Mars could be provided in this case.
other higher orbits, and 4) the capability to
support the kind of vehicles that could be
developed later to travel to and from the
Moon. In 10 years, the IOC infrastructure
now favored by NASA could be acquired.
In 15 years, nearly all of the infrastructure
now seriously considered by NASA could be
acquired.
At $3 billion per year (assuming that only
funds, not technology or other factors, would
be the pacing program factor): NASA’s fully
developed “space station” could become
available in somewhat more than 5 years. In
10 years, this infrastructure plus a geosta-
tionary platform, plus a Shuttle-derived cargo
vehicle (SDV) for lower cost transfer of fuel
and cargo to LEO, plus a lunar facility ready
for occupancy and continuing operation
would become possible. In 15 years, NASA’s
complete infrastructure aspirations and a
lunar settlement could be in hand and, per-
haps also, plans for seeing a human crew
travel to the vicinity of Mars and back could
be well advanced.
These projections are for infrastructure acqui-
sition only; operational costs are not included.
In general, more extensive infrastructure would
require larger operational costs. Also, there is a
basic difference between the costs associated
with using Shuttle-type vehicles and permanently
orbiting facilities. The use of an EDO to conduct
extended science or development activities with
a crew would involve launch costs each time it
went into orbit; use of a permanent facility would
require resupply loads several times per year, but
the cost of each flight could be shared with other
payloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30-day
EDO flights were conducted per year about $1
billion (1984$) in annual transportation costs
would be involved; in comparison, cost of four
partial-load Shuttle launches per year to resup-
ply a permanent facility would total $100 million
to $400 million (1984$), depending on the weight
of supplies carried in each flight.
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CONCLUSIONS
The general conclusion of a great deal of study
by the civilian space community (Government,
industry, and university) is that some additional
long-term in-space LEO infrastructure could be
used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of a number of present and anticipated space
activities. However, our space experience to
date, and science, engineering, and space oper-
ations considerations alone, are not now suffi-
cient, by themselves, to determine the charac-
ter and amount of the in-space infrastructure
to be acquired soon. And in the absence of any
objective external demand for its prompt acqui-
sition, these considerations cannot determine
the rate at which it should be acquired.
There are a wide variety of infrastructure op-
tions that could be chosen from to provide vari-
ous kinds and amounts of in-space support assets
and services. Some infrastructure options cur-
rently exist, others could be developed using cur-
rent technology, and some would require new
technology. The cost to the Government of ac-
quiring this infrastructure could be reduced, sub-
stantially, if our private sector were to offer to pro-
vide lower unit cost portions thereof, and other
portions were provided by other countries in col-
laborative programs within the United States.
it is clear that a number of important support
assets and services could be provided with in-
frastructure other than that defined as “The NASA
Space Station.” Therefore, in considering how
much of what kind of in-space infrastructure
should be provided by when, reasonable ways
for Congress to proceed might be:
l to select those specific support assets and
services that they judge to be important, ask
NASA to price them, and specify a date by
which they should become available; or
l to set an annual average funding rate for the
acquisition of in-space infrastructure, and
allow NASA to select the assets and services
to be provided and the dates of their acqui-
sition.
And Congress could decide to what extent
NASA should emphasize the acquisition of any
infrastructure by our private sector and by other
countries in order either to relieve the burden
on the Government’s budget generally, or to in-
crease the amount, or hasten the time, by which
space infrastructure would be acquired and/or
other space activities were conducted.6
Using the first approach, Congress initially
might select functions similar to those provided
by the Soviet Salyut 7 (operational since 1982).
Such a semi-permanent LEO laboratory could be
developed using Spacelab-like modules con-
nected to a power and support module patterned
after current platform designs. It would support
several crewmembers and one-third of the science,
commercial, and technology development activ-
ities that NASA now suggests would be handled
by their IOC. NASA’s estimate is some $2 billion
(1984$) for such a development.
Or, in another example, the conduct of ROTV
operations might be selected as one of the main
support functions to be supplied by space infra-
structure. This would allow servicing and other
activities in virtually all orbits, including polar,
geostationary, and even lunar. In addition, such
infrastructure would support the continued ex-
ploration of the solar system, which is one of
NASA’s most important “char ters.” The cost for
an ROTV and its associated LEO infrastructure has
been estimated at $3 billion to $4 billion (1984$).
Of course, another example of the first ap-
proach would have Congress simply select the
IOC assets and services identified by NASA and
the aerospace industry that are estimated to cost
$8 billion (1984$) (plus the cost of NASA staff);
or even to spur the infrastructure acquisition
process beyond NASA’s present aspirations, and
begin to move people beyond LEO.
Congress could consider alternative ways of
providing those assets and services in varying
degrees. For instance:
l an on-orbit laboratory supporting research
on a wide range of life, materials, and other
science topics, and new technology devel-
‘A conceptual possibility would be for NASA to provide a core
facility to which private industry could attach docking and fuel stor-
age equipment for commercial ROTV operations.
—— 
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l
l
l
l
l
opments (Shuttle, EDO, Spacelab, Colum-
bus, NASA minimum cost “space station,”
Space Industries platform);
permanent observatories for astronomy, and
Earth remote sensing (Shuttle, EDO, Space-
Iab, Space Industries, SPAS, MESA, EURECA,
Landsat, LEASECRAFT, Space Telescope,
IRAS, 0S0 satellites, Solar Max, and other
existing or planned observatories);
a facility for microgravity materials process-
ing including the manufacturing of such
products as pharmaceuticals, semiconduc-
tors, glasses, and metals (Shuttle, EDO,
Spacelab, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries
platform, SPAS, Columbus, EURECA, MESA);
servicing of satellites and platforms, includ-
ing the maintenance or replacement of com-
ponents, replenishment of consumables, and
exchange of equipment (Shuttle, EDO, ELVs,
as well as OMVs and ROTVs operated from
the Shuttle);
a transportation node to assemble, check
out, and launch vehicles to geosynchronous
and other high orbits, and on interplanetary
trips {Shuttle, EDO, Columbus, NASA mini-
mum-cost “space station”);
an assembly facility for large space structures
such as antennas for advanced satellite com-
munications systems (Shuttle, EDO, Colum-
bus, NASA minimum-cost “space station”);
l
l
a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and sup-
plies for use as needed by satellites, plat-
forms, vehicles, and people (ETs, Columbus,
LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries platform,
NASA minimum-cost “space station”); and
a staging base for later, more ambitious
exploration and travel (Columbus, NASA
minimum-cost “space station”).
If Congress were to select an average annual
funding rate, some examples of the approximate
kind and amount of infrastructure that could be
obtained over a period of some 10 years (in 1984
dollars) are, for instance:
$0.1 billion per year: an EDO (20-day stay
on-orbit) plus some free-flying platforms; or
$0.3 billion per year: an EDO (50-day stay
on-orbit), plus free-flying, pressurized infra-
structure supporting several crewmembers,
plus some free-flying platforms; or
$1 billion per year: most of the NASA IOC
plus an ROTV; or
$3 billion per year: all of the NASA IOC, plus
its extensions, plus an ROTV, plus a Shuttle-
derived cargo vehicle, plus
platform, plus an operating
program.
a “geostationary
lunar settlement
 Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure l 9 9
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One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the Space Shuttle for many advanced operations in
low-Earth-orbit. Shown here are: (A) satellite servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit—
here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna.
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Chapter 5
BROADENING THE DEBATE
SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE AS METHODS AND MEANS
Even the most informed ardent supporters of
a U.S. civilian “space station” program agree that
any such facility would be a means to various
ends, rather than an end in itself. The ends pro-
posed may be grouped into four categories: in-
dustrial (e.g., manufacturing materials); commer-
cial (e.g., servicing satellites); scientific (e. g.,
conducting experiments in the life sciences); and
national security (e. g., maintaining a permanent
U.S. manned presence). These ends, despite their
diversity, have in common a presumption that
space activities will in future become more rou-
tine and more clearly operational, less experi-
mental, and less tentative. This presumption in
turn derives from an important change in the way
that we are now beginning to view space.
Twenty-five years into the Space Age, we are
in a position to view near-Earth space much as
we would a vast tract of undeveloped raw land
on the Earth’s surface:
l We have identified at least some of the de-
sirable locations (particular orbits).
. We have established an initial legal frame-
work for their beneficial occupancy (the Out-
er Space Treaty).
l We have reliable transportation for people
and machinery to and from these remote
areas, from selected locations on the Earth’s
surface (via the Shuttle).
Ž We can maintain reliable communications
with these remote areas (via NASA’s satel-
lite communications system).
These capabilities are prompting us to undertake
the considered development of  near-Earth space—
with, therefore, the long-term implications for use
and support of any assets and people placed
there.
indeed, the terms “space station” or “space
transportation node” are most accurately under-
stood as identifying elements of long-term, per-
haps permanent, space infrastructure, concen-
trated initially, for the most part, in low-Earth
orbits. These elements would provide in-space
structure, electrical power, thermal control, ware-
housing, stability (as to location, attitude, and
temperature), communications, fuel, associated
docking and air lock capabilities, local transpor-
tation, LEO-GEO transportation, and, if staffed by
men and women, life support and residential and
working space, Because it is expected to be so-
phisticated, and useful for periods of several dec-
ades, this space infrastructure could provide a
new and qualitatively different regime of space
assets, allow the provision of new space services,
and support the conduct of space activities in a
new and presumably more efficient and effective
manner.
Four major decisions have marked the U.S. ci-
vilian space program: the establishment of NASA
in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958, the initiation of the Apollo program in
1961, the establishment of COMSAT in the Com-
sat Act of 1962, and the initiation of the Shuttle
program in 1972. But, despite the growing im-
portance of the Nation’s publicly supported space
activities, the pattern of decision making over the
past 20 years has seldom proceeded in the light
of broad public discussion. Until very recently,
the discussion of whether to undertake a “space
station” program and, if so, what elements it
should contain, had also been confined princi-
pally to engineers and scientists within NASA, and
within NASA-supported university programs and
aerospace contracting firms. Consideration of the
views and interests of these communities has, to
a very great extent, determined the kind of “space
station” program now suggested by NASA.
As NASA’s Shuttle development program comes
to a close, thousands of its in-house engineers
and technical support staff and, in principle, as
much as $2 billion per year in contract funds,
u rider its present “budget envelope, ” would be
freed up to be applied to one or more new pro-
grams. Given the agency’s natural desire not only
to maintain its current size (a size NASA leaders
judge to have the support of the general public),
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but to grow at 1 percent per year1–a desire sup-
ported by the Reagan Administration–this com-
bination of people and funds that could soon be-
come available suggests, strongly, that any new
programs must include the development and ac-
quisition of a great deal of new technology,
preferably related to having people in space; large
numbers of technologists would be gainfully
employed both in NASA and in the space indus-
try under contract to NASA. NASA’s plans could
well have been further influenced by the fun-
damental political belief that the agency might
not long survive in its present form without a
single, large, “people-in-space” program upon
which a majority of its energies are focused. If
a number of smaller programs were initiated in-
stead, each of them, it is thought, could be ter-
minated without widespread objections arising
in the political process. Finally, NASA may have
thought it prudent to propose a “space station”
program rather than some other large endeavor(s)
(e.g., a return of Americans to the Moon, send-
ing people on an expedition to Mars, etc.) both
because the former had been carefully studied
over the years, representing, in NASA’s view, a
natural complement to the Shuttle, and because
alternative large programs seemed too grandiose,
have not recently been discussed with the gen-
eral public, and, therefore, were less likely to
enlist the required support, both within and with-
out the administration.
Once the decision had been made to begin de-
fining a “space station” program to be proposed
for congressional approval, NASA began canvass-
ing possible user communities to learn what char-
acteristics they would like it to incorporate in
order to meet their needs. This process would
I NASA management has a strong commitment to its own institu-
tional future. NASA Headquarters material, NASA HQ MF 83-
2275(1 ), prepared for a presentation to its internal Policy Review
Committee in mid-1983, and subsequently presented to a Board
of the National Research Council, lists eight “Agency Goals. ” The
first goal is: “Provide for our people a creative environment and
the best of facilities, support services, and management support
so they can perform with excellence NASA research, development,
mission, and operational responsibilities. ”
The second goal speaks to the space transportation system (the
Shuttle), and the third to the establishment of a permanent manned
presence in space.
App. B shows that, in previous years, this commitment has also
been strong.
ensure that the actual infrastructure, when built,
served as many constituencies as possible, and
also might moderate potential opposition from
groups who might view any large project as a
threat to the budgets of their relatively smaller
activities.
The groups canvassed included the various
NASA Centers, the National Research Council
(the Space Science Board and the Space Applica-
tions Board), the space industry, various poten-
tial foreign providers and users of space technol-
ogy (the European Space Agency, Canada, and
Japan), and, in general, any groups that had
worked on previous “space station” studies. The
essential form of NASA’s questions to these vari-
ous groups was: if there were a permanent and
permanently staffed “space station, ” what activ-
ities might it reasonably support, how would
these activities influence its design, and of what
value would those support activities be? Eight aer-
ospace groups, placed under contract to NASA
in the fall of 1982, undertook parallel “mission
analysis studies”2 in order to determine a set of
activities for the first 10 years of the “space sta-
tion’s” operation, the fundamental characteris-
tics suitable for accomplishing these activities,
and the presumed value to be associated with
obtaining and using them. These contractor groups
soon formed similar judgments regarding the
amount of money that (NASA hoped) would be
made available, a desirable acquisition schedule,
and NASA’s preferences on such matters as the
employment of people in space and the use of
new v. already space-qualified technology. Also,
using standard industry cost estimating practices,
they suggested the likely acquisition costs of the
infrastructure elements to the Government,
The process by which users were canvassed
was essentially open-ended: no potential use that
either required or would materially benefit from
a “permanently manned space station” was re-
jected out of hand. Given NASA’s internal cir-
cumstances, this open-ended character was cer-
tainly unexceptionable: the more—and the more
varied—the identified uses, the more capable, so-
phisticated, and large the supporting infrastruc-
2The resu Its of these studies are summarized in app. A.
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ture would have to be. The greater the resulting
capability and sophistication, the more engineers
would be required to design, develop, and pro-
duce it–and the greater its cost. Increased costs,
in turn, wouId imply more Government contract-
ing—and understandably generate greater inter-
est in and support for the program by the space
industry.
In general, the greater the number of poten-
tial users and potential suppliers, the greater the
influence that could be brought to bear on Gov-
ernment decision makers to approve any “space
station” program. In any event, essentially all im-
portant space industry groups were represented
in the eight aerospace groups of companies, and
the number of potential uses recommended for
inclusion totaled well over 100.
If there were any important potential uses left
out of account, either because the supporting
technology would be too costly or could not be
obtained in time, or because NASA judged their
discussion to be inappropriate for the time be-
ing, they could still be provided for later, not in
the initial operational capability (IOC) “station,”
but in the subsequent full capability “space sta-
tion” program, which could continue to the end
of this century.
it is important to appreciate that the form in
which NASA put its original questions to the eight
aerospace groups largely determined the approach
taken to potential acquisition of a civilian “space
station.” And this approach, in turn, largely deter-
mined the result—a “Christmas-tree” proposal in
which there was something for all identifiable po-
NEED FOR GOALS
This entire panoply of relatively narrowly
focused and nearer term ends provide, in OTA’s
judgment, insufficient justification for a major,
new U.S. civilian space effort. Moreover, there
is general agreement neither on a set of long-
range goals which the U.S. civilian space program
now is expected to achieve nor on a set of spe-
cific objectives which, as they are addressed,
would serve as milestones of progress toward
those goals. And without such a set of goals and
objectives the Nation cannot make a clear deter-
tential users, with little attempt either to weigh
the seriousness of their intentions to use the fa-
cility, or to gauge their willingness to see funds
that they would employ otherwise used instead
to develop it. A different, and perhaps more
appropriate question, wouId have been: in view
of the maturing capabilities and increasing num-
bers of the spacefaring nations of the world,3 what
elements of long-term, in-orbit infrastructure
would be appropriate to facilitate the considered
development of near-Earth space? This question
would not have required initial assumptions that
the facilities would be permanent and perma-
nently manned, that the size of the eventual pro-
gram would have to be geared to maintaining
NASA’s size and form, and that all possible users
should be accommodated.
But even with the large number of uses that
were identified, little doubt remains that the
kind of “space station” which NASA prefers
cannot now be fully justified on scientific, eco-
nomic, or military grounds,4 or combinations
thereof. Rather, a decision to approve it will
rest, finally, on a political judgment that will re-
flect many intangible factors as well.
31deally,  one should add: “ and in wew  of the goals and ob-
jectives of our civilian space program. ” However, as argued
throughout thts  report, there is no publicly accepted agenda of such
goals and objectives,
‘It must also be noted that, since the cancellation of the Manned
Orbiting Laboratory Program in 1968, the U.S. military has been
consistent in its public position that there is no military require-
ment for a “manned space station. ” This position IS still publicly
malntal  ned and remains i n force, even in the context of the Presi-
dent’s call, in March 1983, for development of advanced ballistic
missile  defense systems that could see large amounts of very sophis-
ticated  and costly military technology deployed in space.
AND OBJECTIVES
mination of the basic characteristics of the infra-
structure elements actually needed, of their
acquisition schedule and cost, or of the means
whereby they should be acquired.
If future U.S. space-related goals and objectives
are to be effective in providing direction to future
U.S. space efforts, they should be such as to com-
mand widespread attention; have great inherent
humanitarian and scientific interest; foster the de-
velopment of new technology; have relevance
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to global issues; prompt international coopera-
tion; and involve major participation of our pri-
vate sector so as to advance our economic
prospects.
THE POLICY BACKGROUND
The overall end of U.S. space activities was first
stated as a preamble to the National Aeronautics
and Space (NAS) Act of 1958, as amended (sec.
102 (a)): “The congress hereby declares that it
is the policy of the United States that activities
in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes
for the benefit of all mankind.” Six policy prin-
ciples, forming the core of the NAS Act, give sub-
stance to that overall end. These six have pro-
vided the framework in accordance with which
the civilian space program has evolved to the
present day. These principles may be stated as
follows:
l
l
l
l
l
l
that U.S. preeminence in space science, ex-
ploration and applications be maintained;
that economic, political, and social benefits
be derived;
that knowledge be increased;
that civilian and military activities be sepa-
rated (though they are to be coordinated and
are not to duplicate one another unneces-
sarily);
that NASA, the civilian agency, be limited
largely to research; and
that international cooperation be fostered.
Thus, the NAS Act articulated the policy prin-
ciples for overall guidance of the U.S. civilian
space program, but the act alone has not pro-
vided (and cannot be expected to provide) the
particular goals for civilian space activities. Lack-
ing such guidance, the space program has instead
been directed by political and budgetary pres-
sures not always relevant to a logically ordered
exploration, development, and use of space. At
the same time, none of the policymaking bodies
successively established in the executive branch
nor any of the committees of Congress have been
able to ensure that a long-range plan of particu-
lar policies and programs would be pursued. s
5For a fu II discussion of these policy principles and their implica-
tions, see Civilian Space Policy and Applications, O T A - S T I - 1 7 7
(Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
June 1982).
Over the years, a number of specific goals and
objectives have been proposed. Significantly,
however, none of them has arisen as a result of
widespread public discussion. With the maturity
of U.S. space capabilities (and the capabilities of
several other countries and our own private sec-
tor as well) on the one hand and the straitened
financial circumstances of the Government on
the other, this situation is in need of fundamen-
tal change. That is, if the United States is to main-
tain a strong commitment to a continuing civil-
ian space program, then an informed national
agreement on the goals and objectives of such
a program is most important.
At the beginning of the Nixon Administration,
the Apollo program was rapidly coming to a suc-
cessful close, but no clear definition of a post-
Apollo space program had emerged. Early plan-
ning efforts had failed to yield a consensus, and
space program budgets had decreased dramati-
cally, presenting the new administration with
growing unemployment in the aerospace indus-
try as well as a major technological agency that
did not have clear signals regarding its future. In
order to address these problems, the Presiden-
tial Space Task Group (STG) was established
under the chairmanship of the Vice President.
The STG review was the first comprehensive in-
teragency planning effort that was carried out
with respect to the civilian space program.
In its final report,6 the STG recommended com-
mitment to a balanced publicly funded program
that included science, applications, and technol-
ogy-development objectives, but no immediate
commitment to expeditions to the planets. They
suggested no change in the institutional structure
nor an operations role for NASA, but did empha-
size the desirability of expanding international
cooperation. The major technological develop-
ment that the STG suggested was the reusable
— - . . —
bThe Post-Apo/lo Space Program: Directions for the Future, Space
Task Group Report to the President, September 1969.
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space Shuttle system that couId support an even-
tual “space station. ” The clear priority was for
Shuttle development first, with a “space station”
as a potential future development. Support for
exploratory expeditions to the planets was re-
tained as a long-range option for the Govern-
ment’s civilian space program, with a “manned
Mars mission before the end of this century as
a first target. ”
In 1976, almost two decades after the adop-
tion of the NAS Act, NASA issued its own “Out-
look for Space” report. This document addressed
the cultural goal of better scientific understand-
ing of the physical universe and the social/eco-
nomic goal of further exploration and exploita-
tion of the solar system, The report suggests four
goals reflective of basic human physical needs:
1. improving food production and distribution;
2. developing new energy sources;
3. meeting new challenges to the environment;
and
4. predicting and dealing with natural and man-
made disasters.
In October 1978, President Carter released a
space policy statement that summarized the im-
portant aspects of an administration review of
space policy and provided guidance regarding
the President’s view of national objectives in the
publicly supported civilian space program over
the next several years. This statement reaffirmed
endorsement of a balanced space program and
committed the administration to the continued
development of the space Shuttle system and its
use during the coming decade. However, the
statement made no new program commitments
and specifically rejected any major new techno-
logical development. No goals were set to pro-
vide a focus for the program and the general phi-
losophy was best characterized by the statement
that “activities will be pursued in space when it
appears that national objectives can most effi-
ciently be met through space activities. ” Over-
all, the policy statement left many questions un-
answered. It made several statements about what
the United States would not do in space, but re-
mained very general regarding the nature of what
it would do. In addition, it became clear that fiscal
constraints were likely to continue, and, as a con-
sequence, commitments to specific multiyear
Government programs would be made only with
great care. This announcement was received with
some dismay by the congressional leaders in-
volved with the space program and by the aero-
space community. This concern spawned a num-
ber of hearings and proposed legislative approaches
to a more vigorous space policy for the United
States, and led to the request for the OTA assess-
ment of Civilian Space Policy and Applications.
Then on July 4, 1982, President Reagan an-
nounced the issuance of his National Space Pol-
icy Statement “. . . to provide a general direction
for our future [space] efforts . . .,” asserting that
// . . . our goals for space are ambitious, yet
achievable. ” This statement “. . . establishes the
basic goals of United States policy which are to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
strengthen the security of the United States;
maintain U.S. space leadership;
obtain economic and scientific benefits
through the exploitation of space;
expand U.S. private sector investment and
involvement in civil space and space-related
activities;
promote international cooperative activities
in the national interest; and
cooperate with other nations in maintaining
the freedom of space for activities which en:
hance the security and welfare of man kind.”
On June 27, 1983, the Science Advisor to the
President “. . . challenged] the aerospace com-
munity to do some bold thinking about the future
[concerning space],” and went on to observe that
// . . . the real issue is how we can fashion a space
program that addresses today’s national aspira-
tions and needs . . . and . . . re-ignite[s] the spirit
of adventure that captured America in the past
. . . . “ He questioned “. . . why don’t we let the
American people share the grand vision of the
future of space?”
But the articulated goals, particularly in the ab-
sence of specific objectives designed to address
them, fall well short of what the United States,
today, might expect of its publicly supported ci-
vilian space activities.
They do not speak at all of such fundamental
matters as having human beings in space; of hav-
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ing the general public directly involved in space- pendence of the Western European countries and
related matters; or of ameliorating the great in- Canada, Japan, Brazil, the People’s Republic of
hibition that the present cost of space assets and China, india, and others, as well as the large and
activities has on the development and use of constantly expanding U.S.S.R, space program
space. And there is little in these words to sug- that, in its nonmilitary aspects, commands the at-
gest the imaginative, the exciting, the challenging tention and respect of our civilian space Ieaders.7
or the adventurous or, to use the Science Advi-
sor’s word: the “bold. ” 7See  Salyut—Soviet  Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence
Finally, behind all of this there are the grow- in Space—A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-STI-14 (Washing-ton, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Decem-
i n g  a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s ,  c o m p e t e n c e ,  a n d  i n d e - ber 1983).
TODAY’S TOO NARROW DEBATE
As the important matter of defining and artic-
ulating such national goals and objectives is ad-
dressed, it should not be taken as implied here
that such definition and articulation are not now
going on. What should be understood is that, for
all practical purposes (including that of obtain-
ing any civilian “space station”), this activity is
being conducted by space-related scientists, engi-
neers, and program managers—almost all within
the Government, within university offices sup-
ported by the Government, or within the Gov-
ernment-supported aerospace industry, At best,
then, the goals and objectives that would be ex-
pected to result from this kind of consideration
might, understandably, represent viewpoints that
are narrow relative to the wide spectrum of our
national interests and opportunities in the civil-
ian space area today. It is likely that an expres-
sion of goals, and especially specific objectives,
arrived at in this fashion will reflect, perhaps un-
duly, the interests of their originators. And finally,
the U.S. political system oftentimes places as
RECENT
Recently, there have been a number of calls
to formulate a set of broadly based, contempo-
rary national goals and objectives in the civilian
space area.
For instance, Simon Ramo observes in his new
book What’s Wrong With Our Technological So-
ciety and How to Fix /t (pp. 175-1 76):
After twenty-five years it is still true of the en-
tire commercial use of space in the united States
much weight on the process by which a national
decision is reached as on the substance of this
decision; therefore, the better course for the Gov-
ernment in the longer run is to encourage as
many of our citizens who are interested in space
to participate in the pre-decision debate.
It was quite appropriate that, for most of the
past quarter of a century, our national space goals
and objectives primarily reflected those of the sci-
ence and technology communities alone. These
communities have done their work well. Conse-
quently, our space activities now can, and should,
be broadened to reflect both the maturity of our
space knowledge and skills, and the general pub-
lic’s broader interests and concerns.
The matter of describing a new and clarified
set of long-term civilian space goals, and laying
out specific civilian space activity objectives, is
made more urgent by the recent increase of mil-
itary interest in space—an increase that may well
soon accelerate.
PROPOSALS
that the government and the private sector have
not yet worked out their best permanent roles.
Less forgivable is something else. With space so
clearly an arena of powerful economic and [na-
tional] security interest for the nation, we have
been approaching plans and policies about
space for well over a decade on an intermittent,
t-top-and-jump short-range political basis. NASA
has many hopes and plans, of course, but the
nation does not have a plan for the next two dec-
ades. A real plan would describe both goals and
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anticipated budgets. It would have recognition,
acceptance, and stature with all the power cen-
ters influencing advances and applications in
space, namely, the government’s Executive
Branch, Congress, industry, and the scientific
and technological fraternity. A real plan would
be one to which all these forces were committed
long-term, in the same way that at the start of
the 1960s we were committed to landing a man
on the moon before the end of the decade. . . .
[And while] the possibilities of space warfare
[and] economic constraints [must be considered]
none of these factors should prevent the United
States from having sound long-range space goals
as a guide to the government’s budgeting proc-
ess. . . . Less-than-adequate attention has been
given to setting priorities and long-range goals
and allocating missions to each sector.
in a recent report prepared by the Subcommit-
tee on Space Science and Applications and trans-
mitted to the Committee on Science and Tech-
nology of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Representative Ronnie Flippo, then Chairman of
the Subcommittee, stated that: “. . . there is a
lack of long-range goals for our space program.”8
The report noted that 7 years earlier it had also
addressed “Future Space Programs” and then
emphasized that NASA should “. . . focus on an
over-arching concept [that] should represent one
or more mind-expanding endeavors which chal-
lenge the imagination and capability of the coun-
try [the] key element of [which] should be sub-
~Future  Space Programs: 1981, Subcommittee on Space Science
and Applications, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives, May 1982, p. 1.
stantial return on past and current investments
in space through clear . . . benefits to the society
on earth in the form of greatly expanded serv-
ices and direct contributions to solution of earth-
bound problems. ”9
The “NASA Advisory Council Study of the Mis-
sion of NASA” (released on Oct. 12, 1983) sug-
gests activities that, in some cases, could be con-
sidered goals or objectives: explore the solar
system, pursue scientific research in space, ex-
ploit space for public and commercial purposes,
and expand human presence in space. And
NASA awarded a near $1 million contract to a
private organization (Ecosystems) to provide it
with suggestions on “. . . long-term research
goals and the technology it should work on to
meet those goals. ”
The President’s Private-Sector Survey on Cost
Control, in commenting on the “. . . Federal
expenditure on R&D [of] about $48 billion a year
. . . faults the major science agencies for failing
to have clearly defined goals and plans for meet-
ing them. ”10 And an editorial in the Christian
Science Monitor pointedly observes that “. . . it
is most important that the U.S. develop a con-
sensus on manned-space-flight goals. None now
exists . . . Until consensus exists no specific space
station concept can be usefully approved.’” 11
91 bid., p. 3.
l~sclence,  No. 222, NO V. 25 ,  1983, p. 903.
I I The Chrjgjan Science  Monitor, Dec. 12, 1983, p. 23.
PRESIDENT REAGAN’S CALL FOR A “SPACE STATION”
In 1984, the future of the Nation’s activities in
space was placed squarely on the congressional
agenda. In his State of the Union Address, Presi-
dent Reagan spoke at considerable length about
the space area and what he judges should be the
Nation’s aspirations in regard to it. And he de-
voted his radio address during the same week to
space. He directed NASA to commence the de-
velopment of permanent, low-Earth-orbit infra-
structure that would support human beings in
space, and to obtain it within the next decade.
And he asked Congress to authorize and appro-
priate Federal funds to begin studies of this pro-
posed infrastructure.
Of particular relevance here is the president’s
assertion that: “[one of] our great goal[s] is to build
on America’s pioneer spirit and develop our next
frontier . . . : space.”; “America has always been
greatest when we dared to be great. . . . We can
follow our dreams to distant stars.” And in devel-
oping the infrastructure (i. e., a civilian “space sta-
tion”) he called for international participation so
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as to: “. . . expand freedom for all who share our In effect, the President’s speeches have now
goals. ” prompted, and indeed his specific request for Fed-
In his radio talk, he spoke to the: “. . . challenge
eral law and funds for a major new initiative in the
[of] reaching for exciting goals in space , . . ,“ while
publicly funded civilian space program essentially
requires, the conduct of a national debate over the
explaining that, as well, “Our space goals will chart next year or two regarding our national interests,
a path of progress toward creating a better life for
goals and objectives in the civilian space area.
all people” [and he emphasized that]: “a , . . space
station [should be seen as] a stepping stone for [ad-
dressing] further goals.” Emphasis added.
STEPS TOWARD BROADER PARTICIPATION
Interestingly enough, the circumstances dis-
cussed above have resulted in only one impor-
tant change to the basic 1958 Act—the explicit
emphasis on space commercialization that was
added this summer. Indeed, it was only in the
fall of 1983 that Congress began to hold hearings
that might lay a basis for such changes. Scores
of billions of public dollars have been appropri-
ated to pay for our public civilian space program
since we reached the Moon, and almost surely
scores of billions more will be appropriated dur-
ing the next few decades, but, to date, without
the kind of thoughtful and fundamental reap-
praisal of our contemporary national interests and
activities in space that many are coming to believe
the issues now demand. Our publicly supported
civiIian space area has seemed to suffer from a
form of benign neglect.
However, the debate is quickening. Congress
has taken an extraordinary step regarding the ar-
ticulation of national goals and objectives in the
civilian space area. In passing the National Aero-
nautics and Space Act of 1985, Congress, among
other things, found and declared that “. . . the
identification of long-range goals and policy op-
tions for the United States civilian space program
through a high-level, representational public
forum will assist the President and the Congress
in formulating future policies for the . . . pro-
gram . . . “; and they called for the establishment
of a “National Commission on Space” that will
assist the United States “ . . . to define the long-
range needs of the Nation that may be fulfilled
through the peaceful uses of outer space “12
With the President’s signature to Public Law 98-
361, there has been put into motion the first for-
mal and fundamental reexamination of the Na-
tion’s civilian space aspirations, objectives and
institutions since the passage of the NAS Act in
1958.
From the outset of this assessment, the need
for identifying a far-sighted set of generally accept-
able civilian space goals and objectives that re-
flect today’s circumstances has been apparent.
Most notably, the assessment’s Advisory Panel
has strongly urged that an initial set of such goals
and objectives be identified and proposed for
broad study and discussion so as to lay a more
rational basis for the consideration of any large
and costly space civilian “space station. ”
In response to that call, and with the intention
of providing a sound and useful starting point for
a national debate on the scope and direction of
the Nation’s space activities, the next chapter of
this report provides an ensemble of interrelated
goals and objectives for consideration by Con-
gress and the American public.
IZpubllc Law 98-36I, Title Ii.
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Chapter 6
TOWARD A GOAL-ORIENTED
CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM
POSSIBLE CIVILIAN SPACE GOALS
If the civilian space activities of the United
States are to maintain widespread and enthusi-
astic public support, they should aspire to pro-
tect, ease, challenge, and/or improve the human
condition. Such aspirations can and should be
articulated in the form of long-range goals that
would guide the conduct of the Nation’s space
activities in general and a decision regarding pos-
sible acquisition of any “space station” in par-
ticular.
In order to prompt the formulation and subse-
quent discussion of future space goals and ob-
jectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible long-
range goals and a set of nearer term objectives
designed to address those goals. Although OTA
does not recommend either this particular set of
goals or its supporting family of objectives, they
are intended to exemplify the kind of goals and
objectives around which consensus might well
be formed so as to provide sensible guidance for
the Nation’s future space activities. The Advisory
Panel for this assessment has taken an unusually
active role in helping to formulate these goals and
objectives. It is the Panel’s judgment that the
goals and objectives proposed for discussion are
reasonable and important.
The set of possible goals follows. (They should
be read with reference to the six basic principles
spoken to in the 1958 Space Act and discussed
in the previous chapter. ) Some of these can be
defined in fairly specific terms, but others–no less
POSSIBLE CIVILIAN
In order to illustrate how the six basic civilian
space goals suggested in the previous section
could be addressed, this section identifies 10 spe-
cific objectives that the United States (in coop-
significant—can be stated only in a more general
and open-ended way:
l
l
l
l
Ž
l
to increase the efficiency of space activities
and reduce their net cost to the general
public;
to involve the general public directly in space
activities, both on Earth and in space;
to derive scientific, economic, social, and
political benefits;
to increase international cooperation and
collaboration in and re space;
to study and to explore the Earth, the solar
system, and the greater physical universe;
and
to spread life, in a responsible fashion,
throughout the solar system. ’
These goals (some new, some already well-
accepted) have been chosen so as to move U.S.
space interests and activities closer to the main-
stream of public interest and concern, while at
the same time maintaining space leadership,
enhancing national security, and developing new
capabilities to respond to finding the unexpected
in the cosmos.
I Undertaking this goal responsibly would entail preserving the
pristine environments of other worlds for future study and apprecia-
tion. For example, there are bodies such as Europa and Titan, which
have not yet been explored, where life may already exist. And there
remains some residual controversy even about the possibility of
microbes on Mars.
SPACE OBJECTIVES
eration with other countries, in most cases) could
attain within the second quarter-century of the
space age. The particular objectives suggested
here for further study and discussion are chosen
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to have a great impact and, taken as a group, to
respond to a broad spectrum of public, private,
professional, and international interests.
Of course, discussion of any of these concep-
tual objectives should actually be undertaken
only with surface-based alternative and comple-
mentary activities clearly in mind. Some elements
of a few are already under way in a modest fash-
ion, but not in the sharply focused fashion sug-
gested here. Some may turn out not to be feasi-
ble for technological, economic, or other reasons,
Some could be attained in a very short time, but
others will take many years. Some respond to ob-
jective needs, some respond to conceptual op-
portunities. Broad consensus on some should be
rather easily reached, but others can be expected
to provoke serious argument and perhaps even
disagreement. They range in cost from near-zero
to tens of billions of dollars. Some are chosen par-
ticularly because, in addition to the importance
of their being achieved, they also invite the ac-
tive and important partnership of other countries
and the U.S. private sector.
These objectives are proposed under the as-
sumption that the U.S. Government would still be
expected to carry on, as today, a “core” space-
related basic research program at the level of at
least $1 billion annually (in constant dollars). Pure
scientific research should continue to encompass
such diverse space-related areas as astronomy,
cosmology, life sciences, materials sciences, ge-
odesy, magnetism, relativity, plasma physics, me-
teorology, atmospheric composition and dynam-
ics, and programs of preparing for human Iunar,
asteroid, and planetary exploration and settle-
ment. The basic research program would be ex-
pected to continue solar system exploration gen-
erally, including the planets, their moons, the
Sun, comets and asteroids, and to improve the
methods and means of transporting equipment
and people in space. And it would be expected
to develop, deploy, and use those “cutting edge”
space technologies—large and sophisticated tele-
scopes and interferometers that span the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, microgravity furnaces, so-
phisticated and powerful Earth-oriented remote
sensors, sophisticated space probes, etc.—that are
required to make early and fundamental advances
in these fields in a highly productive fashion.
The results of these basic research activities, of
course, will be many and varied. In both the
shorter and longer term they can have important
public policy implications and, in general, they
can eventually influence the cultural, economic,
and national security interests of the country in
many, and oftentimes unexpected, ways. As the
roles and capabilities expected of our in-space
infrastructure for the next two or three decades
are considered, basic research activities should
receive a high priority.2 Continuing success in
fundamental space research may be expected to
facilitate the accomplishment of the objectives
proposed here.
The titles of the 10 civilian space objectives fol-
low. They are not rank-ordered:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
90
10.
Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimi-
zation.
Human Presence and Activities on the
Moon.
Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids.
Medical Research of Direct Interest to the
General Public.
People, Drawn From the General Public,
in Space.
Modernizing and Expanding International
Short-Wave Broadcasting.
Providing Space Data Directly to the Gen-
eral Public.
Using Space and Space Technology for the
Transmission of Electrical Energy.
Reducing the Cost of Space Operations, Es-
pecially Transportation.
lncreasing Commercial-Industrial Space
Sales.
The eventual acceptance of any or all of these
objectives (along with their related costs) as ac-
tual national objectives would leave the priority
among them, and the rate of public expenditure
in addressing them, completely open. Each and
all would be undertaken, if at all, only as the
funds become available to do so.
Table 9 relates these 10 specific objectives to
the broader goals.
A brief elaboration of each of the 10 follows.
‘See the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Public Law
98-361 ).
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Table 9.—Possible Goals and Objectives
Goals
Increase Derive
space activities’ Involve the scientific, Increase Study and Bring life
efficiency; general Derive political, inter- explore the to the
reduce their public economic and social national physical physical
net cost directly benefits benefits cooperation universe universe
Objectives:
1.-
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Establish a global information system/
service re natural hazards
Establish lower cost reusable
transportation service to the Moon and
establish human presence there
Use space probes to obtain information
re Mars and some asteroids prior to
early human exploration
Conduct medical research of direct
interest to the general public
Bring at least hundreds of the general
public per year into space for short
visits
Establish a global, direct, audio broad-
casting, common-user system/service
Make essentially all data generated by
civilian satellites and spacecraft
directly available to the general public
Exploit radio/optical free space
electromagnetic propagation for long-
distance energy distribution
Reduce the unit cost of space transpor-
tation and space activitiesa
Increase space-related private sector
N
Y
N
P
P
P
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N N N Y Y Y N
N
N
N
Y
P
Y
Y
Y
P
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
P
Y
P
P
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N N Y P Y N N
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
sale#
aThls ~~u~d  advance the proSpeC&  of successfully addressing all other ‘Qoals.”
Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carded  out.
1. Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimiza-
tion.—ln cooperation with the other countries of
the world, our Government and our scientific and
enginering communities could be set to the task
of beginning to provide a global, space-related,
Earth-monitoring system/service which would
provide fundamental information to the world’s
political leaders, organizations, and institutions
to assist them in dealing, satisfactorily, with
macroscopic “life-and-death” problems in such
areas as weather, climate, air and water purity,
food production, seismology, and resource con-
servation. It would be designed to complement
related surface-based system/services, taking spe-
cific advantage of the in-situ measurement and
monitoring perspectives that only appropriate
sensors located in space could offer. Attention
could be concentrated on earthquakes, tsunamis,
ozonosphere perturbations, severe storms, envi-
ronmental pollution, the carbon dioxide “green-
house” effect, volcanic effluvia, etc. Well before
the year 2000 this operational global system/serv-
ice could be in place, monitoring and studying
the Earth’s space and atmosphere, and surface
and subsurface, for characteristics and changes
relevant to such problems, and supplying both
immediate and longer term “warning” infor-
mation promptly, directly, and in a form useful
to nontechnicians.
These are problems that have inherent multina-
tional elements of potentially grave hazard. And
this type of space-related system/service could be
developed, installed, and used in such a fashion
as to obviate the serious concerns raised by some
countries over what they consider to be undue
surveillance of a military-political nature, or the
kind of monitoring that could provide an undue
economic advantage to some countries. The
original elements of this system/service could be
continually improved on as new scientific knowl-
edge is obtained, new space-related measure-
ment techniques are perfected, and experience
is gained in the reliability, utility, and cost of
space-related services in comparison with analo-
gous services that could be provided at the sur-
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face. It could, of course, draw heavily on any
“global habitability” scientific studies. And it
could provide information that would be usefuI
in furthering study of “nuclear winter. ”
2. Human Presence and Activities on the Moon.
–Our Government and our scientific and engi-
neering communities in government, universities,
and the private sector, could be given the task
of establishing a modest, permanent, habitable
facility on our Earth’s Moon. Such a facility would
allow physical, chemical, geological, and cosmo-
logical studies to begin there in earnest–with the
entire activity involving as many countries as pos-
sible. The U.S. private sector in concert with the
Government could also be challenged to provide
facilities and services there that would open up
the Moon to travel, recreation, sports and other
cultural, commercial, and industrial pursuits.
Three important elements of this program could
be: 1 ) the development of a relatively low-cost,
human transportation system/service between
low-Earth-orbit and the Moon [see objective (9)];
2) consideration of producing oxygen on the
Moon from lunar materials as a source of rocket
oxidant for return trips and for life support (i. e.,
using solar energy to release oxygen from Moon
rocks); and 3) a search for abundant supplies of
water/ice in the cold-traps at the lunar poles.
A primary cost-driver for human settlement on
the Moon, and other celestial objects, will be the
reliability and efficiency of the technology which
would enable such settlements to provide livable
atmospheres, grow their own food, and build ef-
fective and durable habitats using local materials.
3. Obtaining Information Required for Eventual
Human Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids.
—The Soviet Union has stated that it expects to
explore, and have some of its people establish
a presence on, the planet Mars. The United States
could also aspire to do so when the technology
is in hand to allow it to be done at relatively low
cost, when adequate Mars-related data and in-
formation are also in hand, and when our experi-
ence in settling on the Moon gives us the con-
fidence that we can do so successfully and effi-
ciently [see objective (2)]. Early programs to de-
velop and use lower cost transportation, hous-
ing, and people-related services in establishing
low-Earth-orbit and lunar residential and work
places could all keep analogous Mars objectives
specifically in mind. Over the next 10 to 20 years,
crewless space probes, with characteristics spe-
cifically reflective of our intention to have some
of our men and women visit the surface of Mars
early in the next century, could be sent there.
Specific plans could see a human exploration pro-
gram commence on the satisfactory completion
of our initial settlement on the Moon, provided
the cost of doing so is then seen to be acceptable.
Of course, the space probes could, as well,
search for information of importance to a better
understanding of our own terrestrial circum-
stances and processes. And consideration could
be given to exploring a few of the asteroids as
wel I.
4. Medical Research of Direct Interest to the
General Public.– For over 20 years, the space pro-
grams of both the United States and the Soviet
Union have been concerned with the ability of
men and women to survive and function well in
space. Space provides a special environment,
marked particularly by the near absence of grav-
ity, within which several diseases and related
human physiological processes might now begin
to be profitably investigated. Important topics
relevant not only to future space dwellers, but
also to the Earth population as well, could include
research on hypertension, osteoporosis (a disor-
der involving loss of bone mass highly prevalent
in older women), osteoarthritis (which affects
over 16 million Americans), weight control, en-
ergy metabolism, digestive function, and body
fluid balance.
To elaborate on one such opportunity: exper-
imental evidence, gathered from both animals
and humans in space and in certain Earth-based
simulations of some of the conditions of space
flight, suggests that there may bean analogy be-
tween some of the physiological changes that oc-
cur in the absence of gravity and those changes
which take place during the normal aging proc-
ess. For example, as cosmonauts and astronauts
adapt to longer duration living in essentiaJJy
weightless conditions in space, they experience
atrophied muscles, brittle bones, and decreased
cardiovascular and respiratory capacity, i.e.,
38-798 0 - 84 - 9 : QL. 3
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physiological conditions similar to those which
accompany senescence. Further experimental
studies in research programs carried on at the
Earth’s surface and on the Shuttle-Spacelab may
confirm that, inasmuch as the human aging proc-
ess evolved under conditions of constant grav-
ity here on Earth, removal of this force over long
periods of time in space results in changes in the
aging process and its rate—changes that could be
studied in weightlessness with an explicit inten-
tion of relating any findings to the general popula-
tion. Given the importance of scientific studies
of aging to all of the world’s people as individuals,
and the effects of an aging population on many
economic, social, and political institutions, if sur-
face and Shuttle-Spacelab “space station” studies
are encouraging, the United States could in-
augurate a major international research program
in the fields of gerontology and geriatrics that
would encompass related experimentation both
in space and on the Earth’s surface.
5. People, Drawn From the General public, in
Space.—The Government is now moving to ex-
pand human use of the Shuttle to include a very
few nontechnician “communicators” per year on
Earth-space flights. Within the next decade, we
could have space “Lodge/Habitats” established
in low-Earth-orbit, with the Shuttle being used to
see hundreds of persons per year, the great ma-
jority of whom would be representative of various
professional and cultural sectors and the general
public (i.e., nonastronauts and nonspace techni-
cian workers) drawn from the United States and
rest of the entire world’s population, being trans-
ported there to spend a short time in space. The
entire activity could be operated as a sound,
albeit innovative, commercial enterprise carried
on in cooperation with the U.S. Government;
there should be little or no net out-of-pocket cost
to the Government as a consequence of this co-
operation. The enterprise could be conducted so
as not to favor the rich—all of our citizens should
have some opportunity to visit there. And such
“Lodge/Habitats,” and the activities that they,
and the Shuttle, could allow to commence in
space, could be used to help the world celebrate
the next “Millennium” in an extraordinary fashion.
Only when a large number of our citizens, rep-
resentative of a broad cross-section of our society,
begin to experience the “space adventure” di-
rectly, will the space domain and space activi-
ties gradually begin to move into the mainstream
of our national interests and concerns.
~his objective and objective (7) have in com-
mon the aim of making the space domain, and
space science and technology, much more acces-
sible to the general public.]
6. Modernizing and Expanding International
Short-Wave Broadcasting.–Hundreds of millions
of people, world-wide, regularly listen to speech
and music programs broadcast via shortwave by
more than 100 countries. Because of the inherent
characteristics of the ionosphere which influence
the way by which the broadcast signals are pro-
pagated, this service is limited at best and often-
times is of poor quality, reliability, and coverage.
Also, shortwave broadcasting has become a mat-
ter of growing international political contention
because of its dominance by the major countries
and the growing interference to reception caused
by increasing use of the sharply limited useful
radio-wave spectrum by very powerful surface
transmitters. A cooperative U.S. Government-
private sector initiative could lead an international
effort to establish a global system, employing so-
phisticated and powerful direct broadcast satel-
lites, that could replace most of today’s individ-
ual country shortwave stations well within a
decade. Developed as an international common-
user system, use of its services could allow broad-
casters throughout the world, regardless of their
size, location, or political persuasion, to reach
audiences in other countries clearly and reliably,
and at relatively modest cost. Such a service
could go far toward meeting a standard of nation-
to-nation broadcasting equitability simply not
physically possible under today’s surface-based
shortwave broadcasting circumstances. Briefly,
it would be a more efficient, effective, and fair
way of accomplishing the kind of shortwave
broadcasting now done from the Earth’s surface.
And, as well, the prospect of wholly new kinds
of international programming and international
marketing services could be opened.
7. Providing Space Data Directly to the General
Public.—’’The wholesale introduction of com-
puters into [the home and especially] into class-
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rooms since 1980 amounts to a quiet revolution
that will help meet the demands of scientific and
technological change as well as economic com-
putation in world markets.” 3 Nearly 80 percent
of our junior and senior high schools now have
computers and it is expected that the number in
our public schools will reach 600,000 by next
year. A computer network now interconnects 200
university sites, and the number of terminals is
expected to reach 150,000 soon.
A high school teacher in the United Kingdom
has attained international attention by having his
students ‘‘tune in” to signals from Soviet space-
craft and deduce information about the crafts’
characteristics and activities. The cultural, social,
and economic implications of having a large and
growing segment of our population using increas-
ingly sophisticated computers in their homes,
businesses, grade and high schools, universities,
etc., promise to be enormous. Many of these in-
dividuals and organizations could now be sup-
plied, in near-real-time and at modest cost, with
the nonclassified and nonproprietary data gen-
erated by payloads of public satellites and space-
craft generally, by designing them to allow direct
readout of the space signals transmitted from
them and/or by providing the data promptly and
generally from central collection points. For in-
stance, a recent Shuttle/Spacelab flight resulted
in the generation of 20 million video frames, 900
frames of film, and 2 trillion bits of data. Hun-
dreds of thousands of people have already taken
the opportunity simply to listen in, passively, to
surface-space voice communications—and made
modest payments to do so. Making data available
on the atmosphere, surface and subsurface char-
acteristics of the bodies in our solar system, in-
cluding the planet Earth, and spacecraft operat-
ing data as well—all directly, while they were
being generated–could allow and prompt a
much greater direct public involvement, both
here and abroad, in the publicly supported U.S.
civilian space program. As well, it could increase,
by orders of magnitude, today’s study and ap-
preciation of these space data, spacecraft tech-
nology, and space activities generally, especially
by our younger people. In time, the market could
well prompt the creation of “service-added” or-
‘Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 1984.
ganizations that could prepare various education-
al packages with a wide variety of users in mind:
students of various ages and interests and many
of the general public with home TV receivers,
video recorders, and computers.
8. Using Space and Space Technology for the
Transmission of Electrical Energy. -In effect, any
radio communication involves the transmission
of energy through the Earth’s atmosphere and/or
space—albeit at miniscule power levels. A few
years ago, tens of thousands of watts of continu-
ous microwave power were transmitted in free
space with very high efficiency and reliability, and
multi hundred million dollars per year Defense
programs are now anticipated that would see at
least 10 megawatts transmitted through the at-
mosphere and/or space via collimated and directed
microwave and optical electromagnetic beams.
Use of such methods and means might allow
electricity to be distributed usefully across space.
Energy sources could be located in geostationary
orbit and/or on the lunar surface and the energy
transmitted to the Earth’s surface. Or energy
could be supplied from the Earth’s surface, as
needed, to geosynchronous orbit and to a mil-
lion miles or more beyond, at any desired power
level. Given that the cost of electricity is very
much higher in orbit (where it is provided by solar
cell/battery combinations) than at the Earth’s sur-
face, the latter might be able to be done com-
petitively at an earlier date.
The ready availability of such electrical energy
in space could allow a complete rethinking of the
design and use of space assets and activities in
such space-related areas as communications, nav-
igation, position-fixing, remote sensing, and even
transportation. This is because systems designers
could anticipate having tens of megawatts (or
more) of electrical power available in space,
whereas they now have only kilowatts and still
only tens of kilowatts by the middle of the next
decade, and system operators would have to pay
only for the amounts of power that the systems
would actually consume, just as at the surface.
In addition, many areas of the world have enor-
mous renewable energy potentials (especially
hydro, but solar as well when the conversion
process becomes economically attractive), but
they are located too far from other areas which
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need such energy. A reliable, cost-competitive
and efficient solution to the very long-distance
(several thousands of miles, and intercontinental)
transmission problem could allow surface-gen-
erated (N. B., in this case not in-space generated,
as in the Solar Power Satellite concept) electri-
city to be distributed via space. Most importantly,
electricity generated by renewable sources could
be treated as an exportable commodity, and in-
ternational and intercontinental distribution and
load-shedding could become a global possibil-
ity—to great economic, social, and political ad-
vantage.
And, of course, when such technology is reli-
ably and economically in hand, it could be used
to supply electrical “fuel” to spacecraft on voy-
ages to and from the Moon, and farther.
9. Reducing the Cost of Space Transportation.
—Whatever other measures are used to charac-
terize civilian space activities, that of the enor-
mous cost of in-orbit assets and activities is cer-
tain to be listed. The primary “cost-driver” is that
of space transportation for people and physical
assets. For the predictable future, it will cost well
over $1 ,000/lb (1984$) to place human and equip-
ment payloads into 200-mile high-Earth orbit, in
an era when, near the Earth’s surface, they can
be transported by aircraft over 10 times the dis-
tance at one-thousandth of this cost. Such a great
cost differential continues to be one of the great-
est inhibitions, perhaps the greatest inhibition, to
our investment in, and use of, our Earth’s space.
We could now begin to look well beyond the
Shuttle, and the specific technologies, fuels,
payloads, and operations basic to its design and
use. We could mount large-scale, advanced tech-
nology development programs that would ad-
dress promising methods and means of provid-
ing reliable space transportation at much lower
unit cost, giving full consideration to the future
circumstance of the much greater space traffic
volumes that such lower costs could engender.
An initial objective could be to reduce the cost
per pound for transport between the Earth’s sur-
face and low-Earth-orbit by an order of mag-
nitude.
10. Increasing Commercial-industrial Space
Sales.–The United States has spent well over
$200 billion (1984$-adjusted) to learn how to en-
ter space, to survive and function in it, and to
use it. In doing so, the Nation has accrued an
enormous reserve of space knowledge, assets,
and experience, and created a sophisticated
high-technology space industry administered and
managed by Government and non-Government
professionals in essential harmony with many
other professionals in our university community.
With one important exception, the entire civil-
ian space effort has continued to be supported
from the public purse. The time has now been
reached when our private sector—commercial-
industrial-financial—could begin to assume an in-
creasing responsibility for the conduct of our ci-
vilian space activities. The one exception, the pri-
vate satellite communications business, has already
reached sales of some $2 billion per year and
continues to grow at an average 15 percent per
year rate, compounded. Government organiza-
tions, policies, activities, and leadership could
now be structured not only to see that the growth
in this one economically successful space field
is maintained, but that other space fields (naviga-
tion, position-fixing, tourism, remote sensing, and
materials processing) are likewise explicitly en-
couraged to grow and prosper. The President has
announced a space strategy “to encourage Amer-
ican industry to move quickly and decisively intc
space. Obstacles to private sector space activi-
ties will be removed, and we’ll take appropriate
steps to spur private enterprise in space, ” And
the Space Act has now been changed so as to
require NASA to “seek and encourage . . . the
fullest commercial use of space.” New busi-
nesses, increased employment, increased sales
here and abroad, the introduction of new and
useful public and private services, and larger Fed-
eral, State, and local tax revenues all lie in pros-
pect, once the present private sector learns how
to moderate its dependence on the Govern-
ment’s largess and its slow-paced, structured way
of doing business, and new private, competitive,
entrepreneurial activities are formed and grow.
One of the most important civilian space objec-
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tives now could be that of seeing that procure-
ment of more and more of our space assets, and
the conduct of more and more of our space activ-
ities, become commercialized, so that: 1 ) the net
burden of space activities on the public purse is
sharply reduced, and 2) the Government can apply
its resources to the achievement of objectives that
either are not appropriate to the private sector
or lie beyond its capabilities.
As these economic benefits grow, they could
be looked at as offsetting, at least to some extent,
the cost of our publicly supported space program.
Social benefits also must be kept in mind, since
a fundamental purpose of government is that of
meeting important public needs that the private
sector inherently cannot.
Of course, a number of other objectives could
also be entertained. These could include: in-
creased emphasis on a solar system exploration
program, augmenting the expected wide-ranging
core solar system exploration program mentioned
earlier; a global person-to-person satellite com-
munications system/service; an in-space “sophis-
ticated-machine” experimental and demonstra-
tion program; etc. It is clear that when truly
imaginative minds become impressed with the
broad dimensions of the space domain–not only
its physical magnitude and character but the op-
portunity for innovative uses–there is little appar-
ent limit to the number and kinds of concepts
for exploring and using it for earthly benefit.
Underlying a decision to pursue any or all of
these objectives would be a concern for the basic
welfare of our own and indeed all of the world’s
people; a challenge to international cooperation
in large, exciting, and peaceful activities; a chal-
lenge to the basic innovativeness and cost con-
sciousness of our private sector; a commitment
to the permanent human investiture and consid-
ered development of both our Earth’s space and
our Moon; and a general sense of “spirit-lifting.”
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After careful study, and the weighing of costs and reflective of enlightened U.S. leadership in the
alternatives, it seems reasonable to observe that thoughtful, bold, imaginative, and purposeful de-
any decision to pursue them could be taken as velopment and use of space.
INDICATED INFRASTRUCTURE
Some of these objectives, if they are to be fore . . . and use much common or hand-me-
achieved, would require certain elements of in- down technology, as much as possible rather
space infrastructure; others, depending on how than build custom hardware. . . .“4
they would be carried out, may or may not re-
quire such elements; still others would require
none. The manner in which the United States ob-
tains any of this infrastructure should reflect, to
the maximum, our already great investment in
space technology and operations; whenever rea-
sonably possible, it should be obtained at the
lowest capital, and operations and maintenance,
cost to the public purse. It would embrace the
If the Government’s large capital costs for de-
velopment and production are to be minimized
and the private sector strengthened, then serious
consideration should be given to encouraging the
private sector to provide infrastructure elements,
through sales, long-term leases, or on the basis
of charges for actual service use, that meet Gov-
ernment performance specifications.
views of NASA’s chief scientist: “[n assembling
the necessary hardware, the watchword is ‘in-
heritance’ . . . projects and spacecraft are to 4Dr. Frank McDonald, quoted in  Christian  Monitor,
make maximum use of what has been done be- Dec. 28, 1983, p. 14.
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Obtaining space infrastructure in this fashion
is not only a reasonable and effective use of U.S.
space assets, but it could reduce the difficulty of
obtaining public funds for the scientists, engi-
neers, managers, and equipment needed to pur-
sue more, and more important, space ends.
The main elements of longer term space infra-
structure called for in pursuing the 10 objectives
are:5
l an LEO capability to assemble and check out
the large and sophisticated satellites and
space structures needed to provide both the
hazard-prevention and the direct audio
broadcast global system/service [objectives
(1) and (6)];
JNo additional space infrastructure elements are needed to
achieve objective (7).
l
l
l
an LEO human residential and working
space to be used for medical research [ob-
jective (4)];
a transport staging facility to support efficient
travel to geostationary orbit, the Moon, and
beyond, using reusable orbital transfer ve-
hicles or other vehicles. This would address
objectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9), and possibly
(8); and
a storage facility in LEO would allow use of
full Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), and
staffed LEO laboratory facilities could pro-
mote objective (1 O).
Of course, if such infrastructure elements were
available for the specific purposes that justify their
acquisition, they could be used for additional pur-
poses also.
Note that, in essence, provision of the infra-
structure needed to pursue two of the larger scale
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objectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate most
of the needs of all of the other eight. In what fol-
lows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure is
included under these two objectives.
And note that no Government development of
free-flying platform infrastructure elements is
called for; they (e.g., MESA, SPAS, LEASECRAFT,
EURECA, and the Space Industries platform)
could and probably would be designed, devel-
oped and installed by our private sector, and/or
other countries, and offered to the civilian space
community—both Government and private inter-
ests—under appropriate sale or lease arrange-
COST AND
Attaining all of these 10 suggested conceptual
objectives would cost money—overall, a great
deal of money. In table 10, rough estimates are
made for the cost of each of them, and the length
of time over which each would be pursued. in
all cases the cost estimates are rounded off to one
figure. And, again, the maximum use of: 1) al-
ready developed and paid-for space technology,
2) the most truly competitive procurement meth-
ods, and 3) the most modern and least burden-
some acquisition strategies and procedures, are
all fundamental assumptions.
OTA’s first rough estimate of the total cost of
attaining all 10 of the objectives is some $40 bil-
lion (1 984$) over the next 25 years. But, seem-
ingly in the nature of things, long-term high
technology development programs such as these
invariably encounter unforeseen difficulties and
experience the pressure of unexpected external
events. Indeed, the total cost should be under-
stood to be no less than $40 billion (1 984$), and
perhaps considerably more–as much as, say, $60
billion (1984$ ).6 Given the early period at which
these estimates are made, there cannot be great
b“ln recent decades the average overrun on major programs, in
constant dollars and constant quantities, has been slightly over 50
percent. The average schedule milestone has been missed by a third
of the time initially projected. The average time to develop new
systems has, until recently been increasing at the rate of three
months per year . , each year. ” Norman R. Augustine, “The
Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech Management, ” Aero-
space America, March 1984, p. 5.
ments, where they could be used for the conduct
of scientific research or the production of various
materials under microgravity conditions.
Finally, note that large amounts of very costly
electrical power (with initial capital costs as high
as $10,000 per watt) are not called for in LEO;
some 20 kilowatts would appear to be sufficient.
Larger amounts appear to be needed only for any
eventual commercial-industrial materials process-
ing, and could then be provided and financed
by the private sector in anticipation that such
processing will prove to be profitable.
SCHEDULE
confidence in their detailed accuracy. But such
accuracy is not needed for the illustrative pur-
poses for which they were developed.
if work were to commence on all of them now,
the bulk of the cost would occur over the next
15 years.
Space transportation costs are not included in
these estimates, except for an additional $0.1 bil-
lion (1984$) or so for each LEO-lunar orbit flight.
Rather, it is assumed that some 10 Shuttle surface-
LEO flights per year, at an average cost of about
$0.1 billion (1984$) each, would be budgeted for
all Government-sponsored civilian research and
development purposes, including those consid-
ered here.
Clearly, these costs are great in total sum, espe-
cially in the face of other important calls upon
Federal tax revenues during an area of multi hun-
dred billion dollar annual deficits in the Federal
budget.
While the total cost of our publicly funded ci-
vilian space program will reflect the magnitude
and character of the objectives addressed in the
program, and these will, in turn, reflect political
decisions, the unit costs to acquire and operate
the technology will reflect engineering and man-
agement decisions.
Beyond the observation that, in some general
fashion, the cost will increase with the magnitude,
——
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Table 10.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion
Total costa Duration
Objectives (billions, 1984 dollars) (years)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Establish a global information system/service
re natural hazards
Establish lower cost reusable transportation
service to the Moon and establish human
presence thereb
Use space probes to obtain information re
Mars and some asteroids prior to early human
exploration
Conduct medical research of direct interest to
the general publicd
Bring at least hundreds of the general
public per year into space for short visitse
Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,
common-user system/service
Make essentially all data generated by
civilian satellites and spacecraft directly
available to the general public
Exploit radio/optical free-space electro-
magnetic propagation for Iong-distance
energy distribution+
Reduce the unit cost of space transportation
and space activitiesh
Increase space-related private sector salesh
2
20
2
6
0.5
2
0
0.5
5
0.5
- $40i
10
15, 25
15
5, 25
5, 25
10
25
10
15
25
ab~t~  are for deve[~pment  and  acqu~sltlon,  o~ratfons  and  maintenance costs are not Included, excePt for some launch and
operations costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.
b15 years t. establish  the settlement, and 3 vlsits&ear  at $0.1 billlon  each (PIUS basic Shuttle launch costs) over the following
c&{~~r&erage,  one  pro~ evev 3 years and S0.4 billion  each.
d$2 billion  over  5 years t. establish a life  sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2 billionlyear  thereafter to oPerate  it. This
laborato~  could also be used for materials science and other research.
e5 years t. establish  a LEO  “lodge-habitat, ” and its continuing use thereafter.
f w ~ bllllon~ear  In addition to DOD expenditures.
9w:3 bllllon/year  for a 15.year technology development effort  to reduce space transportation  Urlit  COSk3.
%hls  would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives.
i The actual  cost could  ~ as high as ~ billion  (1984 dollars), if costs exceed Mtial Predictions  @ ~0/0
generality, and sophistication of the space capa-
bility acquired, it is difficult–indeed, it is impos-
sible, at this time—to estimate the eventual cost
to the Government of addressing these objectives
and obtaining the required infrastructure. A num-
ber of the significant infrastructure “cost-drivers”
are presented in chapter 4. Suffice it to say here
that there are a number of factors that could in-
fluence the net cost to the taxpayer for acquir-
ing space infrastructure, and many opportunities
to minimize this net cost that could be grasped
by vigorous and imaginative NASA management.
Appendix D speaks to the matter of cost con-
tainment.
To this point, only the initial capital cost of LEO
infrastructure has been considered. To this cost
must be added its ongoing operation and main-
tenance (O&M) costs (and the O&M costs of lunar
infrastructure also); the cost of instruments, fur-
naces, etc., needed for scientific experimentation
in association with its use; and the interest cost
of any money borrowed to fund the acquisition
program.7 We must remember, too, that infra-
structure eventually becomes obsolete or wears
out, and, since its support services will come to
be depended on, this implies that some form of
amortization and replacement will be called for.
A consequence of the successful attainment of
any or all of these unit cost reduction objec-
tives—and reduction in the unit cost of space
7Any such cost is not allocated (if indeed it were possible to allo-
cate it) on a program-by-program basis. But, in the overall, the more
than $100 billion per year now required to be paid on the Federal
debt is a cost of Government that must be considered by Congress,
at least implicitly, in all of its authorization and appropriation
actions—in the space area as for all others.
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transportation generally—would be to attract and more of its research, development, test, and
more private interest to space activities. NASA, evaluation funds, to the development of truly
in turn, would then be able to apply more scien - “cutting edge” technology in support of its
tific, engineering, and management attention, science, exploration, and other activities.
CONCLUSIONS
To create a truly modern civilian space pro-
gram, the United States now might well move to
adopt up-to-date, long-term goals in the civilian
space area, and to initiate work on a first family
of specific space objectives to address over the
next 20 to 25 years, If such goals and objectives
were set, the Nation would have a clearer pic-
ture of the kind of space infrastructure required
to meet the objectives, as well as the cost and
schedule under which this infrastructure could
be obtained.
The United States would also be able to treat
its publicly supported civilian space program
more explicitly as a direct investment of great po-
tential economic importance, in addition to the
other benefits that it provides. This might in turn
ensure that the program’s public costs would be
prudently contained, that its economic benefits
would be substantially and objectively enlarged,
and that it would serve the broadest public in-
terest.
Finally, if an early, paced transfer of manage-
ment attention, commitment, and resources takes
place away from further major development and/
or production of Shuttle capability, and if there
is a vigorous and innovative pursuit of Govern-
ment cost sharing with other countries and our
own private sector, then the 10 objectives out-
lined here–or others analogous to them–could
be aggressively pursued, and probably attained
relatively soon, within the appropriations now ex-
pected to be received by NASA. And the attain-
ment of these objectives would entail the acqui-
sition of much of the in-space infrastructure that
NASA now aspires to acquire. Also, if there is a
continuing increase in extra-NASA payments for
use of Shuttle services, and if the private space-
related sector succeeds in continuing to grow at
anything like its present rate, thereby generating
rapidly increasing tax revenues, these important
“offsetting” incomes could be taken into consid-
eration by Congress when passing on NASA ap-
propriations.
Indeed, a reasonable extrapolation from pres-
ent funding circumstances would suggest that, by
the end of this century, our publicly supported
space program could be much larger than it is
today.
It must be emphasized that whether or not, as
a matter of public policy, our tax-supported ci-
vilian space program should be allowed to grow
to the magnitudes discussed here as possible is
not an issue addressed in this report. Rather, it
is important to appreciate that, under certain con-
ditions, expenditures for this program could be
considered to be offset to a large extent by reve-
nues, thus giving Congress more flexibility in set-
ting expenditure levels than it has today. An im-
portant element of public debate about our space
future, therefore, should be about the allocation
of public, economically related investments
therein—for we need no longer consider our pub-
lic space expenditures as consumption expend-
itures that underwrite the salaries of astronomers,
the technologies required for exploring the solar
system, and the intangibles of “space leader-
ship. ”
The promising prospects now in view indicate
what agenda items should be emphasized in pub-
lic policy considerations of our long-term civil-
ian space interests. For if, over the next quarter-
century, we modernize our civilian space goals
and lay out a family of objectives for our civilian
space activities much broader than those usually
discussed; if we determine to focus our Govern-
ment and private sector skills on building, togeth-
er, a great commercial-i ndustrial-financial private
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sector space business in the face of growing in- we can move civiIian space activities into the
ternational competition; if we administer and mainstream of America ’s- indeed, the world's—
manage our space activities with vigor, imagina- interests, reap great political, sociaI, and economic
tion, and statesmanship; and if we take the lead benefits, and very soon begin to have our men
in orchestrating the space interests and activities and women strike out across the solar system.
of all of the friendly countries of the world; then
Phofo credif /Vaflona/ Aeronauf/cs and Space Adm/n/straf/on
Space technology has opened up the entire  to observation and scientific research. Satellite (I  a joint project
of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, produced dramatic revelations about the characteristics
of other stars in our galaxy.
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FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Congress and the United States will soon have
an unprecedented opportunity to rethink its basic
views and interests in the civilian space area
through the creation, and subsequent endeavors,
of a “National Commission on Space. ” Public
Law 98-361 mandates that such an extraordinary
Commission be formed.
In preparation for doing so, a few observations
should be made about a truly fundamental con-
cern held by many regarding our publicly sup-
ported civilian space program–a concern that,
for the most part, goes unvoiced by professionals
associated with this program, but which should
be dealt with in any fundamental reexamination
of it. In so doing, we should keep in mind that
the essential magnitude and character of this pro-
gram was set a generation ago in response to the
major national security concern raised by the
launch of Sputnik by the U. S. S. R., and subse-
quent international events and our perceptions
thereof. Thus, the basic nature was set in another
era to serve the needs of that era and, fundamen-
tally, has changed little, even though those needs
have long since been met.
This concern may perhaps best be expressed
in question form: How can the U.S. people and
Government justify, today, continuing to make
such truly great and continuing public expendi-
tures on space related matters perceived by most
of our general public as (however at times inter-
esting, and even exciting) lying well outside of
the mainstream of their personal interests and
concerns, particularly now that our military space
program serves to offset most perceived U.S.S.R.
space-related military “threats,” and during an
extended period of unusual national financial
stringency?
As Congress begins to ponder this question, it
might start by reflecting on an observation made
recently by Freeman Dyson: “ . . . if I look at, say,
Senate hearings and Congressional Committees,
they tend to pay too much attention to scientists.
They’re always talking very much in quantitative
terms and technical details when the problems
really aren’t there. They very seldom ask, ‘Well,
what’s all this good for?’ “ (Emphasis in the
original .)8
In response to this question, many might be
willing, in principle, to give the Government the
“benefit of the doubt” when its leaders point out
(as they have nearly every year for the past dozen,
at least), that eventually such R&D expenditures
will return economic benefits many times over.
While there is a general consensus that, in macro-
economic terms, economic “spinoff” to the pri-
vate sector has been significant, outside of the
satellite communications area it has not been pos-
sible to identify with objective confidence, to
date, that such great economic returns have been
obtained (though there are grounds for hope that
eventually satellite navigation and materials proc-
essing in space may also provide significant eco-
nomic benefits).9 And, of course, the same pros-
pect for economic return could be advanced also
about many other economically related R&D
areas, high technology and not, in which Gov-
ernment expenditures are either essentially zero
or only a very small fraction of today’s annual
$7 billion public civilian space expenditures. So
there is understandable reserve and questioning
about such a response. For most of us, $7 billion
per year is a great deal of money.
Well beyond these kinds of considerations is
the ethical concern of whether or not scientists,
engineers, and managers should be paid so very
well by the public to spend additional large sums
of public funds each year to do such things as
take photographs of distant planets. Many take
the view that, with the immediate, continuing,
and enormous problems faced by hundreds of
millions of people throughout the world, with
millions of U.S. (tax-paying) families having to live
on a truly modest income or, indeed, having to
deal with the lack of employment, with interest
eThe Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1984, P. B-1  1.
9However difficult it may be to quantify the benefits of space R&D,
one can say with confidence that the use of weather satellites has
saved thousands of lives. In addition, the use of surveillance satel-
lites has resulted in savings to the Government that are on the or-
der of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars.
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payments on our Federal debt now costing us
over $100 billion per year, supporting space re-
search and exploration of this great magnitude
just doesn’t seem to be a sensitive and equitable
use of public funds or even, to some, a particu-
larly decent human avocation.
The more general pro forma response to this
concern, at least in part, is that: “ . . . life is un-
fair. ” Life is unfair. But most of us would proba-
bly agree that we all do have some obligation,
when reasonably possible, to attempt to redress
some of these sobering societal imbalances and
that, at the very least, those who are generously
supported by the public to engage in civilian
space activities should share widely in the dis-
charge of this obligation.
Another general pro forma response is that
most grave and widespread human problems
seemingly cannot be addressed by space-related
activities, any more than they can be by a ballet
production or a walk in a park.
In this assessment the more direct and useful
response is that some of our civilian space pro-
gram objectives can be purposely selected to see
that space is used, specifically, to make progress
toward important agreed-on societal ends. The
suggested family of 10 conceptual objectives has
been crafted so as to see that some of them speak
directly to a few of the most fundamental human
concerns that space and space technology can
indeed be used to “get at”: better protection from
natural disasters, better communications among
the world’s governments and peoples in our nu-
clear weapons age, and greater understanding of
physical conditions that affect all of us as we grow
older. They are of such a basic nature as to be
of potential value to “all mankind. ”
And, as well, a basic theme suggested here is
that the publicly supported civilian space pro-
gram now could be organized and conducted to
a considerable extent as a public investment pro-
gram in basic science and high technology, and
that its leaders now could be charged, explicitly,
with overseeing all of our public space activities
with a fundamental view in mind: that these activ-
ities lead, in both the shorter and longer run, to
the creation of wholly new commercial-industrial-
financial ventures, and to truly large-scale, rapid,
objectively measurable, national economic growth
—with all that this implies for the delivery of new,
useful, public and private goods and services, in-
creased employment, increased deficit-offsetting
tax revenues, and a more competitive interna-
tional trading position.
And another basic theme is that the U.S. Gov-
ernment could now endeavor to orchestrate the
interests and capabilities, however diverse and/or
small, of all of the friendly peoples of the world
in cooperative civilian space activities.
If the United States does all of these things, and
does them in a truly efficient and productive man-
ner, then we would see space being used, where
space can sensibly be used, both to protect and
to ease the human condition.
With the creation of such major space-related
programs to address such basic human concerns,
and appreciating that most of us the world over,
much of the time, “do not live by bread alone,”
we can in more reasonable conscience also con-
tinue to undertake—and even perhaps enlarge
upon—space-related activities that, as well, chal-
lenge the human condition: we can strike out
from the Earth for the Moon, 10 for the planets and
asteroids, and indeed fix our eyes on ‘‘distant
s tar s .
But only if we pay our ethical dues to our fellow
countrymen and women and to “all mankind”-
and only if we meet our financial obligations as
we go.
10An OTA Working paper giving the thoughts of six philosophers
on “The Philosophical Implications of Establishing Permanent
Human Presence in Space” is available from the OTA Science,
Transportation, and Innovation Program office.
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The panel was asked to consider the proposal
for a manned civilian space station in the light
of the development of the Nation’s space activi-
ties generally, and of possible future civilian activ-
ities and goals in space. The panel approached
this task first as a broad enquiry into future ob-
jectives in space and how the proposed space
station relates to those objectives. The results of
that enquiry made it inappropriate for us to er-t-
gage in a more detailed evaluation of the current
space station proposal.
As background for our conclusions, we need
to note that the panel believes U.S. civilian space
activities are and should be of high value to the
Nation domestically and internationally. The
country has a variety of motivations behind its
space commitments—-political, psychological,
scientific, technological, economic—all of which
have validity and importance. In particular, in
looking to the future, the panel believes it essen-
tial that the program should come to represent
again the sense of exploration and adventure, the
energizer of both technological and institutional
innovation, the source of outward-looking na-
*The participants are [n general agreement with this  summ~rv
ot cone [us ions,  although some members may not necessarl Iy cn -
dorw all the details or the phrasing of certain statements.
tional pride that captured our imagination, and
that of others, in its first two decades. Those char-
acteristics can be achieved in different ways, not
necessarily correlated to the magnitude of the
space budget. We also believe there should be
ways that the program can be used more effec-
tively as an instrument for peace and cooperation
in a world in which the environment of space is
threatening to become one more arena for mili-
tary competition.
Our conclusions are as follows.
I. Current Space Station Proposal*
The panel has major reservations about the cur-
rent NASA concept for a permanent manned
space station and recommends against commit-
ment to such a project at this time. We are quite
certain that a space station of some kind will
eventually be needed. However, the objectives
underlying the current concept seem diffuse and
imprecise. Approval of the proposal now would
tend to lock the Nation’s civilian space efforts into
a large, expensive program that would likely pre-
empt alternative possibilities and programs.
The panel was most concerned about the ab-
sence of studies that evidence a larger vision of
space objectives and opportunities, against which
this, or any future space station proposal, could
be evaluated (see 11). A space station should not
bean end in itself, but rather a step toward other
goals. Those other goals, which need to be care-
fully developed and publicly debated, should
provide a necessary framework for evaluating the
role and usefulness of any proposed design for
a space station.
The panel recognizes that not all possible activ-
ities and payoffs can be anticipated, and that
*George E, Mueller dlsa~rees w Ith thl~ conclusion, which he
regards  a$ not ~ onstru[  t iie with resi)ect to direct Ion tor NASA, and
Su[)ptjn  i~ [’ of unnecessary study. t+ e does a~ree w Ith the need to
make the i[)acc  itatlon a step  to a lon~-ra  n~e goa 1, and would sup
[mrt  ,i\kl n~ NASA to de~lgn a t,Ic I lit} to ~upport  such a program
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unexpected opportunities emerge in the course
of developing a new capability. And the panel
accepts the validity of the desire to take advan-
tage of the capabilities offered by the Shuttle. But
some of the immediate functions envisioned for
the proposed space station (exploring near-Earth
applications, for example) can be evaluated with-
out much, or any new infrastructure in space, in
fact, by imaginative uses of the Shuttle; and a
more fully thought-out station keyed to longer-
range objectives would be more likely to stimu-
late innovation and imagination.
Moreover, the station as envisioned would ap-
pear to have little payoff either for development
of new technology (see III), or for the political-
psychological benefits at home and abroad we
have already indicated should be given substan-
tial weight (see also Xl).
The development of a habitable space station
to gain expertise of people in space is an impor-
tant argument, but also one with little present
basis for evaluation. We have seen no analysis
of the differential costs of a manned v. an un-
manned facility, nor an analysis of the oppor-
tunity costs of that differential. It is important that
it be understood that the panel does not argue
against man-in-space per se (the Shuttle may pro-
vide a good portion of that experience), but rather
that a better rationale than has been provided us
is required for a goal worthy of attainment.
Il. Analysis Capability
The lack of studies analyzing long-term space
goals and opportunities was striking to the panel.
There were not even studies available that laid
out possible alternatives to the current proposal.
Without these, the panel felt it was not possible
to sensibly evaluate the scale, nature, cost or pur-
pose of a manned civilian space station. An ini-
tial “goals” paper prepared by OTA staff repre-
sented a start toward the kind of studies that are
needed.
The panel believes this situation is deeper in
its significance than simply whether adequate
studies had been conducted before the space sta-
tion proposal was put forward. NASA has been
positively discouraged by successive administra-
tions from engaging in or sponsoring much for-
ward thinking, presumably to discourage the
emergence of costly ideas or prevent the appear-
ance of lobbying. One result is that apparently
little capability exists within NASA, and essentially
none outside, able to carry out on a continuing
basis the kind of informed, analytical, critical
studies that any major program area ought to
have. The need is acute.
We have considered various options for cre-
ating such a locus for the professional study of
public policy questions relating to the civilian
space program and wouId make several observa-
tions. Clearly, NASA should have a larger inter-
nal capability for long-term analysis, but that
alone would not be adequate for obtaining ob-
jective outside views or for establishing public
credibility. The Administrator of NASA could, and
we believe should, serve as a sponsor of such
studies, perhaps working through a broadly based
advisory committee to enhance objectivity and
credibility. We recommend that early consider-
ation be given to a long-term program of support
of studies in the private sector (analytical orga-
nizations, commerce, industry and universities)
that would build a community of knowledgeable
analysts of the Nation’s space activities, analo-
gous to that which has been developed in other
areas such as energy and the environment.
Such a program of studies also implies a more
open planning process and the concomitant con-
tinuous rethinking of NASA objectives that go
with that openness. This process can provide an
opportunity for more extensive engagement of
the private sector (see Vi), an objective we
believe should be high on NASA’s agenda, and
can engage the interest of constituencies not
already deeply involved in the space area.
Ill. R&D
A major factor in evaluating a proposal for the
next step in the space program should be the con-
tribution that objective will make to the devel-
opment of new technology. The panel does not
believe the civilian space station as proposed is
likely to have as significant a technology-forcing
effect as should be required from a program that
would be the centerpiece of the space agency’s
activities for close to a decade.
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In fact, the situation is more serious, for ad-
vanced technological development has been
severely cut back in the space program since the
early days of the Shuttle program. Key technol-
ogies that wouId be necessary for later missions,
such as advanced space propuIsion systems or
machine intelligence and robotics, have not been
adequately (or at all) supported because of fund-
ding limitations. Even technologies to fully exploit
current space applications have been relatively
neglected. The current proposaI for a civiIian
space station would generate little such technol-
ogy development and, more than likely, would
prevent funds being available for such programs.
Yet, those technologies represent what should be
major payoffs of space activities and the central
features of future space activities
Accordingly, we recommend that NASA en-
gage in the conscious development of seminal.11
technologies that are Iikely to form the bui!ding
blocks for future space goals. This should be car-
ried out in close cooperation with industry, rather
than wholly in-house, with the Government stim-
uIating private-sector ventures  and financing
where possible. The model of the highly success-
ful relations between the National Advisory Com -
mittee for Aeronautics (NACA) and industry for
aeronautical technology could well be followed
by NASA for space technology development.
IV .  Immediate  A l te rnat ives  to  a
Space Station
In recommencing deferral of the proposed
NASA civilian space station commitment, we do
believe other steps should be taken. Two of high
priority are given above: begin analyses of pos-
sible long-term space goals, and design a program
of technology development. In addition, some
of the stated purposes of the proposed space sta-
tion could be explored with the existing Shuttles.
In particular, the possibilities and viability of man-
ufacturing in space, repair of low-Earth-orbit
space satellites, and much scientific research can
and should proceed with present capabilities and,
if indicated, their modest improvements. Such
programs can provide necessary information to
judge more definitively what the real needs are
to carry out those functions on a continuing basis.
It makes little sense to make major commitments
to an expensive large-scale facility if already ex-
isting capabilities remain underexploited because
of shortage of funds,
I n any programs undertaken in the near term,
however, it is important that they not be allowed
to develop a Iife of their own that prevents more
desirable aIternatives, or interteres with other
ongoing programs of great importance, such as
those i n space science.
V.  Long-Term Mis s ion Poss ib i l i t ies
The p,inei  di~c us~ed w)m~~ ~x)s>i ble Iong-term
a c- t i v i t i es t h (~ t < (~t i \ti (c( ! s o m e ot t h [’ ( r i t ~~ r i a Ji { I
b e l i e v e d  t o  1)~’ im~mrt,lnt:  lik.~1) to L t)mrm,]n({
~vi(iwpr(~ad  altent i( )n, i n ho r(’ r) t S( i (’ n t i ti( I n t e r c’~t,
technolc)g~  t’(lr(  I ng r[> I LIL d n( (‘ to XI o I ){1 I i $~ L] t’~,
\u b~td nt i,i I sixn Iti( .l n[{~ to h t] r II.~ n ~)! ( }t>l[’m 5, $11 lt-
a hi I it y for i rlt~’ rn ,lt i u n d I C-[XJI N I r ,tt i f) n ( >~’<’ V I I i ,1 nd
~)rikate-$c~(  t~jr [J,irt i{ i~~<itit)n [~[t~ X), L1’~ I Ilcl\ ~’ tlcll
rx[~rn i ned t h[’~~’ i n d(4{l i I, not  f 1( ~ Lt [’ ,](ji [x-{ltt’ ,) n}
~Jc] rtlcu Iclr c hoi~ v T h~~>/ ,] r{) \Ll ~}qt~~t I () 11 \ 01” 1 I) L’
kind~ ()( ~\MC [’ ;(~’i li L$ t> l~t~li(i  (.) ~h(~u  I(I l~t$ ,] n,i -
ly7ed dnd stu(ji[(l  il} (J(~tc]il.
(In<’ c-{]tegor) (Jt ~x~ssii)l~~ gtMl\  L\oLl I{i ini (Jl\ (J
programs (let i~n(~d  spvc iticci  I 1)’ to cc)rlt  ri but(’
knowledge ~]bout  ~jres(nt  or futur<)  pl,~nc’t,ir>  ,{nd
human issuc~s. For  cx,~m}]l(~,  ~)rogram< [{e>ign~[l
to Iearfl  mor[) dbout the global ‘‘~rw>r~hou:)~)’
effect that cou Id resu It from dcc u m u I<it i rl~ C a r-
kn dioxide in the atmosphere th rou~ll, ,Inl{)ng
ot h(’ r~, intensive examination ot t h e at m osp h [: w
ot VP n us, which has experienced its own m~~s$ive
C02 ‘‘green house.” Another such goal WOUIC{  be
the study of the effects of Iarge-sc.]le  fire, ~olcanic
act ion and d u st storms t h rough ta rgeted stud i es
of the Martian en~i ronment,  which is rite ~vith
such events.
More directly Earth-oriented, ,1 [)oi~ible  orga-
nizi ng focus of an i m portal nt se~ment  of’ space
activities cou Id be the detaileci nlon  it(~ri ng of the
habitability of our planet on the surface and in
the atmosphere. The substantial hazards anci pos-
sible catastrophes lying ahead —COl and other
gas accumulation, ozone depletion, soil deple-
tion, deforestation, desertitication,  agriculture dis-
[>.]se \(LJ Iner,]bi  I ity, among others—make a major
ciedicatecl  program of global monitoring poten-
tially of crucial  importance for the future.
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A different kind of goal in space would be to
contribute directly to more generaI research ob-
jectives in the life, material, or other sciences. For
example, some of the effects of zero gravity on
the body appear to be similar to the effects of
aging. Are there important contributions that can
be made through space research programs on
aging, an increasingly important social goal for
an expanding global population? Many other
such complementary research targets could un-
doubtedly be developed and evaluated.
And, of course, there is a long list of possible
scientific goals in space that can be considered:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
unmanned rendezvous missions to an aster-
oid or comet to provide early solar system
history;
Mars exploration, with unmanned roving
vehicles;
landing on the Saturn moon Titan, which has
a nitrogen atmosphere, complex organic mat-
ter and strong evidence of a liquid ethane/
methane ocean;
solar spacecraft able to penetrate some dis-
tance into the Sun while sending back infor-
mation; and
Venus probes.
Longer-term:
6. landing on asteroids, planets or comets with
return of sample material;
7. probes beyond solar system;
8. manned lunar station;
9. manned asteroid station; and
10. manned missions to Mars.
Note, incidentally, that the current space sta-
tion proposal would not necessarily be the pre-
ferred next step for most of these goals.
V1. Private-Sector Involvement
The panel is strongly of the belief that the pri-
vate sector can be more effectively and exten-
sively engaged in the Nation’s space activities
than it has been to date. For the most part, cur-
rent involvement has been restricted to a select
group of NASA contractors or subcontractors.
There is need for involvement of a much broader
industrial constituency to elicit new ideas for
space applications and techniques. Not only is
it desirable to engage the innovative and entre-
preneurial character of American high-technol-
ogy industry, but also to attempt to bring down
unit costs of space assets and activities over time,
and to involve consumer-oriented industries in
space applications that may be marketable.
To engage the private sector effectively to
achieve these objectives poses several require-
ments. Consultation with industry should start
with a broad dialogue on a wide range of possi-
ble space goals and mission opportunities, not
with the detailed design of an already-determined
space station.
A second requirement is to develop a clarity
of commitment to activities that signals long-term
interest. Such commitment is necessary to en-
courage industry to invest its resources of man-
power and money in the development of tech-
nology potentially useful for those activities. Such
a clarity of commitment should be the outcome
of the joint studies and consultation referred to
above,
A third, with regard to space applications, is
to use either public corporations (perhaps of the
Comsat type) or other institutional innovations
to take over commercial development and ex-
ploitation of space technology. NASA is not well
suited to the design and marketing of commer-
cial/industrial systems or services—that is not its
purpose—and simply attempting to hand over an
existing developmental system, such as Landsat,
to the private sector for operation is unlikely to
be viable.
It is also possible that the present structure of
NASA is not well suited to prompt a major in-
crease in private-sector space activities because
of the present large commitment to in-house lab-
oratories (see IX) and present technology procure-
ment practices. We cannot make a definitive
judgment on that, but recommend an objective
evaluation by NASA and by Congress.
VIl. International Cooperation
International cooperation has been a goal of
the U.S. space program from the beginning, but
the panel believes much more could be done.
Cooperation is particularly attractive for future
activities for several reasons: technical compe-
tence is more widely distributed throughout the
world than in the past, resource limitations are
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more of a constraint on all countries, and many
space activities are relevant to all people, not just
Americans.
It is possible that the costs of space activities
could be reduced by genuine joint programs that
enlisted not only the funds, but also the talents
of other nations. Examples, such as Spacelab,
already exist. But for more extensive cooperation,
there must be a commitment for joint planning
at a very early stage, and reasonable guarantees
of program continuation once a commitment has
been made. Past history of American project can-
cellations in midstream do not contribute to con-
fidence in the United States as a reliable partner.
Near-Earth space applications are of obvious
interest to other countries from a commercial
perspective, but programs for monitoring the
changes in habitability of our planet would pro-
vide other common motivations. And, planetary
probes that would potentially provide informa-
tion relevant to this planet’s concerns—for exam-
ple, those goals mentioned earlier of improving
understanding of the CO2 greenhouse effect by
studies of Venus, or gaining knowledge of the ef-
fects of fire, volcanoes and dust from study of the
Martian environment—would also provide com-
mon foci of interest with other countries.
In fact, the potential benefits for all from space
activities should provide a high incentive target
for cooperation even if the other possible benefits
of resource and talent sharing are less clearly rele-
vant. There are also, of course, difficulties inher-
ent in international cooperation, difficulties that
stem primarily from problems of meshing of
disparate bureaucracies and political systems.
There is also the problem that the structure and
incentives in NASA, and more broadly in the
budgetary and decision process in the U.S. Gov-
ernment, do not lead naturally to seeking inter-
national cooperation. This, too, is an issue we
believe deserves separate attention by NASA and
by Congress.
It should be noted that there seems to be con-
siderable interest within Western industrial coun-
tries in cooperating on the proposed civilian
space station; European countries, Canada, and
Japan are waiting for the United States to decide
what it intends to do. Cooperation, to be really
meaningful, must involve joint planning and
study of alternatives before selection is made. We
recommend a more open set of discussions that
ask what we and other interested countries
should be doing together.
Any military overtones to NASA projects (see
Vlll) will likely have a negative effect on possi-
bilities for international cooperation. Though it
may be possible in practice to separate the mili-
tary from the civilian interests in specific missions,
it is a problem that we cannot afford to ignore.
There are also potential political benefits to be
gained over time through intimate and extensive
cooperation with others. Cooperation with East-
ern bloc countries, and especially the Soviet
Union, will not remove the sources of conflict,
but may be used as an instrument to ameliorate
those conflicts and offer alternatives.
Vlll. Effect of Military Programs
and Interests’
The panel is very concerned about the effects
on the civilian space program of a major new and
enlarged focus on military uses of space. Though
there might be some budgetary competition, the
primary problem would be the competition for
scarce technical manpower and industrial re-
sources. The most qualified personnel would
likely be attracted to the rapidly expanding and
technologically exciting defense sector, and
NASA itself might see some of its best people
leaving.
In addition, such a large-scale military commit-
ment would likely serve to give a military image
to our space activities abroad, where the distinc-
tion between civilian and military interests may
not be clear.
International cooperation in the civilian pro-
gram may also be harder to achieve because of
increased concern in the United States over ap-
parent loss of technology assumed to be critical
for national security. Controls over information
could well be sufficiently onerous as to rule out
some forms of otherwise desirable cooperation.
*To avoid the appearance of possible conflict of interest, mem-
bers of the panel with past and present involvement in military space
activities did not participate in the formulation of this section of
the report.
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IX. NASA Operations and Organization
The panel did not make any formal evaluation
of NASA’s structure and performance, but a few
observations based on the experience of panel
members and the issues at stake are in order,
some already mentioned.
As has been noted, NASA is not well positioned
for much more extensive cooperation with the
private sector, or with other countries. The spe-
cific reasons are different in each case, but the
underlying factors in NASA appear to be: the
pride in past successes achieved by “going it
alone”; the perception of private-sector activities
as competitive with, not complementary to, its
interests; the lack of desire among most scien-
tists and engineers to devote themselves to the
administrative orchestration of multicultural,
multi-political projects; and the large fixed facil-
ities of NASA that inhibit flexibility. All of these
discourage assignment of major responsibilities
outside the organization.
This structure also serves to maintain high fixed
overhead costs in NASA, again discouraging ex-
ploration with industry of ways of bringing unit
costs down. It is not clear what cost reductions
would be possible, but it would be difficult to
evaluate the possibilities given the present
structure.
To some extent, the existing structure may also
discourage the development of alternative goal
concepts, and generally inhibit imagination, since
changes in programs may have negative effects
on the present organization.
These observations may be exaggerated, or
should perhaps be balanced by other important
attributes. We urge attention to the issue,
however.
X. International Economic
Competition
International competition in provision of civil-
ian space services has already emerged, primar-
ily with European countries, and is likely to grow
in the future as Japan becomes more heavily
engaged. To some extent, that competition has
been encouraged by U.S. policies that have not
provided adequate guarantees for the future,
such as launch services, or have not been ade-
quately consumer-oriented in systems design and
development (for example Landsat). However,
competition is inevitable, quite apart from U.S.
policies, for advanced industrial nations with
high-quality technological capabilities are likely
to enter any market with economic potential.
Men and women in orbit, utilizing sophisticated
and costly space assets, may be an important ca-
pability for U.S. commercial exploitation of the
economic potential for near-Earth orbits, but we
consider that case as not having been demon-
strated as yet. In fact, commitment to such a ca-
pability could delay exploitation, by preempting
funding and personnel that might better explore
possibilities with industry through use of the pres-
ent Shuttle capability or its modest extensions.
It could, in fact, be a massive commitment to the
wrong kind of station, even for economic purposes.
There is another aspect of the economic value
of space activities—the spinoff of new technol-
ogy to the commercial sector. In this respect, as
we noted before, the proposed space station
would likely hold relatively little interest as a
means of developing new technology—especially
in comparison with other feasible goals.
Xl. Geopolitical Competition
The Soviet Union has been conducting a vig-
orous manned space station program which, not-
withstanding some serious mishaps, is apparently
on track. Beyond the continuing exhibition of
space prowess, presumably of important politi-
cal value to them, the uses to which their capa-
bilities are intended to be put are not clear–
perhaps this is similar to the American situation—
though Soviet Union scientists have often indi-
cated that the long-range goals for their space
program include manned bases on the Moon or
Mars. Regardless of later goals, they have cer-
tainly been gaining useful information about peo-
ple in a space environment (which they share
quite extensively with the United States).
There is a natural reaction in such circum-
stances that leads to programs undertaken to
“match” the achievements of the Russians, or to
be concerned about the information or experi-
ence they have obtained that is not immediately
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available to us. But, for the United States to
undertake a large-scale program not necessary,
or ill-suited, to our needs is more likely to hand-
icap us in the future in geopolitical competition
with the Soviet Union. Especially is this so in this
case in which the civilian space station goal is
not likely to command dramatic attention or to
lead to important new technology.
Civilian space activities are, in fact, an impor-
tant arena for international political competition.
The panel’s plea is for the United States to aim
for a goal worthy of attainment from this perspec-
tive, as well as from others. The international po-
litical effects of visible, dramatic nonmilitary ac-
complishments are important in presenting an
image of a dynamic Nation able to preserve its
vitality in an open, democratic form of govern-
ment. Many throughout the world find hope and
encouragement in that demonstration; it is im-
portant to us as well as to them.
We note again that competit ion in civi l ian
space accomplishments need not rule out the
possibility of some cooperation as well, even with
our primary competitor. The more important the
subject, the greater would be the political signifi-
cance of cooperation.
We close with reiteration of the panel’s con-
viction of the importance of the civilian an space
program to the country, and the significance of
the next major steps in space that the Nation
undertakes, Our ideas, our imagination, and our
critical analytical abiIities need to be engaged i n
laying out the alternatives before us just as our
institutions, public and private, need to be appro-
priately engaged in implementing the decisions
finally made. In the long run, a sustained and ef-
fective civi l ian space program wilt depend on
building a lasting political consensus,a consen-
sus based on informed public debate and under-
standing of the significant objectives that can be
served by civiIian space activities.
APPENDIXES
Appendix A
RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL NASA STUDIES ON SPACE
STATION USES AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Early in 1982, NASA established working groups to
prepare for and coordinate a planning program to ac-
quire a long-term in-space inhabited infrastructure,
i.e,, a civilian “space station. ” A Space Station Steer-
ing Committee at NASA headquarters led a two-
pronged effort. A Technology Steering Committee had
the task of assessing the current state of technology
and planning any needed development activities for
the program. At the same time, a Space Station Task
Force became the principal planning group to con-
sider types of activities (user needs/desires) to be car-
ried out with any new long-term infrastructure, sys-
tem physical characteristics, concept development,
and management organization.
To support the Task Force as well as help clarify
various issues involved, NASA authorized a series of
parallel investigations of the potential desires for, and
characteristics of, such infrastructure. These studies
(costing more than $6 million altogether) were made
by eight U.S. aerospace companies (with their asso-
ciated subcontractors). In addition, the European
Space Agency, Canada, and Japan funded essentially
parallel user studies of their own. Related investiga-
tions of possible nonaerospace industry interest in
space use were made by two consulting firms.
Major Findings of the U.S. Aerospace
Industry “Mission Analysis Studies”
In anticipation that the United States could decide
to build a publicly funded, habitable, permanent ci-
vilian “space station”, NASA asked eight aerospace
industry contractor groups to perform independent
“mission analysis” studies to indicate what it could
be used for (the desires and/or needs), what capabil-
ities it should have to meet them (its attributes), what
its fundamental characteristics and components might
be like (its architecture), and what costs and benefits
to the Nation might be expected of such a space pro-
gram conducted over the remainder of the 20th cen-
tury. Emphasis was to be on the user communities,
national conceptual uses, and general architectures,
not specific configurations.
in essence, they were asked to answer the questions
“If the United States were to acquire an initial civil-
I The Department of Defense also participated with NASA in these studies,
and paid 5 percent of their cost. For the most part, the studies related to
national security are classified, and no further reference will be made to them
here.
ian “space station “ complex in low-Earth-orbit (LEO)
in the 1990’s, who could use it, how could they use
it, what attributes, capabilities, and types of compo-
nents should it therefore have, what would it cost,
when could it become available, and what benefits
could its use provide?”
The contractor groups (in each case a prime con-
tractor, usually with several subcontractors) commu-
nicated with the individuals, organizations, and insti -
tutions that might be expected to make use of such
in-space infrastructure to ascertain the important pres-
ent and potential desires and/or needs for it, with em-
phasis on those uses that would require or materially
benefit from it. They then analyzed these various uses
as a sequenced set of activities, so as to identify and
characterize infrastructure attributes and capabilities
that would be necessary in order to meet them. Suffi-
cient study of major components and architectural op-
tions was made to provide reasonable indications of
how adequate infrastructure could be provided.
They next provided programmatic and scheduling
plans in order to predict when various portions of the
program could become operational. Finally, costs of
establishing the overall space infrastructure were esti-
mated and the economic benefits projected that they
foresaw through its use. The companies drew conclu-
sions and made recommendations regarding further
developments.
The eight prime contractors performing these studies
were Boeing Aerospace Co., General Dynamics Corp.
(Convair Division), Grumman Aerospace Corp., Lock-
heed Missiles and Space Co., Martin Marietta Corp.,
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., Rockwell Inter-
national, and TRW. About 20 other high-technology
companies were involved as subcontractors. The final
reports were submitted on April 22, 1983. Their results
have been published in a series of volumes entitled
“Space Station Needs, Attributes, and Architectural
Options.”
The major findings of these contractor studies are
outlined below.
Users and Uses
(Mission Requirements)
The aerospace contractors actively sought out the
interests of potential users of LEO infrastructure in or-
der to project what kind and extent of activities its sup-
port assets and services should provide. Users were
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categorized under the three broad areas of science
and applications, commercialization, and technology
development.
The fields of astrophysics and solar physics, life
sciences, environmental sciences and Earth observa-
tion, materials processing, and communications sci-
ences all offered examples of possible uses of an ini-
tial complex. Over the longer term, it could be used
as a base for launching lunar, asteroid and interplane-
tary research spacecraft. Advantages of having a
human crew were seen in instrument and equipment
servicing (predominantly for Earth observation, plasma
physics and astrophysics) and human involvement in
research (predominantly in materials processing, life
sciences and solar physics). Research in most life
sciences, and some materials and astro/solar physics
was deemed impractical without direct human par-
ticipation; one contractor concluded that 41 of 75
science activities would benefit from a human pres-
ence. The servicing of equipment would produce the
side benefit of seeing instrument assets in space accu-
mulated. Long-term operations would be especially
important to some research.
The permanent infrastructure would include “free-
flying” tended platforms to ensure isolation (where
needed) from the possible dynamic disturbance or
contamination of various kinds that might be present
in an inhabited location.
Commercial possibilities were suggested for remote
Earth sensing in the fields of petroleum and mineral
prospecting, and agricultural forecasts; for materials
processing; for on-orbit satellite launching of meteoro-
logical, navigation, and communications satellites to
higher, even to geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), and
for satellite servicing (although CEO servicing would
not be possible using the initial infrastructure now en-
visioned by NASA).
Almost all Earth resources observation from space
currently employs satellites without a crew and their
use will continue; however, the contractors found ad-
vantages in using people to select surface locations
to be studied, instruments, and observational param-
eters. Having space infrastructure also would enable
concurrent multidisciplinary observations, and the
crew would add the flexibility to modify the instru-
ments during long-term observation periods.
The economical processing of some materials under
conditions of near-zero gravity is one of the more in-
triguing possibilities for eventual commercial exploita-
tion, with such materials as pharmaceuticals, alloys,
semiconductors, and optical fibers as products. (Mar-
ket demand for each of these products is seen by some
of the more optimistic contractor groups as having the
potential to grow to the multibillion-dollar-per-year
level by the year 2000 if they could be made avail-
able at acceptable prices).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. has already pioneered
in exploring the use of the electrophoresis process to
produce pharmaceutical materials aboard the Shut-
tle. Electrophoresis is a separation process in which
electrically charged particles suspended in a solution
migrate through the fluid in the presence of an ap-
plied electrical field. If the particles are of microscopic
or larger size, a common process limitation is a sedi-
mentation of the particles under gravitational condi-
tions. The effective absence of gravitational attraction
when conducted in orbit around the Earth permits the
process of separation and purification of such ma-
terials as proteins and pharmaceuticals to proceed at
rates 500 to 1,000 times faster than on the surface of
the Earth.
Several other companies are giving serious consid-
eration to studying and manufacturing materials in
space. However, the contractor groups agreed that the
concept-to-market process generally takes many years,
that a space research laboratory is required, that for
at least some of the studies professionals in situ and
continuous operations are very important desiderata,
and that for most production processes, very large
amounts of electrical power (in present space terms)
would be essential.
Satellite communications is already a 20-year-old,
highly successful, world-wide commercial space enter-
prise. It is seen as a business that should continue to
expand rapidly. The required technology should move
in the direction of large, dynamically controlled, multi-
antenna subsystems, on-board switching, and high r.f.
power, for which a “space station” may well be seen
by some as essential (or at least desirable) for efficient
structural assembly and deployment, testing and
check-out, lower-cost transportation to geostationary
orbit—and eventually, perhaps, the servicing of GEO
satellites.
Satellite servicing is seen as enabling resupply and
repair of co-orbiting space vehicles, and those in other
orbits, such as polar or geostationary. In the latter case,
a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV) would be
needed to deploy or retrieve the spacecraft, as (ac-
cording to several contractors) extensive servicing
would usually by done in, or in the vicinity of, a cen-
tral “space station” complex.
LEO infrastructure is seen by the contractor groups
as enabling space technology development on all
fronts–developments of interest to materials process-
ing, communications, flight controls, fluidics, large
space structures, on-orbit assembly and test, robotics,
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etc. All of these would benefit because of the sophis-
tication of the support equipment that could be pro-
vided them, the longer time available for work in or-
bit than is provided by the Shuttle, and the extensive
crew involvement needed, at least for the foreseeable
future, for construction, calibration, and test.
Phased Activities (Mission Sets)
The contractor groups assembled sets of activities
and operations responding to needs and desires ex-
pressed by potential users in order to estimate the
assets and services required to support them for vary-
ing stay times in space. The preferred orbits were seen
to be a low-Earth-orbit whose plane would be at 28.50
inclination to the Equator (typical of launches from
Kennedy Space Center, FL), a 57° inclination (possi-
ble from KSC with a more northerly insertion direc-
tion) and a polar orbit (available with launch from
Vandenberg AFB, CA). In some cases, staging to
geostationary orbit or to escape velocity (for lunar,
asteroid and/or planetary flights) would be necessary.
Most of the studies identified several hundred pos-
sible uses and desires, a number well in excess of what
might be accommodated during the 1990s. When ex-
amined in the context of realistic technical progress,
the likelihood that such uses/desires would actually
develop, and the benefits made available through such
use, etc., the vast majority of those potential uses
could be supported with infrastructure located in the
low inclination orbit of 28.5°. This is exemplified by
a typical distribution of activities shown in table A-1
as recommended by one of the contractor groups. The
activities in this baseline set are noted as being best
accommodated either by attaching them to a central,
inhabited infrastructure complex, or locating them on
free-flying platforms that would be tended only inter-
mittently by crew members.
Inasmuch as some 70 percent or more of the po-
tential needs/desires could be accomplished in the
28.5° orbit, it was the unanimous recommendation
of all the contractor groups that any initial inhabited
infrastructure be located in this orbital plane. Free-
flying platforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit,
could accommodate most of the remaining missions.
One example of the number of inhabited infra-
structure-attached payload elements at any time (so-
called station occupancy) is shown in figure A-1, in
which the initial operational capability was assumed
to occur during 1990. The projected activities are seen
to reach a high number quite early in the develop-
ment cycle.
Functional Capabilities
NASA has recently indicated that it expects pro-
posed new space infrastructure to provide the set of
functions described in chapter 2. One contractor’s
visualization of these functions is given in figure A-2,
while table A-2 illustrates the corresponding attributes
required for space infrastructure designed to accom-
plish the functions. Translated into physical quantities,
the requirements for power, pressurized volume, crew
size and Shuttle launches are typified by figure A-3.
The initial power needs for the central space complex
of the infrastructure are modest, about 25 kW, but as
Table A-1 .—One Contractor Group’s Mission Set
Attached to central
infrastructure complex
in LEO Free-f I yers
Inclination plane Inclination plane (LEO)
28.5” Polar 28.5° 57” Polar GEO Escape
Science and applicatlons:
Astrophysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Earth and planetary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Environmental observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Life sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Materials processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Commercial:
Earth and ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Materials processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Industrial services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Technology development: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Operations: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
86
Total mission set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6 3 1 1
3 1 7 12
4 1 7 4 3
1 2 1
5
1
1
2
7 9 12 14 12 12
SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the General Dynamics Corp
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Figure A-l .—One Contractor’s Time-Phased Set of
Activities Involving Work Crews
30
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0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
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Conclusion: 28.5-deg station captures approximately 92°/0 of
activities involving crews.
SOURCE Based on Informatlon contained in the study led by General
Dynamics Corp
the experiment load increases so does the power re-
quirement. If materials processing in space takes place
on a commercial scale now visualized by some, the
power demands could then become quite large. It is
likely that, eventually, much of the materials process-
ing production would be carried out on platforms with
their own solar array power supplies; they would co-
orbit with the central complex.
In the view of most contractor groups, an initial
operational crew would consist of some three persons,
with the crew size growing to as many as 8 to 10 in
the mid 1990s. Corresponding pressurized volume for
the crew and some operations might grow from about
200 m3 to 600 m3.
Five or six Shuttle flights would be required to estab-
lish the IOC infrastructure suggested in the studies.
Figure A-2. —A Representative Set of Functional Capabilities
SOURCE Based on   in the study led by Grumman Aerospace 
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Table A.2.—One Contractor’s Estimate of Required
Infrastructure Attributes
Accommodates activities with work crews:
. Micro-gravity
— Life sciences
— Materials processing
— Technology development
l Outward looking
— Astrophysics
l Earth pointing
— Earth exploration
— Environmental observation
Supports free-flyer activities:
l LEO/H EO satellites/platforms
— Emplacement
— Service
— Retrieval
l GEO satellites/platforms
— Emplacement
— Service
l Planetary satellites
— Boost
Provides resources:
l Work crew time
l Power
l Data processing
l Command and control
l Thermal control
l Stable platform
l Pressurized volume
l Exterior mounting
Provides functions:
l Assembly and construction
l Checkout
l Service
l Reconfiguration
l Maintenance and repair
l Transportation
l Storage
SOURCE: Based on Information contained In the study led by the General
Dynamics Corp
Contractors estimated that civilian projects would re-
quire six or seven flights per year (fig. A-3). While three
or four supply visits per year by the Shuttle would be
needed for ongoing operations and maintenance
(O&M), these could be partial-load deliveries com-
bined with other loads.
Infrastructure Elements
(Architecture)
It is at the implementation stage that the contractor
groups’ reports suggest quite different approaches to
providing those in-space infrastructure elements
needed to meet the user needs/desires. One concep-
tual array of components is illustrated in figure A-4.
The central complex would be in communication with
other elements including free flyers, free-flying plat-
forms, a reusable orbital transfer vehicle, the Shuttle
Orbiter, and ground stations via the Tracking and Data
Relay Satellite communications system.
The components suggested by one of the contrac-
tor groups for the first central complex are indicated
in figure A-5. A central command/habitability module
provides overall infrastructure command and control,
data handling, communications, and accommoda-
tions for a crew of four. (Several of the contractor
groups’ studies suggest three crew members at the
outset.) Directly attached is the energy module where
solar cell arrays and batteries provide electrical power
and its conditioning and storage. (In this illustration,
the energy module is pressurized; some studies sug-
gest that it be mounted externally.) The third, logistics,
module stores and makes available consumables and
equipment delivered by the Shuttle. With only these
three infrastructure elements, a crew could live in or-
bit satisfactorily for extended periods but would be
able to accomplish relatively little scientific or other
activity beyond those experiments that could be ac-
commodated in the available internal space.
Additional elements shown in figure A-5 are the
airlocks to permit people to move in and out of the
habitability module and to conduct activities in space
(so-called extravehicular activity (EVA)), an astronomy
service pallet to enable mounting of scientific obser-
vatory equipment, and a payload service pallet to per-
mit servicing of satellites and such auxiliary vehicles
as an orbital maneuvering vehicle. The final unit sug-
gested for the IOC is a materials processing laboratory.
The continuous power suggested would approach
25 kW (roughly corresponding with the initial level
shown in figure A-3). Inasmuch as the crew accom-
modations might require about half of this amount,
the power available to users would allow for materials
processing experiments but not for some kinds of
ongoing production.
Other contractor groups would arrange the infra-
structure elements differently, with a possible com-
mand module separate from an habitability module,
or an operations module combining energy genera-
tion and conditioning with a command and control
center and EVA facilities. Some designs would incor-
porate tunnels or passageways to connect different
modules.
Ten or more subsystems have been suggested to
enable the infrastructure elements to remain in orbit
and function satisfactorily. These are itemized in the
organizational diagram shown in figure A-6.
In accordance with the NASA study directions to
the contractor groups to envision the use of new tech-
nology where it would be beneficial, various new
materials and theoretical designs for the subsystems
have been suggested. An example of one contractor
group’s technology recommendations is given in table
A-3; while most items are considered to be currently
available in a useful form, advanced technology would
be required to achieve the improved capability and/or
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Figure A-3.— One Contractor’s Estimate of Resources and Services
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SOURCE Based on !nformatlon contained In the study led by the General  Dynamics Corp
reduced weight and Iifecycle costs that it recom-
mends. Some contractors identified standardization
as contributing to cost containment; where no ad-
vance in technology appeared necessary, they sug-
gested use of standard available equipment if prac-
tical, with space qualification as necessary.
Evolution of the Initial Capability
All of the contractor groups provided plans for evo-
lution from the initial operational capability (IOC) to
expanded infrastructure expected to become available
by the end of the century. One example of infrastruc-
ture located in the 28.50 orbit is shown in figures A-7
(IOC) and A-8 (Evolved). The crew would increase
from three to nine, the power would triple, the num-
ber of pressurized core modules would increase from
one to five, and the servicing facility would quadru-
ple in size. A similar evolutionary plan including
tended co-orbiting and polar platforms and an ROTV
is shown in figure A-9. A possible co-orbiting indus-
trial platform is illustrated in figure A-1 O, and an ini-
tial tended polar platform could appear as shown in
figure A-1 1. Core module commonality was suggested
by essentially all contractor groups in order to pro-
mote production cost economy.
Role of a Human Crew
All contractor groups emphasize the importance of
having a human crew. All consider that “sophisticated
machines” (robotics, artificial intelligence, etc. ) will
not be able to provide the desired capabilities that
could be provided by a human crew through the early
1990s. The benefits of having a human crew are sum-
marized by one contractor group in table A-4.
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Figure A-4. —infrastructure/’’Space Station”
Costs and Benefits
The cost estimates of design, development, test and
evaluation, and production, of a “space station” com-
plex have been made by each contractor group ac-
cording to parametric models following a “Work
Breakdown Structure” developed by the joint Indus-
try Government Space System Cost Analysis Group.
Since detailed designs were not part of the study,
predominantly weight-based parameter estimates
were used to arrive at a rough order-of-magnitude esti-
mate for the costs of designing, building and deploy-
ing a complex.
Inasmuch as individual contractor groups proposed
different combinations of modules and systems, con-
siderable care is necessary in making comparisons of
costs among them. It will suffice here to note that a
“core” IOC space station in a 28.50 inclination orbit
(i.e., command/habitation capability for a crew of
three or four, power unit, and resupply logistics
modules) was estimated to cost $3.3 billion to $4 bil-
lion (1 984 dollars). With appropriate attached pallets
and modules to provide further observation, experi -
ment, and servicing capability, the cost would be $4.5
billion to $6 billion. With a crew of eight or nine, 6 0
kW of power to users, two or three laboratory modules
and expanded servicing facilities, plus two tended
platforms–one co-orbiting and one in polar orbit–
the estimated acquisition cost would be $7.5 billion
to $9 billion. This latter infrastructure array corre-
sponds to the IOC suggested by the NASA Space Sta-
tion Task Force (SSTF) in June 1983.
The above figures include those Shuttle launches re-
quired to place the elements in orbit, but generally
do not include NASA support and program manage-
ment expenses; OTA estimates that these latter costs
would be another $1 billion to $2 billion if acquired
by NASA in its usual fashion.
An additional ROTV capability cost has been esti-
mated at $2 billion to $3 billion, including both the
LEO basing facility and the operating vehicle. If a new
fuel tanker vehicle were to be developed, it could cost
approximately $1 billion.
The programmatic approach assumed by a number
of contractor groups is that of the use of “protoflight”
construction. One group compared the new method
38-798  - 84 - 11 :  3
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Figure A-5.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex Architecture
SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by Rockwell International.
Figure A-6.—A Suggested Central Complex Subsystem Organization
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gen
l Power l Water
dist reclamation
l Waste mgmt
l Clothing
l EVA
l IVA
l Radiator l Storage l Engines l Data bus
l Transport l Handling l Processors
l Interfaces
l Controls/
displays
l Storage
l FLT
software
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l Momentum
ranging
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l Navgat ion
l Orbit
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l Structures l Health maintenance
l Mechanisms l Habitability &
l Materials crew support
SOURCE Based on information contained in the study led by Rockwell International
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Table A-3.—One Contractor’s Suggested List of Subsystem Enabling Technology
Subsystem characteristics —
EPS . . . . . . . . . . . . l
l
l
DMS . . . . . . . . . . . •
l
l
l
COMM & TRKNG •
l
l
l
EC/LSS . . . . . . . . . l
GN&C . . . . . . . . . . l
l
l
Solar array
NiH, batteries
180V  dist.
Ada computer language
Fibre  optics
Advanced main memory with b/u
battery
Bubble auxiliary memory
S, Ku band subsystems
Dish, omni-antennas
TDRS
Simultaneous operation
closed loop
Attitude control
Velocity control
Stabilization
Sensors
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
a   technology and  techniques adequate
 required for  technology
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Enabling technology
Thin cell and higher efficiency
Cell manufacturing processes
Battery development
High voltage component development
Meeting existing Ada schedulea
Low loss  couplersa
Develop higher densities
Space qualifications and higher densities
Modulations/cod ing/bandw idtha
Design/develop for application
Acquisition/tracking/data ratea
Radio frequency interference protection
Existing hardware with modifications
Existing hardware with modifications
Existing hardware with modifications
Existing hardware with modifications
Existing hardware with modifications
Key
 Power Subsystem
 Management Subsystem
 —Communication
TRKNG—Tracking
EC/LSS—Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
GN&C–Guidance, Navigation, and Control
TDRS—Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
SOURCE Based on  contained  the study led by the Grumann Aerospace Corp
Figure A-7.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex
SOURCE Based on Information contained  the study led by Grumman Aerospace Corp
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Figure A-8. —The Same Contractor’s
Added facilities
l Solar array
Suggested Evolved Central Complex
— Assembly/storage
NADIR
SOURCE Based on  contained  the study led by Grumman Aerospace 
. Typical missions
— Astronomy
— Life science
— R&D
— Satellite & industrial
platform service
— Payload assembly
— Earth observation
Figure A“9.—One Contractor’s Suggested Evolution Plan; LEO, 28.5°
Key
TMS—Teleoperataor maneuvering system ISTO—lnitial solar terrestrial observatory
MMU—Manned maneuvering unit ASTO—Advanced solar terrestrial observatory
RMS– Remote manipulator system ASO—Advanced solar observatory
OTV—Orbital transfer vehicle LSS — Large space structure
SOURCE Based on  contained in the study led by  Marietta 
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Figure A-10. —One Contractor’s Suggested Free-Flying Industrial Platform
SOURCE Based on  contained  the study led by Grumman Aerospace 
Figure A-11 .–One Contractor’s Suggested Tended Polar Platform (IOC)
.
SOURCE Based on  contained  the study led by Grumman Aerospace Corp
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Table A4.—One Contractor’s Summary of Benefits of infrastructure Work Crew Presence
Function Benefit Related issues
Maintenance and repair. . . . . . . . . . . . . . l
l
Real-time mission involvement. . . . . . . . l
l
Lab operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l
l
Construction, assembly, test checkout,
modification of large systems . . . . . . l
l
l
l
Reduced equipment cost l
Enhanced availability and life
Reacting to unexpected or transient “
events
Discovery, insight, and
understanding
Difficult or impossible to automatea •
Research progress not paced by
Shuttle reflight schedule l
Difficult or impossible to automatea l
Simplify designs compared to l
complex deployment l
Stiffen structures
Final test and correction in space
Realizing cost savings potentials
Designing activity and
instruments to take advantage
Lab equipment at “space
station”
Crew skills
Role of EVA
Design to realize benefits
Low-thrust transfer to final
destination
%VIthin the predictable future.
SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study lad by the Boeing Aerospace Co.
with that used in the Skylab project. In contrast to the
multiple qualification test, backup, and flight articles
used then, they assume that the first production unit
will be a flight article. Furthermore, they judge that
the large size of modules permitted by the space trans-
portation system (STS) would promote economy of
scale. Finally, they judge that autonomous operation
of the infrastructure would allow significant reduction
in ground support compared to that of Skylab. These
factors lead them to conclude that a “space station”
could be acquired for significantly less cost per pound
than was Skylab. Although it is unclear which precise
spacecraft elements are included, their estimate was
$77,000/kg ($35,000/lb) for Skylab (1984), while they
projected $44,()()0/kg ($20,000/lb) for a “space sta-
tion.” Their estimate of the cost of the Spacelab is
$220,000/kg ($100,0O0/lb), although this is higher than
that of European sources. (Of course, a “space sta-
tion” could be many times larger and heavier than
either Skylab or Spacelab.) They estimate that it re-
quired 10 percent of the acquisition costs per year for
Skylab O&M, and estimate that a life-cycle-cost de-
signed “space station” would require about 3 percent
per year to operate.
Estimates for operation and maintenance costs of
all the aerospace contractor groups fall within the
range from $150 million to $600 million per year
(1984); about $400 million per year represents a mean
value of these costs for a “space station” accom-
modating 8 to 10 crew members.
All contractor groups foresee that in-space infra-
structure could provide operational performance,
sociopolitical, and economic benefits. The first two
are essentially qualitative in nature: appropriate activ-
ities would enable scientific and commercial commu-
nities to expand and improve their activities in space.
Some of the technology advances would be expected
to “spin off” to other areas.
Further, they expect that the performance benefits
would accrue from an improved ability to perform in-
space tasks, resulting in both an increase of quantity
and improved quality of output. A number of these
are listed in table A-5. In the research and technol-
ogy areas, the cost of development programs could
be reduced by large factors–some project it to be as
much as 50 percent. Free-flying platforms could en-
able and promote many commercial projects. A base
for maintenance and repair of in-space equipment on
Table A.5.—One Contractor’s Summary
of Performance Benefits
All mission operatlons:
l Decoupled from Shuttle launch schedule, payload
priorities, and ground delays
Space based ROTV:
• 10,000 kg + useful payload into GEO
l On-demand capability
On-orblt assembly:
Ž Work crew can inspect, work around, and
complement robotics and automation
l Shuttle size limits surmounted
On-orbit technology and R&D:
l Work crew can calibrate, operate, and modify
l True space environment
l Interaction of multiple disciplines and capabilities in
a novel environment will produce synergistic
advances
l Shorter development programs
Sclentific observations:
l Short lived experiments extended
l Work crew can monitor, intervene, replenish, and
update
SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman
Aerospace Corp.
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an as-needed basis, and scheduled activities such as
resupply and/or removal of manufactured products,
would be provided. The useful life of observation
modules would similarly be enhanced by replenish-
ment of consumables, change of experimental equip-
ment items and their unscheduled repair.
As scientific knowledge is gained there is greater po-
tential to enhance the quality of life. Basic research
results provide some of the background to applied re-
search, where economic and social benefits prospects
become more visible. Improved space-based ocean,
weather, and atmospheric research eventually could
assist in our ability to locate and manage Earth re-
sources, and monitor and control the physical envi-
ronment. New pharmaceuticals as well as semicon-
ductors and metal products could become available
through space research and processing. Other social
benefits envisioned by one of the contractors are in-
dicated in table A-6.
“Space station’ ’-related economic benefits are
hoped for in at least three ways: research, develop-
ment, and production activities generally; satellite
servicing; and orbital transfer vehicle operations. The
contractor groups judge that the greatest benefits
should flow from the latter.
Research and development cost reduction through
use of infrastructure support is the most difficult to esti-
mate, but most of the contractor groups concluded
it could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars per
year. One example is that of a lengthy science re-
search project such as that involving the Shuttle In-
frared Celestial Telescope Facility that anticipates
some 250 days of use in space. If done in a series of
30-day extended-duration orbiter (EDO) trips, the
associated operating expense is estimated to be about
$3.6 million/day, while if accomplished in a continu-
ous interval in a laboratory there, the cost is expected
to decrease sharply, to $0.4 million/day. Materials
science experiments done in space using a 30-day
EDO might cost $2.9 million per experiment, com-
Table A-6.—Some Social Benefits Suggested
by One Contractor
. High-technology—a national goal
l Focus for engineering/science education
l Lunar and beyond exploration
• International cooperation
l Unique, sophisticated development facility
• New communication services
l New commercial products and industries — medical,
semiconductor
l New therapeutic, diagnostic techniques
l Enhanced national security
SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman
Aerosp~e  Corp.
pared with an estimated $0.6 million per experiment
if done in a long-term laboratory there. One estimate
of the cost of pharmaceutical production, where a
large portion of the expense is in the materials, is that
of some $33 million/kg ($15 million/lb) if done in an
EDO, compared to $18 million/kg ($8 million/lb) if
done at a “space station.” These kinds of cost benefits
could be expected to continue throughout the com-
plete “space station” life of some two decades and,
if realized, could be a significant factor in encourag-
ing the commercialization of space.
Were a Shuttle used to service an LEO satellite, the
price per flight would approach some $20 million,
which is comparable to the value of the servicing for
many such satellites. Using permanent space infras-
tructure services offers the possibility, in principle, of
reducing this operational cost by perhaps one half.
Benefits expected of an ROTV are related primarily
to its being based in space and its reusability. One of
the study contractor groups estimated that a fully
amortized ROTV service could be provided at a total
cost of about $60 million for a 4,500 kg (10,000-lb)
payload delivered from LEO to GEO. In contrast, a
large expendable upper stage costs some $100 mil-
lion or more, delivered with its payload to LEO. Thus,
net economic benefit for the ROTV would be some
$4o million to $5o million per flight, and 20 launches
per year could provide a total savings of $1 billion/year.
Figure A-1 2 illustrates the judgment of one contrac-
tor group regarding the various kinds of benefits ex-
pected of the use of a “space station.”
Regardless of when a positive economic payoff
might commence—always assuming that it does—a
“space station” could be a powerful capability multi-
plier. Of course, one of the most important benefits
would arise from the conduct of activities which
would be impossible to conduct without it, and activ-
ities that we cannot conceive of now.
Conclusions
The aerospace contractor groups that studied po-
tential needs and desires for new infrastructure iden-
tified hundreds of activities in the areas of space
science and applications, commercialization, and
technology development that could be carried out uti-
lizing long lifetime infrastructure with accommodation
for a crew to live and work in space. The vast majority
are activities that are possible only with a crew sup-
ported by the infrastructure, or ones that would be
enhanced by their presence: they would maximize
R&D performance, especially in the life and materials
sciences, and contribute to economic benefits. No
single activity, or even a few, would be sufficient to
justify its establishment, but the large total number
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Figure A-12.–One Contractor’s Summary of Infrastructure (“Space Station”) Payoffs
Provides significant economic
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contributing in all functional areas, in the judgment
of the contractor groups, provide reasons to acquire
an extensive permanently inhabited space infrastructure.
All study participants see significant benefits—in-
cluding such intangibles as national prestige, leader-
ship in space, and economic, performance, and social
benefits connected with scientific research, commer-
cialization, and new technology. Reflecting the broad
range of advantages projected, contractors differed as
to which aspect would be most significant. Planetary
probes, a Lunar settlement, and human exploration
of Mars are considered of great significance in terms
of longer range goals.
It was the unanimous recommendation that the first
infrastructure units should be placed in a 28.50 inclina-
tion low-Earth-orbit. All were envisioned as new tech-
nology designs and were projected as allowing evolu-
tionary growth with increased size and capability
phased in over an initial assembly period of about 5
years. The smallest unit with adequate volume to
house a crew of three for extended stays and with min-
Provides long-term capability for
imum experimental and research facilities would con-
sist of a command/habitat module connected to a
solar-array energy module, plus two logistics modules
(for resupply by Shuttle flight). They estimated such
an initial unit’s acquisition cost to be from $3.3 bil-
lion to $4 billion (1984). A later complex accom-
modating eight crew members, 60 kW of power to
users, two laboratory modules, several external pay-
load attachment points and satellite service pallets,
and two tended platforms (co-orbiting and polar) were
estimated to cost $7.5 billion to $9 billion. An ROTV
capability could cost as much as $3 billion more. And
further expansion of “space station” components and
capabilities were contemplated into the 21st century.
These contractor costs accumulate to $10 billion to
$12 billion for the development of the contractor-
suggested evolved complex over an approximately 9-
year period to the mid-1990s; NASA support and pro-
gram integration expense could be another $2 billion
to $3 billion. The contractor “evolved” system is
roughly comparable to the summer 1983 NASA IOC
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but with the addition of full ROTV capability. (Further
additions that enter, generally, in NASA’s future plans
to the year 2000 would add another $6 billion.)
The contractors point out that, although quite large,
these expenditures may be compared with the approx-
imately $60 billion (1 984) invested in the Apollo pro-
gram and the estimated equivalent $56 billion spent
for the Salyut-Soyuz project (reported by Interavia for
February 1982), each over a somewhat comparable
period of time. While the study contractor groups con-
cluded that these estimated costs could be contained
within a NASA budget projection that maintained
today’s level of appropriation over a 10-year period,
they recognize that some cost-offsetting economic re-
turn on this public investment is necessary.
While the prospects for cost containment and other
intangible benefits are considered to be promising,
two operational factors are pointed out as the main
sources of large, quantifiable economic benefits. One
is the use of an LEO-based ROTV system to transport
equipments between LEO and higher orbits, including
GEO. The other relates to the fact that appropriate in-
frastructure would result in maximizing the STS load
factor for each flight. The contractors project a reduc-
tion in costs for these activities of up to $10 billion
over the system lifetime. Income could result from in-
creased commercial space development fostered by
the lower cost of space activities and faster conduct
of research activities generally.
A final comparison may be made regarding other
long-duration “space stations” of the past and present:
Skylab and Salyut. As orbiting spacecraft accommo-
dating crews, at first glance they appear to be fun-
damentally similar. But, while all three could function
as space test and laboratory facilities, the contractors
note that the proposed “space station” is the only one
providing for satellite servicing. And neither Skylab nor
Salyut offered the assembly and transport harbor en-
visioned for a new “space station. ”
Major Findings of “Mission Analysis
Studies” of Other Countries
Related studies were also requested of potential
foreign participants in any “space station” program.
In terms similar to the eight U.S. aerospace contrac-
tor group studies, the European Space Agency (ESA),
the National Research Council of Canada, and a Jap-
anese Space Station Task Team (representing numer-
ous organizations in Japan interested in aerospace
activities) prepared studies. In addition, individual
companies or groups of companies from these regions
presented reports of elements or subsystems of special
interest to them. Among these were Dornier of Ger-
many, Aerospatiale of France, Spar Aerospace of Can-
ada, and a group of European companies consisting
of AEG, British Aerospace, Fokker, and CIR.
European Space Agency
The member nations of the European Space Agency
(ESA) authorized a study team which was directed by
MBB/ERNO and included Aeritalia, Matra, British
Aerospace, Dornier System, SABCA, BTM, and KAMP-
SAX. It examined European interest in providing ele-
ments and the likely consequences of utilizing a
“space station” having crew capabilities.
Especially emphasized was ESA’s desire to partici-
pate actively in the program, both in the design and
construction of components (e.g., logistics modules,
free-flying platforms, laboratory modules, and equip-
ment and servicing pallets) and in the later operations
(e.g., access on a continuing basis for experiments,
identification of payloads and operational require-
ments, and provision of crew members).
The study assessed participation as offering poten-
tial benefits to European nations in scientific, techno-
logical, industrial, economic, operational, and politi-
cal areas. European contributions were seen as based
upon their own set of potential user interests, on sys-
tems with clean interfaces with other infrastructure
components, and on the utilization of developed Euro-
pean technologies (specifically Spacelab). Perhaps ESA
could provide “dedicated modules” with preferential
conditions for European users to compensate for Euro-
pean investment. Participation would be particularly
cost effective to ESA if all of the infrastructure were
available to it without a major program on their part
to obtain it, so that it would be complementary with
rather than competitive with European unmanned
systems.
The study team identified about 130 activities that,
conceptually, European countries desire to carry out
in space. Similar to the projections of the U.S. con-
tractor groups, they included materials processing, life
sciences and bioprocessing studies, space science and
applications, and technology development. An inno-
vative use was that of entertainment, such as filming
of space movies and creation of new artistic forms in
space.
ESA recognized the possibility of free-flyers as a sup-
plement to a “space station” for Earth observation and
space science, but noted the advantages (over an ex-
pendable booster) of the Shuttle and additional in-
orbit infrastructure; this combination would involve
less costly hardware, provide return transportation as
needed, and obviate the necessity of bringing a com-
plete spacecraft back to the surface for servicing.
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The need or benefit from human involvement in
about 70 percent of the proposed activities was
stressed. Among these were life sciences experiments
and the servicing of satellites such as the EURECA
vehicles that are under design in Europe. Power needs
identified for users were in the range of 20 to 30 kW.
Canada
The National Research Council of Canada expressed
a high degree of interest. The Canadian report iden-
tified about 37 potential uses and desires, largely in
the areas of remote sensing and technology develop-
ment. Most could be carried out at an orbit inclina-
tion of 28.5° with 5 kW of power. Many uses would
benefit from having a human crew, and a Canadian
astronaut as a payload specialist was proposed.
Continued development of the SPAR Remote Ma-
nipulator System is anticipated along with new work
on associated construction and servicing subsystems.
Also, Canada would develop a space vision system
to facilitate ranging and docking, and consideration
is being given to advanced remote sensing subsystems.
In a separate report, Spar Aerospace Limited out-
lined its capabilities in high-power solar arrays and in-
dicated interest in building one of a modular type;
various concepts were given but no cost estimates.
Japan
The Japanese Space Station Task Team reported
long-term, across-the-board interest. While few spe-
cifics regarding individual experiments were given,
they anticipated uses for astronomy, life sciences,
materials processing, technology development, Earth
observation, space energy research, and large com-
munications satellite assembly. The majority of these
would require or benefit from human presence, with
long time on orbit and human judgment and/or oper-
ating capability as important factors. They anticipate
that space activities would involve two general phases—
one up to the middle 1990s to develop methods to
be capitalized on thereafter.
The Japanese would be interested in developing
almost any or all elements of the space infrastructure,
from attached modules to the ROTV. They suggest
starting with simple standard modules and enlarging
the capabilities for various additional needs.
Individual Foreign Company Interests
Extensive studies were made by several European
companies or industrial groups to augment the reports
discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. A
submission of Spar Aerospace Limited has already
been discussed in the section on Canada; others are
presented here.
DORNIER
Dornier of Germany investigated several concep-
tual infrastructure elements for ESA which have an ob-
vious relation to a potential later participation of Eur-
ope in a U.S. program. The conceptual elements
analyses included:
1.
2.
3.
‘requirements and technology aspects for space
pointing systems;
designs and capabilities of heat pipe radiators;
and
life sciences experiments and development of life
support systems.
AEROSPATIALE
Aerospatiale of France studied the following areas:
1.
2.
3.
General infrastructure concepts, along with their
evaluation of the eight U.S. contractor group ar-
chitectural designs. The contractor group studies
were noted as having numerous advantageous
design features, but in each case several dif-
ficulties are foreseen.
Concepts for a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehi-
cle were studied with special consideration of its
fuel storage arrangements.
Designs of a Teleoperator Maneuvering System
were-studied. It would incorporate solar arrays
to provide electrical power.
AEG, BRITISH AEROSPACE, FOKKER, CIR
This group of European companies analyzed power
sources employing solar energy arrays, comparing
planar and concentrator designs and various support-
ing structure arrangements. A flexible-blanket, retract-
able, fold-out array was favored for further study. This
approach also lends itself to stepwise growth to power
levels as great as 250 kW.
MBB/ERNO, AERITALIA, BRITISH AEROSPACE,
DORNIER SYSTEM, SABCA, BTM, KAMPSAX
MBB/ERNO, the leader of this group of companies,
was also the principal contractor for the general ESA
“space station” study. Thus, much duplication occurs
in this report of the summary appearing earlier in this
chapter.
Considerable emphasis was put upon the possibil-
ity of the Spacelab and EURECA spacecraft being used
as infrastructure elements.
Modifications of Spacelab could provide combined
habitation/laboratory functions in conjunction with an
EDO vehicle. A crew of three could be accommo-
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dated, but this would result in a decrease in labora-
tory space compared to the present Spacelab design.
EURECA would first be used as a Shuttle-tended un-
pressurized free-flying platform. Later development of
a resource/service module incorporating solar elec-
trical power, environmental control, and life support
systems would enable an increased capability in asso-
ciation with the developed Spacelab and the EURECA
platform. Ultimately these elements could, with others,
become components of a larger, more permanent
space infrastructure.
Also, a Spacelab with its own solar array could be
a free-flying experiment module which could be
tended by a crew that would visit for a few hours at
a time.
They also indicated a European consortium was pre-
pared to develop and produce an ROTV and its
hangar facility, a Teleoperator Maneuvering System
(labeled by Matra as a Teleoperated Service Vehicle),
and the satellite service and assembly infrastructure
segments.
No specific estimated costs were given. However,
six items (a free-flying, tended, experiment module,
a logistics module, a free-flying platform, an unpres-
surized logistics resupply carrier, a teleoperator ma-
neuvering system, and a thermal control technology
development program) could be achieved over a 1s
year period at funding levels aggregating about $1.6
billion (1984). While direct comparison with estimates
made by U.S. aerospace companies is difficult be-
cause of numerous design and capability differences,
this cost could be lower than, but of the same order
of magnitude as, the estimate for a corresponding set
of modules by the American contractors.
The study observed that pressurized modules would
sometimes be needed for experimental reasons even
if human habitation were not a consideration, and this
would affect not only the design but also the opera-
tion of such modules.
The study team recommended that development
should proceed in phases with the initial phase using
proven existing elements. Automated processes should
be preferred for routine work, but cost effectiveness
must always be considered, inasmuch as automation
can be costly.
This study, representing companies from many
European countries, was oriented to identifying po-
tentially produceable infrastructure elements, not
overall concepts. This emphasized Europe’s intention
to play an active role in development and operation,
not simply provide hardware. The candidate elements
would satisfy their user needs and have clean inter-
faces with the other elements of space infrastructure.
This would not only put Europe in a position to oper-
ate their facilities, but also enable them to be offered
to the United States, thus allowing a sharing of re-
sources and reducing the financial involvement of par-
ticipating nations,
Summary
The universal attitude of all non-United States orga-
nizations is one of enthusiasm to participate in a space
infrastructure program, not just to develop and build
elements of it, but to be active as partners in the oper-
ation and use of its facilities, especially the elements
that they would produce. Many of them look upon
it as fundamental to their future role in space and
therefore want long-term understandings or agree-
ments with the United States. The characteristic note
is one of desired international cooperation in which
there is true participation throughout rather than
simply shared eventual utilization.
NASA Synthesis of the “Mission
Analysis Studies”
NASA assembled the United States and foreign mis-
sion analysis reports relating to a civilian “space sta-
tion” and held a workshop during May 1983, to syn-
thesize the results. Of the hundreds of projects and
experiments proposed by potential users, the work-
shop of the Requirements Working Group and the
SSTF Concept Development Group established a min-
imum time-phased “mission set” (for the decade from
1991 to 2000) of 107 specific space activities, plus four
generic industrial service activities (e.g., satellite
servicing).
Of the 107, 48 were categorized under science and
applications, 28 under commercial, and 31 under
technology development. The four additional com-
mercial opportunity activities would be continuously
available as needed for industrial servicing.
The NASA working groups judged the list of activi-
ties to be realistic in terms of maturity of experimental
and program planning, scientific need, and progress
of technology development. The programs identified
for the first 3 years were particularly well validated
in their view. At the end of the workshop, their rec-
ommendations of the minimum capabilities required
at IOC were as follows:
1. Space station central complex at 28.50:
l 55 kW of average electrical power to users;
l Two 60 m3 laboratory modules (for materials
processing in space and life sciences);
l 5 person crew (4 for payload operations);
l 300 MBPS data rate; and
• 4 to 6 payload attachment mounts,
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2. Polar platform (unpressurized):
l 12.5 kW of average power;
l 300 MBPS data rate; and
• 4 payload attachment mounts.
Nonaerospace Industry Interest
in Space Use
NASA contracted with the Booz-Allen & Hamilton
and Coopers and Lybrand consultant firms to com-
municate with a variety of nonaerospace companies
to ascertain (and at the same time stimulate) interest
in the use of space facilities for commercial purposes.
Up to March 1984, they discussed prospects with up-
wards of so companies of which more than 30 ex-
pressed active interest. To most of these firms the con-
cept of doing business in space is utterly foreign; a
great deal of exploring with them is necessary to sur-
face possibilities of products or services that might be
compatible with their commercial activities and offer
promising opportunity of eventual financial success.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton reported to a conference in
mid-1 983 that most of the companies moving toward
negotiation of Joint Endeavor Agreements with NASA
are well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with an an-
nounced agreement is the 3M Corp.) but several are
from the small business sector or Europe. Interest is
concentrated in such fields as chemicals, metals,
glasses, communications, and crystals. Another type
of enterprise being actively pursued is a fee-for-service
laboratory in space. Among the half-dozen companies
actively investigating space experiments, most are in-
terested in crew-tended operations rather than remote
or automated procedures.
Since the administration’s authorization of a “space
station” program, interest among several companies
has become more firm, according to those involved
in the study; the 3M Corp. has recently announced
a Memorandum of Understanding with NASA to begin
space experiments on inorganic chemical materials
and on thin films. An executive with one company
with experience in aerospace has indicated that the
Government’s funding toward eventual acquisition of
permanently inhabited space infrastructure is a nec-
essary (but not sufficient) condition to convince in-
dustries that the United States is serious about space
commercialization. He considers that, in addition, a
long-term commitment to supporting the commercial-
ization effort is what will suffice to bring the private
sector into full participation.
Some industry observers point out that the often-
mentioned example of how communications satellites
became a commercial success is not necessarily rele-
vant to today’s efforts at space commercialization in
other areas. First, there was already a clear market for
the improved communications services which a pri-
vate organization was created to provide, something
which is not clearly evident today is such areas as
materials processing in space or remote sensing. Sec-
ond, the enabling legislation to move it forward to
reality was motivated by the need to create an inter-
national system, while today’s commercialization
issues concern primarily U.S. domestic businesses.
The barriers that Booz-Allen & Hamilton found to
wider interest in commercial space enterprises were
technical, economic, and government-related. First,
technical knowledge of the space environment by
many industries is very scanty, while in general there
are too few answers as yet to the behavior of many
kinds of materials in space. Second, economic risks
associated with timing and cost of space experiments
are looked at by private enterprise from the standpoint
of the expected long payback period (1 O or more
years). Third, the maze of government bureaucracy
to be faced to obtain approval on such things as Joint
Endeavor Agreements is deterring some, especially
small companies, from entering into space business.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton is recommending establish-
ment of some form of permanent intermediary to assist
nonaerospace companies in contacts with NASA and
other Government agencies.
Appendix B
THE EVOLUTION OF CIVILIAN IN-SPACE
INFRASTRUCTURE, I. E., “SPACE STATION,”
CONCEPTS IN THE UNITED STATES*
Introduction
Almost from the first time humans thought about
leaving the surface of this planet, one theme has been
the creation of some form of human outpost in space.
In fiction, and during this century in increasingly spe-
cific engineering detail, the “space station” concept
has been extensively discussed. In one of the two ma-
jor space-faring nations, the Soviet Union, a fairly
rudimentary but still very capable “space station” pro-
gram, centered on the Salyut spacecraft, has been on-
going since 1971. In the other space power, the
United States, the development of some kind of per-
manent presence i n space to support space activities
i n an efficient and effective manner, is now u rider
way.
This appendix reviews those past occasions, with
particular attention to the rationales offered at various
times for space infrastructure development and to the
differing concepts which have been proposed. His-
tory can cast a useful perspective on current policy
alternatives, which, after all, reflect the continuation
of a long-running debate over the justification for in-
frastructure of various characteristics, size, and cost.
By sketching the earlier points in the history of the U.S.
space program at which a “space station” has come
under serious consideration as a major project, only
to be rejected in favor of some other alternative, it may
be possible to identify what is now different, and what
is not, that might now lead to a more favorable evalua-
tion of various proposals.
Earliest Space Infrastructure
(i e.,. . “Space Station” Concepts) t
The first proposals for “space stations” conceptually
akin to modern schemes appeared in the late nine-
teenth century. Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky’s Dreams of
Earth and Sky and the Effects of Universal Gravity
(1895) and Kurd Lasswitz’s On Two Planets (1897) set
*This paper was prepared for OTA by John Logsdon, based In part on
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the tone by picturing “space stations” as stepping
stones for trips by people to the planets, especially
Mars. Like these earliest contributions, succeeding
proposals included fiction and nonfiction, humanism
and science, practicality and fancy. They were sparked
by an unbridled enthusiasm for spaceflight and a firm
belief that exploration of the planets was human des-
tiny. Most were informed enough to realize that di-
rect ascent from Earth to interplanetary space was not
technical y attractive. “Space stations” were way sta-
tions, logistics depots on the way to the planets.
Tsiolkovsky in 1923 wrote of a station placed “at
a distance of 2,000 to 3,000 versts (a Russian unit of
distance equal to 0.6629 mile) from the Earth, as (an
artificial) Moon. Little by little appear colonies with
supplements, materials, machines, and structures
brought from Earth.” In his 1923 book, The Rocket
Into Interplanetary Space, space pioneer Herman
Oberth first described an orbiting manned satellite as
a “space station, ” and proposed that it could be used
as an Earth observation site, world communications
link, weather satellite, or orbital refueling station for
outward-bound space vehicles.
The early proposals resulted in more words than
hardware. The only group of “space station” advo-
cates to make progress toward realizing their dreams
were the members of the German Rocket Society,
among whom the “space station” concept became
common currency.2 But even they could only mud-
dle along on rocket research with the limited private
funds at their disposal until military support prompted
by the approach of World War II brought on the fi-
nancing necessary for research and development that
would lead to spaceflight. Wernher von Braun and
his associates built the v-2 rocket for the Wehrmacht
in order, they said later, to achieve their real goal—
the development of spaceflight. Whatever their mo-
tives, after the war they brought to the United States
the most advanced rocket technology in the world and
schemes for “space station” and interplanetary flight
that had been sparked and nurtured by the romantic
enthusiasm of the first half of the 20th century.
‘Barton C. Hacker, “And Rest As On a Natural Station: From Space Sta-
tton  to Orbital Operations In Space-Travel Thought, 1985-1951 ,“ unpublished
paper, NASA History C)tlce  ArchIves (hereafter NHOA), Washington, DC,
p 9.
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In the United States in the years immediately fol-
lowing World War II, both scientists and military lead-
ers recognized that the ability to launch payloads into
orbit would have important implications for their par-
ticular fields of activity. In considering the various uses
to which space might be put, several lines of devel-
opment emerged. First, to the concept of “space sta-
tions” with human crews as stepping stones to the
planets was added the less dramatic but more reali-
zable concept of relatively small Earth satellites, not
to send men to other celestial bodies but to perform
practical, Earth-oriented tasks in orbit: communica-
tion, scientific research, reconnaissance, etc. j
Second, further consideration led some to conclude
that bases in orbit were “not necessary for most activ-
ities envisioned there: rendezvous of the rockets and
satellites themselves is sufficient to most purposes. ”4
But this perspective and its appearance in the literature
did nothing to deter a third line of development: the
elaboration of earlier concepts of “space stations, ”
perpetuated in this era most spectacularly by Wernher
von Braun’s concept of a toroidal “space station. ”
Von Braun’s ideas received wide publicity in a Col-
lier’s magazine special titled “Man Will Conquer
Space Soon.” Von Braun claimed that “scientists and
engineers now know how to build a station in space
that would circle the Earth, 1,075 miles up . . . .If we
do it, we can not only preserve the peace but we can
take a long step toward uniting mankind.”
Von Braun’s plan called for a triple-decked, 25-ft-
wide, wheel-shaped station in polar orbit which would
be a “superb observation post” and from which “a
trip to the Moon itself will be just a step.” The main
element of space infrastructure would be accompa-
nied by another: a free-flying observatory that would
be tended by a crew.
Von Braun noted that the station would not be alone
in space; “there will nearly always be one or two
rocket ships unloading supplies near to the station. ”
“Space taxis” or “shuttle-craft,” as von Braun de-
scribed them, would ferry both people and materials
from the rocket ships to the station itself.
Von Braun noted a number of uses for a “space
stat ion”:
l “a springboard for exploration of the solar
system”;
‘R. Carglll  Hall, “Early US. Satellite Proposals,” Tec/rno/ogy  and Cu/fure,
vol. 4, 1963, pp. 41 O-434; and Arthur Clarke, “Extraterrestrial Relays: Can
Rocket Stations Give Worldwide Coverage?” W/re/ess  Wodd, October 1945,
pp 305-308.
4Harry  E. Ross, “Orbital Bases, ” )ourna/ of fhe British /rrferp/anetary  Society,
vol. 9, 1949,  pp. 1 -19; Kenneth W. Gatland,  “Rockets in Circular Orbit, ”
)ourna/  of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 9, 1949, pp. 52-59.
‘Wernher  von Braun,  “Crossing the Last Frontier, ” Co//ier’s, Mar, 22, 1952,
pp. 25-29, 72-74.
l “a watchdog of the peace”;
l a meteorological observation post;
l a navigation aid for ships and airplanes; and
l “a terribly effective atomic bomb carrier. ”
This detailed description was only one of the many
concepts developed in the years after World War II
but prior to the 1957 launch of Sputnik and the for-
mal beginning of the Space Age.6 Even before the
United States had an official civilian space program,
most of the possible uses of a “space station” had
been identified by visionaries who dreamed of space
travel,7
The Response to Sputnik, 1957-618
Sputnik changed the context for U.S. space activi-
ties. In spite of President Eisenhower’s attempts to
avoid it, a space race with the Russians was on. All
kinds of proposals that would have been laughed from
the stage in earlier years were put forward in deadly
earnest. Many at home and abroad perceived the
United States as having fallen behind the Soviet Union
at least in this sophisticated technology, and nothing
but a crash program would do.
Having people in space is the most complicated and
the most dramatic of space activities, and it quickly
became the focus of the competition. News that the
Soviets were considering a “space station” of the von
Braun variety fanned the enthusiasm in the United
States for a like undertaking and underlined the mili-
tary overtones of the space race.9 As one observer put
it, “the rapid and timely completion of the Military
Space Station will do much to bring about space
supremacy (italics added) for America and lay the
scientific foundation for the aerospace power of the
future. ” 10
But this was not to be. In spite of all that the mili-
tary had done to pioneer research in spaceflight, Presi-
dent Eisenhower opted for a civilian space agency, the
bThe  detailed description in the von Braun article should not be confused
with a detailed design. For two early detailed designs, see: 1 ) “Assembly of
a Multl-Manned  Satellite, ” Lockheed Missile and Space Division, LMSD
48347, Dec. 18, 1958 (available in the archives of the National Air and Space
Museum of the Smithsonian Institution); and 2) “A Modular Concept for a
Multi-Manned Space Station, “ in the IAS Proceedings of the Manned Space
Stat/on Symposium, Apr. 20-22, 1960, pp. 37-72.
7See,  for example, the IAS report, op. cit.
8Thls  history is recounted in John M.  Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the
Moon Project Apollo and the Nat/onal  Interest (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press,
197o), ch, 2; and W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson, Living and
Working  in Space: The History o{ Skylab (Washington, DC: National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, 1983), SP-4208,  ch. 1.
9“Soviet  Scientist Sees Need for Manned Station in Space, ” AerO/spdCe
Engineering, vol. 17,  September 1958, p,  27.
iOLowell  B. Smith, “The Military Test Space Stat Ion,” Aero/Spdce EfWKW-
/ng, vol. 19,  May 1960, p. 19.
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and entrusted it with a manned mission. And
that mission would be a modest one, at least at the
start. Project Mercury would demonstrate that a per-
son could fly in space; until then there would be no
talk of “space stations” and manned flight to the
Moon and planets.11
However, as the new space agency began opera-
tions, NASA leadership set the development of a long-
range plan for the agency’s first decade as a high-pri-
ority task. A “space station” was a leading candidate
for a post-Mercury goal. The House Space Commit-
tee in early 1959 concluded that stations were the log-
ical follow-on to Mercury, and von Braun (then still
working for the Army) presented a similar view i n his
briefings to NASA, At this time, the German rocket
team had developed an elaborate scheme, called Proj-
ect Horizon, for Army utilization of space, including
miIitary outposts on the Iunar surface.
In the first half of 1959, NASA created a Research
Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight, chaired
by Harry Goett. At the first meeting of this committee
members placed a “space station” ahead of a lunar
expedition in a list of logical post-Mercury steps. In
subsequent meetings, the debate centered on the
question of whether a “space station’s” value for
scientific research, especially in the biomedical area,
outweighed the excitement of a lunar landing goal.
While some members of the committee argued that
“the ultimate objective of space exploration is
manned travel to and from other planets, ” the repre-
sentative of one center argued for an interim step,
since “in true spaceflight man and the vehicle are go-
ing to be subjected to the space environment for ex-
tended periods of time and there will undoubtedly be
space rendezvous requirements. All of these aspects
need extensive study . . . the best means would be
with a true orbiting space laboratory that is manned
and that can have a crew and equipment change. ” 12
Ultimately, the Goett committee recommended that
a lunar landing be established as NASA’s long-range
goal, on the grounds that it was a true “end-objective”
requiring no justification in terms of some larger goals
to which it contributed.
These recommendations were not immediately ac-
cepted. For example, at an August 1960 industry brief-
ing on NASA’s future plans, George Low presented
a scheme in which a manned lunar landing and crea-
tion of a “space station” were given equal treatment
I I Loyal s Swenson, jr., james  M, G rlmwood,  and Charles C. Alexander,
This I\’eM Ocean A H/sfory  of’ Prqect  Mercury, NASA SP-420T (Washing-
ton, DC National  Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon,  1966).
I ~Bruce Lofi  I n, as quoted I n the  MI n utes of  the Research steering  Commit-
tee on Manned Fllght,  meeting of May 25-26, 1959 (NHOA)
as long-range goals of the NASA program; Low told
the conference that “in this decade, therefore, our
present planning calls for the development and dem-
onstration of an advanced manned spacecraft with suf-
ficient flexibility to be capable of both circumlunar
flight and useful Earth orbital missions. In the long
range, this spacecraft should lead toward a permanent
manned “space station. ”13 Low also announced the
name of the advanced spacecraft program, then aimed
both at the Moon and at “space stations”; it was to
be called “Project Apollo.”
The Apollo Anomaly
Once again, however, external events intervened
to upset the orderly course of events envisioned by
those planning the country’s future in space. President
Kennedy came into office in 1961 committed to reas-
sert America’s vitality and resolve in the war of nerves
with the Soviet Union. When, in April 1961, the Rus-
sians tested the United States once again by launch-
ing the first man into space, Kennedy ended his early
indecisiveness on the space program and in 1961
committed the country to the race to the Moon. This
decision, the most momentous in the history of the
American space program, was made for reasons of
prestige and politics.14 It determined the future of
NASA and its programs more thoroughly than any
other decision before or since. That influence oper-
ated on two levels.
First, and perhaps most importantly in the long run,
the style and public perception of the Apollo commit-
ment made it something of a model for all future space
proposals. President Kennedy made the decision
quickly but not precipitously. He consulted his staff
and NASA and chose the Moon landing as the most
dramatic and most feasible of the suggestions for
demonstrating U.S. ability to best the Soviet Union in
high-technology competition. He presented the idea
in a speech before an unusual joint session of Con-
gress, in which the new President outlined his plans
for fulfilling his campaign promises of getting the
United States moving again.
“Now is the time,” said Kennedy, “to take longer
strides—time for a great new American enterprise—
time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in
space achievement, which in many ways may hold
the key to our future on Earth. ”15 In a moving and un-
compromising challenge, the President called on Con-
1
‘George Low, “Manned Space Fllght,  ” an NASA,  NASA -lrrdustry  Program
P/.]ns Conference, July  1960, p. 80, (NHOA).
‘“ Logsdon,  op. cit., chs.  3-5, recounts the history of the declslon  to begin
the Apollo program and analyzes the motives which  led to that declslon
“lbld  , p. 128
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gress and the public to commit itself to a $25-billion16
undertaking in space for largely intangible goals of
prestige and competition. Congress and the public
agreed, launching NASA on its most famous and for-
mative enterprise and creating an indelible image of
how to launch a major project in space. Only slowly,
if at all, would NASA administrators and other space
advocates come to realize that the Apollo commit-
ment was a political anomaly defying duplication.
The Apollo decision also ensured that in accom-
plishing the lunar landing objective the United States
would develop a large, but specialized, space capa-
bility, and that manned spaceflight would come to
dominate all other kinds for at least a decade. And
it ensured, especially after it was complemented by
the lunar-orbital rendezvous decision, that the “space
station” concept would recede into the background
for the duration of the race to the Moon. The Moon
mission would proceed on its journey directly from
Earth orbit–simply because that was the quickest way
to go (though not necessarily the best for long-term
development) and the Saturn V launch vehicle (origi-
nally designed for other purposes) would permit it.
In this hothouse atmosphere, Project Mercury and
Project Gemini became demonstration programs for
Apollo. Many of the tasks that had to be accomplished
in order for Apollo to succeed were also on the agenda
for “space station” research. Mercury, for example,
demonstrated that a person could survive the weight-
lessness and radiation of space. Gemini demonstrated
that rendezvous, docking, and extravehicular activ-
ity were feasible. The last of these was always more
important to “space station” plans than to Apollo.
Both projects demonstrated, at least to some, that a
human being was a crucial component of the space-
craft’s capability, performing such functions as
piloting, observing, and photographing; and piloting
especially was contrasted with the comparatively
primitive, ground-controlled capsules of the Russians
in which the cosmonaut was simply a passenger. ’
Notwithstanding these positive steps on the road to
a total manned spaceflight capability, Apollo was to
prove a programmatic deadend for NASA. Many in
NASA understood all along that the lunar rendezvous
approach to accomplishing the objective was a tech-
nical anomaly and they never gave up their notion
of a more logical approach to human exploitation of
space, i.e., a “space station. ” For this reason, while
Apollo was at the center of public attention during the
lbThen_some  $6CI bi I I ton today.
I TSwenson,  et al., Op. cit.; Baflon  C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood,  on
the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini,  NASA SP-4203 (Wash-
I ngton, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1977).
1960s, studies of “space station” concepts proceeded
throughout the decade.
“Space Station” Plans During
the 1960s
During the 1960s, “space station” studies were con-
ducted both within NASA and by the various aero-
space contractors (particularly those without a major
role in Apollo). They resulted in examination of a wide
variety of concepts, ranging from inflatable balloon-
Iike structures, through the use of refurbished rocket
stages, to very large stations requiring the use of Saturn
V boosters to put them in orbit. Three NASA field cen-
ters—the Manned Spacecraft Center in Texas, the Mar-
shall Space Flight Center in Alabama, and the Langley
Research Center in Virginia—managed these in-house
and contractor studies, and they were coordinated by
the Advanced Missions Office of the Office of Manned
Space Flight at NASA headquarters in Washington.18
While the manned flight centers at Houston and
Huntsville were focusing almost their total energies
on getting Apollo started in the early 1960s,’9 the
Langley Research Center was giving substantial atten-
tion to the theoretical and engineering aspects of
“space station” design. These efforts dated from at
least mid-1959, and by 1962 enough work had been
done to form the basis for a “space station” symposi-
um.20 Langley researchers noted that “a large manned
orbiting ‘space station’ may have many uses or ob-
jectives.” Among these objectives they listed:
1. learning to live in space;
l artificial-gravity experiments,
. zero-gravity experiments, and
• systems research and development,
2. applications research;
l communications experiments,
l earth observations,
3. launch platform experiments; and
4. scientific research.
With respect to launch platform experiments, Langley
suggested that:
. . . the “space station” with its crew of trained astro-
nauts and technicians should be a suitable facility for
Iestudles durln~ the 1960s  at the Langley Research Center, the Manned
Spacecraft Center, and the Marshall Space Flight Center are summarized In
Langley Research Center, Compilation of Papers Presented at the Space Sta-
tion Technology Symposium, Feb. 11-13, 1969 (N HOA).
!sEven  So,  both Houston and Huntsville had “space station’ study effofls
under  way;  in  par t icu lar ,  Houston was s tudy ing a  la rge  (24-
person) “space station” to be launched by a Saturn V. The studies directed
by Langley have been chosen for review because they were more fully de-
veloped than those directed by the two other centers.
~t}The  early  Langley studies are summarized in Langley Research Center,
A Reporl  on the Research and Technological Problems of Manned Rotating
Spacecraft, NASA Technical Note D-1 504, August 1962 (NHOA).
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learning some of the fundamental operations neces-
sary for launching space missions from orbit. The new
technologies required for rendezvous, assembly or-
bital countdown, replacement of defective parts, and
orbital launch can be determined. 21
Among various “space station” studies carried out
by Langley contractors during the first half of the
1960s, perhaps the most detailed was that of a
Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) con-
ducted by Douglas Aircraft from 1963 to 1966. Doug-
las had had some prior interest in “space stations”;
in 1960 it had built a full-scale mockup of a four-
person astronomical space observatory as the central
theme of an “ideal home exhibition” held in London.
This station was to be constructed inside the fuel tank
of a second-stage booster, a Douglas idea which ulti-
mately found use in the Skylab program over a dec-
ade later.22
In this study, a baseline technical concept for an
MORL was established first, then the “utilization po-
tential” of such a station was examined—i,e., design
preceded requirements. When the original design was
compared to various requirements, it was inadequate,
and a larger station in a different orbit evolved as the
final result of the study effort. The study found that
the highest utilization potential came from “key engi-
neering and scientific research studies augmented by
specific experiments directed toward potential Earth-
centered applications. ” As the study proceeded, the
MORL got steadily more sophisticated and bigger, as
there were no criteria established to limit the addition
of new experimental requirements.
The MORL requirements study examined:
l Earth-centered applications;
l national defense;
l support of future space flights; and,
l the space sciences.
From this analysis, the study predicted the need for
“hundreds of thousands of man-hours” in orbit to
carry out all useful applications; this implied a long-
range requirement for “near-permanent operations
and support of probably several space stations. ” The
study also noted, foreshadowing a future issue, that
“the limiting factor on the number of such stations,
and the crew size of each station, appears to be the
cost of logistic support. ” The final MORL concept, al-
though basically a zero-gravity station, had an on-
board centrifuge for reentry simulation, testing of phys-
.
“ I hld
)iGeorg(,  v But Ier,  ‘‘space sti3t10n5, 1959 To?” in B. J, Bluth  and S R.
\Ic  \eal L,Iprf~te  on SpJCe, vol 1 (Granada Hills, CA National Behavior Sys-
[t’m\,  1981 J, p 8
ical condition, and physical therapy if zero-gravity
conditions were debilitating for the crew.23
By early 1963, NASA Associate Administrator and
General Manager Robert Sea mans called for study of
an Earth Orbiting Laboratory (EOL) from “an overall
NASA point of view.” Such study was needed, said
Seamans, since an EOL had been studied and dis-
cussed “by several government agencies and con-
tractors” 24 and because NASA and DOD “are now
supporting a number of additional advanced studies. ”
Seamans’ reference to DOD was significant: NASA
and DOD were locked in a controversy over control
of post-ApoIlo manned flight efforts. NASA’s manage-
ment, anticipated Seamans, would “be faced with the
decision to initiate hardware development” in 1964.
Seamans ordered an agency-wide, 4 to 6 week high-
priority study which would examine EOL proposals
in terms of, among other factors:
1. Defense Department interest,
2. international factors, and
3. other government agency interest. 25
Throughout this study and other attempts to define
a “space station” program in the 1963-66 period,
there was a continuing tension between those design-
ing the station itself (primarily associated with the Of-
fice of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), its field centers
and associate contractors) and those interested in the
experiments and other uses of such a faciIity (primar-
ily the Office of Space Science and Applications and
the Office of Advanced Research and Technology
(OART)). For example, one OART staffer complained
in 1963 that “the fact that OMSF is supplying funds
for MORL , . . does not change the fact that in doing
so they are in a supporting role to the experimental
purpose of the MORL. That experimental purpose
should carry a heavy stick in the determination of how
the research program will be accomplished. ”26
Later in 1963, the Director of OART asked field cen-
ter assistance in defining “more clearly the potential
usefulness of such a laboratory as a platform for scien-
tific and technological research in space. ” He noted
~JDouglas  MISS I Ie and Space Systems Diwslon,  Douglas Aircraft CO., ‘‘ Re-
port on the Development of the Manned Orbkal  Research Laboratory (MORL)
System Utilization Potential, ” Repon  SM-48822,  January 1966.
ZdThough  It IS not discussed in detal I In this report, durl ng this period the
Department of Defense was exploring the potential of manned flight for na-
tional security missions. Some of this study effort was conducted jointly with
NASA, but most was not; one focus of the effort was the military potential
of a “space station. ” In 1963, the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory
(MOL)  program was approved as an initial step in examining the ways In
wh Ich human crews cou [d be used to enhance national security operations
In orbit The MOL wa5 canceled In 1969
J~Memoran~u  m from NASA Associate Adml nlstrator,  “Space Task Team
for ,Manned  Earth Orbltlng Laboratory Study,” Mar. 28, 1963 (NHOA).
“Memorandum from Chtet,  Manned Systems Integration, to Director, Ot-
tlce  of  Ad\anced Research and Technology, “ SEB for the Manned Orbttal
Research Laboratory, May 16, 1963 (N HOA).
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that “a view has prevailed to date, based primarily on
intuitive judgment [emphasis added here], that this re-
search function (exclusive of biotechnology and hu-
man factors research) constitutes one of the more im-
portant long-range justifications” for a “space station.”
It was essential, he argued, to make “a correct deci-
sion as to whether and why a MORL project should
be undertaken.”27
By 1964, the definition of uses for a “space station”
had broadened enough to lead the Director of the
OMSF Advanced Manned Mission Office to suggest
that it was “both timely and necessary to pursue
. . . broadly beneficial uses of “space stations” with
the departments and agencies that will capitalize and
exploit these broader uses” and that an interagency
“applications working group” be established for this
purpose. Such interagency involvement, he noted,
“can result in a higher level of knowledgeable sup-
port to NASA for implementation of a national multi-
purpose ‘space station’ program.”28
Beginnings of Post-Apollo Planning2g
Under pressure from the White House and Con-
gress, NASA began looking beyond the Apollo proj-
ect in 1964 and 1965. In 1964, an in-house examina-
tion of NASA’s future options had recommended that
NASA defer “large new missions for further study and
analysis. “3° However, there was concern within NASA
about maintaining an adequate workload for both
NASA centers and NASA contractors, as the develop-
ment phase of Apollo neared completion, and an evo-
lutionary approach from Apollo to more advanced ac-
tivities appeared more likely to meet this need, given
the low probability of a major new start on post-Apollo
programs.
The nature of NASA’s long-range planning during
this period turned on the style and personality of the
Administrator, James E. Webb. A lawyer and business-
man who had served President Harry Truman as Di-
rector of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and as Under
~’Memorandum  from Director, Office of Advanced Research and Tech-
nology, “Request for Assistance in Defining the Scientific and Technological
Research Potential of a Manned Orbital Laboratory, ” Oct.  31, 1963, NHOA,
This IS not a reference to the Air Force’s MOL Program.
ZaMemorandum  from Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program, ‘‘1 n-
creased Participation of Potential User Agencies in Development of Broadly
Beneficial Utiiizatlons  of Manned Orbiting Space Station, ” July 15, 1964
(N HOA),
~gSee Arnold  Levine, Managing NASA In the Apo1/o  Era, NASA Sp-4012
(Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1983),
chapters 2 and 9 and James Webb’s foreword, for a full account of post-
Apollo planning.
~OThe  rep~ was called  “Summary Report, Future Programs Task Group, ”
and was printed in U ,S,  Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1966, 89th Congress,
1st sess,,  1965, pt. 3, pp.  1027-1102.
Secretary of State, Webb combined an ebullient and
dynamic personality with a keen political sense and
long familiarity with the ways of Washington. He
believed in long-range planning, but he eschewed
long-range plans, which he felt excessively tied the
hands of the Administrator. He wanted to be prepared
for the future, but he did not want to commit himself
or NASA prematurely to another project as large as
Apollo.
Webb adopted two approaches to post-Apollo plan-
ning. First he characterized and rationalized Apollo
as the development of a capability in space, not an
end in itself. Once the Moon landing was accom-
plished, NASA would be able to convert the resources
and experience of the Apollo program to other pur-
poses through a program called Apollo Applications.
Second, he used his fine political sense to ensure that
NASA adjusted its ambitions in space to suit the cli-
mate of opinion in Washington and throughout the
Nation. As the war in Vietnam and the domestic unrest
of the late 1960s compounded NASA’s problems in
getting congressional attention and appropriations,
NASA gradually modified its internal plans and pro-
posals. The agency took more clearly the line that
Webb stressed throughout his tenure: NASA must
have a balanced program in which manned space-
flight played a role along with space science, applica-
tions, and aeronautical research.
NASA spoke more often in the mid-to-late 1960s of
practical, Earth-oriented space activities, which would
exploit the gains already made and provide taxpayers
with tangible returns on their investment in space,
And, increasingly, NASA came to look on the “space
station” as the logical next step that would at once
exploit the Apollo team and its achievements and still
respond to political pressure for a measured and prag-
matic space program .31
The public debate in the late 1960s on the future
of the space program introduced many of the con-
cepts about the “space station” that still surround this
proposal–some inherited from the Apollo experience,
others developed to address the criticisms of that pro-
gram. First, NASA sought, in conjunction with its plans
for a “space station,” to define an undertaking large
enough to focus the agency’s future activities, as Apol-
10 had focused them in the 1960s. Occasionally, it was
suggested that a manned Mars mission would provide
the ideal focus,32 but the “space station” could per-
~1 see, for example,  Webb’s testimony i n U.S. Congress, Senate Commit-
tee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, National Space Goals for  the Post-
Apol/o Period, Hearings, 89th Cong,,  1st sess., Aug. 23-25, 1965.
JzWebb for example,  stressed the importantance of focus in a letter  to
President Johnson, Feb. 16, 1965, published in U.S. Congress, Senate Com-
mittee  on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal
Year )966,  op. cit., p,  1028,
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form the same function, even while providing a logical
step toward Mars. The “space station” had the added
advantage of seeming more practical and Earth-
oriented. Second, NASA stressed the flexibility of the
“space station” concept and a station’s ability to per-
form a variety of functions ranging from Earth-oriented
applications and scientific research to staging plat-
forms for manned missions to the planets. George E.
Mueller, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Manned
Flight, emphasized the economic benefits of “space
stations” i n such areas as applications, weather, com-
munications, research, and national security. 33
NASA advocacy of “space stations” also argued that
the country should see that the Apollo team and hard-
ware were held together and exploited, should main-
tain manned spaceflight in addition to unmanned mis-
sions, and should sustain the Nation’s preeminence
in space in flight operations, science, and technology
lest the Soviets win the long-term space race by de-
fault. 34 Occasionally, NASA invoked national security
as a rationale for the “space station, ” but in the 1960s,
at least, this brought the agency into apparent con-
flict with the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory,
a conflict Webb tried to avoid, at least in public. 35
The theme that NASA employed most relentlessly
was that the “space station” was the logical next step
in the development of America’s capability in space.
George Mueller was especially emphatic. Speaking of
practical applications, he testified:
The major steps that are involved . . . are, first of
all, the development of an orbital “space station, ” and
along with that is a need for a logistics system to pro-
vide support for an orbital “space station. ” That com-
bination then leads to the development of what might
be called an application center, and if you will, that
is probably going to turn out to be a relatively large
orbital station which will have in it the sensors that
are required .36
Continuing this hypothetical progression of Earth-
oriented, practical “space stations, ” Mueller added
that,
. . . having utilized this orbital station for a number
of years, there is another major step forward in going
to a research complex which might be the large or-
biting research laboratory and coming from that re-
search complex, then, would come the second gen-
eration of application centers, and here they would
JJM~eller’s  testimony IS in U.S Congress, Senate COminlttee  on Aeronau-
tical and Space Sciences, National Space Goals for the Post-Apollo Per/od,
Op Clt , p. 103
MU s congress, senate Corn mlttee  on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Ndtlonil Spdcc  God/s for the Post-Apollo Pe[@d,  op. Cit., p, 338,
)~webb  told congress  the h40L  ‘‘represents an added nationa I space ca -
pa bill(y rather than a competitive  one. ” Ibid , p, 341.  See also the testimony
ot  Harold Brown, Director of  Defense Research and Englneerlng,  esp p. 336
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be more specialized and there would be more of
them.
This envisaged a time well into the future where
man is really operating on a continuing basis in
space . . . . Mueller also proposed that:
we can go in the direction of exploiting our
Iunar capability as it developed in the basic Apollo
program and will be developed further if the Apollo
Applications Program is carried out. Or we can go in
the direction of increased emphasis on Earth orbit ap-
plications . . . . We can go from Apollo applications
through the development of an orbital “space sta-
tion, ” and then on to the near planet flyby systems
and follow a logical path which then goes to planetary
exploration.
For all the purposes a “space station” might serve,
from the purely practical to the widely visionary, it
was always cast in this period as the logical next step
in developing space capability. NASA instituted an
Apollo Applications Program, but this was an interim
move towards what the agency really sought: a ma-
jor political commitment to make the next step an-
other large one.
In 1967 and 1968 this campaign suffered major re-
versals which had permanent impact on the course
of events. The Apollo 204 fire in January 1967, which
killed three astronauts during preflight testing at Cape
Kennedy, set the Apollo landing back a number of
months, and cast the first serious doubt on NASA’s
ability to meet its Apollo goal. The accident also
focused congressional attention on NASA and con-
sumed some of the agency’s political credit on the
Hill. Perhaps more damaging in the long run was the
resignation of James Webb in the closing weeks of the
1968 presidential election campaign. Leaving the
agency without the major commitment to a post-Apol-
10 program he had sought, Webb took with him an
irreplaceable sense of political pragmatism that the
agency would sorely miss.
As the first successful lunar landing mission ap-
proached, in the fall of 1968 NASA requested $60 mil-
lion to initiate a “space station” effort. This request
was denied. NASA approached the beginning of 1969
in some disarray:
• James Webb had resigned in the Fall of 1968, and
the Acting Administrator, Thomas Paine, was new
to the agency.
l Richard Nixon had been elected President, and
his position on space policy was far from clear.
l NASA had settled on the “space station” as its
post-Apollo program objective, but to date had
had no success in getting Presidential or congres-
sional support for such an initiative.
NASA took bold action in the early months of 1969
to attempt to change this situation.
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Post-Apollo Planning Under
Thomas Paine
A research engineer before joining NASA as Dep-
uty Administrator in January 1968, Thomas O. Paine
became Acting Administrator following Webb’s resig-
nation in October. Nominated NASA Administrator
by President Nixon in March 1969, Paine was con-
firmed by the Senate the same month, beginning the
shortest term—less than 20 months—of any NASA
head.
Paine was a swashbuckler,37 an out-and-out space
enthusiast, critical of the caution and circumspection
of his predecessor and determined to inaugurate the
second decade of space with a major, national, Apol-
lo-like commitment. As he wrote to the President’s
science advisor after being confirmed as NASA Ad-
ministrator:
We have been frustrated too long by a negativism
that says hold back, be cautious, take no risks, do less
than you are capable of doing. I submit that no per-
ceptive student of the history of social progress doubts
that we will establish a large laboratory in Earth or-
bit, that we will provide a practical system for the fre-
quent transfer of men and supplies to and from such
a laboratory, that we will continue to send men to
the Moon, and that eventually we will send men to
the planets. If this is true, now is the time to say
so . . . .We in NASA are fully conscious of practical
limitations . . . .In the light of these considerations,
we can be sensible and moderate about our requests
for resources—but we must know where we are
going. 38
Initial Proposals
This philosophy led Paine, at the start of the Nixon
administration, to take steps unusually bold for an act-
ing agency head. In February 1969, Paine appealed
directly to the President in support of the manned
space flight program. He argued that “positive and
timely action must be taken by your Administration
now to prevent the Nation’s programs in manned
space flight from slowing to a halt in 1972” and sug-
gested that:
the nation should . . . focus our manned space
flight” program for the next decade on the develop-
ment and operation of a permanent “space sta-
tion”-a National Research Center in Earth orbit—
accessible at reasonable cost to experts in many dis-
ciplines who can conduct investigations and opera
J7Homer  Newe[ [, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years Of space science
NASA SP-421 1 (Washington, DC: National  Aeronautics and Space Adminls-
tratlon,  1980), p.  288.
‘Quoted  {n Levine, op. cit., pp.  258-259.
tions in space which cannot be effectively carried out
on Earth.
Paine told the President that he had “a unique op-
portunity for leadership that will clearly identify your
administration with the establishment of the Nation’s
major goals in space flight for the next decade” and
that “the case that a ‘space station’ should be a ma-
jor future U.S. goal is now strong enough to justify at
least a general statement on your part that this will
be one of our goals.”39
Paine asked for a March 31 presidential decision on
future manned space flight issues. He did this even
though he knew that, on February 13, the President
had established an ad hoc blue-ribbon Space Task
Group (STG) and had asked that group for “definitive
recommendations on the direction which the U.S.
space program should take in the post-Apollo period,”
with a September 1 reporting date.40 By asking the
President to decide on the future of manned space
flight in advance of the planning process which was
being established for precisely that purpose, Paine was
trying to use the success of the Apollo 8 circumlunar
mission and the desire on the part of any new admin-
istration to take some early and popular initiatives as
counters to a process which he was not sure would
be favorable to NASA.
In preparing for Space Task Group consideration of
the Paine initiative, the positions of the various par-
ticipants on a large “space station, ” and the factors
influencing their positions, became evident.
The BOB objective was to “head off any play by
NASA to get a budget amendment now” since “this
is bad budget strategy, probably unworkable as far as
Congress was concerned, and impossible to obtain
without committing the President to support the long-
range objectives. ”41
The President’s Science Adviser, Lee DuBridge,
asked the Space Science and Technology Panel42 to
assist him in evaluating the Paine initiative. The Panel
met with NASA officials, and advised Dr. DuBridge
that there was “no great urgency” related to the issues
Paine had raised and, “from a programmatic stand-
point, the arguments in favor of early action appear
very weak. ”43
JgMemorandum  from Thomas Paine to the President, ‘‘Problems and Op-
portunities  in Manned Space Flight,” Feb. 26, 1969.
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The “space station” did gain some support from the
Department of State, which saw:
. . . a close relationship between our space program
and foreign policy objectives. Thus, an ongoing, chal-
lenging and successful space program is important
from the viewpoint of these objectives–particularly
one designed and funded to afford increasing oppor-
tunities for international cooperation.
The State Department believed that there were “great-
er international values i n a “space station” and reusa-
ble logistics vehicle than in . . . lunar exploration, ”
and that:
our choices should not be unduly influenced
by our estimate of Soviet choices, nor do we need
to prejudice deliberate consideration of our space
goals in order to preempt Soviet activities. Our capa-
bility is now well understood both by the Soviets and
by most other countries. Foreign countries will focus
less on the competition between ourselves and the
Soviets than on the relevance of space activities to
their own interests and needs.44
The Department of Defense (DOD) position was
that DOD “does not have or anticipate projects which
require a “space station” as defined by NASA. DOD
has great interest in the development of a lower cost
transportation system suitable for their uses as well as
for NASA’ S.”45
The report of the STG staff directors was a rejection
of that part of the Paine initiative which asked for early
“space station” commitment:
The majority of the Committee members . . . did
not support the request for additional FY70 funding
to enable more rapid progress toward the launch of
a “space station” in the mid-1970s. This view does
not represent an unfavorable judgment on the ques-
tion of adopting the “space station” as a major new
goal of our space program, but rather results from a
desire not to imply prejudgment of the eventual re-
suIt of the STG review. The case for urgency was un-
convincing, and it appears that no important options
would be foreclosed by deferring action .46
This attempt by NASA to get early commitment to
a “space station” has been reviewed in some detail
because its resolution foreshadowed much of what
happened in the following 1 ½ years as NASA strug-
gled to gain support for a “space station” develop-
ment as its major post-Apollo program objective,
Throughout the STG review and the White House
consideration of the STG report, NASA argued that
the “space station, ” and not the space shuttle con-
cept, which was evolving from its origin solely as the
“R F Packard, “Department of State observations, ” draft, Mar. 13, 1969,
45MI Iton  Rosen  (NASA staffer for STG), ‘‘Memorandum for the Record, ”
Mar 13, 1969 (N HOA).
46, Report O( the space Task Group Staff DI rector’s Committee on NASA’S
Request for Amendments to the NASA fiscal  year 1970 Budget,” Mar. 14,
1969, p 4
station’s logistic vehicle, should be the Agency’s top-
priority program, In the summer of 1969, NASA let
two Phase B study contracts for “space station” de-
sign, and in its 1970 congressional testimony the sta-
tion was presented as the centerpiece of the agency’s
programs,
Throughout 1970, NASA continued technical stud-
ies and user-oriented activities to promote the station
concept. However, by the middle of that year, it was
clear that in the eyes of the space subgovernment out-
side of NASA, the shuttle program was a more attrac-
tive investment than was the station, and by the end
of the year, the station had been dropped back to con-
ceptual study status. NASA had built up a great deal
of momentum behind the “space station” concept
through the 1960s, but when it came time for the
country to decide, through the policymaking process,
whether the station was a “good buy, ” the response
was negative. The reasons for this negative assessment
were already clear for NASA to see by March 1969,
but it took over a year for NASA’s leadership to rec-
ognize the situation and to steer the Agency away
from the station and behind the shuttle.
Detailed Station Planning
After conducting preliminary Phase A studies, pri-
marily in-house, during 1967 and 1968, NASA was
prepared in early 1969 to involve the aerospace in-
dustry in defining the program through two Phase B
studies. NASA’s hopes were that these program defi-
nition studies would provide the technical basis for
a start on “space station” development within a year
or two. These studies were initiated in September
1969, and extended over most of the next 2 years. But
events at the policy level made it increasingly unlikely
that the “space station” program would ever proceed
beyond the Phase B stage, at least in the 1970s.
The handwriting was already on the wall by the time
the “Paine initiative” was rejected in March 1969, but
during the rest of 1969 and 1970 it became much
clearer. Finally, NASA could no longer avoid reality,
and by late 1970 the space Shuttle, not the station,
was identified as the agency’s top priority. Just as the
Apollo Applications Program had been a “better buy”
for the country in the mid-1960s, so the Shuttle was
perceived by policy makers in the early 1970s, But the
failure of the “space station” program to gain approval
was not because of a lack of effort; the Phase B study
process was the focus for that effort.
DEFINING THE PREFERRED CONCEPT
AND ITS RATIONALE
One problem, perhaps the key one, was that NASA
found it quite difficult to tell both prospective contrac-
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tors and the political leadership what kind of station,
for what purposes, it wanted to develop. This was so
even though NASA had been studying “space station”
concepts throughout the 1960s. The basic require-
ments which had emerged from the study effort were:
1.
2.
3.
qualification of people and systems for long-dur-
ation Earth orbit flight;
demonstration of man’s ability and functional
usefulness in performing engineering and scien-
tific experiments; and,
periodic rotation of the crews and resupply of the
“space station. ”
The average crew size for this station was planned to
be six to nine persons, with a 2-year orbital lifetime
design goal.47 An Apollo command and service mod-
ule launched by a Saturn 1B booster was to be the lo-
gistics vehicle for the station; the station itself was to
be launched on a Saturn V booster.
When Thomas Paine was exposed in January 1969
to this staff thinking, he found it too modest. His cen-
ter directors agreed. For example, Wernher von Braun
told Paine that:
NASA should now tell the contractors what we want
in the long run, what we foresee as the ultimate—the
long range–the dream–station program. NASA
should spell out the sciences, technology, applica-
tions, missions and research desired. Then NASA
should define a 1975 station as a core facility in orbit
from which the ultimate “space campus” or “space
base” can grow in an efficient orderly evolution
through 1985.
MSC Director Robert Gilruth told Paine:
We should now be looking at a step more compara-
ble in challenge to that of Apollo after Mercury. The
“space station” size should be modular and based
on our Saturn V lift capability into 200-mile orbit.
Three launches would give us one million pounds in
orbit, including spent stages. That is the number we
should be planning for the core size.48
Out of this lack of consensus within NASA came a
rapid change from the January concept of a “space
station.” In February, Aviation Week reported that “all
previous concepts have been retired from active com-
petition in favor of a large station,” with the focus on
“a 100-man Earth-orbiting station with a multiplicity
of capabilities” and the “launch of the first module
of the large “space station, ” with perhaps as many
as 12 men, by 1975. ” Top NASA officials were re-
ported to have rejected earlier “space station” plans
as “too conservative. ”49
4%Vllllam  Normyle,  “Alternatives Open on Post-Apollo, ” Awatiorr  Week
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NASA issued a Statement of Work for the Phase B
Space Station Program Definition on April 19. Prospec-
tive contractors were ready; they had been following
the rapidly expanding character of the program closely
and were “already forming teams in anticipation” of
the Phase B competition. so
The Work Statement described the “space station”
as “a centralized and general purpose laboratory in
Earth orbit for the conduct and support of scientific
and technological experiments, for beneficial applica-
tions, and for the further development of space ex-
ploration capability” and noted that the work re-
quested would include “the Space Base but will focus
on the mid-l970s Space Station as the initial but evolu-
tionary step toward the Space Base. ” The objectives
of the “space station” program were stated as:
l
l
l
l
l
l
Conduct beneficial space applications programs,
scientific investigation and technological engi-
neering experiments.
Demonstrate the practicality of establishing, oper-
ating, and maintaining long-duration manned or-
bital stations.
Utilize Earth-orbital manned flights for test and
development of equipment and operational tech-
niques applicable to lunar and planetary ex-
ploration.
Extend technology and develop space systems
and subsystems required to increase useful life by
at least several orders of magnitude.
Develop new operational techniques and equip-
ment which can demonstrate substantial reduc-
tions in unit operating costs.
Extend the present knowledge of the long-term
biomedical and behavioral characteristics of man
in space.
The initial “space station” was to have a crew of
12, and would normally operate in a zero gravity
mode, but during the early weeks of its operation there
would be an assessment of the effects of artificial grav-
ity; a counterweight would be tethered to the station
and the configuration spun to provide the gravitational
effect, The station was to be 33 ft in diameter and was
normally to operate in a 270-nautical mile, 55° orbit,
but also be capable of operating in polar and slightly
retrograde orbits, 51
Shortly after the original proposals in response to
the statement of work were received by NASA, a new
requirement was added to the Phase B effort. Not only
was the “space station” to be designed so that it could
be the core around which a space base could be de-
50Wllllam Normyle,  “Large StatIon May Emerge as ‘Unwritten’ U.S. Goal,”
Aviat/on Week and Space Technology, Mar, 10, 1969, p. 104.
51 NASA  , ,Statement  of Work,  Space station Program Definition (Phase B), ”
Apr. 14, 1969,
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veloped; the station module would also be the core
of a spacecraft designed for a manned trip to Mars.
This requirement came out of the policy debates de-
scribed in the section in this report, “NASA’s Post-
Apollo Ambitions Dashed,” and was a reflection of
the high hopes for all of NASA’s future manned pro-
grams which were pervasive in the immediate after-
math of the first lunar landing.
PHASE B STUDIES
Three aerospace firms, North American Rockwell,
McDonnell Douglas, and Grumman Aircraft, sub-
mitted proposals to NASA in response to the Phase
B Statement of Work, and on July 22, 1969, NASA
awarded Phase B contracts of $2.9 million each to
North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas.
The studies were to run for 11 months beginning in
September; MSC would manage the North American
Rockwell effort, and MSFC, the McDonnell Douglas
study.
A continuing problem during the course of the
Phase B studies was the difficulty of integrating sta-
tion design and the candidate experiments for the sta-
tion. These studies were compiled into a thick docu-
ment known universally as the “Blue Book. ” One
participant in the study later noted that “the candi-
date experiments compiled in the NASA Blue Book
are too costly to be considered as a whole, are some-
what duplicated . . . , have not been verified as the
true experiment goals . . , .“52
The Phase B studies were extended for 6 months
on June 30, 1970; by this time, the planning date for
the first station launch had slipped to 1977. The cost
of the program was now estimated at $8 billion to $15
billion, including both development costs and 10 years
of on-orbit operations; this estimate did not include
the cost of a space Shuttle program. It was reported
that “an overriding desire on the part of the United
States to internationalize the 12-man “space station”
. . . has eliminated any possibility of Department of
Defense participation in the program.”53
In addition to the technical design activities, NASA
was undertaking a Phase B effort to define experiment
modules to be added to the core station and planning
a year-long study to involve potential users, both do-
mestic and international, in the program as it was de-
veloping. A user’s symposium to kick off this effort was
scheduled for September 1970, and both study con-
tractors were building full-scale mockups of the 33-ft
“Jack  C. Heberllg,  “The Management Approach to the NASA Space Sta-
tion Deflnltlon  Studies of the Manned Spacecraft Center, ” NASA Technical
Memorandum X-58090, June 1972, p. 30,
$~space  Business Dady, July 27, 1970.
station. However, beneath this growing momentum
was an uncertain base of political support.
On July 29, 1970, Charles Mathews, NASA’s Dep-
uty Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight,
ordered MSC and MSFC to terminate the continuing
Phase B activity and to redefine the effort in a funda-
mental way. On the basis of congressional action,
NASA leadership had become convinced that the Sat-
urn V program, which had been in terminal condi-
tion for almost 2 years, was finally dead, i.e., there
would be no booster capable of launching a 33-ft sta-
tion. The only launch vehicle available for use in put-
ting the “space station “ into orbit would now be the
space Shuttle, with its planned 15-ft by 60-ft payload
bay. What had started out as the supply vehicle for
the station was to be its key to survival.
It took some doing to skew the study effort toward
components with diameters able to fit into the Shut-
tle payload bay; one study contractor commented that
“people who were eager to fly in a 33-ft station found
the prospect of long stays in the 14-ft station not very
attractive. ” But NASA did issue Phase B extension
contracts for a modular “space station” study effort
to extend through most of 1971, and North Ameri-
can Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas went to work
on the new concept.
By the time the studies were begun, however, the
likelihood that they would lead to an early commit-
ment to station development was already vanishingly
small. NASA had suffered a number of defeats in late
1969 and through 1970 in its attempts to get an am-
bitious post-Apollo program approved, and by the
summer of 1970 it was becoming quite clear to NASA
leaders that only one big program had any chance of
presidential and congressional approval, and that it
was not the “space station” program. From its start
as the “advanced logistics system” for the station and
space base, the space Shuttle had garnered the inter-
est of the Air Force and many within NASA, and in
the summer of 1970 the agency leadership grudgingly
decided to make the Shuttle its top-priority program.
Thomas Paine had announced his resignation in mid-
1970, and the station thus lost a supporter at the top;
this may have made the shift to the Shuttle easier.
Station studies continued through 1970, 1971, and
1972, with the final in-house studies focused on a
single research applications module (RAM) to be car-
ried into orbit by a Shuttle.54 This was all that remained
of what, only a few years earlier, had been plans for
truly large facilities in Earth orbit. As a final indication
of this reality, on November 29, 1972, the Space Sta-
~qThls  u Itlmately  became the basis for the Spacelab  developed by the Euro-
pean Space Agency,
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tion Task Force was abolished, then immediately rein-
carnated as the Sortie Lab Task Force. NASA was able
to gain approval for Shuttle development in early
1972, and that task occupied the agency’s energies
throughout the decade. Until the Shuttle was ready,
the dream of permanent human facilities in space
would have to wait. However, preserving a large pay-
load bay as an essential element of the Shuttle, NASA
was able to maintain the possibility of returning to the
station concept, thereby keeping its dream alive.
NASA’s Post-Apollo Ambitions
Dashed55
While the “space station” Phase B effort was pro-
ceeding apace at the technical planning level, at the
policy level NASA from 1969 through the end of 1971
was trying to get White House (particularly) and con-
gressional support for an increasingly less ambitious
post-Apollo program. The initial forum for this attempt
was the Space Task Group. After its early rejection of
NASA’s “space station “ initiative, the STG turned to
the task of preparing recommendations on future
space policy and programs for President Nixon.
The image of the Apollo commitment as a model
for future space goals colored STG discussions from
the start. At an early STG meeting, NASA’s Adminis-
trator, Thomas Paine, argued the need for a “new ban-
ner to be hoisted” around which competent and mot-
ivated engineers, scientists, and managers could rally,
as they had around the Apollo goal. Vice President
Agnew, reacting to Paine’s point, raised for the first
time in the STG context the question which would in-
fluence much of the group’s debates: Where was the
Apollo of the 1970s? Could it be, asked Agnew, that
the United States should undertake a manned mission
to Mars?
When Agnew first read the staff proposals for STG
consideration, he reportedly was disappointed be-
cause none contained the strong and dramatic theme
he thought was required for the national space effort.
On July 16, 1969, as he joined thousands at Kennedy
Space Center to watch the liftoff of the Apollo 11 mis-
sion, Agnew “went public. ” In interviews at the
launch site Agnew said that it was his “individual feel-
ing that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, op-
timistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end
of this century. ” After liftoff, Agnew told the launch
team that he “bit the bullet . . . today as far as Mars
is concerned. ”
Agnew’s statement at Cape Kennedy was not a
spontaneous reaction to the excitement of the occa-
55Th is account is acJapted  from John M. Logsdon, ‘‘The Policy  Process and
Large-Scale Space Efforts,” Space Humanization Series, vol. 1, 1979, pp.
65-80.
sion; it had been planned in advance. It reflected
Agnew’s willingness to lend support to an ambitious
and bold space program, if only NASA would propose
it. This willingness matched the predispositions of
NASA administrator, Paine, himself disappointed at the
lack of excitement and purpose he was getting from the
organization’s planning machinery. Spurred on by
Agnew’s private and public support, Paine decided
that NASA should also “bite the bullet” and move ag-
gressively to identify an early manned Mars mission
as the central focus for its future plans. In order to do
this, he ordered NASA planners explicitly to incor-
porate a manned Mars mission during the 1980s into
NASA’s overall plans. This was the source of the early
modification to the Phase B study requirements de-
scribed previously.
There were several reasons for switching to the Mars
emphasis as a central theme in NASA planning. Per-
haps most influential was the early STG rejection of
a “space station” commitment based on the “logical
next step rationale. ” By justifying a “space station”
as a necessary precursor to manned Mars missions i n
the 1980s, NASA hoped to provide a convincing ra-
tionale for the station’s urgency. Not only “space sta-
tions” but the newly proposed space Shuttle, the de-
velopment of nuclear rocket engines, and the
retention of the large Saturn V as a booster were re-
quired if an early manned Mars landing were to be
approved as a national goal.
Between March and August 1969, as the Apollo pro-
gram and other ongoing NASA missions achieved
spectacular successes and public interest in space was
at a peak, as the Vice President continued to ask for
an “Apollo for the seventies, ” as NASA’s manned
flight organization coalesced behind an aggressive
plan of new activities for the next decade, Paine
became more and more bullish about the need for
bold new initiatives as a way of keeping the Nation’s
civilian space program vigorous and his agency’s
momentum large. As Apollo came to an end, NASA
plans had gotten increasingly ambitious.
Now, by asking for “commitment in principle” to
the most ambitious plan his advisers had conceived,
Paine presented a challenge to the other STG mem-
bers and to others interested in the future of the space
program. He told the Nation that NASA was ready to
begin a program that would send people to Mars at
the earliest feasible time, and he asked the Nation’s
leadership whether they were willing to support such
a bold enterprise. The answer was not long in com-
ing, and it was a resounding “No.”
The results of NASA’s attempt to mobilize support
behind the Mars objective, were, from the agency’s
perspective, little short of disastrous. What NASA dis-
covered was just how limited the support for major
new space initiatives was. The final STG report, sub-
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mitted to the President i n mid-September, did suggest
that “the United States accept the long range option
or  goa l  o f  manned p lanetary  exp lora t ion wi th  a
manned Mars mission before the end of this century
as the first target. ” This goal, said the report, would
act as “a shaping function for the post-Apollo p r o -
gram. ” Beyond its general statements, the report rec-
ommended no commitment to any particuIar program
option or even any specific project on a particular
timetable.
Even this “muted Martian manifesto” had no stand-
ing with the White House. Although the STG finished
its work with its submission to the President, more
then 6 months passed before Nixon made any formal
reaction to the Group’s recommendation, and that re-
action was noncommittal. In the interim the processes
of public policymaking operated on the space pro-
gram to shape it to the short- and longer-term require-
ments of what the White House perceived as the
budgetary and political interests of the Nation. When
NASA tried to use the STG report as the basis for justi-
fying its 1971 budget request, it found that the report’s
recommendations carried little weight either in the Bu-
reau of the Budget or, particularly, the White House.
While the President personally apparently remained
a space buff, his advisers were quite skeptical of the
political payoffs from major new activities in space;
their reading of public opinion was that American
society had little interest in future space spectaculars.
This skepticism, combined with stringent budgetary
constraints, resulted in a budget for NASA in fiscal
1971 that was far below NASA’s most pessimistic ex-
pectations. NASA, still not reconciled to the notion
that space had little political support, “fought a retreat-
ing action through the entire budget process, ” being
“beaten back but fighting lustily at every turn of the
road, ” according to Administrator Paine.
It was in this context that, during the first half of
1970, it became clear to NASA leadership that N A S A
would not get approval to develop simultaneously
both a “space station” and the space Shuttle. In a
March 1970 statement, President Nixon provided only
a very guarded endorsement of future space activi-
ties, and what priority was granted he gave to the
space Shuttle. During the 1970 debate over NASA’s
budget, Congress expressed a high degree of skepti-
cism about ambitious new goals in space. The linkages
among the Shuttle program, development of a “space
stat ion,” and a manned Mars expedition came under
particular attack, and threatening but unsuccessful at-
tempts to delete funds for station and Shuttle studies
were made in both the House and the Senate.
As the preceding section described, at the techni-
cal level NASA was still acting in mid-1970 as if “space
station” approval were possible. However, NASA’s
policy leadership grudgingly read the handwriting
(which was in capital letters) on the wall, and in put-
ting together the next agency budget request in Sep-
tember 1970 decided to make the Shuttle the top-pri-
ority NASA program for the 1970s and to give up
attempts to gain approval to develop a “space station”
until after the Shuttle program was well under way.
It took another 1 ½ years of conflict-filled negotiations
with the White House and Congress before NASA was
able to gain their endorsements of the space Shuttle
in 1972.
Using the budget process, the political leadership
of the country had applied its concept of national in-
terest and national priorities to the space program;
through that process, the technological aspirations of
NASA were put under firm though perhaps too short-
term political control. What happened to NASA’s
“space station” plans is best viewed, not in terms of
NASA “winning” or “losing,” but in terms of what
happens when an agency’s aspirations are significantly
at variance with what political leaders judge to be both
in the long-term interests of the Nation and politically
feasible. This experience might be quite relevant to
current attempts by NASA to gain support for the kind
of “space station” program that it desires.
Skylab: An Interim “Space Station”56
The only remainder of the Apollo Applications Pro-
gram, begun with high hopes in 1966, Skylab was a
S-IVB third stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle, out-
fitted as a workshop to be visited by three successive
crews after being launched into low Earth orbit. The
mission could hardly have gotten off to a worse start.
During launch of the Skylab workshop in May 1973,
the meteor/thermal control shade tore loose from the
spacecraft and seriously damaged a solar cell panel
needed to produce power on the vehicle. The first
crew to visit Skylab managed to jury-rig a parasol to
replace the shade and to salvage the one solar panel
that was not lost in launch. This proved enough to save
the mission and to allow virtually the full run of ex-
periments that had been planned for the three crews
that visited the laboratory in 1973 and 1974, turning
potential disaster into another virtuoso display of
NASA resourcefulness and skill.
Skylab provided grist for everyone’s mill. “Space sta-
tion” advocates praised the demonstration of man’s
long-term survivability in space–84 days for the third
~~F~r a tull account of the Skylab project, see W. David Compton and
Charles D Benson, LI\ Ing  and Work/rig In Space. the H/story  of Space/ab
NASA SP-4208 (Washington, DC National Aeronautics and Space Admlnls-
tratlon,  1983).
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crew—and the rich variety of scientific and applica-
tions tasks of which he had proved himself capable–
ranging from Earth observation and photography to
manning the solar telescope, conducting physiological
experiments, and even carrying on space processing.
Especially did they fasten on the role of human be-
ings as the flexible, opportunistic component in the
“space station” that had saved the mission with emer-
gency repairs no machine could have made. Without
people, claimed the advocates, Skylab would have
failed. 57
Without people, claimed the critics, Skylab would
not have been necessary. Many who questioned the
wisdom of manned space flight, especially scientists,
even while they conceded the impressiveness of the
Apollo achievement and appreciated how their own
programs had ridden on its coattails, came to won-
der if the whole undertaking involving people was
worth the candle. With money drying up and many
scientific missions promised for the final flights of
Apollo being canceled with those flights, the relative
economy and efficiency of unmanned, automated
missions looked more attractive in contrast. 58
Whatever the eventual evaluation of Skylab, it was
interpreted by NASA’s manned space flight managers
as legitimizing renewed study of the “space station”
concept. Those studies, carried out during the 1974-
80 period, have laid the base for current discussions
of whether it is finally time to move ahead with the
acquisition of in-space infrastructure, of what charac-
ter and magnitude, to be obtained by when, and to
be operated, used, and paid for by whom.
Recent In-Space Infrastructure
(i.e. “Space Station”) Studies
In addition to the impetus to reexamine the “space
station” concept which came from the success of the
Skylab project, other influences in the same direction
included the need to begin to identify potential “post-
Shuttle” programs and new requirements for using
men and women in space operations emerging from
a number of study efforts being carried out by NASA
in the 1974-75 time frame.
In order to build a plausible rationale for once again
proposing a “space station” as an element of NASA’s
program, it would be necessary to identify some high-
priority activities which could not be accomplished
using the space Shuttle, with its 7 to 20 day orbital
staytime, its Spacelab facility for manned experimental
Szsee,  for example, John H. Disher, “Next Steps in Space Transportation,
Astronaut/es and Aeronautics, January 1978, p. 26,
JBNewell, op. cit., pp.  290-295.
activities, and its significant capability for lifting large
and/or heavy cargoes to low Earth orbit (LEO). Studies
which established requirements for large structures in
both LEO and geosynchronous orbit–structures
which could only be constructed in space—seemed
to provide the needed rationale, and space construc-
tion became a major theme in space infrastructure
studies during the 1975-80 period.
The first NASA foray into a new station study effort
was a 1975 study of a “Manned orbital Systems Con-
cept” (MOSC) carried out by McDonnell Douglas As-
tronautics under the technical direction of the Mar-
shall Space Flight Center. This study “examined the
requirements for . . . a cost-effective orbital facility
concept capable of supporting extended manned
operations in Earth orbit beyond those visualized for
the 7-to 30-day Shuttle/Spacelab system.” Study guide-
lines included use of available hardware developed
for the Skylab, Spacelab, and Shuttle programs, “in-
sofar as practical, ” and an initial operational capabil-
ity (IOC) in late 1984.
The context for the MOSC study included a grow-
ing concern about the Earth’s resource limitations,
population growth, and environmental stresses, driven
by the widely publicized “limits to growth” debate
of the early 1970s. The study noted that “the plan-
ning and development of future space programs can-
not be done in isolation from the many critical prob-
lems facing the peoples of the world during the
coming decades” and that “there will continue to be
many conflicting and competing demands for re-
sources in the years ahead.” This context skewed the
emphasis in establishing activities to be conducted
with the support of in-space infrastructure to “the re-
search and applications areas that are directly related
to current world needs. ”
Though oriented more directly than past station con-
cepts to high-priority global problems, the MOSC
study still emphasized the “science and applications
research facility” rationale; although such activities as
assembly of large structures and operating space man-
ufacturing facilities were examined during the study,
the emphasis was on a facility which would “enable
the scientific community to pursue programs directly
related to the improvement of life on Earth.” The final
MOSC configuration called for a four-man modular-
ized facility; the manned module would be based on
the Spacelab design, and Spacelab pallets would also
be used to support unpressurized payloads. Total pro-
gram costs for development and operation of the ini-
tial MOSC facility were estimated to be $1.2 billion.59
SgMcDonnell  Douglas Astronautics, Manned Orbita/ ~YskmJ ConcePts
Study, Book l-Executive Summary, Sept. 30, 1975, pp. iii, 1-2, 30, 36.
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Rather than attempt to gain approval to take the
MOSC effort to a Phase B stage, in the Fall of 1975
NASA decided to conduct further studies in which the
emphasis was shifted from research in orbit to space
construction. In explaining its study plans, NASA
noted:
Earlier “space station” studies emphasized the
“Laboratory in Orbit” concept. Emphasis is now be-
ing placed on a Space Station as an “Operational
Base” which not only involves a laboratory but also
such uses as: (a) an assembly, maintenance, and lo-
gistics base for conducting manned operations involv-
ing antennas, mirrors, solar collectors, transmitters;
(b) for conducting launch and retrieval operations for
orbit-to-orbit and Earth-departure vehicles which may
require assembly or propellant transfer in orbit; (c)
for conducting retrieval, maintenance and redeploy-
ment operations for automated satellites; (d) for man-
aging clusters of spacecraft and space systems as a
central base for support for common services . . . .
Orbital location studies will emphasize the possi-
ble exploitation of geosynchronous orbit, as well as
low inclination and polar low Earth orbit . . . . Cur-
rent planning is directed toward a “space station”
new start in fiscal year 1979.60
There were a number of reasons for NASA’s switch
i n emphasis in “space station” justification. There was
no evidence that the scientific community was any
more supportive of a manned orbital laboratory con-
cept in 1975 than it had been in 1970; prior attempts
to justify a “space station” by its use as a space-based
R&D facility had not been successful. More positively,
the mid-70s saw a number of studies of the potentials
of space operations for addressing problems on Earth.
The most broadly conceived of these studies was
undertaken by a NASA study group which was asked
in 1974 by NASA Administrator James Fletcher (who
had become Administrator in April 1971) to provide
an Outlook for Space—”to identify and examine the
various possibilities for the civiI space program over
the next twenty-five years. ” The study group con-
cluded that:
. . . the great challenges facing the physical needs of
humanity are principally the results of the continu-
ing struggle to improve the quality of life. Particularly
critical is the need to improve food production and
distribution, to develop new energy sources, to meet
new challenges to the environment, and to predict
and deal with natural and manmade disasters. In each
of these areas, we found that significant contributions
can be made by a carefully developed space program.
The NASA report recognized that “future space pro-
grams must provide a service to the public.” In re-
sponding to the Outlook for Space report, James Flet-
‘>W S Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and  Space Sciences, N A S A
4u(horIzatIon  /or FY  1977, Hearings, p. 1046
cher set as a primary NASA goal, “accelerating the
development of economic and efficient space serv-
ices for society, ” such as “resources management,
environmental understanding, and commercial re-
turns from the unique contributions of space. ”61
The Outlook for Space report was not directly or
strongly supportive of the need for a “space station. ”
It did conclude, however, that:
Most of these activities might well be supported by
the Shuttle system, together with associate space lab-
oratories and free-flyers, There are more far-reaching
objectives, however, which will require human activ-
ities in space transcending those supportable by cur-
rent Shuttle flight plans, such as the construction of
satellite power stations or the establishment of a per-
manent lunar base. It is difficult at this time to assert
that either of these activities, or others like them—
space manufacturing, space colonies—will be under-
taken within the next 25 years. Nevertheless, as we
looked at the future of space, particularly at those
more creative programs directed toward major exploi-
tation of the opportunities which space provides, we
inevitably found man to be an integral part of the sys-
tem. If the United States is to be in a position to take
advantage of these potential benefits then it would
seem necessary that we develop the capability to
operate for extended periods of time. The space fa-
cility would be constantly available, although crews
would, of course, be periodically exchanged.
The creation of such a permanent space facility
seemed to us to be the most useful way to continue
the advancement of manned-flight technology. With
the Shuttle system giving us comparatively low-cost
access to space on the one hand, and the economies
which could be realized from the use of the perma-
nent space facility on the other hand, the construc-
tion of a permanent “space station” appears to be
the next logical step for the manned flight program—
not as an objective in itself, but rather for its techno-
logical support of a number of other objectives which
can benefit from our growing knowledge of how hu-
mans can work in space and to provide a foundation
for the future.62
Once again, NASA saw the justification for a “space
station” primarily as “the next logical step” in ex-
ploiting people’s ability to work in space.
In addition to the Outlook for Space study, in the
mid-1970s a number of even more visionary efforts
were identifying challenging future space goals. One
notion which received wide public attention, but had
a relatively modest influence on NASA’s internal plan-
ning activities, was the proposal by Princeton Professor
Gerard O’Neill that, primarily in response to the
Earth’s resource limitations, work begin on develop-
~1 outlook  {of sPaCe.  A synopsIs (Wash I ngton,  DC: National Aeronautics
and  Space Adm I n Istratton,  January 1976), pp. iv, v, 5-7
~~lbld,,  pp 55-56
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ing very large human habitats in space—space col-
onies. 63
A concept which was quite attractive to NASA’s
engineers was developed by Peter Glaser of Arthur
D. Little, Inc.; this was the proposal that large solar
arrays in geosynchronous orbit could provide a large
source of continuous energy on Earth. The solar power
satellite (SPS) idea was given a great deal of technical
attention by NASA during 1975 and 1976, until NASA
was forced by the Office of Management and Budget
to turn over lead responsibility for SPS to the Energy
Research and Development Administration (soon to
become part of the Department of Energy).
Developing an SPS would require extensive use of
on-orbit work crews in order to assemble and test very
large structures in space. Similar construction require-
ments were derived from less grand schemes involv-
ing large antennas in space for communications use
and scientific investigations.
By the end of 1975, NASA had developed an argu-
ment that space construction might be a major re-
quirement of its programs during the 1980s, and
wanted to explore the role of in-space infrastructure
utilizing work crews in carrying out these construc-
tion efforts. In December 1975, the agency issued a
request for proposals for a “Space Station Systems
Analysis Study” (SSSAS); the study effort was to be
focused around the use of a “space station” to “serve
a wide range of operational base and space labora-
tory activities, ” such as using the station “as a test fa-
cility and construction base to support manufactur-
ing, fabrication and assembly of various sizes of space
structures, ”64
One finding of the system analysis studies was that
scientific efforts could “go along for the ride” on
‘‘space stations” capable of supporting construction,
materials processing, and power generation objec-
tives. An aerospace publication reported that:
The space base concept is one whose time seems
to be coming rather quickly. Until recently, “space
stations” have been thought of mainly as . . . ‘the
traditional laboratory in the sky. ’ Some observers were
surprised when construction, materials processing and
power were given roughly equal status with sci-
ence . . . . Now, the balance has shifted further
to . . . space construction work as the ‘prime focus’
of the studies.65
When NASA began this study effort in late 1975,
its hope had been to use the Phase A study results as
6JGerard  K. 0’ Nelll, ‘‘The Colonization of  SpaCe, ’ phY51c5 Today,  Sep-
tember 1974,
b4NASA Press Release, “NASA Seeks Proposals for Space Station Studies, ”
Dec. 11, 1975.
‘
>
’’ Operational Base Concepts Gain In Space Station Studies, ” Aerospace
Dally,  Sept. 13, 1976, p.  54.
the basis for a Phase B “space station” “new start”
in fiscal 1979—i.e., sometime after October 1978.
However, NASA was unable to get the approval of
the Office of Management and Budget to proceed on
a schedule which would have made such a new start
possible. Recognizing that NASA was not going to be
able to start on a major “space station” effort anytime
soon, by the spring of 1977 NASA officials were sug-
gesting that “the (Shuttle) orbiter is a significant ‘space
station’ in itself, ” and were looking toward ways to
enhance Shuttle capability to perform many of the
missions that the SSSAS studies had assigned to a
“space station. ”66
Rather than being the year in which significant mo-
mentum behind a “space station” program was de-
veloped, 1978 turned out to be a year in which there
was essentially no “space station” activity per se. The
system analysis studies had identified, as important
steps in extending the capabilities of the space Shut-
tle, the development of an in-orbit power supply and
of Shuttle-tended unmanned orbital platforms for var-
ious science and applications payloads. Both Johnson
Space Center (JSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC) were studying orbital power supplies during
1978; the Johnson Space Center concept was called
a power extension platform, while Marshall Space
Flight Center was examining a 25-kW power platform.
Marshall also initiated studies of an unmanned
Science and Applications Space Platform (SASP), and
most of the MSFC study activities during the 1978-80
period were devoted to these two program concepts.
(During 1980 and 1981, MSFC contracted with
McDonnell Douglas to study an evolutionary program
through which an unmanned platform such as the one
defined in the SASP study could grow into a manned
platform, i.e., a “space station, ” perhaps along the
lines that McDonnell Douglas had earlier defined in
the 1975 Manned Orbital Systems Concept study.)
While Marshall’s emphasis was on an evolutionary
approach to space platforms, by early 1979 the leader-
ship of JSC had decided that the Center’s efforts should
refocus on a major “space station” effort. Aviation
Week reported JSC was “concerned about this lack
of continuing assessment for permanently manned
U.S. facilities” and was “mindful of the growing So-
viet capability in this area. 67’ Another factor influenc-
ing JSC thinking was “a need for a real goal to main-
tain the dedication of present participants in the space
program and the interest and enthusiasm of young
people in space technology in order to motivate their
pursuing engineering and science careers.”68
6bAvja(jon week  and Space Technology, Mar. 16, 1979,  P. 49.
b71bld.
MNASA,  Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Space @erations Center: A
Concept Analysis, Nov. 29, 1979, pp. 1-1, 1-2.
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Based on these considerations, during 1979 JSC con-
ducted an in-house study of a concept identified as
a Space Operations Center (SOC). This study was
based on two assumptions: “that the next 10 to 20
years will include requirements for large, complex
space systems” and “that geosynchronous orbit is
clearly a primary operational area in space in the com-
ing decades. ” If these assumptions were valid, JSC
argued, then “the space construction and servicing
of these future systems wiI I be more effective with a
permanent, manned operations center in space. ”
The primary objectives of the SOC were identified
as:
l
l
l
construction, checkout, and transfer to operation-
al orbit of large, complex space systems;
on-orbit assembly, launch, recovery, and servic-
ing of manned and unmanned spacecraft; and,
further development of the capability for perma-
nent manned operations in space wiith reduced
dependence on Earth for control and resupply.
The SOC study noted that this list of objectives:
. . . noticeably does not include onboard science and
applications objectives, although the free-flying sat-
ellites which would be serviced would include mostly
those of this genre. The primary implication of this
mission is that experiment and applications require-
ments will not be design drivers; the SOC will be “op-
timized” to support the operational functions of these
objectives. However, experiments or applications
which can tolerate the operational parameters of the
SOC can be operated onboard, or an entire dedicated
module could be attached to an available berthing
port.
The study developed a concept of a self-contained,
continuously occupied orbital facility built from sev-
eral Shuttle-launched modules. The initial SOC crew
would be 4 to 8 people. In addition to a core facility,
the full-capability SOC would require a construction
facility and flight support facility. The costs of this fully
capable SOC were estimated at $2,7 billion, with the
total facility in place 9 to 10 years after program ini-
tiation. b9
The Johnson Space Center briefed interested par-
ties on SOC at the end of November 1979, in anticipa-
tion of initiating a contractor study of the concept dur-
ing 1980. One account of this briefing suggested that
“the ‘space station’ may be ready for a comeback.”7°
The following year would see a new administration
take office and a new NASA Administrator appointed.
The concept of in-space infrastructure would be
looked at afresh.
l
W hj., pp 1.8, 1-13, 1- 1‘3, 1 ’24
7“Da\  Id Doollng, “Space StatIon May Be Ready for  a Comeback, ” HurIf~-
~ i//c TIrrw$, Dec 9, 1979, p 4
Conclusions
It should be evident that there is no obvious cutoff
point for an account of the development of the “space
station” concept. Today’s planning and proposals are
a continuation of an evolution which has roots in the
earliest years of this century and which has proceeded
i n sporadic bursts of intensity over the past quarter-
century. It is possible, however, to reflect on past ex-
perience in the context of the current situation. Such
reflection reveals two levels of concrete justification
which have been offered i n support of in-space infra-
structure—i. e., “space station, ” acquisition.
One set of justifications ties the need for a perma-
nent human presence in orbit to a particular image
of the future objectives of the civiIian space program.
According to this line of reasoning, a “space station”
can
1.
2.
3.
In
be seen as:
a necessary way station in preparing for people
exploring the solar system; or
an extremely valuable “national laboratory in or-
bit” for carrying out many of the research and
development activities related to a balanced and
diverse civilian space program with both scien-
tific and application objectives; or
a centralized operations base from which the
routine exploitation of, particularly the commer-
cial exploitation of, both LEO and geosynchro-
nous orbits can most effectively proceed.
all of these justifications, in-space infrastructure
is explicitly a means to achieving or faciIitating a par-
ticular set of space policy objectives, and a decision
to develop it would be tied to the more fundamental
decision that those objectives were of sufficient
priority to justify the investments required to achieve
them, including the necessary infrastructure itself. His-
torically, what has happened at past occasions for
decision on the course of the American space program
is that other goals than those which would have re-
quired a “space station” were given preference:
1.
2.
In 1961, President Kennedy sought a dramatic
space achievement in which the United States
could best the Soviet Union. The choice of a lu-
nar-landing objective and of the lunar-orbital ren-
dezvous approach to achieving it as the response
to Kennedy’s need meant bypassing the devel-
opment of Earth-orbital capabilities including
“space stations. ”
In 1969-71, President Nixon sought to reduce the
priority and budget allocation of the space pro-
gram after Apollo while still developing some
new technology, maintaining a manned space
flight element, and creating more balance among
various program objectives. Within the scope of
what he was wiIling to approve, there was insuf-
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ficient activity to justify developing a major or-
bital laboratory, and the space Shuttle was se-
lected as an alternative (and in NASA’s mind, an
interim) step until the level of space activity
would become high enough to require such a fa-
cility.
From the perspective of overall policy objectives,
then, the fact that a “space station” has been rejected
as a part of the space program in the past can be in-
terpreted primarily as a function of the particular stage
i n the program’s evolution at the time that its acquisi-
tion was proposed. Such rejections are best under-
stood as national leaders saying “not yet” or “not
under the current conditions, ” rather than an outright
“no.” The issue then becomes whether the overall
character and desired objectives of the Nation’s space
program for the rest of this century are now of a scope
to justify acquiring in-space infrastructure as a means
to achieve them.
Related to this point is an observation which springs
clearly from this historical record: that the concept
“space station” can be used to describe very different
hardware configurations and technical capabilities,
ranging from the von Braun toroidal concept of the
1950s, through the 50 to 100 person space base pro-
posed by NASA in 1969 and the “construction shack”
concept of the mid-197os, to recent proposals for a
small and evolutionary station based on an unmanned
platform. Historically, then, the term “space station”
is extremely elastic, and an informed evaluation of a
particular proposal must ask “what kind of ‘space sta-
tion, ’ for what purposes, at what cost?” In this sense,
the past history of the proposal is not particularly rele-
vant to the current situation.
At another level of justification, the need for a per-
manent human outpost in orbit has been consistently
seen by those with a broad perspective on future
space activities as a necessary step in development
of a capability to explore and exploit outer space, if
that exploration and exploitation is to be pursued ag-
gressively. Thomas Paine made this argument to
Richard Nixon in 1969:
We believe strongly that the justification for pro-
ceeding now with this major project as a national goal
does not, and should not be made to depend on the
specific contributions that can be foreseen today in
particular scientific fields like astronomy or high en-
ergy physics, in particular economic applications,
such as Earth resource surveys, or in specific defense
needs. Rather, the justification for the “space station”
is that it is clearly the next major evolutionary step
in man’s experimentation, conquest, and use of
space.71
Current NASA Administrator James Beggs has made
much the same point, saying that “a ‘space station’
is the logical next step in the history of our manned
space systems. It will build on the achievements of
the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle pro-
grams. ”72
This argument decouples station justification from
any particular set of missions and suggests that a
“space station “ is a valuable, logical, and/or neces-
sary step in developing the capability to pursue any
future objectives in space. The underlying assumption
is that the United States will want to pursue an active
space program and that a “space station” is required
to do so. This line of argument is frequently combined
with assertions of the need for leadership or preemi-
nence in space as a source of national pride and pres-
tige and as a counter to the military and/or economic
threats coming from other spacefaring nations.
This theme has consistently been put forth over the
past two decades by advocates of a “space station.”
In the past, it seems as if they were “ahead of the
curve’ ’—i.e.,., that in objective terms the U.S. space
program had not yet developed to a point where the
argument that a permanent manned outpost was in-
deed the logical next step in an aggressive space enter-
prise was plausible to those outside the space com-
munity.
The same argument is being put forth today; the
question is whether it is any more plausible in 1984,
as the U.S. space programs enters its second quarter-
century, than it has been previously. Given the capa-
bility for easy access to orbit provided by the space
Shuttle, it may be that having the ability to stay in or-
bit for extended periods for experiments or operations
is now in fact a “next logical step.” Or it may be that
the program has not yet evolved, and is not evolving
toward the kind of active future, in which the crea-
tion of permanent human presence in orbit is justified.
This historical review suggests that space advocates
will continue to press their vision of the way to go
about opening the space frontier and that a “space
station” will continue to be an integral part of that vi-
sion. It is up to others in leadership positions to decide
whether the vision of space held by those who are
the heirs of Tsiolkovsky, Oberth, von Braun, and many
others who have worked on the space program in this
country is one which the United States will now
embrace.
T\ Memorandum from Thomas  Paine to the President, Feb. 24, 1969.
72 James M. Beggs,  “Securing Our Leadership in Space,” Astronautics and
Aeronautics, September 1982,
Appendix C
INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A
CIVILIAN “SPACE STATION” PROGRAM*
Introduction
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,
as amended, includes the following passage: “The aer-
onautical and space activities of the United States shall
be conducted so as to contribute to . . . the follow-
ing [objective]: . . . Cooperation by the United States
with other nations and groups of nations in work done
pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application
of the results thereof . . . .’1 As a result of this provi-
sion, NASA has a long tradition of cooperation with
other countries in space activities.
In accordance with this tradition, there have been
extensive discussions over the past 2 years between
NASA and other friendly countries regarding a possi-
ble international in-space infrastructure acquisition
program. Then, in January of 1984, President Reagan
in his State of the Union Address called for a U.S.
“space station” with international participation. These
circumstances indicate the importance of a full con-
sideration of various international options for devel-
opment, acquisition, operation, and use of future long-
term, in-orbit infrastructure. The aim of this appen-
dix is to contribute to this consideration.
Why International Involvement?
THE MOTIVES FOR COOPERATION
Countries engage in international cooperation in sci-
entific and technical undertakings for a variety of
reasons. In order to assess the potential advantages
and disadvantages of international involvement by
another country in a U.S. “space station” program (or
even the advantages of fully internationalizing the pro-
gram) it is first of all necessary to understand the
reasons which lead nations to engage in international
technical cooperation in general. These motivations
can then be discussed as they apply to the specific
situation of space infrastructure development, opera-
tion, and/or use in order to provide a framework for
examining various degrees and forms of potential in-
ternational involvement, from no involvement at all
up to and including a space infrastructure enterprise
which is fully multinational from the start.
l Paper prepared for OTA by Hubert Bortzmeyer,  with revision by John
Logsdon.
I National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, As Amended, Section
102(b)(7).
There are both symbolic and utilitarian payoffs
which lead a country to engage in international in-
volvement in its technical activities through formal co-
operative agreements. Among the national objectives
served by such involvement are:2
1. Symbolic Objectives
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
political and policy influence–a country may
engage in international cooperation in order
to influence political attitudes and policy out-
comes in cooperating countries, in particular
so that those attitudes and outcomes are com-
patible with its own national objectives.
policy legitimization–a country may invite
others to cooperate with it in order to enlist
their support for a particular course of action
that the country intends to pursue; broaden-
ing the base of involvement in a particular
undertaking may increase its legitimacy both
at home and abroad.
policy commitment–a country may allow
others to participate in one of its undertak-
ings as a means of gaining their commitment
to support some of its other policies.
leadership–a country may invite others to
join it in a common undertaking because it
believes that such an intimate partnership will
allow it to demonstrate clearly to others a
leadership position.
cooperation to encourage cooperation—a
country may initiate or enter into a specific
cooperative undertaking in order to demon-
strate its commitment to the general princi-
ple of international cooperation as a desirable
course of action.
2. Utilitarian Objectives
a.
b.
division of labor and sharing of costs–a coun-
try may invite others to join in an undertak-
ing it wishes to pursue in order to achieve a
necessary or desirable sharing of the burdens,
particularly the cost, of that undertaking.
access to foreign resources—a country may
open one of its undertakings to foreign partic-
ipation in order to engage or have access to
‘This statement of objectwes  IS adapted from Stephen M. Shaffer  and Lisa
Robock Shaffer,  The Politics  of International Cooperation: A Comparison of
U.S. Experience in Space and in Security (Graduate School of International
Relations, University of Denver, 1980).
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unique or superior resources, both physical
and human, available only in other countries.
c. economic influences-a country may invite
others to participate in an undertaking in or-
der to increase the likelihood that they will
then purchase the products or services of that
undertaking, rather than those of potential
competitors.
This breakdown of the objectives of cooperation ba-
sically reflects the perspective of a country seeking to
involve others in its activities; however, it also can be
used to identify the reasons why others would agree
to cooperate with that country. In general, one would
expect those responding to a cooperative initiative to
give highest priority to utilitarian benefits, but the sym-
bolic payoffs from international cooperation can ac-
crue, though not evenly, to all partners.
The United States has made international coopera-
tion in science and technology—in space as in numer-
ous other sectors-a major element of its foreign pol-
icy; most observers agree that the overall benefits of
such cooperation in both symbolic and utilitarian
terms have been substantial, and that the negative im-
pacts have been comparatively insignificant.3 Unless
it begins a technical undertaking for motivations which
are overwhelmingly nationalistic in character (e.g.,
Project Apollo or the Supersonic Transport) the United
States has welcomed the participation of its closest
allies. As international involvement in the “space sta-
tion” program is assessed, this “bias” toward coop-
eration will be maintained.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE:
THE RECORD TO DATE
In the 25 years that the United States has had a Gov-
ernment-funded civilian space program, international
cooperation has been one of its major themes; as men-
tioned above, it was an explicit objective of the NAS
Act. Armed with this legislative mandate, with Presi-
dential and congressional support for a U.S. civilian
space program which emphasized openness and sci-
entific objectives, and with already existing patterns
of cooperation in space science, NASA has since its
inception conducted an active program of interna-
tional partnership.
In space, perhaps more than in most areas of inter-
national science, it has been the policies and initia-
tives of the Government, rather than those of the sci-
entif ic and technical community, which have
established the U.S. attitude toward cooperative
undertakings. 4 Although NASA’s international pro-
grams have involved the Soviet Union, Canada, Ja-
pan, and various developing countries, NASA’s pri-
mary cooperative partner to date has been Europe—
both individual European countries and the various
European space organizations which have existed
over the past two decades.
International cooperation in civilian space activity
is thus a longstanding tradition, especially in the field
of space science, but also to some extent in space ap-
plications and space technology programs. As the gen-
eral space policies of potential international partners
in a space infrastructure acquisition program are re-
viewed, many examples of cooperative ventures can
be brought to light. These range in scope from mod-
est participation in minor projects to intense involve-
ment in major undertakings on the basis of full part-
nership, An extreme example of the latter is the setting
up of an intergovernmental consortium to carry out
comprehensive programs in a particular technical
field—telecommunications.
On the other hand, there are few examples of sub-
stantial involvement of foreign partners in programs
which could be characterized as the main thrust of
the national space policy of a given country, whether
it be the United States, the U. S. S. R., or any other
space-capable state. As a matter of fact, the only in-
stance so far of such an arrangement is the involve-
ment, since the early 1970s, of Europe and Canada
in the development of the American Space Transpor-
tation System (STS).
But even that example is not really valid, since the
hardware developments assigned to Europe (Spacelab)
and Canada (the Remote Manipulator System, RMS),
although producing valuable complements, involve
a rather minor share of the total costs involved, on
the order of 10 percent. Furthermore, what is really
central in the STS is the American-built Shuttle. The
other two items are accessory to it: the RMS could
easily have been replaced with some U.S.-designed
equivalent, and, if Spacelab did not exist, the STS
JThe Nat tonal Academy of Sciences has recently undertaken a review of
sclentlflc and technolog~al cooperation among the OECD countries which 4Another  area where Government I nttlatlves  were crucial  I n establlshi ng
reaches this conclusion. patterns of international cooperation was nuclear energy.
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would still be able to carry out 90 percent of its in-
tended activities. s
An invitation for international participation in a U.S.
“space station” program might well have the result,
as did the U.S. offer to participate in STS development,
that foreign participation would be somewhat margin-
al in terms of both the scope and the nature of its share
in the workload. A different outcome, however, is also
possible, resulting in what was described above as a
rather unusual circumstance: major foreign involve-
ment in what will be the brunt of the U.S. effort in
space over the next decade or more. Since the early
seventies, space technology has been disseminating
and/or maturing throughout the world, bringing cer-
tain countries almost to par with the United States in
aspects of space technology relevant to a such an
undertaking, and thus broadening the technical base
for significant cooperation.
In order to understand which of these outcomes is
likely and/or preferable, it is first necessary to detail
the objectives which would lead both the United
States and other countries to collaborate on a space
infrastructure undertaking. As NASA’s current Direc-
tor of International Affairs has observed: “International
space cooperation is not a charitable enterprise; coun-
tries cooperate because they judge it in their interest
t o  d o  s o .  ”6
U.S. OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS RELATED
TO INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S. SPACE
INFRASTRUCTURE ACQUISITION PROGRAM
In the first year of its existence, NASA formulated
a set of policy guidelines for international coopera-
tion in space. Those guidelines have survived periodic
reexamination and remain in force today. They reflect
“conservative values7” with respect to the conditions
under which cooperation is desirable.
sThe U.S. policy, as became clear I n 1972, was to ensure that foreign con-
tributors to the STS should not have responsibility for any element which
was essential to the success of the system. The only civillan  space programs
to which  Europe has contributed or is contributing essential parts are the
International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUVE)  and the Spxe Telescope (ST). There
IS a strong push within NASA to Iim it the foreign role in any ‘‘space station’
program to non-essential elements, but this push is being countered by an
Increasingly  strong insistence, from the major ESA contributors at least, that
potential partners be allowed to develop some of the key infrastructure ele-
ments, Of  course, there is a natural resistance within U.S. industry to seeing
foreign  organizations provide what it could produce: witness, for instance,
the Industrial opposition to the Canadian development of the RMS. It should
be noted, however, that NATO partners are frequently gwen responsibility
for developing essential components of defense systems, with consequent
strerigthenlng  of the alliance.
6Kenneth  S. Pedersen, “International Aspects of Commercial Space Activ-
ities,  ” speech to Princeton Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1983.
7Arnold Frutkin, /nternationa/  Cooperation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1965),
p. 32.
The essential features of NASA guidelines are:
cooperation is to be on a project-by-project basis,
not on a program or other open-ended ar-
rangement;
each project must be of mutual interest and have
clear scientific value;
technical agreement is necessary before political
commitment;
each side bears full financial responsibility for its
share of the project;
each side must have the technical and managerial
capabilities to carry out its share of the project;
NASA does not provide substantial technical as-
sistance to its partners, and little or no U.S. tech-
nology is transferred; and
scientific results are made publicly available.8
These guidelines have occasionally been bent, as
in the case of the 1975 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Apollo-Soyuz
Program. In general, however, they have provided an
effective framework within which NASA has pursued
a mixed set of objectives, including:
l Scientific/Technical
Increasing the number of qualified people
working on problems of space research and
space technology by broadening the base of
involvement in space activities;
Shaping the development of the space pro-
grams in other countries by offering attractive
opportunities to join with the United States i n
“doing things our way”; and
Channeling the funds and technical capabil-
ities dedicated to space in other countries
away from activities which are competitive or
not compatible with U.S. interests, but involv-
ing them in a program dominated by and large-
ly defined by the United States.
l Economic
– NASA estimates that it has achieved over $2
billion in cost savings and effective contribu-
tions from its cooperative programs over the
past 25 years; cost-sharing has been an influen-
tial, though not top-priority, element of NASA’s
cooperative programs.
– Involving other countries in expanded space
activities may create new markets for U.S. aer-
ospace products.
l Political
— NASA’s international cooperative programs
have been designed to present a positive im-
age of the United States to our cooperating
partners; in particular, the contrast between
8Shatier and Shaffer, op. CIt,,  p. 18
38-798 0 - 84 - 13  , QL 3
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U.S. openness and Soviet secrecy with respect
to space has been exploited by the United
States.
— International cooperation in space has been
undertaken by the United States in order to
advance other U.S. foreign policy objectives.
While the priority given to these various objectives
has varied over time and mission opportunity, at the
core has been a policy that permitted this country’s
closest allies to become involved in the U.S. space
effort. Indeed, some have criticized NASA for mak-
ing possible such participation, at minimal cost, in an
effort paid for almost entirely by U.S. taxpayers; “ben-
efit, know-how and opportunity were shared to an ex-
tent which was totally unprecedented where an ad-
vanced technology was involved . . . .“9 Since the
start of its civilian space program, the United States
has used international cooperation in space as a
means of creating a sense of togetherness and com-
mon achievement among, particularly, the industrial
democracies which are this country’s most significant
partners in maintaining world order.
The benefits to the United States of international
space cooperation do not come without costs, of
course. Among the potential negative impacts of in-
volving others in the U.S. space program are:
1. increased technical risk and management com-
plexity;
2. Significant O Ut-flOWS of sensitive or valuable U.S.
.
3.
4.
technology, employment opportunities, and/or
hard currency, as the United States purchases
space-related goods or services from other
countries;
in particular, the development, through their in-
volvement in U.S. space activities, of effective
competitors to U.S. firms in commercial space ef-
forts; and
possible disputes among the United States and
its cooperating partners-which, if not resolved,
could lead to broader foreign policy conflicts.
To date, NASA has managed its affairs so as to have
minimized these potential negative impacts. For in-
stance, many of the cooperative programs involved
NASA’s launching of foreign satellites, in which the
technical risk to NASA was virtually non-existent and
which often led to foreign purchase of additional
launches.
gArnold Frutkin, “U.S. Policy: a Drama in N Acts,” Spectrum, September
1983, p. 74.
FOREIGN OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS
RELATED TO INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S.
“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM
Success in cooperative undertakings requires that
each side perceives the cooperation as being bene-
ficial to itself; such undertakings are even more likely
to be successful if there is at least some commonality
of objectives. All partners must believe that coopera-
tion is a useful means for advancing some of their na-
tional objectives without undue costs related to others.
It is somewhat more difficult to generalize with respect
to the motivations which might lead specific countries
or groupings of countries to decide to join the United
States in development, operation, and/or use of space
infrastructure, but the following seems most germane:
l Scientific/Technical
In most areas of space technology, the United
States is still a leader. Other countries may
hope that close partnership with the United
States will give them increased access to these
technologies and help upgrade their own tech-
nical capabilities.
The “space station” contains elements of
space infrastructure which, used in connection
with the space transportation system, will
“modernize” space operations; other coun-
tries may decide they must be part of the most
advanced way of operating in space,
l Economic
— If the commercial potential of many areas of
space activity is as large as some forecast, use
of in-space infrastructure will be an essential
or at least extremely useful means for achiev-
ing that potential. Other countries wanting to
participate in the commercial exploitation of
space may view sharing the costs of a “space
station” program as the best way to be major
partners in such commercial exploitation.
— Cooperation with the United States may be the
only way that other countries can afford to de-
velop capabilities in particular areas of space
technology. Division of labor and costs is a
necessary approach for those without the re-
sources to develop a total system of space in-
frastructure on their own. While the United
States could probably afford to develop it on
its own, as could the ESA countries in collab-
oration with Japan,10 probably no other coun-
IOAS  noted  later  in this appemfix,  there is a considerable difference bet-
ween the amount of taxpayers’ money the United States on the one hand
and Europe and Japan on the other are prepared to spend on space. But
there is little doubt that Europe alone cou/d make a comparable investment
if the political will existed.
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try or region except the Soviet Union and its
allies could make a comparable investment in
space.
— Other countries may anticipate that such a pro-
gram will provide marketing opportunities for
their industries and want to participate in the
program in order to maximize those opportu-
nities.
. Political
— Participation in the “space station,” like par-
ticipation in the space transportation system,
may provide other countries a way of sharing
in the political and prestige benefits of manned
space flight activities without bearing the total
cost of manned systems.
— The United States is the military and economic
leader of the non-Communist world; cooper-
ation with the United States in such an effort
may provide a way for other countries to main-
tain or increase their commitment to a political
and military alliance with the United States.
THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM
Some have suggested that any major new undertak-
ing in space be from the start “truly” international—
i.e., designed, funded, and managed by an interna-
tional consortium or an equivalent organization .11 Al-
though the current momentum behind “space sta-
tion” plans is leading away from this option, it is worth
identifying it here and assessing it later as a possible
way of approaching its development or operation.
Such an approach would, of course, be the ultimate
in the way of internationalizing a program; in this
mode of cooperation, the United States would merely
be a shareholder among many others within a con-
sortium of participants. There are precedents in this
respect; an instance which comes readily to mind is
that of the International Telecommunications Satel-
lite Organization (INTELSAT).
In 1962, the U.S. Congress passed the Communi-
cations Satellite Act, creating the Communications Sat-
ellite Corporation (COMSAT) and charging it with de-
veloping a global system for international satellite
communications. The United States could not achieve
such an ambitious goal without the active participa-
tion of other nations; therefore negotiations were
started which led (after substantial conflict) in 1964
to an “interim agreement” under which a global net-
work was successfully established. In 1969, a Pleni-
potentiary Conference was convened, with 67
1 I See,  for example,  RcJ&rt Salkeld, “Toward Men Permanently in Space, ’
Astronautics and Aeronautics, October 1979.
member countries in attendance: it resulted in a
Definitive Agreement which entered into force in 1973
and made INTELSAT a working international organiza-
tion, with a present membership of more than 100
countries.
The U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries never
joined INTELSAT, both because it was initiated by the
United States and actually run by Americans during
the first years of its existence and because they would
have had very little influence on the organization
under the weighted system of voting which was
employed.
The International Maritime Satellite Organization
(lNMARSAT) has a number of features that are dis-
tinctly different from those of INTELSAT. It provides
global coverage, whereas INTELSAT does not. Another
difference is that among its member states, INMARSAT
counts the Soviet Union (with a 14 percent owner-
ship share, second only to the United States’ 23 per-
cent) and several other socialist countries.
INMARSAT’S statute obliges it to provide free access
to members and nonmembers.
INMARSAT was created pursuant to the initiative of
a United Nations agency, the Inter-governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, which, from
1973 to 1976, convened a series of international con-
ferences to establish a global maritime satellite com-
munications system. In 1979, the INMARSAT Conven-
tion and Operating Agreement entered into force, and
operations started early in 1982. With the exception
of the above-mentioned differences, INTELSAT and
INMARSAT are similar in structure.
Could a similar international organization be
created, in order to develop, operate, and use in-space
infrastructure? In principle there is no obstacle to this,
although the parallel with INTELSAT can be very mis-
leading. In particular, it is not clear that the provision
of orbital infrastructure to accomplish a variety of ob-
jectives could ever be the kind of profitable enterprise
that space-based communications has been. Commu-
nications is a well-established business, yielding a re-
turn on investment of about 14 percent within
INTELSAT. Also, the capability upon which INTELSAT
was originally based (communications satellites and
launch capabilities) had been developed by the
United States at its own expense.
There are no such credible economic prospects for
space infrastructure, which would have many different
uses, some for pure government-funded research,
others in the nature of a public service, and still others
for commercial applications. Also, in a satellite com-
munications system, there lies more cash-flow in the
procurement of the ground segment than in the
building of the satellites. This has made it possible for
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American firms to be the exclusive manufacturers of
INTELSAT satellites for years without stirring too much
resentment within the international consortium,
because other member countries have found ade-
quate compensation in the manufacturing of ground
stations for themselves and for sale abroad.
Also, Europe, with its Ariane series of boosters, is
now competing for INTELSAT launch contracts. In ad-
dition, some form of international cooperation was ab-
solutely essential, almost by definition, for an inter-
national communications network to be feasible. No
such cooperative imperative is attached to space in-
frastructure.
A more adequate precedent for an international
“space station” enterprise might be that of an inter-
national organization created to conduct a number
of jointly coordinated space programs for the benefit
of its member states. Such a “limited partnership” may
be a realistic approach to space infrastructure devel-
opment and/or operation. To a large extent, the Euro-
pean Space Agency (ESA) does provide such a paral-
lel. 12 Since its inception, ESA has performed very
successfully in spite of the difficulties associated with
almost all international organizations.13 In ESA’s case,
the two major problem areas have been, and still are:
1 ) the time and burdensome negotiations required to
settle differences about general policies to follow and
what programs to support; 2) the framing of an “in-
dustrial policy” designed to improve the worldwide
competitiveness of European industry while ensuring
a “fair return” to individual members states (the “re-
turn” is the value of the contracts let by ESA to any
member state, and it is “fair” when proportionate to
that member’s financial contribution to the agency’s
budget).
The Convention governing ESA provides some clues
as to how these difficulties are dealt with in the long
run:
1. The formal structure of ESA is designed to accom-
modate laborious negotiations and compromises.
The legislative power, so to speak, rests with a
Council where all states are represented; the
Council meets regularly, usually for 2-day ses-
sions.14 There is also an Executive responsible for
day-to-day operations and long-range planning.
I ZESA  is described i n more detail below.
IJI ndeed, if one takes a long view of past European coopf?ration,  saY, over
100 years, ESA’S  record is strikingly good. Although its operations have been
on a much smaller scale than have those of NASA, ESA’S  record of technical
successes is perhaps as good as that of any other organization.
141n  general,  exh Member State has one vote  in the Council.  However,
a Member State does not have the right to vote on matters concerning an
optional program in which it does not take part. Except where the ESA  Con-
vention provides otherwise, decisions of the Council are taken by a simple
majority of Member States represented and voting.
2. ESA’s overall activity is subdivided into two cat-
egories:
mandatory activities, which include chiefly
scientific programs and basic organizational
expenditures; mandatory contributions are
based on each state’s GNP;
optional activities, which are specific programs
like Ariane, Spacelab, Marecs, and so on; con-
tributions to these programs are negotiated
between the participants at the inception of
the program.
This system provides ESA with a considerable flexi-
bility: although unanimous consent of all Member
States is needed formally to permit ESA to undertake
an optional program, a vote in favor of the program
does not carry any obligation to participate. Member
States may decide, after a program has been
authorized, whether—and, if so, to what extent—they
wiII participate. Thus, Member states can adjust their
financial effort to the degree of interest they see in a
program and/or to the “return” their industry will ob-
tain from it (one of the solutions to the irksome “fair
return” problem). Also, member states can support
another partner’s favorite project by a token partici-
pation which can be traded against others, resulting
i n “package deals” which settle seemingly unrecon-
cilable differences.
A further degree of flexibility is provided by the fact
that the agency is not obligated to manage all of its
programs through its own staff. ESA can delegate to
a national agency the responsibilities for a program’s
management, if this appears to be preferable from a
political, economic, or technical point of view (CNES,
the French space agency, is thus entrusted with tech-
nical management of the Ariane development
program).
3. ESA early recognized that a multinational agency
is better off letting contracts to multinational in-
dustrial firms rather than attempting to balance
contracts among national companies according
to its “fair return” principle. This balancing act
is often performed better and more quickly in-
side multinational consortia of European aero-
space and electronics firms, the creation of which
ESA has encouraged.
As a last parallel which might be drawn from ESA,
it should be noted that this agency’s role is generally
limited to development and demonstration of space
systems. Utilization, in the sense of operational or
commercial exploitation, is usually entrusted to other
intergovernmental organization, like EUTELSAT for re-
gional European communications or EUMETSAT for
meteorological satellites. Commercial operation can
even be entrusted to private multinational corpora-
tions like ARIANESPACE, which has been established
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to produce, market, launch, and finance Ariane
launch vehicles. This arrangement could be paralleled
in an international “space station” program: different
international entities, with possibly different member-
ship and operating procedures, could take care of its
development and operation.
As far as development and operation are concerned,
one might question whether the creation of interna-
tional entities in charge of these activities would en-
tail creation of new technical agencies duplicating the
know-how and resources of existing space agencies,
most notably NASA. Clearly, this would not be an ad-
visable course. However, the international body in
charge of the program could confine itself to overall
management, and rely on existing agencies in the par-
ticipating countries for technical management, super-
vision, and day-to-day activity, a procedure similar to
that sometimes followed by ESA. Given that the
United States would undoubtedly be the largest share-
holder in such a joint venture, it should be possible
to have the leading role assigned to NASA and/or the
U.S. private sector in this context. Other major agen-
cies like ESA (Europe), NASDA (Japan), CNES (France),
or DFVLR (West Germany) would as a matter of
course have to be entrusted with tasks commensurate
with their country’s or region’s financial commitment.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. DECISION TO
“GO IT ALONE” WITH RESPECT TO THE
“SPACE STATION”15
Of course, there is the possibility that no other coun-
try will reach agreement with the United States to co-
operate in the acquisition and use of in-space infra-
structure. In this unlikely situation, the United States
would “go it alone. ” Would such a step deal a fatal
blow to all future prospects of international coopera-
tion in space? There seems to be no reason to fear
such a drastic outcome: what would probably hap-
pen is merely an extension into the future of the pres-
ent situation, characterized by a large amount of du-
plication, with most countries striving to acquire more
or less the same capabilities so as to be able to com-
pete, especially where commercial applications are
concerned.
The same countries, however, are now willing to
participate in quite a large number of cooperative
.
I SThe  circumstances adduced at the beginning of this appendix provide
reason to believe that a U .S,  -only program is the least I ikely alternative, How-
ever, since no final Congressional decision on international participation in
any U.S. “space station” program has been made—and since the Congress
may wish to reconsider this matter de rrovo-the  U.S.-only option  IS Included
here
schemes, not only in the field of space science (re-
putedly free of competition), but also in general public
service types of applications (e.g., meteorology or
search-and-rescue), and even in commercial applica-
tions (e.g., communication via INTELSAT, INMARSAT,
or INTERSPUTNIK). Cooperation, in other words,
seems to be a widely recognized way of performing
space activities, provided a certain amount of auton-
omous assets have been secured to safeguard national
independence and ability to compete, so that if this
U.S. offer to cooperate is not taken up on a program
as central even as the “space station, ” this situation
is unlikely to be reversed,
That such duplication does not make optimal use
of the global resources of the international commu-
nity is obvious, but by no means new. If one accepts
it, the next question, from a U.S. perspective, is
whether other spacefaring countries, not being in-
volved in the U.S. program, would thus be motivated
to challenge U.S. supremacy in space and to compete
commercially with it even more effectively and bet-
ter than they do now. In other words, what are the
implications if other countries strive to acquire more
or less the same capabilities as the United States is
seeking by developing space infrastructure, but on
their own and not in partnership with the United
States?
It should be noted first that acquisition of similar ca-
pabilities does not necessarily require development
of similar technology. The capability to launch satel-
lites, for instance, can be provided by a very sophisti-
cated reusable craft like the Shuttle, or by less inex-
pensive expendable rockets. Similarly, it could turn
out that most or all functions of space infrastructure
that utilize a human crew could eventually be per-
formed by one or several automated systems. This cer-
tainly seems to be true whenever a single specific ac-
tivity is under examination: materials processing in
space, for instance, could perhaps be adequately per-
formed in an operational production mode by an un-
manned platform along the lines of the French
SOLARIS concept.
Therefore, when specific activities are considered
in isolation, there appear to be ways for other coun-
tries to remain competitive in space applications with-
out joining a U.S. “space station” program. However,
when looked at from a global perspective, a compre-
hensive space program is more than the sum of a few
specific application projects. U.S. development of
long-term space infrastructure would mark the incep-
tion of a new way of performing activities in space;
the hoped-for result would be enhanced flexibility and
economies of operation in many areas of space sci-
ence and applications, whether already recognized
or presently unforeseen.
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Any country wishing to gain access to this new way
of doing business in space would have to acquire an
extensive set of technologies and systems:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Orbital communication relays. (The United States
is developing such relays in the form of the Track-
ing and Data Relay Satellites; similarly, ESA’s L-
SAT will have orbital capabilities and will be used
in this role for the control of EURECA).
In-orbit servicing (and probably retrieval) systems.
(The United States has flown a short-range system
of that kind, the manned maneuvering unit
(MMU), which enables people to tend satellites
in the vicinity of the Shuttle, To go further along
this line, NASA will have to develop the so-called
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV)).
The capability of returning space hardware from
orbit to the surface of the Earth via unmanned
vehicles. (This is a capability which the United
States has bypassed through development of the
Shuttle) and/or;
Ultimately, man-rated launch and reentry vehi-
cles (unless automated systems or systems re-
motely controlled from the ground suffice. to per-
form all the space tasks for which the need for
human beings is currently foreseen–a possibil-
ity which is debatable at best).
Even if one takes into account that such capabilities
need not rest on facilities identical (in terms of size,
sophistication, etc.) to those deployed by the United
States, the cost of their creation is nevertheless likely
to be several times higher than the cost of creating
and maintaining independent “traditional” satellite
building and launching capabilities.
Consider, for instance, the total development and
flight testing cost of Ariane 1: roughly $1 billion (1984).
The corresponding cost for the Shuttle exceeds $10
billion. The Shuttle’s payload capability is much
greater than that of Ariane 1, especially in LEO. But
the important point is that Ariane suffices to endow
European countries with the capability to launch all
the applications satellites they need, and even further,
to market launch services abroad, competing com-
mercially with NASA and the U.S. private sector in
that field. (One might state more accurately that the
real competition will come from the Ariane 2, 3 and
4 versions, which together will cost about an addition-
al $400 million beyond the initial development ex-
penditures: the argument, however, still holds true.)
Suppose now that Europe decides to acquire a
manned flight capability of its own. A typical way to
do that (as explored in ESA’s “long-term preparatory
program”) would be to develop an even larger ver-
sion of Ariane, with a LEO capability around one-half
that of the Shuttle: under the name Ariane S, various
preliminary designs for such a vehicle have been pub-
licized. These designs are compatible with a winged
reentry vehicle, looking somewhat like a down-scaled
Shuttle, which under the name HERMES has also been
through early design stages in France. Both craft could
operate automatically but could also transport people.
No cost estimates have been officially quoted yet,
but independent experts, by extrapolating from other
European and U.S. program costs, predict $2 billion
to $4 billion as the price for acquiring such a minimal
capability. This is much less than what it took to de-
velop the Shuttle, but 2 to 3 times what it cost to
develop Ariane. Of course, in order to exploit such
a staffed flight capability properly, if it is not to remain
only a prestige enterprise, all space activities must be
adapted to the “new way of doing business in space.”
Today’s European satellites, for instance, do not lend
themselves to servicing in orbit; all sorts of new tech-
niques would have to be adopted for that purpose,
such as modules easy to plug out or in; built-in, readily
accessible and readable check-out circuits; safety de-
vices destined to protect the astronauts’ lives, and so
on.
In turn, even if this proves to be economical in the
long run, it would call for increased investment at the
start. Added to the higher operating costs of manned
space flight, the overall consequence of all these con-
siderations amounts to this: in order to acquire the
capabilities which go with the new way of conduc-
ting space activities, medium space powers like Eur-
ope or Japan would probably have to multiply their
space budgets by at least 2 to 3 times. However, the
ratio of civilian space expenditures to gross national
product (GNP) in Europe and Japan is much smaller
than the corresponding ratio in the United States—
i.e., roughly 4 times less. There is therefore room for
expansion, but such a major shifting of gears would
require a reassessment of national priorities in all the
countries involved, and there is no sign that such a
reassessment is imminent.
A last question to address is whether another alter-
native is open to these countries: again assuming that
the United States goes ahead alone with the devel-
opment of a “space station” and all the attendant new
technologies, must countries wishing to enter into or
stay in the space business of necessity develop similar
capabilities? In other words, could “doing business
in the old way” be competitive when faced with the
“new way, ” just as expendable launch vehicles from
Europe, Japan, and the United States seem to be man-
aging to stay in competition with a very new and dif-
ferent craft, the Shuttle?
Two factors will have a deciding influence on this
question:
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1. Economics
— The relative importance of captive markets;
— charges applied to users: the very sophistica-
tion of new systems may, at least in the initial
phase, lead to high operational costs; this argu-
ment is further complicated by the fact that
user’s charges do not necessarily reflect actual
costs. If the United States decided to go ahead
for reasons of its own, not all of which were
economic ones, it probably would not fully
amortize costs through user’s charges; other
suppliers of space services might do the same,
to facilitate export sales, for instance;
— the fact that the key area of commercial com-
petition in space utilizes the geostationary or-
bit, whereas the “space station” and its related
new capabilities will at the start focus on LEO
activities, and will extend their sphere of
operations to geostationary orbit much later;
meanwhile, business can go on as usual in that
orbit.
2. Political and Technical Trends
— One of the major impacts of “space station”
technology will be in the field of construction
and assembly of large structures or platforms
in orbit. Presently, however, there seems to
be a trend in favor of small or medium-sized
satellites which fit the needs of one given
country or group of countries eager to possess
its own independent system. Small to medi-
um-sized satellites would probably also appeal
to commercial operators (in the United States
and elsewhere) who might find it of advantage
to own a system built along their specifications
rather than to lease a segment of a larger
system.
— However, even small/medium satellites might
benefit from new methods of operating in
space. The capability to check a satellite in
low orbit before transferring it to its final or-
bit to start operation there, or the capability
to repair it when it fails, may be a significant
commercial advantage which no prospective
customer is likely to overlook. However, the
economic attractiveness of satellite servicing
is still a very controversial matter; lb anyway,
from a strictly financial point of view, a cus-
tomer could be presented with the same ad-
vantages by an adequate system of warranty.
But the psychological appeal would clearly be
in favor of the servicing capability.
lbThe  reluctance of those concerned to meet the relatively low  costs  of
retrieving and refurbishing WESTSTAR 6 and PALAPA B-2 indicate that in-
orbit retrieval ad repair are not yet economically attractive.
At the present stage, it would seem that neither eco-
nomic factors nor political and technical trends yield
a clear answer to the question of whether there is an
alternative way open to countries unable or unwill-
ing to acquire in-space infrastructure. This is a major
reason to believe that the U.S. offer to cooperate with
other countries will be accepted by other spacefar-
ing nations, at least to the minimum extent necessary
to see what happens. Whether such minimal partici-
pation is in the U.S. interest will be discussed later in
this paper. But the conclusion of the reasoning and
analysis just presented is inescapable—as the United
States begins a space infrastructure program, others will
want to be part of it, provided the cost (in all senses
of the term) is not too great.
Possible Modes of International
Involvement in a U.S. “Space
Station” Program
There is a wide variety of possible forms that inter-
national cooperation in a space infrastructure program
might take. This section describes two general cate-
gories of involvement, each with several variations:
1. international cooperation during “space station”
development, then separate deployment of
operational systems; and
2. international cooperation throughout the deploy-
ment, operation, and use of the “space station .“
JOINT DEVELOPMENT, SEPARATE DEPLOYMENT
If the United States and/or its potential international
partners believe that free and open competition in uti-
lizing space is preferable (or unavoidable), and if these
countries nevertheless want to save on development
costs and prevent all-out duplication of efforts, then
this option will be attractive. joint development of a
total system or a piece of hardware, followed by sep-
arate or independent deployment, operation, exploita-
tion and/or sale is a commonplace arrangement in,
among others, aerospace programs. Many military and
civilian aircraft have been or are being born that way,
at least in Europe. The United States seems to favor
separate development  fo l lowed by l icens ing
agreements, but there are examples to the contrary
(e.g., the joint development of the CFM 56 jet engine
by General Electric and the French SNECMA).
Among the reasons that other countries might want
to commit only to joint development, reserving the
right of separate deployment of constituent elements,
are:
1. Going along to see what happens. This would
typically be the attitude of countries or agencies
feeling rather skeptical about the benefits to be
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2.
3.
derived from use of in-space infrastructure, but
which deem it necessary to be at least symboli-
cally present in the game, just in case it turns out
that their skepticism was ill-founded. Such part-
ners may not be of the most active sort, but they
also will not be troublesome, since the very
reason of their being present is “to follow the
leader.” Presumably they would not be interested
enough in the joint undertaking to fund cost in-
creases if the program should meet with difficul-
ties, and would therefore attempt to settle for a
fixed amount rather than a fixed percentage type
of participation.
Going along to acquire some of the know-how
and of the technologies to be derived from the
program. This would be the attitude of countries
or agencies with a positive attitude towards new
systems, but which are not in a hurry to deploy
and use them, so that they only want to acquire
knowledge to be implemented in a much later
perspective. Along with other, more “political”
motivations, this seems to be what prompted Eur-
ope to join the post-Apollo program. There was
also a more immediate industrial motivation; Eur-
ope hoped to sell to NASA more units of the hard-
ware developed by European firms, and NASA
has indeed purchased a second Spacelab flight
unit in Europe. This type of motivation is apt to
create problems, insofar as it raises the issue of
technology transfer or dissemination.
Going along in order to & able to deploy a sep-
arate system at about the time that the primary
partner deploys its own. This is a sign of real in-
terest to the program, insofar as it means that all
parties truly believe in it. However, it might well
generate more problems than would the preced-
ing ones. It is indeed unlikely that all parties con-
cerned will aim, through their joint development
efforts, towards development of strictly identical
infrastructure elements. As a consequence, a
number of compromises would have to be ac-
cepted by all (or some of) the participants to rec-
onciIe differing specifications. Any given partici-
pant will tend to specify the work assigned to it
so that it serves directly (or with the smallest
possible amount of modification or adaptation)
its own national interests. However, the end
product of the same work, if the joint endeavor
is to make any sense, must also be readily adapt-
able to what other participants plan to construct.
In a rather grossly exaggerated way, this is a situa-
tion akin to ESA and NASA trying to agree on a
definition of Spacelab which would enable it to
be launched either by the Shuttle or by Ariane.
Such compromises are by no means impossible, but
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to make
sure that the overall cost of the compromise design
and of its adaptations to specific needs does not ex-
ceed the added costs of separate developments. Fur-
thermore, such a compromise design is inevitably dif-
ficult to agree on, for all parties tend to believe that
it is to them that will fall the largest amount of modifi-
cations to be made later to adapt the common devel-
opment of their specific needs. These, however, are
problems inherent in all cooperative development
programs, and past experience, notably in the field
of aeronautics and armaments, proves that they can
be settled whenever a strong sense of common pur-
pose prevails.
While, for one or more of the reasons sketched
above, joint development without a commitment to
joint operation or utilization may be attractive to a po-
tential cooperating partner, it would appear that the
United States might prefer a more comprehensive
cooperative approach, as described below. However,
there may be reasons for the United States to avoid
commitment to international involvement beyond the
development stage. Among such possible motivations
are:
1.
2.
3
In
A feeling that national security applications in
space might evolve in such a way that the United
States would prefer to deploy its own infrastruc-
ture so that it could control access to it; this is
not necessarily a problem since provisions for
such restriction could be part of an international
agreement.
A similar argument could be made if, particularly,
materials processing activities appear quite prom-
ising commercially and U.S. firms prefer a U. S.-
only “industrial park” in space.
The United States may prefer a safety valve free-
ing it from the need to continue a joint effort if
there is a likelihood that the cooperative experi-
ence during the development phase is not satis-
factory on technical, economic, and/or political
grounds.
addition to all of the above, dissatisfaction with
joint development programs sometimes crops up, not
from problems directly related to the development
phase of the undertaking, but from an apparent or real
lack of benefits deriving from the joint effort once it
has carried through. This leads one to examine what
benefits can be expected, and what sort of framework
is needed to ensure that they can be reaped.
1. Each party deploys and uses for its own purposes
one or several units of the jointly developed hard-
ware. (Construction would presumably be shared
among industrial firms which built the proto-
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2.
A
types.) This approach is feasible if integrated
systems have in fact been jointly developed; how-
ever, as stated earlier, this may not necessarily
be the usual case, as agencies and administrations
involved wiII tend to prefer clear-cut interfaces
rather than closely integrated systems.
Assuming then that each participant has devel-
oped a self-contained system (e.g., the United
States develops a core element and country X a
teleoperator maneuvering system (TMS) compati-
ble both with the U.S. element and country X’s
own spacecraft and launch vehicles), several op-
tions are possible:
— Participants in joint development efforts make
no provisions for the post-development phase,
and leave it to evolving circumstances and
economics to ensure a successful career for the
developed items. (For example, if the U.S. ele-
ments are sound ones, country X will purchase
one or more, and vice versa, provided no legal
obstacles or perceived national security con-
cerns regarding these sales arise).
— Make it an obligation for all par-ties to purchase
(and agree to sell) one or several units of the
hardware developed by each.17
— And, of course, all possible intermediate ar-
rangements between these two extremes. (To
use a simplified example: the United States
could be obligated to use country X’s teleoper-
ator maneuvering system, not by purchasing
it but by offering as a compensation a given
amount of “utilization time” on elements of
its infrastructure; reciprocally, country X’s obli-
gations would be to provide and maintain a
given number of these TMS vehicles.)
“closed-end” international partnership appears
to make the most sense if the infrastructure is a“ nec-
essary, but not sufficient, part of the capabilities re-
quired for effective and efficient operations in space.
All partners will want to ensure that whatever is de-
veloped will be compatible with their longer range,
but separate, plans for space. However, this kind of
limited international involvement is less likely in most
situations to be attractive either to the United States
or to its potential partners than more substantial in-
volvement in the operation and utilization phases as
well as the development phase. The following section
examines such an approach.
I @ch an expl~it  obligation WOUld  circumvent the possible unwillingness
of one party to purchase elements from another. From the European point
of view, U.S. unwillingness to purchase additional Spacelab  modules has
been something of a problem.
JOINT DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND USE
The essential features of this option are:
— operation and maintenance costs of the infra-
structure, as well as development costs, would
be shared;
— ownership of most or all of its elements would
stay most probably with the United States; how-
ever, all participants’ rights of access and use for
common and/or national purposes, including
mutual commercial competition, would be guar-
anteed by an adequate legal framework.
Implementation of this approach is essentially a
three-step process, where each step has to be con-
sidered separately before an overall conclusion is
made:
1. Joint Development
Most considerations just set forth in the section
above are applicable here. In a way, however,
there are fewer problems; the ultimate purpose
of joint development being the deployment of
elements to be used jointly, there is less need for
involved legal rules concerning mutual purchas-
ing obligation, second source development, and
so on. Nor does one have to be concerned about
compatibility of certain sub-elements with indi-
vidual countries’ nationally developed launch
vehicles and the like. (Unless of course some par-
ticipants wish to be able to break the partnership
and go their own ways, but this would not be set
as a primary objective of the arrangement.)
Needless to say, though, “rules of the game”
are still indispensable, especially in three areas:
Settling the ownership of technology acquired
while carrying out the joint development, and
transfer of technology, where required, for ac-
complishing the work;
Assuming a dominant position of the United
States in the undertaking, how much poten-
tial leverage will be left to its partners in order
to give them a feeling of being able to protect
their rights?
Conversely, one has to retain for the United
States the possibility to work out substitute ar-
rangements, in the event that one or another
of the partners defaults, so as to ensure the
ultimate integrity of the program,
2. Joint Operation
jointly developed infrastructure can be used
jointly while being operated by a single coun-
try—presumably the United States. joint opera-
tion would, however, lend a more international
flavor and help international participants to feel
more secure by giving them added leverage—
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3.
with, of course, potential problems for the United
States.
International involvement in operating the in-
frastructure could range from very little (opening
a few positions to foreign nationals on the ground
control team and possibly in the orbital crew, as
a token gesture) to full-fledged internationaliza-
tion of both ground team and crew. The latter
would imply including citizens of other countries
in various key positions in numbers proportionate
with the overall level of participation of their
country in the program.
The latter case, even if likely to create prob-
lems for the United States by the leverage and
the visibility it gives to its partners, might, how-
ever, also pave the way towards solution of one
issue raised by this approach—the question of
“equitable costs.” Assuming that the United
States develops, say, 95 percent of a “space sta-
tion” system, and that country X develops and
builds 5 percent of it, it seems fair to reserve 5
percent of the station’s effective working time for
country X’s purposes. If, however, the United
States is alone in bearing all the maintenance and
operating costs, X cannot enjoy its 5 percent
“space station time” free of charge. Some equi-
table reimbursement scheme has to be devised
for maintenance and operating costs incurred by
the United States—a scheme that would resolve
attendant problems of fair and accurate account-
ing, opening U.S. accounts to X’s comptrollers,
devising rules for taking into account all the fringe
benefits built in the system (like the replenish-
ment of propellant tanks with unused fuel from
the Shuttle, and so on). However, if country X
actually carries out 5 percent of the maintenance
and operations in kind, it may be possible to end
up wi th  an a lmost  no-exchange-of - funds
situation.
Joint Utilization
The problem here is that there will be not only
utilization in common for common purposes, but
also an individual participant’s use of the infra-
structure for its own benefit, including commer-
cially competitive types of usages.
International partners will want to be provided
with adequate safeguards to protect their legiti-
mate rights. This, in turn, raises the question of
what are “legitimate rights.” An effort should be
made to define this concept as precisely as possi-
ble. Listed below are what appear to be major
issues involved:
— Is thereto be unrestricted use of a given frac-
tion of the “space station’s” effective work
time, for the user’s own benefit, for whatever
purposes, provided it complies with interna-
tional law and a preset series of explicit rules?
These rules must not be open to unilateral in-
terpretation. Sensitive aspects, such as safety
and national security requirements, must be
exhaustively and accurately dealt with in ad-
vance, so as not to allow, later on, the impres-
sion of arbitrarily imposed requirements.
This right-to-use may not necessarily be free
of charge, but if a price has to be charged for
it, it must be equitable (no preference with re-
spect to the U.S. Government or private users,
no hidden overheads, etc.). As stated above,
the ideal situation would probably be one
where very little or no exchange of funds oc-
curs. The setting of utilization priorities is
equally important in this connection; the pre-
sent NASA-DOD arrangement for giving abso-
lute priority to national security payloads in
Shuttle manifesting would not be likely to gen-
erate much international enthusiasm if it were
paralleled.
Cancellation clauses must be very explicit and
provide for adequate prior warning and com-
pensation; unilateral recanting should not be
allowed. Needless to say, the purpose of such
clauses would not be limited to protection of
U.S. partners; the latter would have to consent
as a counterpart to a perdurable involvement
system, in order to allow not only for the in-
frastructure’s initial deployment, but also for
the continuous evolution and growth which
is going to be one of its main features.
There seems to be no reason why all the above-
mentioned issues could not be settled in the terms of
a cooperative agreement among the United States and
its partners. Legal terms, however, would probably not
be sufficient to enable all parties to the undertaking
to feel safe and secure: safeguards embedded in the
very fabric of the joint effort, providing mutual le-
verage and affording room for the inevitable compro-
mises, may have to be accepted.
On the surface at least, such a situation might ap-
pear unbalanced in the eyes of the U.S. public and
Government: the United States will probably be car-
rying most of the burden of the joint undertaking, and
would seem required to provide to others guarantees
and safeguards and to accept dependence on them
in excess of what would be commensurate with its
partners’ share of the burden. To most of these part-
ners, however, being involved substantially in a U.S.
“space station” program would mean forfeiting their
ability to develop not only a similar, but even a re-
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duced, capacity of their own, at least in the near term.
Therefore, they will be staking the whole of their ini-
tial asset commitment in the joint venture, whereas
the United States would always be in a position, with
some added funds and efforts, to make up for the fail-
ure of one of its partners to keep the deal—a recourse
that, under the circumstances, would be more costly
to the partners.
From the U.S. point of view, of course, accepting
international participants in its “space station” pro-
gram makes sense only if this apparent–and, to some
extent, real—imbalance does not jeopardize funda-
mental national interests. The more guarantees and
safeguards the United States can afford to offer to its
potential partners, the more those countries are likely
to participate substantially and to pay accordingly.
This working out of mutual stakes in a common under-
taking is likely to be a delicate and complicated
process,
Potential International Partners
Now that potential modes of cooperation have been
discussed, the potential partners for the United States
in a “space station” effort will be described in some
detail.
Advances in space technology over the last decade
throughout the world provide many prospective can-
didates for bilateral or multilateral cooperation on a
space station project. One should, however, keep in
mind that taking a meaningful share in a program of
such scope, cost and technical sophistication, will be
no trivial undertaking for most of these candidates.
What is meant by “meaningful share” depends, of
course, very much upon the circumstances. In a bi-
lateral arrangement between the United States and
another country, the latter’s supplying less than 1 per-
cent of the infrastructure’s value in hardware or com-
monplace electronic components can hardly be
termed meaningful. On the other hand, in the case
of a broad multilateral organization comprising many
countries, large and small, with shares ranging from
a fraction of 1 percent to several 10s of percent, a par-
ticipation similar in level and kind to what has just
been described might well be meaningful to the par-
ticipating country.
Another factor to be taken into account when con-
sidering joint ventures in advanced technological de-
velopments is, obviously, the relative level of indus-
trial development of the participating countries.
Countries with more or less comparable industrial
backgrounds, similar technical outlook and mutually
compatible management practices will find it easier
to pool their resources.
This description of potential international partners
will focus first and foremost on those industrialized
countries which at present are displaying a certain
amount of interest, or at any rate curiosity, toward
“space stations.” This list includes Europe–as a whole
through the European Space Agency and as exempli-
fied by countries like France, the Federal Republic of
Germany and Italy–and Japan and Canada.
Among the industrialized countries, the Soviet
Union also deserves some mention, though hardly as
a likely participant in a U.S.-sponsored program. Rath-
er, as a major space power already engaged in its own
program of developing, emplacing, and using in-space
infrastructure, the Soviet Union is a potential compet-
itor to the United States in offering opportunities for
international involvement in such activity.
Among the developing countries, some have ac-
quired enough space technology capability to design
and build indigenous satellites and launch vehicles
(China, India), and others have ambitious plans to do
so in the future (Brazil). These and others deserve
some attention, especially as possible participants in
a broad multilateral effort.
EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY
Although joint European endeavors in space date
back to the early 1960s, the present European Space
Agency (ESA) was founded in May 1975. ESA was the
successor to two earlier organizations, the European
Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the
European Space Research Organization (ESRO). It is
of interest to recall briefly the history of these organi-
zations, insofar as it sheds some light on U. S.-
European relationships in space endeavors as well as
on how international space organizations perform.
In 1960-1961 a number of European countries (Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom) became aware of the political
and scientific benefits to be drawn from space activi-
ties (awareness of potential economic benefits
emerged some years later). They understood also that
a pooling of their resources and efforts was necessary
to compete with the United States and the U.S.S.R.
i n at least certain key areas—leaving out the develop-
ment of staffed capabilities in which the superpowers
were competing strongly for what appeared to be es-
sentially national prestige reasons. These countries
also recognized the importance of a comprehensive
program including satellite as well as launch vehicle
development.
ESRO was created to deal with satellite develop-
ment, and it did so successfully. From 1967 to 1975,
ESRO launched (with U.S.-built rockets) nine satellites,
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conducted a large number of experiments in space,
engaged in successful cooperative projects with
NASA, and managed to have its mandate enlarged to
encompass applications satellites. The organization
built up a competent and well-organized executive
and technical staff which ran three technical field
centers and a network of tracking stations.
ELDO, meanwhile, kept running into trouble, al-
though it had only one project to deal with, the de-
velopment of Europa, a medium-size rocket, roughly
equivalent to the U.S.-built Atlas-Agena. Poor man-
agement structure was the main source of trouble;
ELDO had almost no authority of its own, but acted
as a sort of coordinating agency for separate national
projects (a British first stage, a French second stage,
a German third stage, Italian payload fairings, etc.).
Additional problems arose from the fact that system
and subsystem development had to proceed in par-
allel. The first stage was virtually completely devel-
oped at the start of the program and suffered only one
minor failure in nine flights. Each of the remaining
stages experienced failures on its first operational flight
as an element of the complete vehicle: as a result,
there was a string of six failures in which, in turn, each
major element became successful.
The program was further marred by a formidable
escalation of costs, and, when its eleventh test flight
ended in failure at the end of 1971, it was finally can-
celed after $700 million had been spent.
At about the same time, the United States had stim-
ulated ELDO, ESRO, and their member states to con-
sider whether Europe should build a major segment
of NASA’s proposed space transportation system (STS),
then referred to as the “post-Apollo program.” By
1972, agreement seemed to be within reach; the task
allocated to Europe was development of a “space
tug,” an advanced rocket-stage to be used to transfer
payloads from the Shuttle’s low orbit to higher ones,
including the commercially essential geostationary or-
bit, The tug appeared to be a good candidate for coop-
eration, insofar as it was indeed an important segment
of the STS—almost a key one—and because in devel-
oping it, Europe could draw from its unhappy but ex-
tensive experience in rocketry. Furthermore, it would
enable Europeans to keep working and making pro-
gress in what they felt was an essential area–i.e.,
launch vehicle development.
In mid-1 972, however, the United States decided
to withdraw the space tug proposal, “partly because
the entire post-Apollo program was being scaled back,
because of doubts about European technical capabil-
ities, and also because the Air Force thought the mili-
tary potential of the tug was too great to permit de-
pendence on outside sources.”18-19
Also, during the same period, France and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (FRG) were negotiating with
the United States for the launching of their jointly built
Symphonic telecommunications satellite, which the
cancellation of the Europa project left without a
launch vehicle. The United States agreed initially to
launch Symphonic, but required that the satellite be
declared experimental rather than operational. The
United States thus complied with its policy of assisting
with launchings provided they were for peaceful pur-
poses and in compliance with “relevant international
arrangements.” This was a reference to the INTELSAT
Agreement which required signatories to avoid “sig-
nificant economic harm” to the organization caused
by regional competition, To France especially, and
perhaps to a lesser degree to the FRG, these condi-
tions were construed as an attempt by the United
States (and other INTELSAT partners who shared in
this position) to keep them out of the expanding sat-
ellite telecommunications business.
These events acted as catalysts in the setting up (in
1973) of the principles which were to govern the fu-
ture ESA as well as in the drafting of its program. Based
on unsatisfactory European experience in obtaining
U.S. launch assurances, the French found excellent
grounds for advocating development of an autono-
mous European launch capability, and succeeded in
obtaining from its partners a 40-percent participation
in the previously French-only program to develop the
Ariane launcher. The FRG, though disappointed by
the withdrawal of the tug proposal, nevertheless
sought out European participation in the U.S. space
transportation system through development of a “sor-
tie laboratory,” later named Spacelab.
The United Kingdom agreed to go along with a
“package deal” which was worked out in July 1973,
whereby France funded 60 percent of Ariane, the FRG
about the same percentage of Spacelab, and the U.K.
56 percent of a European maritime communications
satellite, later called MARECS. Each of the three coun-
tries also agreed to take a minor share of the two
others’ favorite projects. With this “package deal” ac-
cepted, the creation of ESA could proceed, and the
agency began operation in May 1975. The stated ob-
jectives of the ESA include:
IKivilian Space Policy and Applications (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment OTA-STI-1  77, 1982), p. 363.
19A  more  detailed discussion of European involvement in NASA’S pOst-
Apollo efforts is provided below.
App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program • 191
— developing and implementing a long-term space
policy;
— carrying out space activities;
— coordinating the European space program and
the space programs of its member states; and
— developing and implementing an industrial poli-
cy appropriate for its programs.
The agency, in addition to carrying out major but
optional projects such as Ariane and Spacelab, car-
ries out a space science program planned on a 5-year
basis. This science program and ESA’s operating budg-
et call for mandatory financial contributions from its
member states. Table C-1 lists the current distribution
of such contributions for the ESA science program. I n
constant-dollar terms, the ESA budget for mandatory
programs has remained virtually constant since the or-
ganization’s inception.
ESA runs a comprehensive set of space programs.
1.
2.
Communications Satellites-a broad and vigorous
program, with several satellites in orbit (OTS, an
experimental spacecraft, and MARECS, leased to
INMARSAT to provide operational maritime com-
munications); with more to be launched (ECS-1
and -2, for the purpose of setting up a regional
satcom system); and with a large communications
satellite (L-SAT) under development. The first L-
SAT payload includes four different experiments,
one of which is to test direct-to-the-home TV
broadcasting.
Remote Sensing–as a contribution to a global
program set up under the auspices of the World
Meteorological Organization, ESA launched two
METEOSAT geostationary weather satellites sim-
ilar to the U.S. GMS. The second of these satel-
lites was carried in orbit by ESA’s own launcher
(Ariane), and ESA’s member states have agreed
to keep the METEOSAT system in operational
condition for at least 10 years (by replacing the
satellites when they fail in orbit). The Agency also
Table C-1 .—ESA Science Budget
Percent contribution to ESA’s
Member States science program
Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.49
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.51
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.40
Federal Republic
of Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . 25.57
Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.54
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.46
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.00
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.04
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.25
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.99
United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . 13.75
3.
4.
has under development an advanced coastal and
oceanic monitoring satellite (ERS-1) equipped
with a radar and other microwave instruments.
Other remote-sensing activities are also underway
(data reception and dissemination, Spacelab-
borne high-resolution camera).
Space Sciences-ESA has pursued ESRO’s tradi-
tion of ambitious scientific satellite projects. Four
of these are presently operating successfully while
several more are in the development phase. Most
notable is GIOITO, a spacecraft to fly by Halley’s
Comet in 1986. Science also is an area where
cooperation with NASA has been and is exten-
sive; ESA is contributing several major subsystems
on the Space Telescope. The two agencies also
had a joint program called the International Solar
Power Mission (ISPM). This was a rather sophis-
ticated plan to send two spacecraft (one U.S.-built
and the other European-built) over the two poles
of the Sun. In 1981, because of budget cutbacks,
NASA chose to withdraw its spacecraft from this
enterprise, creating frustrations and resentment
not only within the scientific community but also
within political circles in Europe. The ISPM has
gone ahead but now includes only a European
spacecraft launched by NASA. The impact of this
withdrawal is discussed later in this appendix.
Launch Vehicles–this is an area where the dual
nature of ESA’s policy is best shown. On one
hand, the Agency actively pursues its Ariane
autonomous launcher program, aimed in part at
competing commercially with U.S. launch vehi-
cles; on the other hand, it is locked in, through
the Spacelab program, to the use of the U.S. Shut-
tle. Concerning Ariane, in spite of two setbacks
(failure of one development flight out of four and
of the first operational flight attempted late in
1982), there were (as of July 1984) 7 successful
launches out of 9 attempts, and it is definitely a
technical success. The more powerful Ariane 2,
3, and 4 versions have already been approved
and funded by ESA. Commercial success also is
expected during the next several years as a re-
sult of several external factors: delays in the Shut-
tle development schedule, high cost of U.S. ex-
pendable vehicles such as Delta or Atlas-Centaur
(resulting, in turn, from low production volume),
and an insufficient number of Shuttle flights. A
private corporation (Arianespace) has been estab-
lished to finance and market Ariane through ac-
tive salesmanship and promotion.
Spacelab was successfully launched aboard the
Shuttle in November 1983. Slippages in the
launch schedule, cost overruns, and technical in-
terface problems—which each party tended to at-
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tribute to the other—have at times caused a cer-
tain amount of strain between NASA and ESA,
but probably nothing more than is to be expected
in such an ambitious cooperative effort.zo T h e
question remains, however, of the scope which
will be given to Spacelab’s utilization, and of who
is willing to pay for the exploitation of its capa-
bilities. How this question is resolved will have
an influence on European attitudes toward par-
ticipation in a U.S. “space station” program.
5. Future Plans–These are still in the process of be-
ing drawn up, but it is worthwhile to point out
that ESA has allocated funds not only to evaluate
those options which are natural follow-ons of pre-
sent programs (like an advanced heavy version
of Ariane beyond the planned version 4) but also
to study explicitly the prospects of “transatlan-
tic” cooperation. Within the next 2 years, ESA
must decide which of the major options identified
by its long-term space transportation plan to
follow: cooperation with the United States in de-
veloping space infrastructure, and/or pursuing
European-only development of modern capabil-
ities for space operations. The timing of U.S. and
ESA decisions on future programs is now com-
patible, but will not remain so indefinitely.
ESA also has an active program of basic research
in materials processing, one of the most promising
candidates for widescale applications aboard a “space
station.” This research program is carried out at pres-
ent on a variety of vehicles, among which Spacelab
is prominent. ESA’s Council has already approved and
funded the development of another in-space infra-
structure element for this purpose; a space “platform,”
it is named EURECA (European Retrievable Carrier).
EURECA is designed to carry experiments that re-
quire longer times on orbit than are available on the
Shuttle. It will include materials processing facilities
(furnaces and the like), and will be launched and re-
trieved by the Shuttle. Its design will provide enough
maneuvering and power supply capability to sustain
a prolonged (i.e., 6 months) orbital life of its own.
These features give to EURECA all the appearances
of a “free-flyer” which could be tended by other,
future infrastructure elements and actually make it
look like a first step toward ESA participation in a
“space station.”
All of the above points clearly toward an ESA will-
ingness to consider seriously the possibility of a Euro-
pean participation in a space infrastructure program.
ZOMany  modifications had to be made to Spacelab  as a result of changes
in the Shuttle interface. This situation was somewhat reminiscent of the opera-
tions of ELDO, for it arose, and inevitably so, from the parallel development
of a system and one of its major subsystems.
Past history, however, also points strongly toward a
European tendency to balance its commitments care-
fully between the acquisition of autonomous capabil-
ities (as exemplified by Ariane) and the involvement
with U.S. projects (e.g., Spacelab).
To sum up, it appears that, notwithstanding its pol-
icy of retaining capabilities of its own, especially in
those areas where commercial competition may take
place, ESA is a likely candidate for a substantial coop-
erative effort with NASA because:
a. ESA and its individual member-states have a
b.
c.
d.
In
longstanding tradition of cooperation with
NASA.
Although much smaller, total European space ex-
penditures are commensurate with NASA’s
(about one fourth). Given that the consolidated
gross national product (GNP) of ESA’s member-
states is somewhat larger than the GNP of the
United States, there seems to be room for a sub-
stantial increase in these expenditures. However,
present trends do not seem to point in that
direction.
The ESA Executive (headquarters and technical
centers) is driven by internal motivations which
are somewhat similar to NASA’s, and ESA is striv-
ing to define and get authorization for an ambi-
tious long-range program which would give size,
focus and purpose to its activity.
Most member-states of ESA are at least willing
to take a look at a possible U.S. offer to cooper-
ate on a “space station,” and generally believe
that the very scope of such a program makes it
necessary to approach it jointly in order to
achieve a meaningful level of participation.
spite of what has just been said, some major
member-states of the European Space Agency do not
want at the present juncture to preclude bilateral co-
operation with the United States (if they deem it wor-
thwhile and no satisfactory joint European arrange-
ment with the United States can be devised.) These
countries appear at present to be France, the FRG, and
Italy, which together account for over so percent of
ESA’s resources. In any case, even though these coun-
tries would be likely to end up participating in a U.S.
space infrastructure program through ESA if such a
program is instituted, they will assess their interests
and decide upon their course irrespective of the joint
European assessment, and it is therefore worthwhile
to take a closer look at each one.
FRANCE
France has always aimed at being the “third space
power” after the United States and the Soviet Union,
and has indeed managed to build up the largest and
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most comprehensive space program in Europe and the
third-largest in the world. Budgetary appropriations
are an indication of this; in 1983 (approximate figures)
France’s space expenses will be $545 million (as com-
pared with the FRG’s $325 million, or Japan’s $450
million). French ambitions date back to the de Gaulle
era, and it was as early as 1966 that France orbited
its first satellite with a French-built rocket, a few days
before its second satellite was launched by NASA.
Since then, the French program has substantially
shifted its emphasis away from national prestige to-
wards economic competitiveness, especially for ex-
port purposes.
Therefore, while maintaining a fair-sized space sci-
ence program, CNES (the French space agency) has
been active mostly in launch vehicle development
(Ariane, under ESA’s supervision), communication sat-
ellites construction (participation in joint European
programs; national TELECOM 1 satellites to be laun-
ched in 1984; a bilateral program with the FRG to
launch direct TV broadcasting satellites in 1985), land
remote-sensing systems (the first satellite of which,
named SPOT 1, is to be launched in 1986 and will
incorporate two high-resolution instruments and
stereoscopic imaging capability), and a variety of other
programs.
French industry, meanwhile, does not content itself
with implementing national programs and its share of
European ones, but also strives very hard to compete
for space-related export sales. Ariane launch services
have been sold to several organizations or countries–
including private firms in the United States—and com-
munications satellites to ARABSAT (a consortium of
Arab countries).
CNES also runs a research program to evaluate ma-
terials processing applications, and has laid out plans
and preliminary designs for a specialized automated
“manufacturing-in-space system” named SOLARIS.
This concept features a platform (without crew facil-
ities) equipped with furnaces, adequate power supply,
and other ancillary subsystems including a robot man-
ipulator arm; a transfer and raw material supply stage
to be launched by Ariane 4; and a ballistic reentry cap-
sule to bring processed items back to Earth. An effort
to promote interest in this concept among other ESA
member-states has not met with success up to now,
perhaps because it was felt to be premature.
In sum, France’s space policy places a strong em-
phasis on “autonomy” (on a European level at least,
if not in the strictly national sense). This is due in part
to a frame of mind inherited from the de Gaulle era,
but now even more so to economic considerations;
commercial competition requires that a country be
able to play its own hand independently. Furthermore,
France and the FRG are now discussing plans for a
military reconnaissance satellite: this makes autonomy
all the more important to French decision makers.
Hence the staunch support (and high financial con-
tribution) given to the Ariane program, and the care-
fully balanced bilateral cooperation with many differ-
ent countries: the United States, the FRG, Sweden,
and the U.S.S.R. particularly. In ESA’s policymaking
bodies, France has been and will probably remain in
the future one of the staunchest advocates of the dual
approach of balancing cooperation with the United
States with an equally strong commitment to autono-
mous capabilities.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Just like France and other members of ESA, the FRG
conducts the largest share of its space efforts through
that agency’s joint programs. In particular, the FRG
government strongly supported the Spacelab program
at its inception in the early 1970s, and since then has
provided more than 50 percent of its funding. The FRG
also provides the largest single contribution to ESA’s
remote-sensing programs (METEOSAT, ERS), and land
communications programs (OTS, ETS). More recently,
when trying to shape ESA’s future programs, the FRG
has acted as a promoter of the EURECA project de-
scribed earlier, while France was promoting Ariane 4.
The FRG, however, is also engaged in a number of
bilateral cooperative undertakings. Along with France,
the FRG is developing TV-SAT, a direct television
broadcasting satellite: experience thus gained will
enable its electronics and aerospace firms to compete
for export sales in what is expected to become one
of the fastest growing markets, that of DBS (direct
broadcasting satellites). Another important area of
bilateral endeavor is space science, not only with the
United States (several FRG scientific satellites have
been launched by the United States), but also with
France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Strong emphasis on materials science and process-
ing is a characteristic feature of the FRG’s space pro-
gram. This includes suborbital flights on sounding
rockets, which provide a few minutes of “near zero
gravity”; small payload packages to be carried by the
Shuttle (referred to by NASA as “Getaway Specials”)
and of course utilization of Spacelab. The FRG has
conducted major experiments on the first Spacelab
mission in 1983 (which was a joint U.S.-European
flight). It has also purchased and will manage a wholly
FRG Spacelab mission called D-1, to be flown in Oc-
tober 1985.
The FRG materials processing program is not purely
scientific in orientation. It aims at involving the indus-
trial sector early in exploring potential applications of
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space-processed metals, composite metals, crystals,
and chemicals. This close association of government
support with industry’s initiative seems to work well,
all the more so because the FRG’s major aerospace
and electronics firms play a much larger role in initi-
ating and funding research and development efforts
than do their counterparts in other European
countries.
Generally speaking, this fits in well with what ap-
pears to be the overall goal of the FRG’s space poli-
cy: to encourage its national aerospace industry, to
promote scientific and industrial/technological re-
search, and to rely on ESA’S programs to stay in the
applications business. The keyword seems to be
“competition through technological capability” rather
than “competition through nationally proven sys-
tems.” (This latter could well be the French motto.)
All this supports the views expressed in many quar-
ters that among ESA’s member-states the FRG is the
most “transatlantic-rein ded,” and that its attitude
towards cooperative ventures with the United States
is likely to be more positive than that of the French.
There is no doubt that in ESA’s councils, and even
more freely so when drafting its national program, the
FRG would consider very seriously a possible invita-
tion from the United States to participate in “space
station” development. Also, the FRG has been less
outspoken than France in its reactions to the frustra-
tions which have resulted from some of the past U. S.-
Europe joint ventures. But the frustrations were there
all the same, and like most of its European partners,
the FRG will weigh closely the pros and cons of the
possible modes of cooperation.
ITALY
With a 1983 budget for space activities in the range
of$150 million, of which slightly more than one-half
makes up its contribution to ESA programs, Italy is
clearly demonstrating a willingness to implement a
space policy of its own. The framing of such a policy
seems to be hindered by lack of central coordination
among the several interested government agencies:
Defense, Communications, and the National Research
Council (CNR). The last, however, seems to be in the
process of taking the lead.
In 1979, CNR managed to secure government ap-
proval for an overall plan calling for a sharp increase
in funding; this has been partly implemented. Most
of the increase is to fund national programs, especially
in the field of communications satellites: a system
named ITALSAT is being considered, as well as a di-
rect broadcasting TV system. Meanwhile, Italy has
strongly supported ESA’s experimental L-SAT program
and has taken a leading position in advanced com-
munications technology (20-30 gigahertz) through the
SIRIO-2 meteorological data dissemination satellite,
which was destroyed in 1982 when the first Ariane
operational flight failed to achieve orbit.
Besides its marked interest in communications-re-
lated space activities, Italy has undertaken several
bilateral cooperative ventures with NASA, particularly
in areas not covered by European programs. In the
past, these have included an imaginative concept
called San Marco, involving several launchings of
small scientific satellites by U.S.-made SCOUT rockets
from an off-shore platform located on the equator off
the coast of Kenya. More recently, Italy started devel-
oping IRIS, a small booster stage for Shuttle payloads.
Remote sensing is another theme for U.S.-Italian coop-
eration, if only because Italy runs the main European
Landsat data receiving station located at Fucino near
Rome.
The latest scheme considered for a joint U.S.-Italian
venture is worth mentioning because of its obvious
relation to in-space activities. It is the so called
“tethered satellite” concept, in which a scientific sat-
ellite is to be attached by a long umbilical cord to the
Shuttle or another infrastructure element in orbit. Italy
now has a Memorandum of Understanding with
NASA regarding this matter, and joint studies are
under way to develop the concept, Perhaps because
of this, Italy up to now has been one of the most eager
of ESA’s member-states to participate in informal dis-
cussions on U.S.-European cooperation in a “space
station” development program.
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Although the United Kingdom initially showed lit-
tle inclination to share in NASA’s “space station”
aspirations, this situation has changed over the past
year, with U.K. interest coming to focus on platforms.
Great Britain is, after France and the FRG, the third
largest contributor to ESA’s budget, but the lion’s share
of its attention over the past several years has been
given to satellite communications, within ESA as well
as nationally. As it happens, a “space station” has
been thought, until recently, to be of relatively little
value to satellite communications (except in the very
long term). Britain’s developing interest in long-term
in-orbit infrastructure, coupled with its intention of
maintaining its vigorous space science program (pur-
sued both through ESA and bilaterally with NASA) and
its rapidly growing interest in remote sensing, may sig-
nal a move toward a more comprehensive and diver-
sified space program.
App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . 195
OTHER ESA MEMBER-STATES
This paper has dwelt at some length on those mem-
bers of ESA which deem it preferable to participate
directly, as well as through ESA, in talks with NASA
on “space station” matters, This does by no means
imply a lack of interest on other member countries’
parts. However, it does make it more difficult to assess
their positions with respect to possible U.S. overtures
since those positions are not debated publicly.21 One
fact remains, however: all ESA’s members have en-
trusted to the Agency a long-term program planning
mandate, and have provided funds therefore. And this
mandate explicitly encompasses consideration of
“transatlantic” cooperation on a space station.
CANADA
There is a General Agreement on Cooperation bet-
ween Canada and ESA, which makes Canadian par-
ticipation in an ESA contribution to a space infrastruc-
ture program at least a possibility. Its longstanding
tradition of bilateral cooperation with the United
States, however, prompts Canada, through its National
Research Council, to evaluate its interest in a “space
station” independently.
Canada’s expenditures in space in 1983 were about
$100 million. Apart from a pioneering effort to operate
domestic satellite communications systems (the ANIK
spacecraft family built by Hughes) and a number of
joint scientific projects with the United States, Can-
ada’s major bilateral program with NASA is the de-
velopment of the remote manipulator arm for the
Shuttle. In return for a NASA commitment to purchase
additional arms from Toronto-based Spar Aerospace
Ltd., Canada has funded the $100 million develop-
ment of the first flight unit, which has been success-
fully tested on Shuttle flights. Manipulator systems
could be important features of space infrastructure and
thus are candidates for Canadian contribution.
JAPAN
With the exception of bilateral cooperation with the
United States, Japan has, to date, carried the burden
of its space activities alone.22 Fairly constant in the last
few years, Japan’s space expenditures per annum
amount to approximately $45O million, a budget near-
ly one half the size of the European Space Agency’s.
ZIThe ~sitlon  of the smaller states In ESA is somewhat simi far to that of
those in the European Economic Community. At the Economic Summit, the
big four European nations attend in their own right; the remaining six are
represented by the President of the Commission.
Zz)apan  may  nw be expanding its sphere of space cooperation. it has re-
cently opened a liaison office in Paris, for example.
Space development in Japan is executed under the
leadership of the Space Activities Commission (SAC),
an advisory organ to the Prime Minister. The main ex-
ecutive agency is the National Space Development
Agency (NASDA), established in 1969 to undertake
the development of applications satellites and related
launch vehicles, and to conduct launching and track-
ing operations. Another agency, the Institute of Space
and Astronautical Science (ISAS), is in charge of scien-
tific space programs carried out on balloons, sounding
rockets, and satellites. ISAS builds its own family of
launch vehicles and runs its own launch center at Kag-
oshima, independently of NASDA’s launch facilities
which are located at Tanegashima.
Japan is the only country where large-scale space
science and space applications programs are carried
out by two completely separate entities, reporting to
different departments of government; while ISAS is an
“independent national institute” under the Ministry
of Education, NASDA reports to the Prime Minister’s
Office through the Science and Technology Agency.
But NASDA also carries out programs on behalf of,
and draws funds from, other ministries: Transport
(meteorology), Posts and Telecommunications,
From 1970 to 1981, Japan successfully launched 21
satellites, developed two families of launch vehicles,
undertook the development of several more satellites
and of a third type of launcher, and readied a number
of experiments to be carried by the Shuttle and
Spacelab. For the time being, this effort has been
directed exclusively towards meeting domestic needs
(communications, remote sensing) and the acquisition
of technology and expertise through a wide range of
scientific and experimental programs. Consequently,
there has been, to date, little effort by Japan to com-
pete with other space powers in offering commercial
services abroad. (An exception is the sale of ground
stations for setting up communications networks or
remote-sensing data reception; in these areas, Japa-
nese industry has captured a good share of the world
market.)
Until very recently, Japan has cooperated closely
with NASA as well as with U.S. industry. In the field
of space science, there have been a number of scien-
tific exchanges, and this will continue as Japan plans
to use flight opportunities on the Shuttle and Spacelab.
Many of Japan’s applications satellites, whether ex-
perimental or operational, have been developed with-
in the framework of joint ventures among Japanese
and U.S. companies. As far as launch vehicles are con-
cerned, the “Mu” series of small launchers has been
an indigenous development from the start, but the
larger “N” family to be used to launch applications
satellites has relied on technology transfers from the
United States.
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The first stage of the “N1” version is in effect a Thor-
Delta first stage built under license, and the third stage
is a U.S. (Thiokol) production. The improved “N2”
version goes even further in this direction, as it also
includes a U.S. (Aerojet) second stage. All told, Japa-
nese industry builds barely more than half of the “N2”
vehicle. It should be pointed out that the U. S.-Japa-
nese Agreement on Space Activities (signed in 1969)
imposes restrictions on the use of these U.S. technol-
ogies and hardware by curbing transfer to third parties.
The new launcher design, named Hi-A (roughly
equivalent to ESA’s Ariane 1 ) will alter this situation
significantly, for the second stage (which will burn ad-
vanced liquid hydrogen/oxygen propellants) and the
third stage, as well as the guidance system, will be of
indigenous design and manufacture. When the H1 -A
becomes operational, Japan will be only one step
removed from an autonomous launch capability,
namely the development of a new first stage (for which
preliminary designs have already been proposed).
In addition to the obvious desire to increase Japa-
nese industry’s share of the construction of space
hardware, this trend towards autonomy could be
based on two grounds. First, there may be dissatisfac-
tion with U.S.-supplied hardware; indeed, in 1979 and
1980 two costly launch failures were traced to prob-
able malfunction of U.S.-supplied subsystems, and in
the aftermath of these events it was decided to accel-
erate indigenous development.23 Second, an autono-
mous launch capability clearly would enable Japan
to offer full-scale commercial services in space ap-
placations. 24
Another aspect of Japan’s space policy is that little
has been done to diversify its sources for technology
procurement and partnerships beyond the United
States. Regular consultations are held, for instance,
with ESA, but amount to little beyond some coordi-
nation or satellite tracking stations. France was ap-
proached in the early 1970s and at several points later
on for possible cooperation on liquid hydrogen-fueled
rocket engines, but to no avail; the parties did not
reach even a conceptual definition of a cooperative
venture.
zqhe  japane5e  reaction to the recent failure of transponders on their di-
rect broadcast satdlite  suggests that the drive toward self-sufficiency will prob
ably be further intensified.
q has ~n ~nt~  out that Japan’s launch capabilities are severely limited
by agreements with the fishing industry, whereby the Tanegashima launch
center can be used only four months per year. But this restriction clearly
would not be sufficient to deter Japan frcwr  its traditional policy of entering
the world market after a technology has been mastered and tried out on do-
mestic markets.
In May 1984, Japan announced a plan for its par-
ticipation in the U.S. “space station” program. The
plan calls for Japan’s development of an experimental
module to carry out life science and materials science
experiments, to be performed by one Japanese work-
er. The module will be connected with the U.S. in-
frastructure. It will include a manipulator arm, exper-
imental devices for studies related to pharmaceuticals,
crystals, compound materials, and a self-sufficiency
food system. The development expenses to be paid
by Japan are estimated to be 200-300 billion yen [$0.9-
1.4 billion (1984)].
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Some developing countries can operate in space on
their own, as is exemplified by India and the People’s
Republic of China. Both countries have launched sev-
eral satellites using indigenous launchers. Both coun-
tries are engaged in efforts to use existing systems to
acquire expertise in important applications areas like
meteorology, remote sensing, communications, and
educational broadcasting. Details of programs and
technology are not always very well known outside
of these countries; most Western observers who have
visited space facilities in India and China have been
impressed by their potential, if not always by their
present condition. In both countries, an adequate sub-
stratum of advanced industries is missing—especially
in the areas of electronic components, high-grade ma-
terials, and chemicals—and strains are caused by con-
flicting priorities and by lack of foreign exchange.
Shortages of trained technicians add further difficul-
ties, but the foundation has been laid for further activ-
ities in space.
Other developing countries are striving to reach the
stage already attained by China and India. A few years
ago, it seemed that Brazil was on the verge of getting
a comprehensive program started, including its own
satellites and launchers, developed in part indige-
nously and in part with foreign help. (France and the
FRG had actually almost concluded agreements with
Brazil to that effect.) Political developments, growing
economic difficulties, and diplomatic pressures from
some countries that were, perhaps, wary of Brazil’s
access to missile technology have lowered these pros-
pects considerably. Although Brazil has not managed
to become a builder of space systems, it is an active
user of existing systems (INTELSAT for communica-
tions, LANDSAT for remote sensing), and still plans
to operate a satellite communications system of its
own, which would be procured abroad.
Utilization of space technology, in contrast to its de-
velopment, is almost worldwide. In particular, more
than 100 participating countries are members in
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INTELSAT, and each of them operates at least one
ground station. In addition, there are more than half
a dozen LANDSAT and/or SPOT remote-sensing data
reception stations i n existence or u rider construction
throughout the so-called Third World .25
Are there potential partners in a joint “space sta-
tion” venture to be found among these countries, es-
pecially among those which have some sort of aero-
space industry of their own? There is no basic reason
why the answer should be no, but it must be pointed
out that:
— to some of these countries, cooperation with the
United States would pose a tricky, if not insur-
mountable, political challenge, unless the mode
of cooperation approached a “genuinely inter-
national” one;
— financial participation of these countries could
probably not exceed a very small percentage of
the total cost; and
— such a program exceeds by far the ambitions that
these countries set at present for their endeavors
in space, and going along with it in an interna-
tional context would not satisfy the fundamental
craving for autonomy and self-assertion which
often, to some extent, underlies their space
policies.
Concerning the second point, it might be argued
that a large number of small percentages can amount
to a sizable sum. To give one example: 82 out of 102
signatures of INTELSAT own each less than 1 percent
of the shares, but their combined participation
amounts to more than 20 percent. As to the third
point, a genuinely international structure could be
acceptable to countries who see space activities as a
means of self-assertion; for, even if the system were
built and operated by industrialized countries, it
would at least be jointly owned/managed by all. These
considerations all point to the same conclusions: a sig-
nificant level of participation by developing countries
is unlikely to occur, except possibly within some
broad international framework and unless aggressively
pursued by the United States.
THE SOVIET UNION
Under present and foreseeable political circum-
stances, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to par-
ticipate in in a space venture initiated and led by the
United States. Even the prospects of its participating
in a genuinely international system seem very remote.
One need only remember that the Soviet Union, and
the other Eastern-bloc countries, have never joined
25Each  of these stations usually serves several Countria.
the INTELSAT organization. These countries decided
instead to create their own international satellite com-
munications system, named INTERSPUTNIK; since the
two systems have to be linked somehow, there are
INTELSAT ground stations in the U. S. S. R., Cuba, and
Romania, but these countries are users of and not par-
ties to INTELSAT. It is true that the Soviet Union is
party to several international satellite systems, notably
INMARSAT (which is, roughly speaking, to maritime
communications, what INTELSAT is to ground com-
munications) and SARSAT-CORPAS (an experimental
satellite assisted search and rescue system). But these
were created in a context where the United States did
not play a dominant role.
However, it is not possible to discuss international
prospects for international involvement in a “space
station” without mentioning the Soviet Union, for that
country does operate its own in-space infrastructure:
Sal yut-Soyuz-Progress .26 Furthermore, the Soviet
Union has provided opportunities to several other
countries to have one or more of their citizens visit
this infrastructure.
The Soviets have never concealed their ultimate in-
tention to have some of their people in space
operating permanent facilities there, and Salyut is
clearly a major step towards that goal. The pace of
its future evolution is, however, open to conjecture.
The Salyut-Soyuz-Progress infrastructure, as developed
to date, does not exhibit all the features to which
NASA aspires for U.S. in-space infrastructure.
For instance, the Salyut’s crew can perform work
only inside the station, or, when spacewalking, only
very close to it, by remaining tethered. The Soviets
apparently have no such thing as manned maneuver-
ing units, teleoperated maneuvering systems, and the
like. As a result, the crew cannot tend other space-
craft which might co-orbit or rendezvous with their
complex, in order to maintain, service, or repair them.
This reflects adversely on all material processing re-
search: Salyut, because of perturbations caused by
NThe  name  SALYUT  designates a series of manned Ohitd  laboratories,
launched and operated one at a time since 1971. The system presently ac-
tive, SALYU1 7, is likely to stay several years in orbit, as did its predecessor
SALYUT  6, both because of design improvements and because a fair amount
of in-orbit maintenance can now be carried out by visiting crews. The space-
craft, weighing about 40,000 Ibs,  is launched unmanned, and later on rendez-
vous with SOYUZ  capsules carrying a crew of 2 or 3. SALYUT  6 and 7 have
also been visited by larger (30,000 Ibs)  unmanned craft. The usual pattern
of activity is to send abroad first a “semi-permanent” crew of two for a dura-
tion now exceeding 6 months. While this crew stays on board, visiting crews
of three join them (usually for a week). These visits alternate with unmanned
resupply trips by PROGRESS. To date, the station has been left unoccupied
for some time after the semipermanent crew has accomplished its long-dur-
ation stay, after which the cycle starts again. For a more complete discus-
sion, see the OTA Technical Memorandum Sa/yut:  Soviet  Steps Toward Per-
manent Human Presence in Space, December 1982.
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crew members’ movements and the lack of a free-fly-
ing platform in its vicinity, does not provide the very
low level of residual “gravity” necessary for the im-
plementation of finely tuned experiments.
In spite of this, and other present limitations, the Sal-
yut has been used extensively for military and civil-
ian activities. In the latter case, where some results
are known, cosmonauts have performed useful work
in life sciences, Earth observation, astronomy, mate-
rials processing, and technology development. Fur-
thermore, SaIyut has enabled the Soviet Union to gain
the prestige associated with having some of its peo-
ple in orbit.
Cooperation with the Soviet Union in space is a
complex matter.27 Planning is difficult when future
plans are, by definition, to be kept secret. Communi-
cation with authoritative Soviet representatives tends
to be scant, slow, and often “beside the point.” Stand-
ards, methods and even terminology are very different
from those in use outside the Soviet Union. Conse-
quently, project managers and teams from these coun-
tries who have been involved in bilateral programs
with the U.S.S.R. have usually experienced great dif-
ficulties in keeping cost and schedule under control.
However, Soviet teams have proven their ability to
be flexible and imaginative when they feel the need
for it. For example, West German scientists whose in-
struments are to be flown on the upcoming Soviet
VEGA mission to Halley’s Comet have found the co-
operative arrangements quite satisfactory.
Whatever the difficulties inherent in international
cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space activities, there
are countries which have no other choice, and there
are countries which find advantage in balancing coop-
eration with the United States with joint ventures with
the Soviet Union. It seems unlikely, however, that
these latter countries would go so far as to bypass co-
operation with the United States on a “space station”
by exclusive recourse to analogous Soviet flight op-
portunities.
Factors Influencing Assessment
of International Involvement in
U.S. “Space Station” Program
PAST EXPERIENCE
Both the United States and its potential partners will
have a substantial historical record in mind when it
comes time to decide whether, and how, to proceed
in a cooperative “space station” endeavor.
The debate over European participation in NASA’s
post-Apollo program is by far the most important past
experience, since it was the only time that the United
States invited its major allies–Europe, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and Japan—to participate in an effort which was
at the core of NASA’s plans for the future. While there
had been significant scientific cooperation prior to
1969, particularly with Europe, there was a deliberate
decision as NASA’s post-Apollo efforts were being
planned in 1969 and 1970 to make international in-
volvement in those efforts, particularly of U.S. allies,
a major theme.
Armed with what he thought was a mandate from
President Richard Nixon to seek such involvement,
NASA Administrator Thomas Paine toured Europe and
the Far East inviting other countries to consider
substantial involvement in the emerging U.S. post-
Apollo plans, which at the time included a “space sta-
tion,” Shuttle, reusable orbital transfer vehicle (“space
tug”), and, ultimately, having people visit Mars. Euro-
pean nations, through ELDO and ESRO, were particu-
larly responsive to Paine’s initiative, and began to
study in some detail various forms of participation; nei-
ther Japan nor Australia made an active response to
the U.S. initiative.
A pr imary NASA object ive in  in i t ia t ing the
post-Apollo dialogue was “to stimulate Europeans to
rethink their present limited space objectives, to help
them avoid wasting resources on obsolescent devel-
opments, and eventually to establish more consider-
able prospects for future international collaboration
on major space projects. ”28 In particular, NASA was
eager to steer Europe away from developing an auton-
omous launch capability. Plans for an expendable
European launcher were the “obsolescent develop-
ments” to which Paine was referring.
At the time NASA was offering to involve other
countries in an ambitious post-Apollo enterprise; it did
not have White House or congressional approval for
the programs it was promoting overseas. Indeed, one
tactic NASA may have been using to gain program ap-
proval at home was to point out the problems involved
in withdrawing from incipient agreements with Eur-
ope to cooperate in those programs. Potential U.S.
partners were aware of the NASA approach; in Sep-
tember 1970, for example, “American space officials
were asked for assurance that, if West European na-
tions scrapped their space programs in favor of a joint
effort with the United States, the latter would not, in
an economy move, back down. ”29
ZTU  ,s, /u .s, s, R. Coowation  in space will be examined by OTA in detail
in a technical memorandum to be published late In 1984.
ZBLetter  from Thomas  Paine, NASA  Administrator, to the President, NOV.
7, 1969.
ZqNew York Times, Sept. 24, 1970, P. 64.
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By 1971, only the Shuttle and orbital transfer vehi-
cle remained as part of NASA’s post-Apollo plans; the
“space station” had been shelved for the indefinite
future. NASA was suggesting to Europe that its partic-
ipation involve developing some portion of the air-
frame of the Shuttle orbiter and total responsibility for
developing the space tug. However, others within the
Executive Branch were skeptical that Europe had the
technical capability to develop the tug on its own, and
were concerned that the United States might, in the
process of assisting Europe in the tug development,
transfer sensitive and/or economically valuable U.S.
technology.
Throughout 1970 and 1971, negotiations on Euro-
pean involvement in post-Apollo development efforts
were Iinked to a European request for U.S. assurance
that it would launch European communication satel-
lites. The United States had for some time resisted pro-
viding such assurances on terms acceptable to Eur-
ope because of its own economic interests, both
INTELSAT and in U.S. industry’s domination of the
market for communications satellites, but i n Septem-
ber 1971 a compromise on the issue acceptable to
both sides was reached and this obstacle to the post-
Apollo negotiations was removed.
President Nixon approved development of the Shut-
tle on January 5, 1972. Shortly afterwards, a joint
NASA/European “experts group” met and reported
that “NASA . . . continued to encourage European
participation in development and use of the post-
Apollo program. . . . NASA’s expectation [was] that
European participation in development of the Shut-
tle would be within the context of a broader program
which included multilateral European responsibility
for development of a major element such as reusable
space tugs . . , or Shuttle-borne orbital laborator-
ies . . , .“3°
The suggestion that there was an alternative to Euro-
pean development of the space tug had emerged with-
in the United States during 1971; the so-called “sor-
tie can” laboratory (also called a research and
applications module) was seen as clearly within Euro-
pean capabilities, offering no risks of unwanted tech-
nology transfer, having no military implications, and
providing clean technical and managerial interfaces
with development of the Shuttle orbiter itself. On the
other hand, two factors militated against Europe’s de-
veloping the tug: 1 ) recognition that the Shuttle and
its associated orbital transfer vehicle would be used
by the United States for military, as well as civilian,
purposes, and 2) NASA’s concern over housing the
JONASA press  Release, Feb. 11, 1972.
tug, with its planned cryogenic fuel, in the Shuttle
payload bay.
In June 1972, the United States withdrew (without
warning) the option of Europe’s participation being
development of the tug, and told Europe that the only
choice left for substantial participation was develop-
ment of the sortie laboratory. Europe was also ex-
cluded from direct involvement in developing any ele-
ment of the Shuttle orbiter itself. This decision came
as a blow to Europe, which had already spent substan-
tial sums both on tug development and, particularly
in the United Kingdom and Italy, on orbiter design
work in collaboration with U.S. industry. In terms of
stimulus to European technical and industrial capa-
bility and eventual sales potential, Europe viewed the
sortie laboratory as a distinctly less desirable option.
Nevertheless, Europe (and in particular the FRG)
found the opportunity to become involved with the
U.S. mainstream program for the 1970s attractive
enough that it continued negotiations in a situation
where the United States was clearly playing a domi-
nant role. After a further year of negotiations, in mid-
1973 Europe agreed to proceed with development of
the sortie laboratory (by now named Spacelab) as part
of a “package deal” which also included development
of a French launcher (which became the Ariane proj-
ect) and of an experimental maritime communications
satellite and which called for the creation of a single
European Space Agency to carry out these projects.
It was the difference in cost between the expensive
tug development program and the less expensive (at
the time) Spacelab program which freed up the fun-
ding needed to initiate joint European support of
Ariane.
The Memorandum of Understanding which gov-
erned NASA/European cooperation on Spacelab was
signed in September 1973.31 At the time of the U. S.-
European agreement on Spacelab development, it was
anticipated that the facility would be used extensively
in conjunction with the Shuttle and that the United
States would buy several Spacelabs beyond the one
engineering model and one flight model which Eur-
ope agreed to develop and build at its own cost and
then to deliver to NASA. This has not yet happened.
31 The Mou b~ween  NASA and E’jA  was  a subo~l  “ate  document  ~hlch
drew its authority from the Intergowxnmental  Agreement between the United
States on the one hand and each of the individual governments of the ESRO
Member States on the other. This Agreement was thus binding on the whole
of the U.S. Government not just on NASA. Although ratified by the parlia-
ments of several ESRO  countries, it was not submitted to the U.S. Senate
for ratification. As a consequence, its status was that of an “International
Executive Agreement” and, as such, subordinate to U.S. domestic law. This
point, which the ESRO  states did not appreciate at the time, became impor-
tant in 1979 in connection with a U.S. Air Force plan (later cancelled)  to
develop a system similar to Spacelab.
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The costs of both Shuttle and Spacelab utilization have
escalated to the point where extensive utilization of
the full Spacelab capabilities is questionable, and the
United States has bought only the minimum single ad-
ditional Spacelab to which it was committed.
The Europeans knew that, under the circumstances,
they would have to accept the status of a junior part-
ner. Now that they have demonstrated their compe-
tence, they will look to agreements on a much more
equitable basis as Europe considers cooperation with
the United States in “space station” development. For
example, the current head of CNES has questioned
whether Spacelab has “fulfilled German expectations”
(the FRG was the major European advocate of the pro-
gram) and has suggested that “there is some question
as to whether Spacelab . . . is really appreciated by
the U.S. . . . In any event, Europe does not really feel
at home in Spacelab, whose operation is now out of
European hands.”32
European acceptance of what some now perceive
to be unfavorable terms in the Spacelab agreement
stemmed in large part from lack of confidence in Euro-
pean capabilities and from a belief that only through
cooperation with the United States could those capa-
bilities be improved. Now, having brought both
Spacelab and Ariane to success, Europe has much
more confidence in its ability to chart its own future
in space and it is likely to be a more demanding par-
ticipant in negotiations with the United States over
cooperative ventures.
European confidence in the United States as a coop-
erative partner was shaken in the spring of 1981 when
the United States announced, without prior consulta-
tion with its European partners, that it was canceling
a U.S. spacecraft which was part of a two-spacecraft
International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM).33 This with-
drawal caused vigorous protests from not only Euro-
pean space officials but also representatives of foreign
ministries.34 There is general agreement that the ISPM
affair was not handled well by the United States.35 Al-
though both the United States and Europe have man-
aged to put ISPM in perspective, European officials
are not beyond using U.S. remorse over the incident
‘
zHerbert Curien, “The Pride of France: a National Commitment, ” Spec-
trum, September 1983, p. 75.
JJlndeed, European confidence had been shaken earlier when the United
States cancel led its share in the AEROSAT program, In this instance, the U.S.
withdrawal was total, and the program was stopped.
3zFor  a runn i ng account of the International Solar Polar  Mission COfItrOVerSy,
see articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar, 2, Mar. 30, Aug.
3, Sept. 28, and Dec. 28, 1981.
JSlt  is ~rhaps  ~rth noting that the situation was aggravated because NASA
was not permitted to consult or even warn ESA  of the impending cancella-
tion until the President’s budget had been delivered to the Congress.
as a bargaining chip in U.S.-European negotiations on
future collaboration. For a time, though, it seemed as
if “aberrations such as the unilateral pullout by the
United States” from the ISPM could “set back pro-
gress for years.”36 It is perhaps an indication of the
basically favorable climate for U.S.-European collab-
oration in space activities that the ISPM incident and
the Spacelab experience are viewed as lessons of what
is to be avoided in future negotiations rather than
reasons for not cooperating in the future.
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
Military and national intelligence space activities
provide the United States and its allies with major na-
tional security advantages, and all indications point
towards reliance on them in the future. A major pro-
gram like the “space station” is therefore bound to
have national security implications. If a decision is
made to develop a single set of infrastructure elements
to satisfy all interests, civilian and military, then the
prospect of international involvement in such a pro-
gram raises critical questions. This is all the more true
since new security implications may emerge as the
program matures. If the future unveils unforeseen po-
tentialities, international participation in the program
may inhibit, perhaps even prevent. the United States
from taking full advantage of them.
To an extent, major international involvement will
obviously restrict U.S. freedom of choice in the future:
it would be more difficult, for instance, for the United
States to preserve the option of integrating all its ef-
forts in space (military as well as civilian) and having
a single Government agency responsible for them
(though the U.S. Army and its Corps of Engineers may
exemplify a possible approach). Such a drastic step
has been debated and rejected in the past, but, in prin-
ciple, it remains an option which international par-
ticipation might foreclose. Conversely, any form of
U.S. military activity would raise major problems for
ESA as a partner, since the ESA charter precludes any
involvement in military projectso37
A more likely future, however, is that any national
security uses would rely on elements operationally
separate from the civilian one, but built with similar
or identical technology and perhaps making joint use
of basic utilities. Dependence of any military seg-
ment(s) on parts and/or subsystems procured from for-
eign sources could ensue, This is a situation which will
36Noel  Hinners, “Space Science and Humanistic Concerns,” in Jerry Grey
and Lawrence Levy, eds.,  Global Implications of Space Activities (American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1982), p. 43.
‘Three  of ESA’S  members (Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland) are neutral
countries.
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never please the military (which, like France, prefers
“autonomy”), but which can probably be met with
adequate licensing arrangements (e.g., those under
which the A V-8 Harrier aircraft was produced). For
instance, if the U.S. military were to envision using
elements of any civilian space infrastructure under
such circumstances, a foreign supplier could be re-
quired to entrust a U.S. official agency with all draw-
ings and documents needed to transfer the manufac-
turing of the item under consideration to a U.S.
supplier if such a course eventually proved to be nec-
essary. An intergovernmental arrangement would spe-
cify those situations where the U.S. agency is author-
ized to implement the transfer to a national supplier,
so as to protect the foreign firm’s commercial inter-
ests in all other cases.
Such a device works best when the back-up sup-
plier in the U.S. is pre-identified, so that a minimum
amount of transfer of know-how, consistent with the
preservation of the foreign source’s interests, can be
carried out in advance, thus shortening the inevita-
ble lead time inherent in a manufacturing restart. Of
course, there is always the possibility that the U.S. mil-
itary could procure systems directly from non-U. S.
suppliers; this has happened for a few military systems
in the past.
Another security-related consequence of interna-
tional participation could be that foreign participants
would be exposed to the operating characteristics of
the technology used by U.S. national security agen-
cies. This could involve those parts or subsystems pro-
vided by foreign sources, and can be assessed only
on a case-by-case basis. But the matter could extend
beyond foreign-supplied hardware, since foreign par-
ticipants will of necessity have access to a certain level
of technological detail, especially those interfacing
with what they supply. This, however, is not neces-
sarily critical: in a similar instance, the Shuttle, al-
though it can be used to carry on U.S. national secu-
rity activities, is itself not a classified item. However,
many aspects of Shuttle operations, such as access to
the Orbiter itself, are carried out under strict security,
and the military has developed separate control facil-
ities for its use of the Shuttle.
Similarly, as the presumed leader in a space infra-
structure program, the United States is bound to be
i n a dominant position regarding transfer of sensitive
technology and industrial information. As was the case
with Spacelab, all data and drawings pertaining to any
foreign contribution would have to be made available
to the United States in order to allow operation, main-
tenance, and repairs to be carried out. The United
States, on the other hand, would have to provide only
essential interface data to its partners. Such considera-
tions, therefore, should not discourage the United
States from seeking foreign participation, if it so
desires.
Perhaps more important to national security con-
siderations are the restrictions which might be im-
posed on certain national security uses of internation-
ally developed infrastructure. While some, perhaps
many, potential international partners might not op-
pose so-called “peaceful” military applications (e.g.,
military R&D, or activities in support areas such as
communications, navigation, surveillance), some of
them are unlikely to agree to the installation of any
“battle station” on an element derived from a devel-
opment program to which they are party. There is
clearly no way to bypass such an issue: it would of
necessity have to be settled beforehand, as explicitly
as possible, in the agreement instituting the interna-
tional program.
A last issue relating to national security considera-
tions is that of the transfer of technology from the
United States to foreign participants, or vice versa.
There are generally two ways in which such technol-
ogy
1.
2.
transfers occur: “
In the course of an international development
program, a certain amount of know-how is inevi-
tably transferred among the parties to the project.
This is more in the nature of general knowledge
(management, organizational methodology and
procedures) than of specific technological skills.
The character of technical interaction between
NASA and ESA in conjunction with Spacelab,
even though it includes some technical assistance
provided by NASA, is evidence of this.
If a foreign participant in charge of a given sub-
system were to appear unable; at a late stage of
the program, to produce a product conforming
to required performance standards, it then would
become necessary to assist the concerned party
in meeting the specifications, a process which
might involve the transfer of valuable and sensi-
tive know-how. This can only be assessed on a
case-by-case basis, but a number of safeguards
can be built into the program at the start. These
would include careful selection of subsystems en-
trusted to foreign participants and provision for
midcourse assessment of performance. Of
course, the reverse possibility now exists as well:
that the United States could gain access to valu-
ab le  technolog ica l  know-how f rom other
countries.
POTENTIAL PRIVATE-SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
In principle, private business and international
cooperation are perfectly compatible; successful
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“multinationals” are proof of this. It is true that until
recently there were no multinational firms involved
in space developments (unless INTELSAT is seen as
a business). Actually, space activities in practically all
countries constitute an area where governmental set-
ting of policy, financing, and implementation of pro-
grams are the rule, although the private sector can be
expected to play an increasingly important role in fu-
ture space activities.
There is a clear trend towards increased private-sec-
tor involvement in those applications of space ex-
pected to generate profit, and the matter of “space
commercialization” is now being actively debated in
the United States. In Europe, precedents have been
set with firms like ARIANESPACE (for the sale of launch
services) and SPOT-IMAGE (for the commercial ex-
ploitation of the French SPOT Earth-resources-sensing
satellite). In Japan, space programs rely on close gov-
ernment-industry interaction.
Hence, if it appears that activities conducted using
space infrastructure can be economically profitable,
the fact that it was developed internationally should
not present an insurmountable obstacle to private-sec-
tor involvement in its use. However, all other things
being equal, it is likely that U.S. industry would pre-
fer to deal with infrastructure owned and operated by
U.S. interests, Government or private.
THE ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS
The greater the prospects of commercial use of
space infrastructure, the better the prospects for re-
turns from investments made to develop it. The eco-
nomic prospects can only gain from its large and wide-
encompassing utilization. Such utilization, including
foreign users, may exist even if the United States de-
velops all or nearly all of the infrastructure. Many
foreign customers would be attracted to any oppor-
tunities provided by its use. The extent of commer-
cialization would then depend mainly on the condi-
tions set by the owner(s) and operator(s): first and
foremost, pricing policy, but also any commercial re-
strictions (e.g., will the infrastructure be made avail-
able to foreign firms competing directly with U.S. firms
in a given field of application?) and technical factors
(e.g., such stringent safety requirements that disclosure
of proprietary knowledge would have to be made by
the user). However, NASA’s experience with accom-
modating commercial interests (including R&D efforts)
on the Shuttle, through such mechanisms as Joint En-
deavor Agreements and trips purchased in whole or
in part by commercial interests under proprietary con-
ditions, provides precedents which suggest that even
U.S.-only elements could accommodate non-U.S.
commercial users successfully.
It appears likely that international involvement in
space infrastructure development, operation, and
ownership would enhance the prospects for an eco-
nomically efficient and broadly based utilization pro-
gram. Common interest in its future capabilities and
use will stimulate creativity and innovation among a
much wider international community of potential us-
ers, including non-profit-seeking ones (governmental
agencies, research institutions and the like). Also, any
competition from the Soviet Union will be lessened
if spacefaring countries feel secure in their participa-
tion in a U.S./international complex.
THE TECHNICAL ADEQUACY OF POTENTIAL
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
What components of space infrastructure would
each of the potential partners reviewed earlier be most
likely to contribute by virtue of the current tenden-
cies of its own programs, of the existence of techno-
logical domains where its industry is known to excel,
or of other factors? Answers to this question are im-
portant. For if any foreign partners enter such a coop-
erative effort, the United States must ensure that their
technical contributions are feasible, compatible, and
complementary. Or, from another perspective: to
what extent would the desired infrastructure have to
be modified in order to accommodate contributions
by a given set of participants?
It is impossible now to suggest more than a few gen-
eralities, inasmuch as NASA has not yet specified what
the overall performance specifications are going to be.
Too, the level of technical sophistication for a given
subsystem cannot yet be articulated. As just one ex-
ample, consider electric power conditioning and dis-
tribution. On all spacecraft developed until now, elec-
tric power is distributed at low voltage, and all
spacefaring countries possess the relevant technology.
Many experts, however, judge that, for long-term in-
space infrastructure, this technology should be sup-
planted by an alternative, high-voltage technology. In
anticipation of just such a development, ESA and
NASA have been discussing for some time the gener-
ation of a set of standards to be employed in space-
craft high-voltage power systems; but the matter is still
outstanding,
Lastly, potential participants may wish to make their
contribution, not in the areas where their industry is
best endowed with existing capabilities, but rather in
areas where they want it to acquire new capabilities.
Nothing should prevent them from doing so if they
are ready to commit themselves to meet the costs of
such new and (to them) risky developments. This mat-
ter could become “sticky,” however, if they were to
wish to make a “key” contribution in such an area,
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Thus, no useful projection of task allocation can be
made now. Perhaps the division of work will have to
be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, before the pro-
gram actually starts, but after its shape and definition
have been outlined in more detail. Some countries are
already suggesting ways in which they might prefer
to contribute, and it would be wise for the United
States to give careful consideration to including pro-
spective partners in the infrastructure design phase in
some sensible fashion.
Assessment: Pros and Cons
of International Involvement
A “U.S. ONLY” PROGRAM
At first glance, since almost certainly the United
States is likely to bear the largest part of the financial
burden of a “space station” development program,
and since international cooperation is fraught with
many well-known difficulties, it would seem that there
would be much merit in the prospect of an independ-
ent, strictly U. S., undertaking. In addition, many of
the reasons which have led the United States to con-
sider a “space station” program in the first place—
national pride and a sense of accomplishment, nation-
al prestige, national security, or supporting U.S. firms
in commercial space activities—might best be served
by a program carried out under exclusive U.S. control.
Similarly, it could be argued that potential interna-
tional partners might find it to their advantage to be
left to their own devices in planning and implement-
ing their respective space programs, rather than hav-
ing to weigh the pros and cons of associating them-
selves with what will in essence be an American
program, unlikely to be perfectly suited to their goals
and/or technical and financial resources and likely to
limit their ability to pursue independent actions.
The arguments in favor of a strictly national U.S. pro-
gram can be summarized as follows:
1, There is no substantial reason why the United
States would not be able to go it alone: the coun-
try has all the technical and industrial resources
necessary.
2. Generating and maintaining international inter-
38
est in a “space station” program and enlisting
participants is in itself a difficult process, leading
to many concessions on the part of the United
States and other participating countries, the re-
turn from which could be rather disappointing.
Participation of Europe in major U.S. space
undertakings, such as the Space Transportation
System or the Space Telescope, seems always to
stay in the 10 to 15 percent range, which is con-
sistent with European space budgets. Even if one
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other major partner, say Japan, joins the “space
station” program at a similar level, this still leaves
the U.S. to bear 60 to 70 percent of the expense.
International cooperative programs, especially
where advanced technology is concerned, have
the reputation of being beleaguered by complex
diplomatic and managerial interfaces, as well as
by difficult compromises needed to tailor the
overall undertaking to each participant’s particu-
lar requirements.
Past experience points to the fact that the U.S.
civilian space pro-gram is difficult enough to coor-
dinate with the U.S. national security program on
a purely national basis. This could be even more
difficult in the case of an international “space sta-
tion” program.
These considerations must however be carefully
weighed against a number of arguments in favor of
international involvement:
As stated repeatedly, international cooperation
is a long-standing tradition in civilian space pro-
grams, and pursuing it has had a very positive po-
litical impact. Traditional partners of the United
States in the industrialized world consistently list
cooperation with this country among the objec-
tives of their space policy statements; for exam-
ple, the head of the French space program, who
also chairs the ESA Council and the European Sci-
ence Foundation, has recently noted that “coop-
eration with the United States is of fundamental
importance. ”38 The United States has given a
strong impression already that it anticipates sig-
nificant international utilization of a “space sta-
tion” and that, in order to assure such utilization,
it wilI be receptive to foreign participation i n the
development phase of the program. A decision
to forego such participation would certainly have
major (though probably not yet very major) po-
litical costs.
2. As discussed earlier, if the United States chooses
to go ahead alone with its space infrastructure ac-
quisition program, several countries or groups of
countries among the industrialized Western-type
democracies are likely to follow suit, even if on
a smaller scale and after some time. Such duplica-
tion of efforts might well result in a net loss to
the Western world. The very cost of these invest-
ments is bound to generate an extremely harsh
level of competition for their commercial utiliza-
tion, to the point where it may not be economi-
cally sound any more and the benefits of space
~acurlen, op. Cit., P. 76
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commercialization could be lost or significantly
delayed.
3. Even if the prospects that Europe and Japan may
associate in a joint “space station” program with-
out the United States seem remote, there is no
doubt that this possibility becomes more likely
if the United States chooses to go it alone. As
argued earlier, there are virtually no cir-
cumstances in which Europe or Japan would
refuse a U.S. offer of involvement in the “space
station, ” and thus it is up to the United States to
decide whether to make that offer.
As argued earlier and briefly again above, a likely
impact of U.S. decision to proceed alone would be
the eventual development by other space-oriented
countries of capabilities which will be, at least in part,
similar to those offered by a U.S. “space station.” This
could result in increased downstream economic com-
petition between the United States and other indus-
trial countries in commercial exploitation of space. By
involving potential competitors in the U.S. ‘program,
this situation might be avoided or minimized. There
is a certain parallel with the situation regarding Euro-
pean involvement in U.S. post-Apollo activities. By
withdrawing the offer of European development of a
space tug (with an estimated cost to Europe of $500
million—$1 billion) and substituting the Spacelab (then
estimated to cost $100 million-$200 million), the
United States made possible a European financial
commitment to develop its own launcher, which is
now competing with the Shuttle for launch contracts.
The United States needs to evaluate carefully whether
it wants to create a similar situation as its “space sta-
tion” program begins.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, from the U.S.
perspective international involvement is an option, not
a requirement. However, not only are there strong
reasons for the United States to pursue this option,
but, at least from NASA’s perspective, internationaliz-
ing the “space station” program to some meaningful
degree eventually may bean important means of ga-
thering political support in this country for the size
and kind of program that it wishes to have. If the na-
tionalistic objectives which might be served by NASA’s
present “space station” program aspirations are not
sufficient to gain White House and congressional sup-
port of a “go it alone” approach, then an approach
mixing nationalistic and cooperative elements seems
essential to mobilize political support for it.
AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM
This approach to space infrastructure development,
operation, and use would be preferred by the United
States and/or other space-capable countries only if it
was the best available means of maximizing all of the
national objectives which have led to beginning the
program in the first place. As mentioned earlier, the
INTELSAT and INMARSAT analogy is rather mislead-
ing here. The objectives of those systems are inher-
ently international in character and could not be suc-
cessfully pursued without broad international
participation, while space infrastructure can be devel-
oped and operated as a purely national enterprise.
Even the parallel to ESA is somewhat artificial: Euro-
pean countries created ESA because such a joint en-
deavor was the only way that they could marshal the
resources required to carry out a comprehensive
space program, albeit on a regional rather than a na-
tional basis. The United States, should it chose to do
so, has the resources required for unilateral “space
station” development.
A decision to create an international acquisition ar-
rangement is highly unlikely, given the specific char-
acter of the support mobilized behind the “space sta-
tion” concept in the United States, Europe and Japan
to date. One fundamental motivation which could
lead to such a decision–that it was the only way to
mobil ize the needed financial or technical re-
sources—is missing, and there seems to be no other
compelling reason, from a U.S. perspective, to pur-
sue this option. Only if it were seen by the United
States and, to a lesser degree, other spacefaring states
as a particularly attractive way of symbolizing their
commitment to broadly based international cooper-
ation would a “fully international” option be pre-
ferred; no such vision has been persuasively ad-
vanced.
Making international operational arrangements
once the infrastructure is acquired appears a some-
what more realistic prospect, though still unlikely to
be preferred by its developers. The United States (and
its partners) could recoup at least some costs of the
acquisition by selling shares in it, and this form of
broadened international involvement may be an at-
tractive way of giving newly industrializing and de-
veloping countries a useful sense of involvement on
the space frontier. Broader international involvement
could also be accomplished by internationalizing (to
some extent) the operating crew—or by leasing facili-
ties to the rest of the world.
A U.S. PROGRAM WITH INTERNATIONAL
INVOLVEMENT
Since the United States has given strong indication
that it will open its space infrastructure program to
foreign participation, it is useful to estimate what form
of involvement is most likely to be successful, where
success is defined as a mixture of costs and benefits
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which is acceptable to all involved. Reaching an agree-
ment is likely to involve difficult bargaining and sig-
nificant compromise at the political, managerial, and
technical levels. This process is already beginning, and
both the United States and its potential partners (par-
ticularly Europe) are approaching the issue in a rather
different manner than was the case during the 1969-73
negotiations over post-Apollo participation.
Those objectives which are likely to be of most in-
terest to the United States perhaps would be best
served by a cooperative approach which would com-
mit the United States and its partners to share impor-
tant parts of the overall acquisition program, to remain
involved beyond its acquisition (i. e., during its oper-
ational phase as well), and to seek broadly based infra-
structure utilization once established: that is, overall
joint acquisition, operation, and use. Certainly the
United States would prefer to be the world leader in
space development and use over the next few dec-
ades. A U.S.-led, freely arrived at, major in-space in-
frastructure collaboration program–one involving
many, perhaps all, countries, especially the major
spacefaring ones—would go a long way toward
achieving this goal.
But it seems as if the objectives, primarily utilitarian,
which would motivate other countries to join in such
a U.S. program would be best served if they could do
so with minimal loss of their future freedom of ac-
tion—i.e., participation in the acquisition, including
development, phase only, with no a priori commit-
ment to system utilization or to sharing in overall
system management.
Potential U.S. partners are, of course, fully aware
that a U.S. offer to share in the acquisition of in-space
infrastructure is fundamentally political in character,
and that decisions on issues such as cost-sharing and
division of labor are as much political as technical or
economic. However, as the earlier review of the space
programs of potential partners has suggested, Europe
(both ESA and individual countries) Canada and Ja-
pan will bring some very real assets to the negotiat-
ing process. The outcome of that process is certainly
not going to reflect U.S. interests alone. Indeed, Eur-
ope, Canada and Japan may consider their participa-
tion in the operation of the infrastructure and their
guaranteed access to it as preconditions to their con-
tributing to its development.
Appendix D
SYNOPSIS OF THE OTA WORKSHOP ON
COST CONTAINMENT OF CIVILIAN
SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE (CIVILIAN
“SPACE STATION”) ELEMENTS1
PREFACE
This appendix summarizes information presented at
an OTA workshop on cost containment and cost mini-
mization in NASA’s projected civilian “space station”
program. This program is expected to result in the
Government’s acquisition of elements of an overall
in-space infrastructure support system. The 2-day
workshop was held on October 18 and 19, 1983, and
was attended by more than a dozen senior profes-
sional representatives from (non-NASA) high-technol-
ogy Government organizations, Government-related
aerospace industry organizations, and non-space in-
dustry organizations. Most of those attending were
either former senior NASA professionals or had
worked often on large NASA contracts. The views of
invitees unable to attend are also contained in this ap-
pendix. A Glossary of Terms appears at the end of the
document.
The workshop discussions were limited to a NASA
program that would develop infrastructure elements
without significant participation by foreign govern-
ments or the private sector in either funding or over-
all management. Such involvement would bring with
it additional considerations that would have to be ad-
dressed early in the planning stages of the project in
order to avoid serious, cost-increasing program
changes.
Moreover, the workshop discussions assumed that
NASA staffing for the project would remain at the min-
imum levels required to obtain the infrastructure at
the earliest date and in the most cost-effective manner.
Workshop participants did not attempt to quantify,
in either absolute or percentage terms, the estimates
of possible cost reductions expected to result from
using the management and technical approaches sug-
gested here.
The first section summarizes the results of the 2 days
of discussion; it is divided into the two areas on which
the discussion centered: management considerations
1 Workshop conducted for OTA by Computer Sciences Corp.
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and technical considerations. A synthesis of the discus-
sions in these two areas is presented in the next two
sections. The last section is a set of tentative
conclusions for the consideration of NASA and
Congress.
Summary
Recent history indicates that only about one-third
of the cost of acquiring a space system is directly
related to hardware. Management, engineering, inte-
gration, test, software, documentation, and other ac-
quisition support activities use up the remaining two-
thirds. Although many ways that promise to cut costs
in a civilian space infrastructure (“space station”) pro-
gram were discussed at the workshop, program phi-
losophy and management were emphasized.
Some of the cost issues have already been recog-
nized by NASA and may indeed be incorporated into
NASA’s current cost-control activities. These issues are
nonetheless included here in order to bolster the argu-
ment that NASA will have to change the way it ac-
quires high-technology space assets if acquisition unit
costs are to be sharply reduced.
The major cost issues are summarized below:
COST-CONTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS
New technology: In general, the cost of in-space
infrastructure elements is directly related to the
amount of new-technology research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) invested in
the program. To minimize cost, NASA should
adopt an approach that would minimize the
amount of new technology necessary to meet
performance objectives. Because NASA Centers
have their own continuing agendas and tend to
incorporate their own RDT&E interests into large,
popular, long-term development programs, the
extent of involvement of the Centers in the man-
agement of large space programs affects the cost
of those programs.
Sufficient management authority: NASA’s cur-
rent plan to designate a separate Associate Ad-
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ministrator for the program is both necessary and
appropriate. The structure, responsibilities, and
authorities of the management organization re-
porting to this Associate Administrator are also
vital for controlling costs.
Careful definition: An extensive definition phase
(e.g., the present NASA Phase A/B) could help
minimize costs by determining precisely what ca-
pabilities are required to meet specific objectives;
technology development should be limited to
those requirements.
These issues, discussed in terms of management and
technical considerations, are summarized below.
l
MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Centralized management: A centralized, high-
level NASA organization to manage development
and procurement could lower cost by reducing
layers of management, minimizing the number
of organizational and design interfaces, and co-
ordinating parallel development efforts. It could
also simplify coordination of technical and man-
agement efforts.
System engineering and integration: Strong sys-
tem engineering and system integration efforts
(see Glossary) both by contractors and by NASA
could reduce the number of technical interfaces,
allow most design conflicts to be resolved in-
house, and help ensure that the overall system
is engineered for optimal performance.
Bounded program: Defining a bound, or end
point, to the initial acquisition, including devel-
opment, activities could contain costs by elimi-
nating the possibility of prolonged RDT&E so as
to reach an early initial operational capability(lOC).
Separation of NASA’s general RDT&E costs from
infrastructure acquisition costs: The initial de-
velopment should be based as much as possible
on available technology. And only those RDT&E
costs that directly contribute to development
should be charged to this program.
Development of new cost models: Current cost
models will not provide accurate estimates of the
funding needs of the future civilian “space sta-
tion” program. These models were developed for
efforts that had requirements fundamentally dif-
ferent from the needs of the proposed “space sta-
tion. ”
TECHNICAL AND PROCUREMENT
CONSIDERATIONS
Current technology: Based on the requirements
defined to date for an operational civilian “space
l
l
station, ” extensive technological development
does not appear to be necessary to obtain its nec-
essary elements. Elements based on current tech-
nology would be less expensive to produce, with
some exceptions would appear to have reason-
able long-term operation and maintenance costs,
would permit later improvements, would not re-
quire as extensive a management effort, and
would cost the taxpayer less,
Performance objectives requirements: The
strong Phase A/B effort that NASA currently per-
forms is required. However, if NASA develops
detailed design specifications and procures hard-
ware on the basis of their use, contractors’ ini-
tiatives to meet or better schedules and costs
would be inhibited. Performance objectives (with
specified minimums) based wherever possible on
current technology would allow contractors to
meet the program requirements in the most cost-
effective and timely manner.
Contract incentives: By specifying performance
objectives that could be met with minimal ad-
vances in technology, NASA would encourage
contractors to propose the most efficient cost and
schedule approaches. Incentive contracts that
both reward and penalize would help to ensure
that these objectives are met.
Design issues: Adopting standards, defining and
maintaining simple” interfaces, replicating ‘basic
elements, and specifying common hardware
would simplify design and development, reduce
change-migration across the interfaces, and re-
duce the impact of nonrecurring costs.
Management Considerations
Both the management philosophy and practice
under which any space program is conducted are usu-
ally dominant factors in determining the cost of the
various program elements. Sound management prac-
tices must include cost avoidance, cost minimization,
and cost containment. The following management
practices should keep space system acquisition costs
low:
centralize the development program manage-
ment organization and have it report directly to
the NASA Associate Administrator;
use proven industry contractors for acquiring the
major program elements;
set specific endpoints for the initial development
phase; and
develop and implement management practices
that emphasize, and wherever possible reward,
cost reduction and cost containment.
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CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT
A centralized organization to manage the acquisi-
tion program could reduce costs by concentrating the
control and integration of all technical, cost, and
scheduling activities. Clear lines of responsibility; cen-
tralized direction; strong control over budgets, funds,
and technical decisions; and control over such fac-
tors as interface and communality would be enhanced
under such an approach. Splitting program manage-
ment among different NASA centers, as has sometimes
been the practice in the past, could make it difficult
to develop a fully integrated “space station.” How-
ever, the centers should be used, as necessary, to pro-
vide specific expertise or technical support.
The management organization, which would be re-
sponsible for contracting for the various program ele-
ments, should be given a large measure of authority.
The organization could be located at a Center in or-
der to have access to technical and administrative sup-
port. Such an organization must have an experienced
technical arm; to achieve that, expert personnel from
NASA Centers could be assigned to the program man-
agement office.
This centralized approach would enable a program
manager to more easily assess risks and make cost-
reducing decisions, primarily because he or she would
be freed from conflicting pressures from other parts
of the organization. (This reasoning supports the argu-
ment that individual NASA Centers should not be giv-
en management control over elements of the pro-
gram,) Under this approach the central program
management team would have the best chance to
evaluate costs, scheduling, and performance objec-
tively, and to produce balanced emphases and
decisions.
When a Center does manage the development of
technology or hardware for the program, it should be
on a subcontract basis from the program management
office. It should have a specific development time and
cost. Inasmuch as current technology would be used
wherever feasible, long-term RDT&E programs at the
NASA Centers would not burden the acquisition pro-
gram with their associated costs and management de-
mands. While new-technology RDT&E is an important
continuing function of the NASA Centers, it should
be funded separately unless it uniquely meets the per-
formance or cost objectives of the space infrastruc-
ture program.
SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION
In any complex system, each component or sub-
system should be designed with the objective of
enhancing the performance of the entire system. Thus,
compromises must be made among the various sub-
systems so that the complete system—not just each
component of it—performs as well as the technologi-
cal state-of-the-art and the funds available for its ac-
quisition will allow. This activity is known as system
engineering. System integration is the term used to de-
scribe activities aimed at ensuring that the individual
subsystems work together to create a well-functioning
whole. Both of these concepts involve much more
than just technical performance. In the case of NASA-
procured systems, acquisition costs and operating and
maintenance costs also should be important consid-
erations. Usefulness to system users, such as simplicity
of access, is another, and long life and easy evolution
to the next step may be others. More detailed factors
might include ease of flight preparation, in-orbit main-
tenance, and updating, for example.
Many past system engineering and integration ef-
forts at NASA have emphasized the technical or mis-
sion performance. Certain changes that have occurred
during the past 25 years of space effort should now
allow NASA to broaden its view of system engineer-
ing and integration.
Until very recently, the civilian space program has
been (it had to be) characterized as a very high-tech-
nology program that has had to bootstrap itself: that
is, the technology often had to be developed during
the same time interval that it would have to be incor-
porated into the spaceflight hardware. Thus, NASA’s
responsibility was not only to manage the aerospace
contractors that build the mission hardware but also
to establish both internal and external RDT&E capabil-
ities to carry out the necessary parallel technology de-
velopment. In discharging these dual roles, NASA, of
necessity, has been intimately involved in design and
development of the systems it was procuring. Indeed,
doing so was the only practical way by which NASA
could effectively communicate its requirements to its
contractors. As a consequence of these circumstances,
NASA has tended to concentrate on the hardware de-
sign and performance aspects of system engineering
and integration— sometimes at the expense of cost
containment.
Two factors present today should allow NASA to
broaden its emphasis from hardware design consid-
erations of system engineering and integration to
other, equally important matters: 1 ) the relatively ad-
vanced state of the technology—especialIy that avail-
able for this program—and 2) the evolving sophisti-
cation of U.S. industrial capability. After 25 years of
space technology development and operational ex-
perience in its use, essentially all of the technology
is in hand to build a sophisticated, long-life, reason-
ably priced civilian “space station” for operation in
LEO. Also, the aerospace industry has changed sig-
nificantly. Part of NASA’s original charter was to fos-
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ter and enhance the space technology know-how of
U.S. industry. To a considerable extent, NASA has
achieved this objective: many senior personnel in in-
dustry have devoted their entire careers to space-re-
lated activities, and many have come to the industry
from NASA–in various fashions NASA gave many of
these and other individuals their professional “start.”
Because of these factors, several cost-reduction pos-
sibilities now exist. Inasmuch as space systems should
be built using current technology unless new technol-
ogy would lower life-cycle costs, in many cases NASA
should be able to specify the use of already existing
hardware. Using this technology, together with cur-
rent industry sophistication, should enable NASA to
transfer more of the system engineering and integra-
tion associated with hardware design to industry, free-
ing NASA system engineers to concentrate on cost
minimization and avoidance, operability, and other
important matters. Of course, NASA must continue
to ensure that all of the space infrastructure elements
work together efficiently; that the major interfaces are
defined, controlled, and integrated; and that the end
use objectives are met. A NASA centralized project
management organization would be responsible for
these efforts. In particular, the organization could en-
sure that appropriate tradeoffs are made that result in
reduced development and O&M costs.
BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM
NASA’s present emphasis on the “evolutionary
character” of the “space station” program, while em-
bodying many good programmatic features, gives rise
to a very real concern —that is, the pace at which ini-
tial elements of the integrated system become avail-
able for early operational use. Program delays often
are associated with over-sophistication built in dur-
ing the definition phase or with unrealistically stringent
specifications. In addition, many engineers and scien-
tists have a tendency to keep improving the design
at all levels—improvements which also can result in
delays in advancing to operational status.
This concern could be allayed by the very practical
approach of establishing a program consisting of a
bounded acquisition phase, including development,
for the procurement, launch, in-orbit assembly, and
acceptance of the infrastructure elements defined as
providing initial IOC. The centralized program man-
agement office would carry out this phase. All other
related or supporting activities would have separate
budgets and would be subcontracted to other NASA
offices after negotiation of performance specifications,
costs, and schedules. Even the bounded program
should have identified elements that could be elimi-
nated or moved off-line in event of cost, schedule, or
performance problems in order to meet the IOC date.
This approach provides considerable flexibility should
unforeseen program difficulties occur—as they almost
always do.
The program’s initial operational phase would be
initiated on the IOC date, but the operational plan-
ning would be begun earlier by a parallel program or-
ganization. A well-thought-out transition plan to move
from the acquisition to the operational phase should
be developed as a part of Phase A/B and acted upon
throughout the acquisition phase so that effective and
comprehensive operating procedures exist at the out-
set of operations. Thus, the program organization
needed to conduct the operational phase should be
established by NASA during Phase B. This organiza-
tion would work with the acquisition program office
and with other operations organizations within NASA.
In particular, it would become familiar with the oper-
ations of the Shuttle, Spacelab and other space infra-
structure elements in order to gain experience in their
use.
The two program organizations–acquisition and
operations—should work together to obtain low life-
cycle costs. Cost estimates should be keyed first to the
two program phases and then to schedules, in order
to foster sound decisionmaking regarding the pro-
gram’s ongoing budget. During the operations phase,
the overall concept of a civilian “space station” should
be reviewed periodically, in close concert with the pri-
vate sector, to determine whether the Government
should continue, expand, or reduce operations based
on considerations of life-cycle costs and national
benefits.
COST AWARENESS AND CONTROL
Establishing and maintaining cost awareness among
aerospace engineering personnel in both Government
and industry should be a major part of any program
activity and should begin at the definition phase. At
that phase, it is important that the definition be com-
plete within the scope of the bounded program. This
activity should include an estimate of costs of all ele-
ments of the work to be done. System designers
should participate in this process and be responsible
for any budget alterations assigned to them. Contrac-
tor costs and schedules must be realistic and contrac-
tors should be made aware of the need to estimate
them accurately.
Cost awareness can be promoted through motiva-
tional programs. One useful approach involves con-
tract incentive fees for cost, schedule, and perform-
ance. However, when this arrangement is used, the
contractor must not be overly constrained in his
problem-solving efforts. The incentive contract is a
210 l Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space
motivational technique that could be used effectively
at all levels of the organization. It could be augmented
at the lower levels by direct awards for cost-saving sug-
gestions, underbudget performance, rapid problem-
solving, and similar efforts that reduce the costs of a
particular facet of the program.
Key to any effective cost control activity are accurate
cost estimates. Estimates that are too low break down
the cost control process. Estimates that are too high
create a “vacuum” that will surely be filled. Moreover,
cost models based on previous programs will not give
satisfactory results for this program because those
models use weight, volume, safety, and complexity
factors that are significantly different. A quantitative
analysis is needed to correct existing cost models. In
the meantime, bottom-to-top estimates may prove in-
structive, particularly when applied to already existing
technology or subsystems.
Life-cycle costing may dictate design decisions that
are more costly initially but that provide savings over
the long term. Program operating environments must
also be considered for their effects on costs: design-
ing for a fail-operational, as compared to a fail-safe,
working environment is costly. The concept of accept-
able risk, particularly human risk, as it affects costs
should be analyzed anew, because the in-orbit “space
station” operating environment is inherently much
more tolerant of operating difficulties than has been
the case in previous space programs. The ability to
repair equipment and rescue personnel also should
be taken into account.
Finally, to be effective, cost estimates, whether de-
rived from cost models or otherwise, must assume a
reasonably small development effort for solving unex-
pected problems. Additional funds should be set aside
to handle such problems, but access to this money
should be very carefully controlled.
Technical and Procurement
Considerations
The kind of technology to be used, and the division
of tasks between private contractors and NASA Cen-
ters during the acquisition process must be considered
in order to achieve the lowest unit cost. The follow-
ing factors should also be kept clearly in mind:
l The United States, the European Space Agency
countries, Canada and other countries have al-
ready invested enormous amounts of money and
effort to develop, test, and use sophisticated
space technology.
. The aerospace industry has “come of age, ” and
now can be expected to exercise ingenuity in
containing costs and meeting performance and
time schedules without the detailed NASA man-
agement oversight required in the past.
Conflicts of interest often exist between RDT&E-
oriented NASA Centers and the system acquisi-
tion management office responsible for overall ca-
pability optimization, cost containment, and
meeting of schedules.
USE OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGY
Together with various ground and space transpor-
tation infrastructure, appropriate in-space infrastruc-
ture should provide NASA and other users with cost-
effective capabilities to pursue many important space-
related objectives. It is quite appropriate that NASA
consider the program in this larger context while mak-
ing plans for its development. And, the character and
magnitude of the NASA Centers’ involvement in this
planning activity must bean important part of this con-
sideration.
The various NASA Centers are developing prelimi-
nary concepts for individual infrastructure elements
and associated subsystems. These design concepts are
technologically sophisticated and are being developed
on an individual subsystem basis. It appears that these
subsystems are to be packaged in modules that are
as independent as possible from each other, and that
the infrastructure central complex will bean aggregate
of these modules.
Proceeding with the acquisition of such individual
subsystems in this fashion could be evidence of in-
adequate system engineering capability, or inadequate
management strength, or both. Both are needed to
enforce those top-down tradeoffs and compromises
necessary to ensure that the overall system—and not
just the individual subsystems or modules—functions
as well as possible, Experience has shown that early
hesitation regarding system engineering can often re-
sult in increasing difficulty later in the enforcement
of such compromises; measures taken to integrate sub-
systems that, by then, do not inherently fit together
can be a very costly experience.
It appears that NASA may now be planning to
employ a substantial amount of new and sophisticated
technology in the program, and to have a parallel pro-
gram for the development of this technology. it is very
important that NASA first analyze, based on perform-
ance requirements and cost reduction/avoidance ob-
jectives alone, whether developing this new technol-
ogy is necessary. In particular, it should seek sound
professional advice from outside NASA in order to bal-
ance any internal tendency to favor new technology
development. It must be repeated that, for the most
part, a functional “space station” could be built using
current technology. It could be cost effective in ad-
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dressing important, long-term, civilian space program
goals and objectives. And it should be designed so that
it could be modified during its operating life as new,
more cost-effective, technologies are developed “off-
line.”
INCENTIVE CONTRACTING VIA
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS
To date, most NASA spaceflight activities have in-
volved planning for and procuring hardware that has
been at the leading edge of the technology. Accord-
ingly, because it has had to issue detailed engineer-
ing specifications to contractors, NASA has been
heavily involved in the technical aspects of such pro-
curements. It is NASA’s present intention to issue engi-
neering specifications for procurement after the
detailed definition is determined in a combined Phase
A/B study. This process would tend to over-constrain
potential private-sector contractors: the detailed de-
sign, budget, schedule, and expected performance
would be predetermined. However, design changes
are usually necessary to resolve unanticipated prob-
lems that occur as the design is developed. The need
for such changes in turn may adversely affect the
budget, schedule, and performance. Design changes
have been the chief reason that spaceflight hardware
has been so costly.
However, if the overall infrastructure was engi-
neered first as a whole, then NASA could procure it
on the basis of performance specifications rather than
detailed engineering specifications. A detailed Phase
A/B preparation would still be required, but its pur-
pose should be to determine the performance objec-
tives and minimum requirements of the overall in-
frastructure, and then of the specific elements,
ensuring that all specifications are necessary and
achievable. Such an approach provides contractors
with incentives for achieving the performance objec-
tives within cost and on schedule.
Specifying the desired performance, and providing
contract incentives for achieving performance and for
bettering costs and schedules, could minimize unit
costs, Further, with negative incentives—i.e., penalties
for failure to meet the costs and schedules–agreed-
to unit costs could also be minimized. NASA should
carefully define an acceptable incentive fee structure
that relates to a predetermined level of risk accept-
ance for the program. Contractors would be respon-
sible for any trade-offs to meet the performance speci-
fied. NASA’s system engineering and integration role
would be to define the areas where the elements meet
and to ensure that the elements do in fact work to-
gether. This procedure is used by COMSAT to pro-
cure hardware for satellite communication systems
from the aerospace industry, and has been highly suc-
cessful and cost effective.
DESIGN ISSUES
For-profit companies understand the importance of
good design practices in minimizing the cost of man-
ufactured products. These practices include using
standard components or subsystems when appropri-
ate, minimizing and simplifying interfaces, and
replicating basic elements as often as possible. It is ex-
pected that space hardware contractors will use such
design practices if NASA encourages them to do so.
As noted earlier, however, NASA seemingly now
plans to procure the infrastructure elements by means
of detailed engineering specifications. Such a plan
could prevent contractors, when the seemingly inevi-
table design changes crop up, from calling on the most
cost-effective design options to remedy the problem.
Moreover, detailed design specifications are rarely
developed with overall cost effectiveness in mind.
Reflecting their past experience, NASA Centers often
emphasize technical excellence and complete elimi-
nation of risks, even when the safety of people is not
a concern, almost regardless of the costs.
But if performance specifications were written to re-
quire minimal use of new technology, design prac-
tices would not be an issue. Contractors could do
what they do best—design cost-effective equipment
that meets the Government’s specified performance
needs.
Acceptable risks should be assessed during NASA’s
Phase A/B definition to determine where performance
specifications and, ultimately, design specifications
could be relaxed to contain and minimize costs.
Conclusions
The primary conclusions of the OTA workshop
follow.
CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Effective and efficient management of the proposed
program could be achieved by establishing an orga-
nization with a single point of authority and control
at a high level within NASA. To ensure complete in-
tegration of all management interfaces, this organiza-
tion should control all prime contractors directly and
involve only those Centers necessary for the techni-
cal execution of the program. This central NASA man-
agement organization should be responsible for estab-
lishing performance specifications and for defining and
managing interfaces between major elements. The
prime contractors for these major elements should be
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fully responsible for the system engineering and in-
tegration of their respective elements.
MINIMIZATION OF THE USE OF
NEW TECHNOLOGY
It is almost axiomatic that cost and risk will be min-
imized if the IOC infrastructure is built using proven,
state-of-the-art technology to the extent feasible. Space
technology has now developed to the point that future
RDT&E and associated facilities should be funded
separately from this program; they should not be de-
pendent on justification by any one large space pro-
gram for their inauguration or continuation. RDT&E
performed at NASA Centers should be funded solely
on the basis of need to support long-range space
science, applications, or technology development.
NASA should seek outside advice as to what new tech-
nology is needed in order to offset any possible in-
house bias in favor of costly, and perhaps unneces-
sary, development.
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS AND
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
Significant cost savings could be realized if NASA
were to procure major elements of the “space station”
based on performance specifications, rather than on
detailed design specifications, Contracting should in-
clude incentives and penalties based on performance
objectives so that the contractors would be prompted
to apply initiative and ingenuity in minimizing costs
while meeting schedules and performance.
CONTRACTOR SYSTEM ENGINEERING
AND INTEGRATION
If infrastructure elements were procured on the basis
of incentive contracts defined by performance speci-”
fications, design details would be the responsibility of
the contractors, not NASA. By implication, contrac-
tors for major infrastructure elements would also per-
form the system engineering and integration for their
elements. The centralized NASA program office would
be responsible for defining, controlling, and in-
tegrating the interfaces.
FINITE, BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM
Costs could be contained if the program were
planned as a finite, bounded acquisition program spe-
cifically designed to achieve an early IOC. The acquisi-
tion phase would include the procurement, launches,
on-orbit construction, and acceptance testing of the
flight systems. The later, separately managed, opera-
tions phase would then be initiated and reviewed peri-
odically. The effect would be to bound all acquisition
costs, including development costs, and to provide a
fixed framework for operations planning,
RISK MANAGEMENT
With the program based, insofar as possible, upon
proven current technology, operational risk could be
examined rationally as a cost factor. Alternative ap-
proaches to quantifying risk acceptance should be ex-
plored; complete risk avoidance at any cost is not
always required and is very costly.
Glossary of Terms
Available technology-space technology, including
hardware, software, techniques, and capabilities
that need no further development for inclusion as
part of the infrastructure (“space station”).
Bounded program–Predetermined end point of any
research, development, test and evaluation
(RDT&E) program, in terms of time and costs based
on realistically achievable objectives.
Cost models–Formal methodologies for estimating
the cost of planned future spacecraft subsys-
tems/systems based on extrapolations of the cost
of previously developed similar subsystems/sys-
tems, with appropriate weighting factors for dif-
ferences in weight, volume, safety, complexity, past
and/or anticipated cost increases, etc.
Components–The lowest level of decomposition of
the parts that comprise a subsystem.
Configuration control–Formally established project
control procedures for proposing and approving
changes to a developing system by assessing the
effects of possible changes on the other compo-
nents/subsystems within the system, on the system
performance, and on the interfaces with other
systems.
Current technology-(See available technology.)
Design specifications- Detailed engineering specifica-
tions for the procurement and manufacture of ele-
ments of the infrastructure,
Definition phase–The initial phase of any proposed
NASA high-technology development and/or acqui-
sition program. (NASA proposes to spend more ef-
fort than usual on the definition phase of a space
infrastructure—civilian “space station’ ’—program,
corresponding to its more conventional Phases A
and B so as to permit better estimates of infrastruc-
ture use, technology, and costs to be made, thereby
enabling NASA to go directly into Phase C contrac-
ting following procurement funding approval.)
Elements–The highest level of decomposition of the
modules, free flyers, platforms, and transportation
vehicles that comprise any infrastructure.
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Engineering specifications–( See design speci-
fications.)
Incentive contracts-Contracts that reward the con-
tractor for meeting or bettering performance,
schedule and/or cost estimates while complying
with all minimum specifications. Penalties are im-
posed for not meeting schedules, costs, or speci-
fications.
Infrastructure-The totality of surface and in-space
components, subsystems, modules, elements, and,
perhaps, in-space human crew that are to be used
to support various space activities efficiently and
effectively. (See “Space Station.”)
Interfaces-The point or points at which adjacent sub-
systems, systems, modules, or elements of any in-
frastructure come together in a structural, mechan-
ical, electrical, or functional sense.
Life cycle cost–Total cost from start of concept
through development, production, deployment,
and operation throughout the useful life of the in-
frastructure. Includes all maintenance, operational,
and peripheral costs.
New technology—Technology that either is nonexis-
tent and must be developed or does not exist in
fully usable form, and which must at least be
changed and perhaps be developed further before
it becomes “avail able.” This implies that additional
costs must be incurred to bring the technology to
a useful stage.
Open-ended program–A program without a defined
end point in time and/or cost and which, in many
cases, tends to be self-perpetuating.
Performance requirements-Quantitatively stated
functional requirements; they must precede engi-
neering or design specifications.
Phases A, B, C, D–Fundamental elements of NASA’s
usual approach to the development and acquisi-
tion of large, high-technology systems:
Phase A–Study of conceptual design options and
alternatives for accomplishing the desired ob-
jectives.
Phase B—Trade-offs to select one or more gener-
ally acceptable approaches as most cost effective.
Usually provides first-order cost estimates based on
past experience with analogous systems.
Phase C–Detailed design, which begins to provide
information for a more accurate bottom-to-top cost
estimate.
Phase D–Actual system development. Usually
done on a cost basis, with an incentive fee; rarely
procured at a fixed price. There is continuous man-
agement by NASA and, at times, negotiation re-
garding performance, costs and/or schedules.
(In phases A and B, suggestions regarding appro-
priate technologies are usually heavily influenced
by NASA.)
RDT&E– Research, development, test, and evaluation
(or engineering.)
Space Station–Infrastructure elements located in the
Earth’s space, perhaps containing a human crew,
used to support space activities efficiently and ef-
fectively. (See “Infrastructure.”)
System engineering-System design methodology that
adjusts components and subsystems in order to
achieve the best possible performance from the sys-
tem as a whole in addressing specified objectives;
system initial and life cycle cost is usually an im-
portant consideration; acquisition time can also be
an important consideration.
System integration-The engineering necessary to en-
sure that all of the individual subsystems interface
properly so that the complete system performs as
it should.
Test bed (RDT&E)–A facility for simulating the envi-
ronment and/or external interfaces so that systems
and subsystems can be tested realistically.
Appendix E
TITLE II—NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SPACE
(PUBLIC LAW 98-361)
Purpose
Sec. 201. It is the purpose of this title to establish
a National Commission on Space that will assist the
United States–
(1) to define the long-range needs of the Nation that
may be fulfilled through the peaceful uses of outer
space;
(2) to maintain the Nation’s preeminence in space
science, technology, and applications;
(3) to promote the peaceful exploration and utili-
zation of the space environment; and
(4) to articulate goals and develop options for the
future direction of the Nation’s civilian space program.
Findings
Sec. 202. The Congress finds and declares that–
(1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, the lead civilian space agency, as established in
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as
amended, has conducted a space program that has
been an unparalleled success, providing significant
economic, social, scientific, and national security
benefits, and helping to maintain international stability
and good will;
(2) the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.), has provided
the policy framework for achieving this success, and
continues to be a sound statutory basis for national
efforts in space;
(3) the United States is entering a new era of inter-
national competition and cooperation in space, and
therefore this Nation must strengthen the commitment
of its public and private technical, financial, and in-
stitutional resources, so that the United States will not
lose its leadership position during this decade;
(4) while there continues to be a crucial Govern-
ment role in space science, advanced research and
development, provision of public goods and services
and coordination of national and international efforts,
advances in applications of space technology have
raised many issues regarding public and private sec-
tor roles and relationships in technology development,
applications, and marketing;
(s) the private sector will continue to evolve as a
major participant in the utilization of the space envi-
ronment;
(6) the Nation is committed to a permanently
manned space station in low Earth orbit, and future
national efforts in space will benefit from the presence
of such a station;
(7) the separation of the civilian and military space
programs is essential to ensure the continued health
and vitality of both; and
(8) the identification of long range goals and policy
options for the United States civilian space program
through a high level, representational public forum
will assist the President and Congress in formulating
future policies for the United States civilian space
program.
National Commission on Space
Sec. 203. (a)(l) The President shall within ninety
days of the enactmert of this Act establish a National
Commission on Space (hereinafter in this title referred
to as the “Commission”), which shall be composed
of 15 members appointed by the President. The mem-
bers appointed under this subsection shall be selected
from among individuals from Federal, State, and local
governments, industry, business, labor, academia, and
the general population who, by reason of their back-
ground, education, training, or experience, possess
expertise in scientific and technological pursuits, as
well as the use and implications of the use of such
pursuits. Of the fifteen members appointed, not more
than three members may be employees of the Feder-
al Government. The President shall designate one of
the members of the Comission appointed under this
subsection to serve as Chairman, and one of the mem-
bers to serve as Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman
shall perform the functions of the Chairman in the
Chairman’s absence.
(2) Members appointed by the President under par-
agraph (1) of this subsection may be paid at a rate not
to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of
basic pay in effect under section 5332 of title 5, United
States Code, for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule
for each day, including traveltime, during which such
members are engaged in the actual performance of
the duties of the Commission. While away from their
homes or regular places of business, such members
may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem
in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons
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employed intermittently in the Government service
are allowed under section 5703 of title 5, United States
Code. Individuals who are not officers or employees
of the United States and who are members of the
Commission shall not be considered officers or
employees of the United States by reason of receiv-
ing payments under this paragraph.
(b)(l) The President shall appoint one individual
from each of the following Federal departments and
agencies to serve as ex officio, advisory, non-voting
members of the Commission (if such department or
agency does not already have a member appointed
to the Commission pursuant to subsection (a)(l):
(A) National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
(B) Department of State.
(C) Department of Defense.
(D) Department of Transportation.
(E) Department of Commerce.
(F) Department of Agriculture.
(G) Department of the interior.
(H) National Science Foundation.
(1) Office of Science and Technology Policy.
(2) The President of the Senate shall appoint two ad-
visory members of the Commission from among the
Members of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall appoint two advisory mem-
bers of the Commission from among the Members of
the House of Representatives. Such members shall not
participate, except in an advisory capacity, in the for-
mulation of the findings and recommendations of the
Commission.
(3) Members of the Commission appointed under
this subsection shall not be entitled to receive com-
pensation for service relating to the performance of
the duties of the Commission, but shall be entitled to
reimbursement for travel expenses incurred while in
the actual performance of the duties of the Com-
mission.
(c) The Commission shall appoint and fix the com-
pensation of such personnel as it deems advisable. The
Chairman of the Commission shall be responsible
f o r –
(1) the assignment of duties and responsibilities
among such personnel and their continuing supervi-
sion; and
(2) the use and expenditures of funds available to
the Commission. In carrying out the provisions of this
subsection, the Chairman shall act in accordance with
the general policies of the Commission.
(d) To the extent permitted by law, the Commission
may secure directly from any executive department,
agency, or independent instrumentality of the Federal
Government any information it deems necessary to
carry out its functions under this Act. Each such de-
partment, agency, and instrumentality shall cooper-
ate with the Commission and, to the extent permitted
by law and upon request of the Chairman of the Com-
mission, furnish such information to the Commission.
(e) The Commission may hold hearings, receive
public comment and testimony, initiate surveys, and
undertake other appropriate activities to gather the in-
formation necessary to carry out its activities under
section 204 of this title.
(f) The Commission shall cease to exist sixty days
after it has submitted the plan required by section
204(c) of this title.
Functions of the Commission
Sec. 204. (a) The Commission shall study existing
and proposed space activities and formulate an agen-
da for the United States civilian space program. The
Commission shall identify long range goals, oppor-
tunities, and policy options for United States civilian
space activity for the next twenty years. In carrying
out this responsibility, the Commission shall take into
consideration—
(1) the commitment by the Nation to a permanently
manned space station in low Earth orbit;
(2) present and future scientific, economic, social,
environmental, and foreign policy needs of the United
States, and methods by which space science, technol-
ogy, and applications initiatives might address those
needs;
(3) the adequacy of the Nation’s public and private
capability in fulfilling the needs identified in paragraph
(2);
(4) how a cooperative interchange between Federal
agencies on research and technology development
programs can benefit the civilian space program;
(5) opportunities for, and constraints on, the use of
outer space toward the achievement of Federal pro-
gram objectives or national needs;
(6) current and emerging issues and concerns that
may arise through the utilization of space research,
technology development, and applications;
(7) the Commission shall analyze the findings of the
reviews specified in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this
subsection, and develop options and recommenda-
tions for a long range national civilian space policy
plan.
(b) Options and recommendations submitted in a c-
cordance with subsection (a)(7) of this section shall
include, to the extent appropriate, an estimate of costs
and time schedules, institutional requirements, and
statutory modifications necessary for implementation
of such options and recommendations.
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(c) Within twelve months after the date of the estab- House of Representatives, a long range plan for United
Iishment of the Commission, the Commission shall States civilian space activity incorporating the results
submit to the President and to the Committee on Com- of the studies conducted under this section, together
merce, Science and Transportation of the Senate and with recommendations for such legislation as the
the Committee on Science and Technology of the Commission determines to be appropriate.
Appendix F
FINANCING CONSIDERATIONS AND
FEDERAL BUDGET IMPACTS
With respect to the conceptual objectives proposed
for discussion in chapter 6 of this report, it is impor-
tant to ask not only the question of “what would their
attainment cost?,” but the next most important ques-
tions as well: “who would pay these costs?” and
“under what circumstances?” This appendix ad-
dresses these questions, and then turns to an exami-
nation of how novel answers thereto could affect the
Federal space budget.
Financing Considerations
International Considerations
Note that what is being discussed here are not
NASA 1 goals and objectives, but national goals and
objectives and, at least for the most part, goals and
objectives for the benefit of all mankind. Therefore,
for instance, when other countries can reasonably be
expected to have an active interest in cooperating with
the United States as parties in multinational activities,
this also should be taken into explicit consideration
when considering their cost to us.
John Logsdon has recently observed that: “There
is now the possibility of a global division of labor and
cost in space science [and exploration] . . .“.2 Offi-
cials of the European Space Agency (ESA), for instance,
are reported to be of the view that ESA: “ . . . antici-
pates contributing . . . perhaps up to 30 percent of the
estimated cost [of any] space station . . .“.3 And OTA
has been told, informally, by a well-informed foreign
official that, if Japan and Canada also were to be in-
cluded in a full partnership arrangement, “in the limit”
this fraction could be appreciably larger. And recently
fractions of 35 to 40 percent overall have been publi-
cized. 4 (This 35 to 40 percent, i.e., some $3 billion
[1984$] apparently is now seen by NASA as in addi-
tion to the $8 billion [1 984$] now estimated by NASA
as the cost of the IOC infrastructure to the United
States.)
Simply for purposes of illustration, an assumption
of one-third foreign government cost-sharing is taken
here as a reasonable expectation regarding at least ob-
I Other Government agencies, primarily the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric  Admtnlstration  (NOAA), have Important space interests and respon-
s} bllitles as well.
‘Science, Jan. 6, 1984, p. 11 et. seq.; see esp.  p. 13.
3Science, Dec. 9, 1983, pp. 1099-1100.
4Nature,  Mar. 15, 1984, p. 216.
jectives (1), (2), (3), and (4). A further assumption is
made: that the U.S. Government will view its civilian
space leadership role as one of orchestrating the in-
terests, abilities, and activities of any and all of those
countries of the world who wish to participate in space
research, exploration and development, and that it
will play this role in the vigorous, sensitive and inno-
vative fashion that competitive space circumstances
and the high political and financial stakes require.
Indeed, if the United States does not lead the world
in this fashion, there is growing indication that, per-
haps sooner than we imagine (especially with the suc-
cessful Spacelab experience behind them), several
European countries themselves would be prepared to
“go it alone.” And the U. S. S. R., as well, may be be-
ginning to exhibit an “outreach” toward cooperation
with countries outside of the Communist bloc.
The Solar System Exploration Committee of NASA’s
senior Advisory Committee has taken specific and pos-
itive recognition of this opportunity in its recent re-
port: Planetary Exploration through Year 2000.5 Under
the general heading of “International Cooperation, ”
the Committee observes that: “In the 1960s and
1970s, planetary science was clearly dominated by the
United States, with major contributions by the U.S.S.R.
The trend in recent years has been an increase, rela-
tive to the United States and the U. S. S. R,, in the ca-
pability and interest of other nations to participate in
planetary science and exploration missions. This in-
creasing interest has occurred against a backdrop of
budgetary constraints in all nations, together with in-
creasing sophistication and cost of planetary missions.
Combined, these factors suggest that more planetary
science can be accomplished in a given period if in-
terested nations coordinate their planning and, occa-
sionally, undertake joint missions.”
But no allowance is made in the NASA budget pro-
jections–projections that average some $400 million/
year (1 983$) throughout the rest of this centuryG–for
the important financial contributions that other coun-
tries could be expected to make to space science and
exploration programs.
One very long-term, very successful example of mul-
tinational cooperation in the space field was devel-
oped under the enlightened leadership, and with the
important assistance of, the United States: the lnter-
S1 983, see esp.  pp. 25-26.
%ee  NASA’s report, p. 27.
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national Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(I NTELSAT). Some 20 years ago, the only countries in-
volved in civilian satellite communications were the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
Today, INTELSAT counts 109 countries as members;
the countries conduct a useful, profitable, and rapidly
growing space-related business–long-haul trunk com-
munications—which grossed some $400 million in
1983, and in which the required U.S. investment share
is now down to less than 25 percent. (The business
is now so profitable that, last year, potential com-
petitors came forward.) And INTELSAT has been
joined by INMARSAT in the maritime communications
area; INMARSAT counts even the U.S.S.R. among its
members. ’
Finally, the President has taken steps to see that the
matter of international cooperation—indeed, perhaps
international collaboration—in the civilian space area
will receive direct and important attention by the ex-
ecutive branch. In his radio address during the week
of his 1984 State of the Union message, the President
observed that: “international cooperation . . . has
long been a guiding principle of the United States
space program [and that] just as our friends were asked
to join us in the Shuttle program, our friends and allies
will be invited to join with us in the space station proj-
ect.” In response to this Presidential directive, NASA’s
Administrator has recently visited several other coun-
tries to explore the matter of their working on any
“space station” program with the United States.
Private-Sector Considerations
Also, when our private sector can reasonably be ex-
pected to assume the cost (in anticipation of commer-
cial-industrial sales and profits), or at least an impor-
tant fraction thereof, this should be taken into
consideration. This should be the case for at least ob-
jectives (2), (5), (6), (7), and (10) (see ch. 6).
For much of 1983, and still continuing, NASA has
had a task force studying what it might do to speed
and enlarge the “commercialization” of space. And
the Department of Transportation (DOT) has recently
been charged by the President with assisting an ex-
pendable launch services industry.
Now the President has given a powerful general
thrust to the matter of much greater economic partic-
ipation by our private sector in space-related activi-
ties, In his 1984 State of the Union address he ex-
pressed himself of the judgment that: “ . . . space
holds enormous promise for commerce today,” and
7For a thorough discussion of the satellite communications area, see the
OTA report International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Ac-
tivities (now in press).
was quite specific in justifying his decision to start
work on the development of space infrastructure in
terms of its eventually allowing for “ . . . living and
working in space for . . . economic . . . gains. ” In his
later radio address he stated that he expects: “ . . . a
space station will open up new opportunities for ex-
panding human commerce . . . .“
The legislative branch too, perhaps smarting be-
cause of the seemingly endless Landsat commerciali-
zation difficulties, and responding to the continuing
hesitancy within NASA concerning their space appli-
cations responsibilities, has moved to strengthen the
law quite specifically regarding “space commercializa-
t ion. ” NASA’S fiscal year 1985 authorization bill,
which became Public Law 98-361 with the President’s
signature on July 16, 1984, makes a basic change in
the “National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.”
It amends section 102 of the act by including a new
paragraph (c) as follows: “The Congress declares that
the general welfare of the United States requires that
[NASA] seek and encourage, to the maximum extent
possible, the fullest commercial use of space.” This
is strong, unambiguous and “revolutionary” language
for our publicly funded civilian space program’s
“char ter.”
It would seem reasonable, therefore, to imagine that
the kind of private sector participation suggested here
in addressing certain of the 10 conceptual objectives
will, in fact, be realized.
International Plus Private-Sector
Cost Sharing Considerations
Thus, when the financial support of both other
countries and our own private sector are taken into
consideration, the net U.S. public cost of meeting
these 10 conceptual objectives is estimated to be some
$25 billion to $40 billion (1984$), i.e., some 70 per-
cent of their estimated $40 billion to $60 billion total
cost. 8 (See table F-l). The average net public cost for
the first 5 years considered here would be some $2.0
billion/year (1984$); during the last 5 of the 25 years
the average net public cost could decrease to about
one-half this rate. (See table F-2.)
These expenditure rates suggest that, with the com-
pletion of the initial modest Moon settlement, the pro-
jected NASA budget could allow a major program of
human exploration of Mars (and of one or more as-
teroids) to begin in earnest.
‘Norman R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech
Management,” Aerospace America, March 1984,
App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts l 219
Table F-l .—USA Net Public Cost (billions of 1984 dollars)
Total Other Private USA net
cost countries sector public cost
1. Establish a global information  system/service
regarding natural hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Establish lower cost reusable transportation service
with the Moon, and establish human presence there . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Use space probes to obtain information regarding Mars
and some asteroids prior to early human exploration . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Conduct medical research of direct interest
to the general public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Bring at least hundreds of the general public
into space for short visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,
common-user system/service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Make essentially all data generated by civilian satellites
and spacecraft directly available to the general public . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Exploit radio/optical free-space electromagnetic propagation
for long distance energy distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. Reduce the unit cost of space transportation
and space activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10. Increase space-related private salesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . = 40b =10 = 4
aThi~  would  advance the pr~~pect~ of successfully  a& JresSing all goals and all other objectives.
bThe  actual total cost  including a ~percent  incre=e could  be $60 billion; the same inCreaSe  could affect  all other cost ‘Stimates’
cwith  a 50.percent  cost increase, this cost could  be $40 billion
NOTE: Some rows do not sum due to rounding.
Table F-2.—First Rough Estimate of the Total Cost/Year and the Net Public Cost/Year
(in billions, 1984 dollars) for the First 5 Years, of Attaining the 10 Conceptual Objectives
Total cost (and the Total Net public cost Net public
years) to attain each cost/year, (and the years) to attain cost/year,
“objective first 5 years each objective first 5 years
1. 2 (lo) 0.20 1 (lo) 0.10
2. 20 (15) 1.33 13 (15) 0.87
3. 2 (15) 0.13 2 (15) 0.13
4. 6 ( 5) 0.40 4 ( 5) 0.28
0.5 ( 5) 0.10 0.1 ( 5) 0.02
6 2 (lo) 0.20 0.2 (lo) 0.02
7. 0 (25) 0.00 0.0 (25) 0.00
8. 0.5 (lo) 0.05 0.5 (lo) 0.05
9. 5 (15) 0.33 5 (15) 0.33
10. 0.5 (25) 0.02 0 (25) 0.00
=40 = 3 =26 ==2
Economic-Growth Considerations civilian space area to date, and considering only ex-
penditures from now on.
To date, except for the satellite communications
area, the United States’ publicly supported civilian
space program has been essentially one of basic re-
search, exploration, and development of technology
required to support both. Economic returns have been
expected to result from general “spin off” to the pri-
vate sector from these otherwise-directed R&D activ-
ities. The general sense is that to some important ex-
tent that has apparently happened, even though the
PROJECTED GROWTH IN PRIVATE SECTOR
SALES AND RELATED TAX REVENUES
Beyond the cost-offsetting financial participation of
other cooperating countries and our own private sec-
tor, it is important to obtain some useful sense of the
present, and future, marginal net cost to the U.S. gen-
eral public of its civilian space activities—i e., setting
aside further consideration of the over $200 billion
(1984 adjusted) “sunk cost” of our investments in the
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evidence on the macroeconomic level is admittedly
difficult to come by.
Let us start, therefore, probably conservatively but
objectively and reasonably quantitatively, by noting
that the present (1 983 year-end) U.S. commercial-in-
dustrial space-related annual sales of capital equip-
ment (essentially all in the satellite communications
business, for satellites, their launching, and their asso-
ciated ground equipments) are some $1.6 billion/
years If satellite insurance sales, operations and main-
tenance (O&M) charges related to surface equipments,
end-to-end circuit lease charges and lease charges for
in-space microwave transponders (there are now
some 400 in orbit which are owned by U.S. compa-
nies) are added, total U.S. private-sector space-related
sales are now probably $2 billion to $3 billion per
year.
This sales figure, at least in the satellite communi-
cations long-haul circuit leasing area where records
have been kept since the outset of private sector oper-
ations (see INTELSAT’s annual reports) is a conse-
quence of an average annual growth rate of some 15
percent/year, compounded, for nearly the past 20
years. 10
If it is assumed that the total of all Federal, State,
and local tax rates on these sales averages 20 to 30
percent, 11 then, roughly, $0. 5 billion/year in Govern-
ment tax revenues are now being derived from these
sales. Thus, while the gross civilian space-related Gov-
ernment expenditures are some $7 billion/year today,
in fact the net Government expenditures could be
considered to be significantly Iess—i.e,, effectively
some $6.5 billion/year (or some 7 percent) less.
Now, assume for the purpose of illustration that the
total sales generated in the satellite communications
area, enlarged in time by space-related navigation,
position fixing, remote sensing, materials processing,
tourism, private launch and transportation services,
space platform leasing, etc., continues to grow at the
current rate, i.e., some 15 percent/year, com-
pounded–a doubling about every 5 years. The pro-
jection for this rate of growth has been made by NASA
and others and may prove to be conservative. The
gThis  figure was provided to OTA by Janet Martinusen ot the Aerospace
Industries Association of America, Inc.)
IOln  what follows,  note that no attention is given either to the influence
of inflation or to any decrease in nonspace-related sales as a consequence
of the growth of space-related sales; i.e., this discussion must be considered—
particularly by economists–as illustrative and qualitative, not methodologi-
cally exhaustive and quantitative.
llfconomjc  RepOr-f of the President, transmitted to the Congress, February
1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); Study  of
1982 Effective Tax Rates of Selected Large U.S. Corporations, prepared by
the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, November 1983).
most recent projection, by Jerry Grey12 is that: “Sat-
ellite communications demand is still growing rapidly
at between 20 and 30 percent per year and is pro-
jected to continue at this rate to the end of the cen-
tury, despite potential inroads by optical fibre cables.
projections for turn-of-the-century annual volume
(spacecraft, launch and integration services, and com-
munications services themselves) range from $30 bil-
lion to$100 billion.” A 15 percent/year, compounded,
sales growth throughout 1984-2000 on a 1983 base
of $2 billion would produce sales of some $20 billion
in 2000; on a $3 billion base, some $3o billion.
Of course, the rate of 15 percent/year, com-
pounded, may prove to be optimistic. If, instead, a
10 percent figure is used, the year 2000 sales projec-
tion would exceed $10 billion on a present $2 billion
base, and $15 billion on a present $3 billion base.
Further, assume either that Government civilian
space-related expenditures remain at about $7.o bil-
lion (1983) per year or that they grow, in real terms,
at 1 percent per year, compounded, as is NASA’s de-
sire and this administration’s expressed intention.
(No attention is given here as yet to the reimburse-
ments made to the Government for the provision of
space-related Government services—now almost
wholly the reimbursement for the provision of Shut-
tle flights.)
Under such circumstances and with such assump-
tions, over time, the effective net Government cost
of supporting the civilian space program (in billions
of 1983 dollars) could be considered as decreasing ra-
pidly. (See tables F-3 and F-4.)
Under either assumption regarding future NASA ap-
propriations, and a projected 15 percent/year tax rev-
enue increase, the “break-even” point would be
reached in some 20 years; i.e., in one generation the
effective net public investment required to underwrite
our entire Government civilian space program—either
a program of today’s magnitude or, by then, some 20
percent larger–would be reduced to zero. Even with
the lower 10 percent/year tax revenue growth projec-
tion, the effective net public cost would then be a
great deal less than today’s. And, over the next 20
years, a total of tens of billions of dollars (1 984) in tax
revenues would have been generated.
This is such an important observation and prospect
that it bears further elaboration. For the prospect that
such extraordinary private-sector space-related sales
and tax revenue projections might well be attained
suggests that the Government could commit itself to
promoting, vigorously and innovatively, the growth
!Z’’lnvesting In Space . . . ,“ Aerospace America, April 1984, p. 90.
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Table F-3.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space. Related Sales,
and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Federal Civilian Space Program
(billions of 1983 dollars per year– assuming a 15°/0 sales growth rate)
Government space expenditure net cost
Tax revenues A constant $7 billion/ $7 billion (1983) increasing
Years growth @ 150A/year year (1983) at 1‘\Olyear
O (1983) 0.5 6.5 6.5
5 (1988) 1,0 6.0 6.4
10 (1993) 2.0 5.0 5.7
15 (1998) 4.1 4.0
20 (2003) 8.2 (1.2) 0.3
25 (2008) 16.0 (9.5) (7.5)
Table F-4.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space-Related Sales,
and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Government Civilian Space Program
(billions of 1983 dollars per year–assuming a 10% sales growth rate)
Government space expenditure net cost
Tax revenues A constant $7 billion/ $7 billion (1983) increasing
Years growth @ 10%/year year (1983) at 1‘/Olyear
O (1983) 0.5 6.5 6.5
5 (1988) 0.8 6.2 6.5
10 (1993) 1.3 5.7 6.4
15(1 998) 2.1 4.9 6.0
20 (2003) 3.4 3.6 5.1
25 (2008) 5.4 1.6 3.6
of commercial and industrial space-related sales. That
is, the Federal Government, working in close concert
with the private sector, would work to see, over time,
a great increase in such high-technology sales, thereby
generating proportionally much greater tax revenues
which could be looked upon as “offsets” to the pub-
lic R&D expenditures on space. Also, if successful,
such an initiative would result in an effective transfer
of much of the responsibility for the health and growth
of space-related economic activities from the public
to the private sector.
The President has just taken particular note of this
possibility: the July 20, 1984, White House “Fact
Sheet” entitled “National Policy on the Commercial
Use of Space” states that “In partnership with indus-
try and academia, Government will expand basic re-
search and development which may have implications
for investors aiming to develop commercial space
products and services.”
Of course, private-sector gross revenues also can be
expected to support space-related commercial-indus-
trial R&D. Again, assuming that sales grow at the aver-
age annual rate of 10 to 15 percent, compounded, and
assuming as well that about 5 percent of these sales
is spent by the private sector on space-related R&D
(probably a conservative assumption; C. Paul Christ-
ensen recently observed that: “ . . . a successful high-
technology company normally must spend 5 to 10
percent of its gross sales on R&D’’13) then, 20 years
from now, a private-sector R&D investment rate of
some $1 billion to $2 billion (1 984) per year would
have been reached.
The total Government investment (again, assuming
that NASA appropriations increase at 1 percent “real
growth” per year, compounded) plus the commercial-
industrial investment in space-related R&D would be
expected to increase substantially overtime. (See table
F-5, which assumes a 15 percent projected growth rate
for the private sector.) By the end of the next quarter
of a century, the country’s overall space-related R&D
activities could reach a level that would be nearly
twice the size of today’s Government program and
that, by then, would be increasing at some 5 per-
cent/year, compounded.
These are extraordinary projections, and they could
well turn out to be conservative ones.
To put such numbers into a space R&D and explora-
tion perspective, note that a U.S. public expenditure
of an average of some $1 billion/year over, say, 15
I Jsclence,  Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117
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Table F-5.—Growth in Yeariy U.S. Space investment,
Federal (increasing at 1°/0 annually) Pius Private
(increasing at 150/0 annually)
Investment (billions of 1983 dollars per Year)
Years Government Private Total
O (1983) 7.0 0.1 7.1
5 (1988) 7.4 0.3 7.7
10 (1993) 7.7 0.5 8.2
15 (1998) 8.1 1.0 9.1
20 (2003) 8.5 2.0 11.0
25 i2008) 9.0 4.1 13.0
to 20 years could allow us, along with other cooper-
ating countries, to place a modest settlement on the
Moon. In similar fashion, an additional some $2 bil-
lion/year, over 20 to 30 years, could allow a first
human landing on the planet Mars. And each of these
sums would include paying for that kind and amount
of LEO infrastructure specifically required to assure
the efficient operational conduct of these ventures,
HISTORICAL BASES FOR A PROJECTION OF
SALES GROWTH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
While, of course, no brief can be held with com-
plete confidence, either for the absolute rates of in-
crease of space-related sales, or for such a long-term
continuation thereof as is outlined here—and other
countries have also already clearly perceived the great
longer-term economic prospects in the space area14–
it must be remembered that the U.S. investment in
the publicly supported civilian space area has pro-
vided an enormous base of assets, understanding and
experience for so doing; that the active interest of our
private commercial-industrial sector in investing in
space assets and activities, already non-trivial, is
quickening; and that we have other high-technology
growth “stories” as useful references: air transporta-
tion, computers, radio, television, medical technol-
ogy, communications, etc.
For instance, President Karl G, Harr of the Aero-
space Industries Association observed, in his report
of December 1983, that “ . . . there has been a con-
siderable acceleration in the building of commercial
communications satellites . , . that’s just the beginning
of an indicated boom; worldwide projections show
enormous increases in demand for satellite commu-
nications services between now and the end of the
century.” And Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth
Dole is recently quoted as saying, with reference to
14See the OTA rew~ on /nternatjona/  Cooperation and Competition in
Civilian Space Activities, 1984.
that Department’s new responsibilities for the com-
mercialization of expendable launch vehicles: “ . . .
this involves ‘a whole new industry’ with growth pros-
pects estimated at up to $10 billion over the next dec-
ade. ”15
A recently published OTA report, International
Competition in Electronics, notes that: “Sales of the
more than 6,000 electronics manufacturers in the
United States exceeded $125 billion in 1982 and are
growing rapidly . . . the growth rate over the past dec-
ade reached nearly 15 percent [per year, com-
pounded].” 16-17
As one general example: Forbes magazine has
recently 18 surveyed the sales growth of 25 leading
companies in the electronics area, comparing the
average of such sales for the most recent 5 years with
the average of the preceding 5 years. The annual
sales growth of the top one-half of the companies aver-
aged 23 percent, compounded.
The early days of commercial radio provide another
example of how the growth rate of a newly introduced
service supported by new technology can attain phe-
nomenal values. “[In] the spring of 1922 . . . the sale
of radio sets, parts, and accessories amounted to more
than $60 million annually. By the end of 1929, sales
had climbed to a remarkable $843 million.”19 This is
an annual growth rate of greater than 40 percent/year,
compounded. More recently, lasers and their applica-
tions have become at least as big a high-technology
business as has satellite communications, “In the past
2 decades . . . the market for laser-related systems that
solve practical problems has grown to over $3 billion
per year , . . “2°
As an individual company example, over the past
7 years the International Business Machines Corp.
(IBM) has seen its sales grow at an average annual rate
of 14 percent, compounded, and its top financial of-
ficer was quoted late last year as venturing the predic-
tion that “ . . . sales growth in the next several years
will surpass the 14 percent rate . . . “;21 in fact, sales
grew 17 percent in 1983.22 Seven years ago IBM’s sales
J~Aerospace Daily, Jan. 19, 1984, pp. 97-98.
lcNovember  1983, p. 108.
17N4B.  Neither this figure, nor any that follow which reference sales growth
in either absolute numbers or annual rates, have been adjusted to reflect
the unusually high inflation rates that held during the late 1970s and early
1980s. Consequently, they are inherently “optimistic” if taken as an augury
of future sales growth. But, at the same time, this was an epoch during which
business expansion was abnormally repressed by the same inflationa~  pres-
sures—pressures that, one hopes, will not soon be repeated.
Iajan. 2, 1984, p.  176.
IsSteven L. ~1 Sesto,  “Technology and Social Change, ” in Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 24, pp. 183-196; see esp. p. 183.
Zoscience,  Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117.
I} Wa//  Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1983,  P. 5.
llwall  Street  Journal, Dec. 19, 1984,  p. 2.
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were some $15 billion; today they are some $40 bil-
lion, and 3 years from now could approximate $55
billion. It is clear that the absolute size of sales is not
necessarily an impediment to further sales growth
when desired new assets and services are being in-
troduced and adopted—not even at the $30 billion to
$50 billion/year level.
Other, more recent, high-technology commercial-
industrial examples abound. Over approximately the
past decade (ending in 1982) the average annual com-
pound growth rate in sales (taken from Moody’s or
individual company reports) for the Communications
Satellite Cooperation was 15 percent; for INTELSAT
and Texas Instruments: 16 percent; for Hewlett-Pack-
ard: 23 percent; and for MCI: 68 percent.
Thus, it does seem reasonable to expect that, with
energetic and innovative consideration explicitly given
to cooperative Government-private sector promotion
of United States commercial-industrial space invest-
ments and initiatives—initiatives directed both to
opening up new uses related to space and to reduc-
ing the unit cost of producing space assets and con-
ducting space operations–the next quarter of a cen-
tury could see truly important, perhaps outstanding,
growth in our civilian space-related sales, with all that
this should imply for employment, tax revenues, in-
ternational trade, etc. As the earlier referenced OTA
report succinctly states: “ . . . the United States needs
to search for new engines of growth to drive the econ-
omy into the 21st century . . . “23 and “ . . . special
stress should be laid on . . . R&D and technology plus
measures aimed at stimulating investment in new and
innovative firms . . . “24 And, as a recent Washington
Post article emphasized: “America’s strength in ex-
porting is not in standardized, commodity products,
but in high-technology specialized products that draw
on the huge pool of American know-how and exper-
tise;] specialized, higher technology products . . . are
America’s bread and butter.”25-26
LEGAL AND EXPERIENTIAL BASES FOR
FEDERAL/PRIVATE-SECTOR COOPERATION IN
ECONOMICALLY DIRECTED R&D
It is important to note that there is some precedent
in Federal law for exploring Government-private sec-
tor initiatives in stimulating sales in a high-technology
13/nternatjona/ com~titfon in Electronics, p. 466.
Z41bld.,  p. 502.
~sjan, 8, 1984, P, G l/G8
26 Notably, in the  private commercial-industrial world, the sPace area is
not yet even considered to be important in terms of “high technology”-
see U.S. News and World Report, Jan. 16, 1984, p. 38 where, in de fintng
“High Technology: What Is It?,” space assets and activities go unmentioned.
domain such as space. The “Stevenson-Wydler Tech-
nology Innovation Act of 1980”27 states: “(a) Policy.
It is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Gov-
ernment to ensure the full use of the result of the Na-
tion’s Federal investment in research and develop-
ment. To this end, the Federal Government shall strive
. . . to transfer federally . . . originated technol-
ogy . . . to the private sector. ” Also, for instance, the
Department of Defense (DOD), using the 1982 author-
ity incorporated into formal law by inclusion of appro-
priate language in Title 10 of the United States Code,
Section 22394, employs very long-term contracting for
utility services in its “Venture Capital Energy Procure-
ment Program by the Military Services. ”28 DOD uses
this program to excite the private sector to develop
and use new technology to provide DOD with energy
services at lower cost than otherwise; this approach
is now being replicated by certain States and munici-
palities.
And the features of the “Small Business Innovation
Development Act of 1982,”29 which was enacted to
(among other things) “ . . . utilize Federal research
and development as a base for technological innova-
tion [so as] to contribute to the growth and strength
of the Nation’s economy, ” also could be utilized by
NASA, NOAA, DOT and other space-related execu-
tive branch offices. This act requires that as much as
1 1/4 percent of the “annual extramural” R&D appro-
priations of most major Federal agencies be spent with
smaller and, presumably, more aggressive, more en-
trepreneurial, business organizations.
Perhaps, say, a small fraction of 1 percent of the total
annual NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT appropria-
tions could be spent directly and specifically to prompt
activities that offer reasonable promise of furthering
the growth of space-related sales in our private sec-
tor. In close concert with our private space-related
business sector, the Government, in order to realize
a more effective linkage of its R&D to the private mar-
ketplace, could use these funds to help “focus” the
scientific, exploration, and technological results of the
other 99.5 percent on the task of increasing business
sales.
Such a requirement would be somewhat analogous
to that holding for the nine national laboratories that
operate under the aegis of the Department of Energy.
Under the terms of the Stevenson-Wydler Act (sec.
11 (b)) these laboratories are obligated to spend not
less than 1/2 percent of their funds on activities that
ITpub[lc Law 96-480, Sec. 11. Utilization of Federal Technology, Oct.  21,
1980.
Zasee an article  by this title in the 10th Energy Technology Conference Re-
port, p. 230 et seq.
‘
qPublic Law 97-219.
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would see the technology that they develop, using
Federal funds, “transferred” to our private sector. The
potential power of such an approach is a matter of
public record. One of these laboratories, Sandia,
spends more than 1 percent of its budget in this fash-
ion, and has had a long list of successful transfers. 30
In one area alone, that of clean-room technology used
by hospitals and electronics companies, Sandia esti-
mates that sales have now reached $200-million/year
by 70 companies. Much as in the case of satellite com-
munications and NASA (but scaled down by just an
order of magnitude), the total tax revenues provided
by such sales, probably some $50 million, is some 8
percent of Sandia’s $7oO million annual budget.
In an article entitled “The Making of a Conserva-
tive Science Policy,” Wil Lepkowski observes that:
from 1982 onward [the present] Administra-. . .
tion . . . drew back from its original insistence that the
government had no business developing new tech-
nologies for the private sector. ” He suggests that: “In
fact, there is nothing wrong with the government’s de-
veloping ideas, concepts, and hardware for the pri-
vate sector to exploit for the good of the public.” And
he concludes: “What the administration will notice
in 1984, and try to stimulate, is evidence from research
agencies that their programs are contributing to the
economy, innovation, and productivity. We can ex-
pect to see growing evidence of the major contribu-
tion of the conservative revolution: closer and closer
integration of economics with science and technolo-
gy. After many decades, policymakers are doing a bet-
ter job of bringing the two together. That, by itself,
is an achievement.”31 The President’s 1984 State of
the Union address and his subsequent radio address
both bear out Lepkowski’s expectation in the civilian
space area,
The Congressional Research Service recently ob-
served that: “ . . . many analysts believe that Federal
policy to harmonize governmental and private sec-
tor support of private science and technology proba-
bly could be improved significantly without [an ex-
cessive] degree of government-private sector
collusion . . . “32 And it prepared a report for the use
of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation of the United States Senate that notes that:33
“With increasing [prospects] of space commercializa-
tion . . . the Government may have to provide fund-
jOTechno/ogy Transfer at Sandia National Laboratories: First Annual Re-
port, SAND83-0345, March 1983.
31 Technology Review, January 1984, p. 39 et SW.
j?jee  the CRS  Review, January 1984,  p. 14.
3Wongressional  Research Service, “Policy and Legal Issues Involved in the
Commercialization of Space” published as a Committee Print (No. 98-102),
Sept. 23, 1983, pp. 17-18.
ing if the private-sector [at the outset] is unwilling or
unable to fund the R&D [and it] may be necessary to
increase support for initial R&D funded by the Gov-
ernment if commercial activity is deemed important.”
The report raises serious questions as to “. . . the ef-
fectiveness of [the] mechanisms [now used by NASA]
for promoting [space] commercialization,” But the
heretofore-mentioned example of Sandia and, for in-
stance, the pressure for AT&T’s Bell Labs, with its $2
billion/year budget, to become consumer- and market-
oriented, 34 suggests that the executive branch, and
especially NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT, if prop-
erly prompted by the President and Congress and led
by imaginative, experienced, and tough-minded lead-
ers, could make the required transition. For instance,
NASA’s recent request for proposals for a Shuttle mar-
keting support contract is an important step in that
direction.35 So is Executive Order #12465 (February
24, 1984), designating the Department of Transpor-
tation as the lead agency “for encouraging and facili-
tating commercial ELV activities by the United States
private sector.”
THE SPACE-RELATED PRIVATE SECTOR GROWS UP
Slowly, the private sector is learning more about
space, more about the prospects of doing business
there, and more about how to deal with the Govern-
ment in so doing.
For instance, NASA and the 3M Co., St. Paul, MN,
signed a memorandum of understanding earlier this
year that will enable the company to fly aboard the
Shuttle several experiments related to the growth of
organic crystals and the development of thin films.
NASA has signed one major joint endeavor agreement
with McDonnell Douglas and Johnson & Johnson for
the production of pharmaceuticals in space, and cur-
rently is in discussions with approximately 20 com-
panies contemplating future space endeavors.
Other firms have been involved in discussing a wide
range of experimental activities such as electroplating
enhancement, improvement in catalytic materials, for-
mation of glass alloys, research in long-term blood
storage, development of remote-sensing techniques,
development of smaller space vehicles and compo-
nents of a “space station,” etc. The firms include: Fair-
child, Micro-Gravity Research Associates, John Deere,
Space Industries Inc., DuPont, Honeywell, A.D. Lit-
tle, Orbital Sciences Corp., American Science and
Technology Corp., Ball Aerospace, C2Spaceline,
Sparx, Spaceco Ltd., and Astrotech.
Jtsee /formation Technology Research and Development, OTA, in Press.
MNASA  tndust~  Briefing for STS Marketing, May 1, 1%4.
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Of greatest importance in considering the matter of
the Government’s working to promote growing pri-
vate-sector sales i n the civilian space-related area are,
of course, the views and policies of the leaders of both
the legislative branch and the executive branch, par-
ticularly the President himself. President Reagan has
made his views and desires clearly known. In his radio
address of January 28, 1984, he stated: “We expect
space-related investments to grow quickly in future
years . . . .NASA, along with other departments and
agencies, will . . . promote private investment
. . . we’re going to bring into play . . . the vitality of
our free enterprise system. ”
So, whatever views the administration has in regard
to close cooperation between the Government and
the U.S. private sector in general, and however much
attention such cooperation receives in other areas, it
is now clearly, indeed forcefully, on record as sup-
porting it between civilian space-related offices such
as NASA and the commercial-i ndustrial-financial in-
stitutions that can be expected to profit from such co-
operation. To repeat: “ . . . NASA . . . will promote
private investment , . . ,“
And, of course, to the extent that the private sector
provides space assets and operational services that
technology, the marketplace, and its growing free-
enterprise capabilities allow, and conducts RDT&E ac-
t iv i t ies  a t  the mul t ib i l l ion-do l lar /year  leve l ,  NASA
would be able to concentrate on the more basic re-
search, the more demanding space exploration, and
the more exotic “cutting edge” technology required
to support both.36 First hints of the potential of such
a private sector move are beginning to appear: Rock-
well International is studying the commercial con-
struction, launch, and maintenance of a private-sector
in-orbit “electric utility, ” costing more than a billion
dollars, that would be prepared to offer electrical pow-
er as a service to a host of space operations; J’ Space
Industries is readying itself to develop, produce, and
deploy a sophisticated space platform by 1988; the
Astrotech Corp. is holding discussions about their pur-
chasing a Shuttle Orbiter at a price of some $2 billion
(1984); etc.
Impacts on the Federal (NASA)
Space Budget
What can be concluded from simply studying and
projecting the Federal civilian space program budget
itself?
jbsee  the article by George Mueller in Aerospace America, January 1984,
p. 84 et seq.
ITsee the International Section of Renewable Energy News, December
1983.
As an initial reference point, the NASA fiscal year
1984 budget authorized by Congress is adopted. It is
usually presented in the general form of table F-6. (The
data source is the Congressional Record. In all that
follows, rounding can influence the last figure in sums.
All other Government civilian space expenditures are
small relative to NASA’s, and their inclusion would
unnecessarily complicate this discussion.) Inasmuch
as only the space R&D elements of this budget are of
concern here, this table presents just these.
Table F-6 shows that $2 billion will be spent on Shut-
tle production (Space Transportation Capabilities De-
velopment) in fiscal year 1984. The Shuttle produc-
tion and development program is nearly complete;
when it ends, there will be about $2 billion that is
unspoken for in the NASA budget, if current funding
levels continue.
Two other financial matters must be taken into con-
sideration: the reimbursement to the Government for
Shuttle transportation services when the Shuttle is used
by the private sector and other countries; and the 1
percent/year real growth in funds that would be made
available to NASA if the present administration’s ex-
pressed budget views in this regard for future fiscal
years are accepted by Congress and continue indefi-
nitely.
That the payments for use of Shuttle launch serv-
ices are already reimbursing the Government for 4
percent of the publicly funded civilian space program,
and that these payments are now expected to grow
to truly important dimensions soon (perhaps 14 per-
cent by 1989), should be appreciated by all with a seri-
ous interest in the cost of this program. The NASA Ad-
Table F-6.—NASA Overall Authorization for
Fiscal Year 1984 (billions of dollars)
A. R&D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.88
B. Construction and facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.13
C. Program management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.24
D. Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =$7.30
The R&D element (A, above) consists of external
contract funds for:
1. Space transportation capabilities
development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.01
2. Space transportation operations . . . . . . . . 1.55
3. Physics and astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.56
4. Planetary exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.22
5. Life sciences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.06
6. Space applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.31
7. Technology utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.01
8. Aeronautical research and technology . . . 0.32
9. Space research and technology. . . . . . . . . 0.14
10. Tracking and data acquisition . . . . . . . . . . 0.70
=$5.90
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ministrator has reported at a press briefing36 that the
reimbursements—primarily for Shuttle flight serv-
ices—approached $300 million in fiscal year 1984, and
that he expects that they will approximate some $7OO
million in fiscal year 1985. Further, he stated that: “1
still anticipate reaching the break-even point in 1988
or 1989. ”
Thus (even without considering the cost-offsetting
importance of tax revenues generated by private-sec-
tor space business) the net cost to the public of our
publicly funded civilian space program even now is
significantly less than the gross cost because of this
Shuttle cost reimbursement: it is $6.6 billion net out
of $6.9 billion gross. Next year the expected reim-
bursement income would more than offset a 4 per-
cent inflation rate. (Considering the tax revenues as
an additional effective “offset” would reduce the $6.6
billion to $6.1 billion. That is, the net cost could be
considered to be some 11 percent less than the gross
cost, and falling.)
And, finally, NASA now has some reason to expect
that funds for its program would increase by 1 per-
cent/year plus any inflationary increase. If inflation
compensation plus 1 percent real growth becomes
emplaced in NASA’s annual appropriations, it would
have important influence on the pace at which space-
related objectives, such as those suggested here, could
be pursued. A 1 percent “real growth” on a base of
$7 billion/year would provide a total addition of some
$10 billion by the end of this century, and a total ap-
proaching $25 billion in the next 25 years—i.e., an
average of some $1 billion per year (1984$) over this
latter interval.
Under the assumptions made here, three conclu-
sions may be reached concerning cost and financing
considerations:
1. In the absence of any private-sector or other-
country financial participation-i .e., under cir-
cumstances whereby the full cost of addressing
the ten conceptual objectives would be defrayed
by U.S. public funds, and assuming that the funds
continuing to become available year-to-year
would be in the same amount as those now avail-
able under NASA’s “budget envelope,” then,
starting 2-3 years hence, the essential completion
of Shuttle-related development could provide
some $2 billion (1984) /year—i,e., some $50 bil-
lion (1984$) over the next quarter of a century,
2. If, to this RDT&E “wedge” is added the antici-
pated 1 percent/year “real growth” in appropria-
tions, in addition to an indexing of appropriations
to neutralize the influence of inflation, the next
3.
4.
25 years could see a total of some $25 billion
(1984$) added to the $50 billion made available
through the Shuttle RDT&E completion—i.e., a
total of some $75 billion (1984$). Thus, just these
two measures alone would suffice to see (from
the financial viewpoint alone) that the ten con-
ceptual objectives could be satisfactorily ad-
dressed within the next quarter of a century.
If the two preceding assumptions are retained,
and if, in addition, the full cost were to be shared
by other countries and our private sector, in the
fashions and to the degrees outlined earlier, this
measure (again, speaking just of financial, not po-
litical or technological circumstances) would al-
low the ten conceptual objectives to be attained
in, say, 20 years since this would allow some $15
billion (1984$) of public funds to be used to accel-
erate the schedule. Alternatively, the 1 percent
per year “real growth” and/or the “base” figure
of $2 billion could be reduced.
Whether or not such public and other funds are
indeed made available could be influenced, pos-
itively and importantly, by two other circum-
stances:
l If the incorne from other countries and the pri-
vate sector for the use of the Shuttle increases
as is now hoped/expected, then, in a half-dozen
years or so, this would amount to NASA appro-
priations being, in effect, “offset” by as much
as some $2 billion (1984$) per year;
. If our private space-related sector could be stim-
ulated to maintain its present rate of sales
growth, it could begin to make significant addi-
tional space R&D investments itself—invest-
ments that could grow to billions of dollars/year
in the next two decades or so; and
. If the tax revenues “thrown off” by our private
sector’s commercial-industrial sales continue to
increase in the future as they have in the past,
i.e., if a 10 to 15 percent per year, compounded,
growth rate were to continue over the next quar-
ter of a century, they could, at least to some ex-
tent, be looked upon also as an important “off-
set” to the gross public cost of our publicly
supported space program, inasmuch as they
would amount to scores of billions of dollars
(1984$).
Clearly, under such generaI circumstances as these,
funding limitations would not prevent the United
States from undertaking an ambitious publicly sup-
ported civilian space program throughout the next
quarter century.
aaThe  Washinflon  Post, Feb. 6, 1984, page A-9.
Appendix G
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS
AND TERMS
Glossary of Acronyms and
Abbreviations
ACC – Aft Cargo Carrier
AEM – Applications Explorer Module
ASO – Advanced Solar Observatory
ASTO – Advanced Solar Terrestrial Ob-
servatory
ASEB – Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board (of the NRC)
AXAF – Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Fa-
cility
B — Billion
BOB – Bureau of the Budget
CDG – Concept Development Group
CNES – Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales
(France)
CNR – National Research Council (Italy)
COM – Center of Mass
C O M M — Communications
COMSAT – Communications Satellite Cor-
poration
DBS – Direct Broadcast Satellite
DDT&E – Design, Development, Test, and
Evaluation
DMS – Data Management Subsystem
DOC – Department of Commerce
DOD – Department of Defense
DOT – Department of Transportation
ECLSS – Environmental Control and Life Sup-
port Subsystem
EDO – Extended Duration Orbiter
ELV – Expendable Launch Vehicle
EOL – Earth-Orbiting Laboratory
EOS – Electrophoresis Operations in Space
EPS – Electrical Power Subsystem
ESA – European Space Agency
ET — External Tank
EUMETSAT – European Meteorological Satell i te
Organ izat ion
E U R E C A  – European Retrievable Carrier
EUTELSAT – European Telecommunications Sat-
ell ite Organization
EVA – Extravehicular Activity (“walking in
Space”)
FF — Free Flyer
g – Gravity
GEO – Geostationary Earth Orbit (some-
times, less precisely, geosyn-
chronous)
GN&C – Guidance, Navigation, and Control
GPS – Global Positioning [Space] System
(see NAVSTAR)
HEO – High Earth Orbit
IMS – Information Management Subsystem
INMARSAT – International! Maritime Satellite Cor-
INTELSAT
IOC
ISAS
ISF
ISTO
IVA
JEA
JSC
Kbps
KSC
kg
kW
LDEF
LDR
LEO
LIDAR
LSS
M
MAC
MAS
MBB
Mbps
M D A
MESA
MMS
M M U
MOL
MORL
MOSC
poration
— International Telecommunication
Satellite Corporation
— Initial Operational Capability
— Institute of Space and Astronautical
Science (Japan)
— Industrial Space Facility
— Initial Solar Terrestrial Observatory
— Intravehicular Activity
– Joint Endeavor Agreement
– Johnson Space Center
— Kilobits per second (of data
handling)
— Kennedy Space Center
— kilogram (2.2 pounds)
– kilowatt
— Long Duration Exposure Facility
— Large Deployable Reflector
— Low-Earth-Orbit (usually 200-600
km)
— Light Detection and Ranging
– Large Space System
— Million
— meter (3.3 feet)
— Modular Attitude Control
— Mission Analysis Study
— Messerschmitt-Boelkow-BIohm
— Megabits per second (of data
handling)
— Multiple Docking Adaptor
— Modular Experimental Platform for
Science and Applications
— Multimission Modular Spacecraft
— Manned Maneuvering Unit
— Manned Orbiting Laboratory
— Manned Orbital Research Lab-
oratory
— Manned Orbital Systems Concept
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MPS
MSC
MSFC
NAC
NAE
NAS
NASA
NASDA
NAVSTAR
NOAA
NRC
O&M
OART
OAST
OMB
OMS
OMSF
OMV
OSM
OTA
OTV
OWS
PEP
P/L
POV
R&D
RCS
RD&P
RDT&E
r.f.
RMS
ROTV
RWG
SAB
SDV
SOC
— Materials Processing in Space
— Manned Spacecraft Center
— Marshall Space Flight Center
— NASA Advisory Council
— National Academy of Engineering
— National Academy of Sciences
— National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
— National Space Development
Agency (Japan)
— DOD Satellite Navigation System
(see GPS)
— National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (within DOC)
— National Research Council (of the
NAS-NAE)
— Operations and Maintenance
— Office of Advanced Research and
Technology (within NASA)
— Office of Aeronautics and Space
Technology (within NASA)
— Office of Management and Budget
— Orbital Maneuvering System
— Office of Manned Space Flight
(within NASA)
— Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (for-
merly designated TMS)
— Orbital Service Module
— Office of Technology Assessment
— orbital Transfer Vehicle
— Orbital Workshop
— Power Extension Package
— Payload
— proximity Operation Vehicle
— Research and Development
— Reaction Control System
— Research, Development, and Pro-
duction
— Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (or Engineering)
— Radio Frequency
— Remote Manipulator System
— Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle
— Requirements Working Group
— Space Applications Board (of the
NRC)
— Shuttle Developed Vehicle
– Space Operations Center
S O L A R I S  – European Space Platform Concept
SPAS – Space Pallet Satellite
SPS – Solar Power Satellite
SPSS – Shuttle Payload Support Structure
SS – Space Station
SSB – Space Science Board (of the NRC)
SSEC
SSSAS
SSTF
STG
STS
TDRS
TDRSS
TMS
TMV
TRKNG
TRS
TSV
TUSK
VAFB
WBS
— Solar System Exploration Committee
— Space Station Systems Analysis
Study
— Space Station Task Force (within
NASA)
— Space Task Group (of the National
Security Council)
– Space Transportation System
– Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
– Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System
— Teleoperator Maneuvering System
(former designation for OMV)
— Transport Modular Vehicle
— Tracking
— Teleoperator Retrieval System
— Teleoperator Service System
— Tethered Upper Stage Knob
— Vandenberg Air Force Base
— Work Breakdown Structure
Glossary of Terms
Base–the central or core set of interrelated, and per-
haps interconnected, 28.5° LEO infrastructure
(“space station”) modules including facilities for
power, docking, control, and human habitation.
Cargo bay–the Space Shuttle’s central fuselage sec-
tion (openable to space) in which cargo, equip-
ment, and experiment modules are carried.
Core–(see base.)
Cosmos 1443-a Soviet resupply vehicle for Salyut or-
biting spacecraft.
Element–any module, platform, free flyer, or vehi-
cle which is an integral part of the in-space infra-
structure, and dependent on one or more other ele-
ment(s) for its long-term operation.
Free flyer–an unattached or free-flying uninhabitable
satellite (usually dedicated to one purpose or activ-
ity) which is serviced by or otherwise dependent
on other infrastructure elements.
Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satellite
whose circular orbit lies in the plane of the Earth’s
equator and which thus remains fixed relative to
the Earth; by extension, a satellite whose position
remains approximately fixed relative to the Earth;
its altitude is necessarily approximately 35,000 km
above the Earth’s surface.
Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite whose
period of revolution is equal to the period of rota-
tion of the Earth about its axis.
Infrastructure-a generic term referring to all the ele-
ments constituting an interdependent space sup-
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port system, consisting of surface and in-space
elements.
Leasecraft-proposed commercial, long-term, unpres-
surized platform that could be used for Earth obser-
vation, materials processing in space, etc.
Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO)–an orbit around the Earth at
altitudes usually ranging from 200 to 600 km and
located at any of various inclinations to the Equator.
Megabit-a data communications rate of 1 million bits
(or units) per second.
Module—an element of the infrastructure base or core
which provides a unique function for infrastructure
operations.
Orbiter–the Shuttle vehicle of the NASA Space Trans-
portation System.
Orbit transfer–change of orbit, usually to one of sig-
nificantly different altititude or inclination.
order of Magnitude–factor of 10.
Pallet–an open structure attached to an element of
infrastructure that provides mounting for equip-
ment, vehicles, or experiments.
Platform–an orbiting multi-use structure capable of
supplying limited utilities to changeable payloads
and dependent on other infrastructure elements;
usually uninhabitable except, perhaps for some, for
servicing.
Polar orbit–an orbit whose plane intersects the
Earth’s axis of rotation.
Salyut–a Soviet inhabited “space station” in LEO, the
first model of which was launched in 1971.
Satellite–a body that revolves around another body
of preponderant mass and that has a motion pri-
marily and permanently determined by the gravita-
tional forces of attraction between them; generally
applied here to an object revolving about the Earth.
Shuttle-the reusable passenger- and cargo-carrying
surface-LEO vehicle of the NASA Space Transpor-
tation System; sometimes referred to as the Space
Shuttle Orbiter.
Skylab–an independent orbiting laboratory com-
posed principally of hardware remaining from the
Apollo program; inhabited by crews of astronauts
during 1973-1974.
Spacelab–a laboratory module, designed and pro-
duced by ESA, carried into and out of orbit in the
Shuttle cargo bay and supported by the Shuttle
power and life support systems.
Space probe–a spacecraft designed to travel out of
the gravitational field of the Earth to explore other
parts of the solar system.
Space station–a totality of habitable and uninhabit-
able Earth-orbiting interdependent infrastructure
elements constituting a long term in-space support
system.
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)–a
communications system used to relay data directly
between orbiting vehicles and a single U.S. ground
station at White Sands, NM.
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